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Abstract
SUBURBS IN BLACK AND WHITE:
RACE, JOBS & POVERTY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LONG ISLAND
By
Tim Keogh
Advisor: Professor Judith Stein
“Suburbs in Black and White” examines how economic development shaped African
American suburbanization on Long Island, New York from 1920 through 1980. After 1940, the
fortunes of Long Island’s growing black population shifted from widespread poverty to upward
social mobility, though by the 1960s, a divide emerged between the rising black middle class and
black working poor, and distinctly ‘black’ suburbs emerged with problems familiar to postwar
inner cities. While urban racial inequality is often framed in terms of housing segregation and
the city/suburb divide, census and labor market data reveal that structural economic change
across the New York metropolitan region produced the racial gap and intra-racial class divide,
regardless of urban or suburban residence. Long Island’s economy experienced the national
labor market ‘twist’ after World War II, as job opportunities expanded for skilled workers and
contracted for the unskilled. By the 1970s, deindustrialization reached the suburbs, leading to
further job loss and strained suburban tax systems. African Americans disproportionately
suffered from the transition, and their economic plight shaped the outcomes of local housing
segregation. Nonetheless, the ideology of suburban ‘affluence’ and the dualism of black city
versus white suburb dominated public policy in the 1960s and 1970s, obscuring the shared plight
of postwar African American urban and suburban residents. By viewing the postwar suburbs
from the perspective of the suburban labor market, this dissertation integrates the urban fringe
and its minority residents into the broader history of late twentieth century racial and class
inequality.
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Introduction

In 1951, real estate developer Taca Home Builders unveiled four-room, fully heated
suburban homes in Wyandanch, a hamlet thirty-five miles east of Manhattan in Suffolk County,
New York. Priced at $7,290 and eligible for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Administration, the homes were competitive with Levittown, the quintessential postwar
American suburb, only six miles away.1 Though similar, the two communities were competing
for different customers: the Levitt brothers refused to sell to non-whites, while Taca made its
product available to anyone, “to give people of all races and creeds an opportunity of owning
their own home.”2 This was an implicit message to aspiring black homebuyers who were denied
government-insured housing elsewhere on Long Island. Taca’s ‘Carver Park’(named in honor of
black scientist George Washington Carver) was one of several housing tracts in Wyandanch
catering to black homeowners, attracted to the hamlet for the same reasons whites liked
Levittown: single-family homes, good schools, ‘country living,’ and well-paying jobs in nearby
industries.3
Wyandanch was a ‘black’ Levittown, a result of federal housing policy that restricted
mortgage subsidies to racially ‘homogenous’ suburbs, creating distinct ‘black’ and ‘white’
suburban neighborhoods in the postwar period.4 For whites though, Levittown was merely one

1

“Complete Homes from $4,990,” Amsterdam News, December 3, 1949; “Non-Racial Dwellings Opened at
Wyandanch,” New York Times, March 11, 1951; Levitt homes generally sold for $6,990 to $9,500 depending on the
model in the initial years after development. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of
the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 236.
2
“Real Estate News,” Nassau Review-Star, June 20, 1952, 18.
3
“New Homes Built for Minorities,” Amsterdam News, May 5, 1956.
4
Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 140; John Kimble, “Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal Housing
Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans,” Law & Social Inquiry 32, Issue 2 (Spring 2007):
428-429.
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subdivision among hundreds of choices reserved for white homebuyers. By comparison, there
were few Wyandanches for black homeowners, which was one of five Suffolk County
neighborhoods that housed nearly two-thirds of the entire county’s African American
population.5 The acute demand for black suburban housing allowed builders to forgo amenities
expected for white communities. Harlem transplants Mozelle and Sullivan Hart quickly learned
this after they purchased an $8,000 home in Wyandanch in 1957, complete with a failing heater,
a yard lacking topsoil, and an unpaved street out front. In contrast, Levittown homeowners
enjoyed fresh asphalt, new appliances, and carefully manicured lawns, all part of Levitt’s careful
community planning and efforts to entice buyers.6 This was true across Long Island’s black
suburban developments, which were hastily constructed, sometimes built without proper runoff,
lacked playgrounds, and in a few instances, existed near environmental hazards.7
Despite the disadvantages, black suburbanites formed ‘places of their own.’8 The Hart
family of Wyandanch eventually fixed the heater, grew a proper suburban front lawn, and put a
second floor on the house, the same improvements white Levittowners made. They remarked
that buying a home in Wyandanch was “moving into paradise,” the same sentiments hundreds of
Levittowners aired about their postwar suburb.9 Their neighbors formed civic associations,
fretted about taxes, joined the school board, and attended local government meetings,
unremarkable activities emulated across suburbia. Wyandanch and its sister communities were

5

Cavaioli, Frank J. “Ethnic Population Patterns on Long Island.” in Ethnicity in Suburbia: The Long Island
Experience, Salvatore J. LaGumina, ed., (Salvatore J. LaGumina: 1980), 16.
6
D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their
Community,” Newsday, September 23, 1990.
7
Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature & the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century
America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 54, 65.
8
I am borrowing Andrew Wiese’s phrase for black suburbs. See Wiese, 7-9.
9
D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their
Community,” Newsday, September 23, 1990.
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referred to as little ‘Harlems,’ symbols of racial progress in spite of segregation and emblematic
of postwar black upward mobility. Though denied entry to Levittown, African Americans
nonetheless made their own equivalents by the early 1960s, diversifying ‘white’ suburbia.
If Wyandanch was the ‘black’ equivalent of Levittown, their histories diverged after
1960. During the 1960s, median family income in Wyandanch trailed twelve percent behind
Levittown and fifteen percent behind other communities in Suffolk County. By 1970,
Levittown’s poverty rate stood at three percent, while seventeen percent of families lived in
poverty in Wyandanch’s most populous census tract, and just under a tenth of the entire county’s
welfare cases resided within the black suburb’s borders.10 Though most of Wyandanch’s homes
were built after 1945, over a fifth of its housing stock was deemed ‘deteriorated or dilapidated.’
Part of this was due to shoddy construction, but multiple families moved into cellars and hastilydormered second floors in single-family homes. Overcrowding degraded the community’s
residential housing stock, strained local public services, and added children to schools without a
concomitant increase in property tax contributions.11 While early critics warned that the Levitts
were building a suburban ‘slum,’ by the 1970s Levittowners delighted in mocking these
predictions as property values soared, homeowners added garages, pools, or patios to their
houses, and the children of first-generation Levittowners became homeowners in Levittown.12 In
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Wyandanch’s largest census tract, 1225, was the only census tract within the contiguous borders of ‘Wyandanch’
in both 1960 and 1970. See Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, US Census ’70: Volume 6: Income
(Hauppauge, New York: Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972), pp. 7, 45, 77-88; Nassau County Planning
Commission, Nassau County, New York Data Book (Mineola, New York: Nassau County Planning Commission,
June 1966), X-4; Nassau County Planning Commission, Nassau County, New York Data Book (Carle Place, New
York: Nassau County Planning Commission, June 1974), 152; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and
Housing: Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY Standard Metropolitan Area (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), P684; Robert Koubek, Wyandanch: A Case Study of Political Impotence in a Black Suburban Ghetto (M.A. Thesis,
Queens College, 1971), 29.
11
New York State Urban Development Corporation, New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual
Report 1973 (New York: Urban Development Corp, 1974), 53; “Portraits of a Housing Crisis,” Newsday, November
12, 1972, 11.
12
“What’s a Levittown? It’s Good Housing,” Newsday, July 9, 1971, 18A; “A Plan to Keep Levittown Unchanged,”
Newsday, October 11, 1975, 7;
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contrast, Wyandanch’s plight undermined its symbolism of racial progress, and a homeowner
admitted that “the main concern of middle class people in Wyandanch is to get the hell out of
here.”13
Wyandanch’s conditions also produced distinct political battles. While all suburbanites
bickered over property taxes, zoning codes, and school quality, local conflicts in Wyandanch
revolved around the black poor. Black homeowners chafed under ballooning school budgets to
accommodate the district’s high proportion of low-income students, and they demanded the
dissolution of Wyandanch’s school district in 1968, so that surrounding white suburban districts
should share the burden of educating the hamlet’s poor population. Their effort failed, and the
district implemented austerity, drawing the ire of low-income parents.14 In 1970, local clergy
and anti-poverty activists contracted with Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s new public housing
agency, the Urban Development Corporation, to build a public housing complex in the suburb.
The low-income project threatened the middle class status of the suburb, and black homeowners,
uniting with whites of neighboring hamlets, defeated the project.15 Frustrations even spilled into
the streets. For three nights in August 1967, youths threw Molotov cocktails into a gas station,
stores, and two homes, lit cars on fire and ignited the high school’s auditorium. They hurled
rocks and bottles at police and firefighters sent to calm the neighborhood and isolate the
flames.16
By the 1980s, Levittowners looked forward to their fortieth anniversary of Levitt’s
postwar achievement, while Wyandanch was unrecognizable from its early past. A growing

13

Quoted in Koubek, 38.
“NAACP Bids State Act on Wyandanch,” Newsday, January 6, 1968, 5; Koubek, 38, 78-82.
15
“The Wyandanch Housing Fight,” Newsday, Jul 26, 1973, 4.
16
“School, 3 Stores set Afire on LI,” Newsday, August 2, 1967, 1l; “11 Fires Plague Wyandanch,” Newsday, August
3, 1967, 3; “Violence Strikes L.I. Village Again,” New York Times, August 3, 1967, 18; “Dennison Vows
Wyandanch Aid,” Newsday, August 5, 1967, 5.
14
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population of drug users and prostitutes moved into derelict houses. Homeless individuals and
addicts met in the “living room” and “Pork Chop Hill,” two wooded areas near the hamlet’s main
thoroughfare. In winter months, the residents of these woods kept warm with barrel fires, but
periodic police raids forced them into other parts of the community. Police battled the
neighborhood’s drug problems, including a high-profile arrest and conviction of a 10-year-old
who sold crack on Straight Path, the hamlet’s main thoroughfare, in 1989. The major battles
over schools and housing persisted, though community activism now included campaigns to
condemn vacant stores and ‘crack houses,’ reduce community addiction, and decrease gun
violence.17 Daria Cooper, who had lived in Wyandanch since the 1950s, remarked that “the
community has not survived as intact as it was when I grew up here."18 Ethel Ryan Bond, who
returned for her high school reunion, lamented the changes as well. In the 1960s, "it was a
country town…when I drive through Wyandanch now, it hurts me. It's not Wyandanch
anymore."19
Levittown was symbolic of postwar suburbia, but the same cannot be said of Wyandanch.
The Pulitzer-winning journalist Les Payne described it as a hamlet “left to the sociologists, the
welfare case workers, the building-resurrection men…it is in the suburbs” he remarked tartly,
“but not of the suburbs.”20 The history of Wyandanch indeed parallels that of the nation’s innercity neighborhoods, not the leafy-green enclaves along the urban fringe. Why such a divergent
trajectory? Segregation looms large as an explanation, concentrating poverty and forcing nearly

17

D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their
Community,” Newsday September, 23, 1990; “Wyandanch Aims to Take Back Streets from Pushers and
Prostitutes,” New York Times, August 22, 1993; “Wyandanch Seeks U.S. Help in Fighting Crime,” New York Times,
October 7, 1993, B7; “Family Court Judge Finds 10-Year-Old Did Sell Crack,” New York Times, February 2, 1989.
18
“Wyandanch Aims to Take Back Streets from Pushers and Prostitutes,” New York Times, August 22, 1993.
19
D.J. Hill, “In a Separate Suburbia Proud but Often Powerless, Wyandanch Residents Try to Stabilize Their
Community,” Newsday September, 23, 1990.
20
“Growing up in Black Long Island; For Elvis Guy Hartley, Wyandanch is Suburbia,” Newsday, June 25, 1972,
6LI.
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all African Americans, save the wealthy few, into the neighborhoods with poor black residents.
This occurred in suburbs and cities alike. Though middle class African Americans could exert
their status economically, they were nonetheless geographically tied to the minority poor, and the
trajectory of black neighborhoods were shaped by both groups.21 On Long Island, residential
segregation mixed with the region’s balkanized government system, where the tax base rested on
small communities of homeowners. Public revenues were generated from local residents,
leaving black suburban schools in places like Wyandanch, where the poor and middle class
shared the burden of supporting schools, starved of necessary funding.
If segregation concentrated African Americans in city and suburb, it nonetheless had
distinct consequences in each space. Urban minorities were relegated to cities with declining tax
bases, disappearing job opportunities, and a vanishing middle class. In the suburbs, segregation
deprived black residents of broader tax revenues, not proximity to suburban jobs or middle class
neighbors. A Wyandanch resident could walk or drive to major industrial centers, and Long
Island’s largest concentration of manufacturing firms was only five miles west. The hamlet
never lost its middle class constituency. Segregation explains the concentration of minority poor,
not the existence of the suburban poor themselves, who, except for local housing and related
school divisions, lived in a space of plentiful opportunity. Understanding Wyandanch’s distinct

21

William Julius Wilson contends that a black middle class served as an integral ‘social buffer’ in
socioeconomically diverse black neighborhoods, since they could support vital community institutions during
prolonged bouts of unemployment and economic contraction. When the black middle class suburbanized, poverty
concentration and social dislocation from norms of employment and community institutions intensified. See
William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 2nd ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 56-57; But as other scholars have illustrated, segregation still placed
middle class residents within poor neighborhoods even if middle class residents left the poorest inner city
neighborhoods. See Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bruce D. Haynes, Red Lines, Black Spaces: The Politics of Race and
Space in a Black Middle-Class Suburb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Karyn R. Lacy, Blue-Chip Black
Race, Class, and Status in the New Black Middle Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), chapter 1;
Steven Gregory, Black Corona Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1998), chapter 3.
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suburban history through the lens of housing segregation has limited analytical utility, especially
because it is reflective of a larger reality, that Wyandanch residents, and black Long Islanders in
the aggregate, were poorer than whites. Black family incomes trailed whites on Long Island,
and more importantly, while the overall poverty rate was much lower on Long Island than New
York City, the black poverty rate change little between city and suburb. As of 1970, sixteen
percent of Long Island’s black families lived below the poverty line, only four percentage points
below that of the metropolitan area (19.9 percent).22
Why African Americans did not enjoy the same upward mobility as whites who moved to
the suburbs is the subject of this study. The answer lies in the broad history of Long Island’s
mid-century suburbanization, which I contend was a process of both job and housing
decentralization. Long Island emerged as the nation’s most affluent suburb after World War II
thanks to strong government intervention, in housing, via mortgage subsidies and infrastructure
projects, and in the labor market, through federal support of the region’s aerospace
manufacturers. The two were inseparable, and both made Levittown possible. Each worked
against black poor suburbanites and neighborhoods like Wyandanch. Aerospace firms were the
largest employers on Long Island and enabled working class New Yorkers to become suburban
homeowners, though the industry employed few African Americans. Long Island’s broader
economy meanwhile favored white-collar and skilled technical employment. While a
burgeoning black middle class benefitted from this labor market, unskilled African Americans
were at a disadvantage, lacking the rising educational standards necessary to obtain Long
Island’s jobs. The black poor could move to the suburbs, but the barriers to becoming a stable
suburbanite were rooted in the job market. Housing segregation compounded labor market

22

1970 Census of Population and Housing, P-601, P-603, P-863, P-865; Long Island’s overall poverty rate was
4.1%, half that of the metropolitan area (9.2%).
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inequality, reflected in black suburbs like Wyandanch, where the rising middle class shared
suburban blocks and schools with the poor, who were unable to utilize the suburban labor market
for upward mobility.
The dominant view of suburbia, embodied in Levittown, obscured these truths. The
suburbs were the spatial antithesis to the city, not only in terms of aesthetics or income, but job
opportunities in the postwar period. When policymakers approached the ‘suburban’ poor during
the War on Poverty, they believed the “pockets of poverty amidst plenty” could easily be
absorbed into the suburban mainstream. In the wake of the riots, the suburbs likewise became
the solution to the nation’s inner-city problems, and housing segregation between city and suburb
was the barrier. Neither perspective accounted for the employment chasm nor the shift from
industry to services that accelerated in both city and suburb in the 1960s and 1970s. As
policymakers searched in vain for suburban jobs that could absorb the poor, or battled suburban
homeowners to build public housing in their hamlets, the problems within black suburbs
compounded. Suburban rioting, joblessness, decrepit housing, rising property taxes, and
stagnant wages fit uneasily into the established spatial framework that dominated the views and
policies of government officials, policymakers, activists, and suburbanites themselves. The
consequence was impoverished policy tools to combat the problems in places like Wyandanch.
Fifty years since, the story of the postwar black suburbs like Wyandanch remains untold
for largely the same reason. Scholars continue to narrate the postwar period as one of a spatial
divide, between largely white beneficiaries of suburbanization versus the minority victims of
segregation. This stems from the vast social science literature demonstrating the broad
consequences of housing segregation, including its contribution to the black/white wealth divide,

9
racial employment and educational disparities, higher rates of crime, and various other ills.23
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton’s oft-cited book, American Apartheid, synthesizes decades
of this research, testing nineteen distinct indices to prove segregation "systematically undermines
the social and economic well-being of blacks in the United States."24 Housing, as these studies
make clear, undermined the victories of the civil rights movement and continues to subvert
progress toward racial equality. In addition, these scholars have contributed to a new conception
of poverty, “not only in individual terms but also in terms of how it is distributed across space
and across communities.”25 Historians for their part investigate the origins of modern housing
segregation, its historical implications, and failed attempts to alter segregated housing patterns in
the postwar period, linking housing segregation to the major political and social developments of
the mid to late twentieth century, from civil rights and conservatism to new racial identities.
While formal Jim Crow fell in the South, a “New American Dilemma” emerged, “the fusion of
class segregation and racial discrimination embodied in the urban-suburban divide.”26
Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier established the framework for understanding the
historical origins of the urban/suburban divide. Jackson argues that New Deal policies
subsidized white suburban development while containing low-income minority populations in

23

Work on the consequences of housing segregation include John F. Kain, “Housing Segregation, Negro
Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, no. 2 (May, 1968): 175197; Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial
Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995); Michael A. Stoll, “Job Sprawl, Spatial Mismatch, and Black Employment
Disadvantage,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 25, no. 4 (Fall, 2006): 827-854; Camille Z. Charles,
Gniesha Dinwiddie, and Douglas S. Massey, “The Continuing Consequences of Segregation: Family Stress and
College Academic Performance,” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 5 (December 2004): 1353-1373; John Yinger,
Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1995), chapter 8; Patrick Sharkey, Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress
Toward Racial Equality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).
24
Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 2.
25
Sharkey, 26.
26
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006), 2; This is compared to the “American dilemma” as Gunnar Myrdal understood it, i.e. Jim Crow.
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urban public housing projects, whose “result, if not intent…was to segregate the races, to
concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of
refuge from the problems of race, crime, and poverty.”27 Policy created disparate cities and
suburbs, and Jackson’s work has influenced an entire generation of scholars. Historians have
since added local government authorities, real estate developers and agents, white suburban
activists, political coalitions, and changing racial ideologies to Jackson’s account, all of which
formed, sustained, and rationalized the racial and socioeconomic divide between cities and
suburbs. They also use this framework to answer some of the most important questions of the
late twentieth century. This includes the civil rights movement, which failed to break down
housing segregation in the face of strong political, legal, and social opposition.28 The late
twentieth century political evolution of the “New” Right and neo-liberal Democrats is likewise
interpreted as an outgrowth of housing segregation. Robert Self, Matthew Lassiter, and Lily
Geismer all claim that middle-class white suburban homeowners, the beneficiaries of
segregation, formed a ‘suburban’ political consensus that defended the spatial advantages they
received from suburban living, including lower taxes, a cleaner environment, and quality
schools, at the expense of those denied housing opportunities. Suburban jurisdictions produced a
‘narrow’ view of social responsibility, absolving suburbanites of the plight of inner cities as they
thwarted integration and redistributive fiscal strategies, perpetuating racial inequality and the
city/suburb divide.29 Finally, racial ideologies were redrawn along spatial lines in the mid-
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twentieth century. David M.P. Freund argues that federal housing policy and local zoning law
fostered a new racial ideology tied to property rather than biological notions of race. This
ideology shaped white views of racial integration’s effects on property values, taxes, and crime,
in turn forming a powerful rationale to enforce segregation.30
These historians situate the city/suburban divide at the center of postwar American
culture and politics. In their telling, housing segregation provided middle-class whites a spatial
privilege that they socially and politically exploited to hoard public resources within their
borders and shield themselves from the poverty, unemployment, fiscal challenges, and minority
concentrations within America’s cities.31 In a period of capital flight, this spatial order is seen as
the major impediment to just and incorporative social and economic policies. The most fleshed
out accounts along these lines are found in Thomas Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis and
Robert Self’s American Babylon, both of which understand deindustrialization, the limits of
racial progress, and liberal/conservative political ideologies in spatial terms. The Origins of the
Urban Crisis is a split history, describing the causes and consequences of deindustrialization for
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Detroit and its residents, while also analyzing white resistance to integration. While the former
affected blacks disproportionately, it fell on all unskilled. Housing exclusion, however, put a
ceiling on black social mobility, concentrated Detroit’s poverty, and left the suburbs safe from
the ‘urban crisis’ isolated in the increasingly black Detroit. White anti-integration activism also
informed their racial identities and an increasingly ‘illiberal’ political persuasion.32 Robert Self’s
American Babylon similarly collapses the economy into a spatial narrative, linking housing
segregation to the decentralization of industry outside Oakland’s city limits, a process that kept
taxes low, employment high, and the suburbs reserved for white homeowners, starving the
minority-dominated inner city of jobs and public funding. This was the outcome of local politics
as much as state policy, between anti-tax, anti-integration suburbanites and black activists
demanding redistribution and reinvestment for the city of Oakland and its poor, minority
residents. 33 In The Origins of the Urban Crisis, the suburbs protect themselves from a decline
concentrated within urban borders. In American Babylon, the postwar political economy is a
spatial battle that white homeowners won after passing the Proposition 13 tax cap.
These studies rely on the sharp white/black, city/suburb divide. In contrast, the most
resent historiographical shift, dubbed the ‘new suburban history,’ explicitly challenges these
inherited constructs, asking scholars to understand suburbs, like cities, as diverse regions. In the
process, historians have uncovered working class suburbs, black suburban ‘pioneers,’ MexicanAmerican colonias, and suburbs varied in character and function.34 ‘New’ suburban historians
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nonetheless agree that segregation was central to racial and class inequality. Andrew Wiese’s
national history of twentieth century black suburbanization exemplifies this. Wiese recognizes
the existence of working class suburbs and regional differences in the suburban experience, but
the struggles pivot around space. After 1945, the greatest threat to black working class suburbs
was urban renewal, what he interprets as ‘racial cleansing,’ projects to erase their neighborhoods
out of existence to make way for white housing developments. While the working class confront
urban renewal, postwar black middle class homebuyers faced housing apartheid, in turn
challenging or working around the segregated market to form ‘places of their own.’35 Though
the ‘new suburban history’ has been criticized by Matthew Lassiter and Christopher Niedt for reaffirming middle-class racial homogeneity and the urban/suburban divide, even these scholars
argue exclusionary suburbanization was pivotal to postwar problems.36 They want historians to
go beyond city versus suburb to reveal the “persistent patterns of racial and class segregation at
the neighborhood level.”37
Collectively, these scholars have uncovered the importance of residential segregation to
America’s intransigent racial and class inequality. In so doing, they have overturned popular
myths, including the assumption that racial housing patterns are the consequence of individual
choice and the belief that ‘de jure’ segregation was peculiar to the South. They have also proven
that segregation was (and continues to be) a structural, ideological, and political construct, not
merely an expression of racism. This is a tremendous achievement, and there is still work to be

History 39, no. 1 (January 2013): 59-78; Wendy Cheng, “The Changs Next Door to the Diazes: Suburban Racial
Formation in Los Angeles’s San Gabriel Valley,” Journal of Urban History 39, no. 1 (January 2013): 15-35; Shauna
Marie Mulvihill, “A Tale of Two Suburbs, or, The Urban Fortunes of El Segundo and Hawthorne, California, 19051960” (PhD diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2005).
35
Wiese, Places of Their Own.
36
Matthew D. Lassiter and Christopher Niedt, “Suburban Diversity in Postwar America,” Journal of Urban History
39, no. 1 (January 2013): 3–14.
37
Ibid, 5.

14
done.38 But whether framing inequality as a divide between city and suburb or specific
neighborhoods, the premise remains the same: space was, and remains, the mainspring of
inequality and postwar urban decline. This places the suburbs outside the problems of poverty,
joblessness, and stagnant wages that plagued Americans across metropolitan regions. The spatial
focus obscures the role of the suburban labor market in driving inequality and ignores the history
of the postwar suburban economy and suburban poverty, developments that share commonalities
with postwar American cities. Though segregation is part of Wyandanch’s history, it is not the
whole story.
Understanding the suburban economy demands a new approach, and “Suburbs in Black
and White” draws on a framework that views suburbanization as a process involving the
decentralization of jobs and people. Geographers Robert Lewis, Richard Walker, and Richard
Harris contend twentieth-century suburbanization was the “simultaneous march of industry and
cities outward,” that housing was “joined at the hip by industry locating to the urban fringe.” The
process occurred in a variety of ways, producing suburbs varied in function, socioeconomic
makeup, density, and race, places that defy any neat city/suburb dichotomy. While they analyze
pre-World War II suburbs, their conclusions apply to the postwar era as well.39 During and after
World War II, defense spending in particular favored industrial jobs outward along the urban
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fringe, pulling residents toward the suburbs. Scholars have documented its influence on
suburbanization, both in terms of infrastructure development and its direct and indirect
employment effects.40 Cold War spending, a major glue cementing labor, state, and business in
the ‘Great Compression,’ made postwar suburbs like Long Island possible.
Understanding suburbs as job sites in the postwar period re-orients the problem of racial
inequality away from segregation and toward a more complex confluence of factors, which
certainly includes racism, but also considers labor market change, employment policy, and “deindustrialization.” Segregation has been endemic on Long Island, dividing suburbs racially into
the twenty-first century. In 2002, David Rusk concluded that Long Island was “the most
segregated suburb for black residents,” and a Census Report found it to be the tenth most racially
separate metropolitan region. This began after World War II, and persists despite federal, state,
and county legislation to integrate Nassau and Suffolk counties.41 But black suburbs were
nonetheless close to the region’s major employment centers, and residential segregation did not
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exclude them from these jobs. Figuring out why they were unable to enjoy these opportunities
on equal terms with whites is key to understanding the postwar racial divide in the north. In
addition, the focus on segregation limits how we can account for change in black communities,
because the consequences of segregation for black Long Islanders shifted over time, inextricably
linked to their broader fortunes in the postwar economy. Both progress and decline occurred
within these segregated communities.42 Lastly, the suburban economic perspective permits us to
include the suburbs into a shared story with cities, because urban and suburban neighborhoods
faced similar social ills as each were tied to labor markets shedding unskilled work. Therefore,
the response of the federal government to unemployment and poverty are central to the suburban
history. And how civil rights activists, working class homeowners, and local government
officials grappled with suburban economic change is as important as traditional suburban
concerns of housing, schools, or taxes. This perspective does not eliminate the role of racism,
but integrates the suburban poor and blue-collar worker, black or white, into a larger postwar
narrative about the national economy.
Approaching black postwar suburbs from an economic perspective addresses several
historiographical fields. The few existing histories of suburban civil rights activism emphasize
the fight for equal housing and schools, not struggles for employment. They favor a classhomogenous framing, a black middle class challenging white suburban homeowners and the
exclusionary suburban political structure.43 Even Andrew Wiese’s Places of their Own, which
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recognizes the importance of job opportunity to working class black suburbanization prior to
1945, cuts the poor out of his narrative after World War II. Middle-class actors and their
concerns dominate the story, namely housing, fair government treatment, and education.44 On
Long Island, black suburbanites were not divorced from the broader fight for jobs, and racism
was just as evident among their employers. Recognizing the fight for jobs reveals the class
tensions between the black middle class and poor in the suburbs. If the former demanded open
housing and equal schooling, the latter struggled for remunerative jobs to survive in high-cost
suburban communities.45 This is particularly relevant to aerospace manufacturing, the primary
suburban industry. Scholars examine the changing dynamics of the industry after 1945, such as
the geographic swing towards the Sunbelt and the shift from conventional armaments to hightech weaponry. The racial dynamics of the postwar defense industry also remains unexplored, as
does the racial consequences of changes within aerospace in the 1950s and 1960s.46
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Understanding how defense aerospace, the second largest industrial employer in the nation,
affected blacks, unskilled workers, and the suburban political economy over the long term is
central to understanding the developments of suburban racial inequality.
Any history of the postwar poor must grapple with the War on Poverty. While historians
study the program’s implementation and the grassroots contribution to its direction and outcome,
generally the subject has been pursued in urban, rural, or national contexts.47 The ‘suburban’
war on poverty is not part of the story. This is unfortunate because the suburbs epitomized the
“paradox of poverty amid prosperity,” and were thus, by this rationale, the place where the
Johnson administration’s solution of job training and economic growth was most likely to
succeed. I will explore the validity of this assumption. A suburban angle likewise complicates
the grassroots narrative that emphasizes tension between local War on Poverty programs,
especially Community Action Programs, and local government. Community action did not
always figure so heavily into local politics, nor did federal programs necessarily produce such
conflict. This dissertation thus offers a new lens to understand the War on Poverty, in a region
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that largely accepted the project, even producing their own local programs that mirrored federal
attempts, all in the hopes that Long Island’s widespread affluence could absorb the poor who
were trained to enter the private market for jobs.
The spatial framework that dominates urban histories also neglects postwar suburban
poverty. As Matthew Lassiter and Christopher Niedt note in a recent historiographical critique,
suburban scholarship recognizes pre-World War II suburban socioeconomic diversity and the
rise of suburban poverty in recent years, but the middle-class suburban ‘norm’ remains the
primary interpretation of the postwar period.48 Contemporary work on suburban poverty, which
has outpaced urban poverty growth since 1990 to become the most popular residence for the
nation’s poor, reveals suburbia’s underbelly of job loss, economic decline, public service
distress, and rising crime, markers historically associated with cities.49 This has a longer history
that flows from the early twentieth century to the twenty-first, and this dissertation bridges the
gap between research on suburban poverty in different periods, and by doing so challenges a
myth that is central to the spatial interpretation of postwar history and racial inequality.
While jobs, suburban poverty, and suburban policy remain under-studied, integration
remains a perennial subject for urban historians. Scholars focus on the late 1960s and early
1970s as the pivotal moment when housing integration reached the national agenda and failed.
Historians blame HUD, state agencies, homeowner opposition, lack of political will, narrowly
interpreted court decisions, and weak legislation for this ‘lost goal’ of the civil rights
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movement.50 Few, however, question the logic of these integration schemes, unlike
contemporaries, who found much to criticize.51 As a consequence, scholars accept and implicitly
support what political scientist David Imbroscio calls the ‘mobility paradigm,’ a thread of policy
proposals to move people “through metropolitan space as a means of addressing urban social
problems.”52 This approach has come under withering attack recently from geographers and
social scientists, who argue that the benefits of spatial integration are an expression of liberal
ideology, not empirical evidence.53 This critique has emerged in the context of current efforts to
integrate cities and suburbs, but one can easily apply this perspective to earlier attempts at urban
and suburban integration, as this dissertation will.
Extrapolating broad conclusions from the experience of the black poor in this one
postwar suburban region is admittedly problematic. After all, African Americans were only 4.7
percent of Long Island’s total residents in 1970, and the black poor were but a fraction of this
population, less than 22,000 residents of 2.5 million according to the official census designation

50

For examples of this analysis, see Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America; Bonastia, Knocking on the
Door; Freund, Colored Property; Edward G. Goetz, Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban America
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2003).
51
Bennett Harrison, Urban Economic Development; Suburbanization, Minority Opportunity, and the Condition of
the Central City (Washington: Urban Institute, 1974); Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans; Essays on Urban
Problems and Solutions (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Joseph D. Mooney, “Housing Segregation, Negro
Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization: An Alternative Perspective,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
83, no. 2 (May, 1969): 299-311; Paul Offner and Daniel H. Saks, “A Note on John Kain's "Housing Segregation,
Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization,"” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 85, no. 1 (February,
1971): 147-160; Stanley H. Masters, “A Note on John Kain's "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization,"” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, no. 3 (August, 1974): 505-512.
52
David Imbroscio, "Beyond Mobility: The Limits of Liberal Urban Policy," Journal of Urban Affairs 34, no. 1
(February 2012): 2
53
David Imbroscio, “The End of (Urban) Liberalism,” Journal of Urban Affairs 32, no. 1 (February 2012): 35-42;
For Imbroscio’s wider critique, see David Imbroscio, Urban America Reconsidered: Alternatives for Governance
and Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); See also Herbert J. Gans, “Concentrated Poverty: A Critical
Analysis,” Challenge 53, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 82–96; For responses to Imbroscio, see Xavier de Souza Briggs,
“Maximum Feasible Misdirection,” Journal of Urban Affairs 30, no. 2 (April 2008): 131-137; John Goering and
Judith Feins, “Social Science, Housing Policy, and the Harmful Effects of Poverty,” Journal of Urban Affairs 30,
no. 2 (April 2008): 139-148; Todd Swanstrom, “Regionalism, Equality, and Democracy,” Urban Affairs Review 42,
no. 2 (November 2006): 249-257.

21
of ‘poverty.’54 One might feel we can write this group off as an anomaly, a people who slipped
through the cracks of an otherwise exclusive zone of prosperity. But the fact that they existed,
formed communities, and fought for full participation in postwar suburbia, including suburban
jobs, warrants attention. And the larger questions of why they existed, and why their spatial
proximity to jobs didn’t translate into upward mobility, provides insight into the causes of racial
inequality after World War II. Black poverty has been an important question in the twentieth
century, though often cast in spatial terms. By looking at the black suburban poor, we can see
that similar forces produced urban and suburban poverty: discrimination in employment, state
failure to create jobs, increasing educational requirements in the labor market, and wage
inequality. In a broader sense, the black poor confronted a reality that growing numbers of
suburbanites faced toward the end of the last century and now must reckon with in the new
millennium: a lack of good employment. Blacks garnered disproportionate attention in suburbia
because poverty was disproportionately black, a ‘paradox amidst plenty,’ but further
investigation into why they existed reveals a great deal about the limitations of the postwar
‘Golden Age,’ not just in racial terms, but in the large failure to secure full employment, a goal
now seemingly lost altogether.
Investigating this history requires defining both ‘Long Island,’ and the even trickier word
‘suburb,’ loaded with social and political meaning. Kenneth Jackson defined ‘suburb’ as a
residential space for affluent and middle class homeowners who live “far from their
workplaces.”55 The definition has been complicated since. Kevin Kruse and Tom Sugrue see it
as a “political” space, where municipal boundaries between city and suburb create two
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competing and separate entities.56 Economies rarely have such neat boundaries, however, and
this dissertation uses Robert Bruegmann’s metaphor of a solar system to explain the relationship
between city, suburb, and rural settlement. All are celestial bodies, intimately connected in
varying degrees through gravity, their bonds shift with time and orbit.57 Long Island relied on
New York City’s broader economy as well as federal military spending and mortgage subsidies,
and dependence on each fluctuated over time. Throughout the dissertation, I shall refer to Long
Island as a suburb and a ‘bi-county region’ within the New York ‘metropolitan area.’ I
recognize such identifications are vague, but here ‘bi-county’ refers to Nassau and Suffolk, the
two counties that make up ‘Long Island,’ distinct from New York City’s two boroughs, Queens
and Brooklyn, which are also on the geographic Island. All of these counties and boroughs are
part of the larger New York metropolitan area, considered to be New York City and the
surrounding seventeen county ‘suburbs’ that sprawl across three states.
The dissertation is organized into six chapters that overlap chronologically. While
chapter one ends in 1945, chapters two through six converge in the 1960s, a crucial turning point
in Long Island’s history. The first two chapters situate black Long Islanders within the region’s
changing job market, framing the story as one of jobs and housing forming simultaneously.
Chapter one begins at the turn of the twentieth century, when Long Island was the main source of
New York City’s perishable produce. Farms competed with developers, who eyed the Island’s
expansive plains and lush harbors as a bedroom for Gotham’s middle class and elite. European
immigrants and southern black migrants became the region’s pre-World War II working class,
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and their jobs in agriculture, domestic service, and construction were primarily low-wage.
Housing reflected this reality, and low-income ethnic and racial enclaves emerged in parallel to
their inner-city counterparts. The Second World War completely transformed Long Island’s
employment landscape, as military spending turned the region’s craft-oriented aviation industry
into a mass employer, dragging Long Island out of the Depression as over 100,000 Long
Islanders, both black and white, entered factories and benefitted from rapidly rising wages and
full employment.
Chapter two picks up after 1945, explaining Long Island’s explosive growth through
1965 and the fortunes of African Americans in this job climate. Military spending continued (a
full-employment policy in outcome, if not intent), along with commuter incomes, supporting
retail, service, and local government employment, all of which made mass homeownership
possible. African Americans were not equal participants in these developments. A rising black
middle class used well-paying jobs to buy homes, but a disproportionately poor black population
competed for low-paying work in what remained of Long Island’s domestic and farm jobs, or
among its non-defense factories. Despite prosperity and growth, racism and structural changes
limited social mobility for Long Island’s black working class and poor, undermining the benefits
of suburban residence.
Chapter three investigates the community consequences of this class divide within Long
Island’s black population. The rising black middle class either challenged entrenched housing
segregation to integrate white neighborhoods or thrived in black ‘Levittowns.’ They formed the
basis of a suburban civil rights movement in the process, concerned with fair housing, public
service equity, and school integration. The black poor meanwhile faced dwindling housing
opportunities due to rising land values, taxes, and urban renewal projects destabilizing the few
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affordable enclaves. While rising incomes permitted the middle class to challenge racist housing
policy and practice, poverty undermined those gains, as segregation set off developments that
forced the black poor into black middle class communities. Such concentration strained local
public services and set off intense political battles over the future of black hamlets, ones that put
suburb against suburb, and within these communities, middle class homeowner against lowincome tenant.
These local conflicts occurred during major economic transformations in the 1960s,
particularly within the region’s most important job sector, aerospace, the focus of the fourth
chapter. Defense manufacturing accounted for twenty-two percent of Long Island’s nonagricultural jobs in 1954, and military firms were consistently the region’s largest employers.
After World War II though, the sector employed few African Americans.58 Firms hired along
gender and racial lines, and the federal government did little to enforce black employment. Civil
rights activists looking to improve black job prospects targeted the industry, and with renewed
federal commitment to fair employment in the 1960s, minority hiring was possible. But the
industry itself was shifting from mass-producing planes to experimental weapons and spacecraft,
favoring skilled technicians over blue-collar assembly line workers. In addition, the controversy
surrounding the ‘military-industrial complex’ pushed Defense Secretary Robert Strange
McNamara to streamline defense spending, which shut down Long Island’s largest employer in
1965, shifted contracts South and West, and generally produced fewer jobs by the late 1960s.
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Fair employment could guarantee minority hiring by 1970, but it was in an industry that no
longer employed unskilled blue-collar workers.
Chapters five and six address the efforts of policymakers to grapple with these suburban
economic challenges. Chapter five covers Long Island’s War on Poverty, both the federallyfunded programs and locally developed initiatives in the spirit of Johnson’s domestic project
between 1964 and 1970. The assumption that America’s economic institutions were sound was
rhetorically resonant on Long Island, which by any statistical measure of poverty or
employment, enjoyed ‘affluence.’ Local policymakers and anti-poverty activists embraced the
program’s supply-side efforts, from transportation initiatives to job training. The chapter
outlines how the initial enthusiasm for eradicating Long Island’s minor poverty program turned
into deep criticism of the War on Poverty’s flawed logic and assumptions by 1968. The War on
Poverty’s failure made Long Island’s unskilled jobs deficit apparent, a problem Nassau County
government looked to solve by guaranteeing every county resident a job by 1969.
Despite the economic troubles of the late 1960s, the belief in suburban prosperity
continued to inform policy, particularly when compared with the ‘urban crisis’ wracking
America’s inner cities. Chapter six deals with this emerging spatial interpretation of America’s
urban problems, contrasting it with the shared economic reality of job loss, the labor market
chasm, and inflation in city and suburb in the 1970s. Federal, state, and county housing agencies
wanted to break down segregation and build low-income suburban housing. Their goals were
expansive, and they wanted to improve employment outcomes among the urban poor and assure
the suburbs offer their ‘fair share’ of jobs and suburban tax revenues. This was premised on the
belief of suburban prosperity, but the communities targeted for low-income housing, including
working class and black suburbs, faced the brunt of the region’s job losses combined with Long
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Island’s regressive property tax system that increasingly burdened their communities. Their
suburban location nonetheless made them ideal for housing projects according to public
agencies, which set off intense battles between suburbanites over who should take their ‘fair
share’ of the poor, a heavy burden for suburbs with low-income populations themselves. The
theory of the spatial divide, that ‘suburbs’ were affluent at the expense of ‘cities,’ confronted a
more complex reality of structural changes plaguing workers in both cities and suburbs alike in
the 1960s and 1970s.
Overall, black suburbs like Wyandanch were of the suburbs precisely because the suburbs
were embedded within the nation’s economy during and after World War II. This meant that
major economic questions, including full employment policy, racial job discrimination, the
growing job market divide, and poverty were suburban as well as urban questions. The fact that
policymakers neglected these realities in favor of a ‘spatial’ interpretation that pit ‘poor’ city
versus ‘affluent’ suburb produced an impoverished set of policy solutions to deal with job loss,
racial inequality, and poverty. Unfortunately, this interpretation and these policy solutions
remain dominant. This dissertation goes beyond this paradigm, because suburban residence was
not a shelter from the broader spout of deindustrialization and declining opportunity affecting the
northeast, mid-west, and older urban centers of the South and West. This was truer of black
Americans than any other group. Suburban residence did not save them.
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Chapter 1
The Future Detroit of the East

Hubert Goode and his family made their way from Raleigh, North Carolina to Long
Island in 1917. Lorenzo B. Smull, a successful real estate developer in the Gold Coast hamlet of
Port Washington, hired the Goodes as servants on his estate. Smull wired money to the Goode
family to travel north, which involved three trains between Baltimore and Port Washington.
Upon arrival, the family lived upstairs in the Smull estate, and Hubert’s parents cooked, cleaned
the house, tended the yard, and raised the Smull children. Hubert, then a young boy, had duties
on the estate as well, from raking the leaves to helping around the house.1 The Goodes were
among the thousands of African American families who migrated from the South and settled in
northern and western suburbs during the Great Migration. As many as one in six southern black
migrants between World War I and World War II moved directly to the suburbs in search of
freedom and employment opportunities, skipping urban centers entirely.2 Unlike central city
migrants, they pinned their hopes on a suburban labor market shaped by the immense wealth
emanating from America’s industrial cities to the bedrooms and farms along the urban fringe.
In Long Island’s case, New York City’s insatiable demand for food kept truck farmers
busy, while Gotham’s burgeoning population sought vacation spots on the Island’s seashore,
suburban housing along its railroad lines, and estate property or private recreational playgrounds.
All of this required an army of workers to construct single-family homes, manage estate gardens,
launder clothes, chauffeur, rear children, and pick produce. A suburban ‘working class’ filled
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these positions, a mixture of immigrants from Europe, native whites, and southern African
Americans. As Long Island’s service and agricultural workers, they toiled in an economy
sharply divided between those who labored in the suburbs and those who resided in the suburbs
but labored elsewhere. The consumption habits of the latter determined the fortunes of the
suburban working class, and little mobility existed between the two. Low incomes and status
within Long Island’s labor market constrained working class housing choice, and poor housing
conditions developed mirroring that of America’s urban ‘ghettos.’ As African Americans came
to dominate the region’s working class by the 1930s, race permeated the discourse of poverty
and its community consequences. Skin color, the migrant origins of southern black laborers, and
their poverty coalesced to form Long Island’s variant of the “negro problem.”
The was the layout of early twentieth century Long Island: a working class catering to
the needs of middle class homeowners, truck farmers, and the consumer needs of an industrial
elite. World War II dramatically altered this reality. The aircraft industry became the dominant
employer in the region, and Long Island became less dependent on the incomes of commuters
from the five boroughs, instead drawn into the orbit of federal defense contract. The new
industry likewise uncoupled Long Island’s working class from its dependence on the wealth of
landowning farmers, suburban homeowners, and estate-owners. The defense industry
compressed the labor market, forging a new suburbia and a new kind of suburbanite on Long
Island: the industrial, working-class suburbanite, their incomes derived from federal contracts,
strong unions, and acute demand for their labor. Over the course of the war, Long Island’s black
workforce joined the industrial working class thanks to this unquenchable demand as well as
anti-discrimination enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels. By 1945, the old economy
of service and agricultural labor was replaced by an industrial landscape, which altered the
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landscape of Long Island, the dynamics of its labor market and the lives of its residents, both
black and white.

The ‘Gold Coast’ and the Sub-urban Economy
In 1898, Long Island’s contemporary form took shape when New York City annexed the
Island’s urban center, Brooklyn, along with the western third of Queens County to form the
borough of Queens. The remainder of eastern Queens became Nassau County on January 1,
1899, and this new county, along with Suffolk County to its east formed the re-defined Long
Island.3 While Long Islanders celebrated their resistance to Gotham’s encroachment as a victory
for ‘home rule’ and local government, New York’s land grab signified the growing influence of
the urban center, a process that began prior to annexation and accelerated afterwards.4 Long
Island remained politically independent from City Hall, but was nonetheless increasingly
dependent on New York City’s economy. This dependence developed in four ways. Nassau and
Suffolk county farmers profited from perishable food demand formerly satisfied within city
limits but pushed out by residential and industrial development. Long Island’s accessible natural
beauty, from its sandy beaches on its south shore to the quiet harbors and hills on its north shore,
led New Yorkers to vacation, relocate permanently, and in the case of New York’s wealthiest,
construct exclusive residential and recreational spaces. All of this produced new labor sectors to
meet the needs of Long Island’s farmers, vacationers, homeowners, and social elite.
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As the Midwest came to dominate grain production and upstate New York exported dairy
products, Long Island’s farmers exploited New York City’s perishable food demand.
Strawberries, cauliflower, cabbage, cucumbers, peas, Brussels sprouts, and above all, potato
production increased in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Even as farm acreage declined amidst
suburbanization in Nassau County (agricultural land in Nassau County dropped from over
90,000 acres in 1875 to 23,000 acres in 1930), farmers managed to double potato production
from 1900-1920 to 1.8 million bushels, largely thanks to fertilizers, new machinery, and
innovative growing techniques.5 Further east in Suffolk, potato production topped fourteen
million bushels per year in the 1940s. Beyond farm produce, farmers also tapped into New
York’s exotic food demand, including the ‘Peking Duck,’ a new specialty item introduced to the
region in 1873 that turned Long Island into the nation’s premier duck producing region. Whether
raising ducks or growing fruit, farmers could only rely on their own labor and new machinery for
a portion of their production. Picking ripe strawberries, bagging potatoes, and slaughtering
ducks required manual laborers, and Long Island’s farmers depended on a seasonal workforce to
ready their goods for market.6
Produce travelled west along the Long Island Railroad to feed New York’s population;
New Yorkers travelled east to enjoy Long Island’s natural beauty. Prior to the 1880s, scant
infrastructure limited access to the south shore’s beaches, though after railroad companies
opened Coney Island, Brighton Beach, and Manhattan Beach in Brooklyn to resort development,
speculation turned eastward. Austin Corbin, who had linked New Yorkers to Coney Island
through his New York and Manhattan Beach railway, bought the Long Island Railroad in 1880,
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and transformed the railroad into a carrier of vacationers to the “greatest watering place in the
world.”7 Corbin encouraged vacation development stretching from the Rockaways in Queens to
Montauk on Long Island’s east end.8 The popularity of these destinations only grew with the
advent of the automobile, inspiring Robert Moses to develop a series of public parks with
beaches, ponds, woodlands, and golf courses, all connected via ‘parkways’ to New York City’s
green-starved residents. By 1928, Moses had secured nearly ten thousand acres and designed
fourteen parks on the Island.9 These resort destinations swelled with employment over the
summer months, necessitating an army of waiters, maids, cooks, landscapers, and maintenance
workers.
Long Island’s recreational attractions and infrastructure encouraged permanent
settlement, and no group had a greater influence on the region’s development than the nation’s
social elite, who colonized both its shores from the 1880s until the outbreak of World War II.
Long Island was the perfect location to emulate European aristocratic ‘country’ living and leisure
while remaining tied to the “Capitol of Capital.”10 Nearly 1,000 French chateaus, English
castles, and Italian villas were constructed across the two counties, over forty percent of which
were built between 1900 and 1918. By 1937, the region housed fourteen of the nation’s twentyfive wealthiest families. On the South shore, running from the eastern border of Nassau County
out to Montauk, sat the estates of financier August Belmont, sugar refiner Henry Have Meyer,
and railroad manager William K. Vanderbilt. On Long Island’s North Shore, over six hundred
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estates stretched from the Queens border into Suffolk County in nearly uninterrupted sequence,
all at least fifty acres large. Collectively known as the ‘Gold Coast,’ powerful families such as
the Morgans, Hearsts, Sages, Astors, Woolworths, Guggenheims, Fricks, Goulds, and Fords
settled within the area. The elite mingled at seventy-one private clubs, participating in every
conceivable social activity, from dinner parties to fox hunts. Beyond the estates themselves were
thousands of acres reserved for trotting courses, horse racing tracks, golf, tennis courts, hunting
grounds, polo fields, and a private highway for America’s first major automobile races.11
The estates and private clubs formed an ‘estate economy,’ a collection of complex tasks
to maintain the physical estate structures along with the daily and seasonal rituals of elite life.
Even a modest country house required a workforce of ten to twenty employees to care for the
grounds, bedrooms, food, and children, not to mention periodic employment of masons, florists,
and construction workers. The largest estates employed between 250 and 400 people. Chicago
department store heir Marshall Fields’ two thousand acre ‘Caumsett’ estate employed over four
hundred to operate the dairy farm, stables, cottages, athletic facilities, power plant, yacht dock,
and several houses. The enterprise was so large that the estate had its own business office to
organize the daily work routines and approve contracts for new building projects, transportation
of workers, and other duties. While most estates were not as complex as Caumsett, all relied on
a stable workforce within their grounds as well as services that operated along the fringes of their
property.12
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Behind the ostentatious migration of the nation’s wealthy was a larger influx of middle
class New Yorkers spilling out of the five boroughs in search of single-family homes. Middle
class housing appeared sporadically in the nineteenth century, and railroad suburbs blossomed in
western Nassau County, including Lynbrook, Lawrence, Woodmere, Hewlett, Rockville Centre,
Garden City, and Freeport.13 In the twentieth century, the population surge eastward through
Queens and into Nassau County accelerated. From 1920-1930, Long Island’s population nearly
doubled to over 464,000, making Nassau County the fastest growing county in the nation.14
Commuters in search of residential suburbs bought up tracts near railroad lines, feeding into a
speculative boom in property and housing construction, all of which benefitted a blue-collar
labor force who built the homes, roads, sidewalks, and stores in these suburbs. Once built, the
homeowners made use of service workers on a smaller scale, relying on a single live-in servant
or visiting maids and nannies, along with laundresses, chauffeurs, gardeners, and masons.15

The Suburban Working Class
The farms, estates, resorts, and middle-class suburbs produced a labor market in the
building trades, road and public works construction, domestic service, and agricultural work,
constituting over half of the jobs Long Island residents held in 1930 and the majority of jobs
available in the region. A diverse population filled these jobs. Whites, some descended from
Long Island’s early English and Dutch settlers, found opportunity within this new economy, as
did the small black population of 5,000, but the massive increase in labor demand attracted
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Table 1.1: Foreign-born and African American Population Growth, 1910-1940
Ireland
Poland
Italy
Germany
African-American

1910
7,326
5,684
8,232
5,088

1920
7,002
6,416
6,988
7,866
5,850

1930
8,954
9,188
13,316
17,616
13,462

1940
8,669
9,093
14,994
18,145
21,927

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910: Statistics for New
York. Containing Statistics of Population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Mining for the State, Counties, Cities,
and Other Divisions (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1913), 230, 236; U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the
United States, 1920 - State Compendium, New York. Statistics of Population, Occupations, Agriculture,
Manufactures, and Mines and Quarries for the State, Counties, and Cities (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1923), 38,
41, 53; U.S. Census Bureau, 1930 Census of the United States: Volume III, Part 2: Montana-Wyoming, section
II - New Hampshire-New York (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1932), 270, 272, 298; U.S. Census Bureau, 1940
Census of Population, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, Part 5: New York-Oregon (Washington
D.C.: GPO, 1943), 47, 52, 63-64.

foreign-born immigrants along with southern black migrants. The foreign-born migration to
Long Island coincided with the general population growth from 1900-1940, as both tripled
during the period. Germans, Poles, Irish, and Italian immigrants dominated the immigration
influx, as Table 1.1 indicates. German immigrants tended to be middle class homeowners
themselves, but Irish, Polish and Italian immigrants toiled as laborers on the estates, farms, and
construction projects across Long Island.16 African Americans trailed European immigration in
the first two decades of the twentieth century, though the black migration outpaced foreign born
immigration after 1920, and southern African Americans became the largest non-native group on
Long Island by the outbreak of World War II.
Broader developments, including the momentum of the Great Migration and declining
immigration, partly account for the increasing presence of African Americans within Long
Island’s labor market, but local factors influenced the growing reliance on black labor as well. In
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the first two decades of the twentieth century, a racial hierarchy existed within Long Island’s
service economy. The wealthiest estate owners, like utility executive John E. Aldred, hired only
the most experienced servants from the British Isles.17 Most were less restrictive, hiring both
immigrants and blacks but dividing their workforce by color. Clarence Phillips, a former yacht
club cook recalled that “gardening wasn’t so great for blacks because…they had the Italians and
Pollocks [sic] that did a lot of gardening around here…in fact, they never heard tell of no black
gardeners.”18 African Americans rarely lived on the estates, instead working at the periphery of
the estate economy. No black workers lived on the Guggenheim estate, and as Alec Sucilsky, a
Polish immigrant and Guggenheim employee recalled, the only ‘colored help’ was “around the
horses…they didn’t live on the estate.”19 If black workers benefitted from the estate economy, it
was through contract work. Black Port Washington resident Marjorie Biddle remembered that
all of her neighbors “took in laundry…just for private people cause all these rich people had
initials on their napkins and things.”20
This racial divide receded in the 1920s and 1930s, encouraging a black migration.
Contrary to the common perception of the ‘Roaring Twenties’ as the height of estate society,
Long Island’s estate economy waned during the decade as operating costs rose, taxes increased,
and opportunities to profit from the real estate boom encouraged estate owners to sell land.21 For
those that remained, cutting costs proved necessary. Rather than import famed landscapers from
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Calabria or servants from the British Isles, estate owners increasingly turned to black labor, and
shifted from live-in to live-out domestic service.22 The growth of the domestic service industry
for middle class homeowners further encouraged black migration as a low-wage labor source.
Amidst the Depression, a continued influx of black workers into the North further depressed
wages, and black workers became the “preferred” workforce among the middle class and
wealthy.23
A structured migration system aided the growth of black labor on Long Island.
Recruitment began unofficially, as one domestic worker would inform friends and families
across the eastern seaboard of job opportunities. John Blount, who moved to Long Island in
1907, recalled that his second cousin negotiated with an estate worker to hire his mother and
sisters.24 Employment agencies eventually organized recruitment, especially as the less personal
live-out domestic system became popular, where homeowners and estate owners hired servants
by the day but did not provide housing accommodations. Agencies contracted with employers in
search of help, and then sent money or drove directly to the South to pick up groups of service
workers ready for the trip north. If new recruits could not afford to pay the agency, they worked
off their debts.25 These agencies were often little more than enterprising domestic servants with
connections to prospective migrants down south. Freeport resident Louise Simpson remembers
how there was “this particular family who was sort of like a personnel person for employment.
She would go to where she came from in Carolina and bring people up.”26 Former domestic
Harvey Sinkar-Herring was one such person. She opened her own domestic servant recruitment
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agency, offering not only passage north, but temporary housing and training classes, charging the
employers hiring fees and room and board.27 A similar process emerged for recruiting cheap
construction labor. Contractors in road and housing construction went south in search of ‘green’
workers to maintain a pliant, low-wage workforce.28
Long Island’s farmers likewise relied on migrants from the South, tapping into a broader
agricultural labor stream flowing along a 1,200-mile network from New England to Florida.
Since the turn of the century, truck farmers utilized temporary laborers during harvest and
planting seasons. These laborers came from a variety of sources, but as Cindy Hahamovitch
finds, a structure emerged tying black southerners to a year-round harvest rhythm during the long
agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s.29 Crew leaders, often migrant laborers
themselves, contracted with growers on Long Island and then recruited individual laborers from
the south by the truckload.30 Like domestic service agencies, the crew leader offered credit to
cover transportation and food costs, and since housing was often provided on site in makeshift
camps at the farm, food and other living expenses were removed from wages during the extent of
the stay. Most migrants were black men, moving with their crews or joining new ones to make
incomes across the eastern seaboard.31
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Once on Long Island, African American workers joined the Italian, Polish, Irish, and
other white workers in competition for service and agricultural jobs as estate owners and farmers
“grazed in a savannah of cheap labor.”32 The most stable and well-paying opportunities (relative
to other sectors) could be found in year-round domestic service. Women predominated, leading
to a black gender imbalance in Nassau County. Women were fifty-five percent of the county’s
black population in 1930, reaching almost sixty percent by 1940.33 Young single women made
the trek along with married women who left their families in search of higher pay up north, “a
highly gendered process of suburbanization” as Andrew Wiese’s states.34 Wages and working
conditions varied depending on the local labor supply, the benevolence of the employer, and the
stability of the specific job. Domestics labored around twelve hours per day, and depending on
their specific duties, could work anywhere from five to seven days per week. Daily wages
ranged from three to five dollars on the estates in the 1920s ($40-65 in 2012), to just forty dollars
a month during the Depression for live-out domestic service (about $660 in 2012).35
Precarity awaited those working in construction, on resorts, along the fringes of the estate
economy, and in the fields. Jobs in these sectors offered seasonal or part-time employment, and
workers cobbled together a living by navigating between them. The estate economy’s everchanging tasks forced laborers to learn a variety of service skills. Thomas Longsworth, living in
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Port Washington, a Gold Coast town, was a chauffeur, butler, chimneysweeper, and when
needed, maintenance man.36 Workers in the seasonal industries, which included resorts, housing
construction, country clubs, and agricultural labor, moved between each as demand changed.
Rebecca Hobson Nash, whose family travelled from Virginia to Riverhead on Long Island’s east
end in 1926, cut potatoes during the spring, harvested the spuds in the summer, and shifted to
house work during the winter months.37 And just as migrant farmers travelled up and down the
east coast to work for as little as two dollars a day harvesting produce, Long Island residents
likewise travelled across the Island following the booms and busts of local employment.
Clarence Phillips, after working as a cook, janitor, and eventually gardener in the Gold Coast,
recalled that once “gardenin’ had all come to an end and there was nothin’ for me to do.” He then
went to work making “3c a bushel for picked potatoes…workin’ on a farm down in the eastern
end of the Island, on Sound Avenue” in Mattituck, some seventy miles away.38
This instability affected men’s fortunes in particular, who had fewer stable opportunities
in the suburban economy. If married, they relied on their wives for stable income that they
supplemented as prospects appeared.39 Ironically, the Depression offered unprecedented stability
for laborers through public work relief. Public jobs programs, first administered under Governor
Franklin Roosevelt’s Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA) in 1931 and
continued through the alphabet soup of federally administered programs, employed thousands.
Statistical records, while scarce, indicate that Long Island’s working class relied on public
programs for their livelihoods. A 1933 survey of families receiving work relief in Nassau
36
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County reveals that nearly eighty percent of the county’s relief workers were either skilled
tradesmen or unskilled laborers, a third were foreign-born, and seven percent were black, greater
than their proportion of the population (less than three percent). A Civil Works Administration
survey in 1934 found that Italian and Polish was spoken among over forty percent of all workers
in unskilled positions.40 The programs funded long-term building projects (at least relative to the
short-term work in the suburban economy), including Robert Moses’ state parkway network,
local public roads and schools, and a county-wide urban sewage system in Nassau.41 African
Americans in particular found security in these work relief programs, and in 1933, almost thirty
percent of Nassau County’s black male population were employed on public relief.42 As African
American domestic Beatrice Nixon recalled, “in Glen Cove, nearly everybody was on the WPA.
That’s the only work they could get.” Her husband, after years of working sporadically in the
estate economy, took WPA jobs “as long as the Depression lasted, until he could go out and get a
job like he wanna, of his own.”43 Nixon stated that workers in Glen Cove thought of “their WPA
work as jobs no different from private employment except that they seem safer and more lasting
than private employment.”44
Long Island’s unskilled laborers could move across the various sectors of the mixed
service and agricultural economy, or exploit the stability of Depression-era relief, but the
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structure of the economy presented little vertical mobility. The skills obtained through service
labor could be transferred into small businesses. Ethel Saulter remembers that her father, a
migrant from Margaretsville, North Carolina, opened a taxi service for train commuters in
Manhasset.45 Others started garbage removal businesses, grocery stores, or delicatessens.46
Such self-employed African Americans numbered less than five hundred, or four percent of the
total black labor force in 1940, and even those workers were tied to the broader service
economy.47 The foundation of Long Island’s wealth was imported from New York City, save
the agriculture sector that required large landholdings and access to capital. Long Island’s
southern black population served as a source of cheap labor to clean the homes of middle class
residents, tend to the gardens of the wealthy, harvest farmer’s potatoes, and wait on vacationers
at seaside resorts. While spared the grueling industrial work migrants in the North’s urban
centers endured, Long Island’s black workers entered a precarious and constrained labor market
of low-wage opportunity, a market they shared with immigrants and the rest of the suburban
working class.

‘The Negro Problem’
Long Island’s low-paying and unstable labor market shaped the living conditions of the
region’s working class. Despite the proliferation of single-family housing across the region, less
than sixty percent of Long Islanders owned homes as of 1940. Immigrant communities did form
the kinds of working class suburbs that Becky Nicola ides found in Los Angeles, where
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homeownership served as a safety net against economic insecurity.48 For example, real estate
speculator Giovanni Campagnoli encouraged Italian immigrants, many from Manhattan’s Lower
East Side and the ‘Belmont’ section of the Bronx, to purchase homes in Copiague, a small
hamlet in Suffolk County. He named the streets after famous Italians, and home-owning Italians
built a “singular Italian village” sandwiched between the resort community of Amityville and the
middle class village of Lindenhurst.49 Communities such as these were rare, though more
common among immigrants than African Americans, as only sixteen percent of Nassau’s and
thirty-three percent of Suffolk’s black population owned their own homes.50 Real estate
developer Louis Fife developed a black homesteader community in Gordon Heights in Suffolk
County in 1927 where actors, vacationers, and local workers lived and grew produce for
consumption as well as truck farming purposes. Gordon Heights was the exception, and most
black residents moved into rental units in urbanized villages within reach of the estate economy,
or across the unincorporated expanse of the Island in strategic locations tied to multiple sectors
of the labor market.51 In Suffolk County, black residents straddled the agricultural and resort
economies, like in North Amityville, a hamlet just north of the waterfront village of Amityville,
where southern blacks could work on nearby potato fields as well as the hotels and restaurants
dotting the Great South Bay.52 In Nassau County, incorporated villages like Hempstead, Glen
Cove, Freeport, and Rockville Centre were hubs for domestics and laborers working in the
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surrounding middle class suburban and wealthy estate economy. Early settlers set in motion
family and community-based chain migrations, and in places like Freeport and Rockville Centre,
the majority of black residents originated from just a few counties in North and South Carolina.53
These population numbers were only what Census takers captured at the moment they surveyed
the area, and in reality, the black presence was higher during peak employment season. In
Hempstead and Rockville Centre, social workers estimated around a quarter of African
American’s were a ‘floating population’ of single women or family members, temporarily
staying as jobs opened and then leaving.54
Within these villages, black residents faced a constrained housing market, limited to the
least desirable housing because of their low incomes, dependence on local employment,
widespread use of racial covenants, and careful deployment of land-use regulation that protected
middle class residences.55 Economic segregation trumped racial segregation, as black residents
shared housing with foreign-born immigrants in similar conditions. Freeport, Inwood (part of
the ‘Five-Towns’ area in southwestern Nassau County), and Glen Cove all had mixed Italian,
black, and sometimes Polish sections, though social workers in these communities noted that
earlier migration among foreign-born whites and their slightly higher economic positions led to
higher homeownership rates among Italian and Polish immigrants compared to black residents.56
Work largely determined housing location, and given transportation difficulties, long hours, and
family ties, Long Island’s rental markets were islands all to themselves, and rent ranged widely
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from one village to the next. Average monthly rents in the Bennington Park section of Freeport,
a domestic service settlement south of the LIRR in the village’s east end, averaged between
eighteen to twenty dollars per month.57 Six miles north, monthly rents in the village of
Hempstead fluctuated from twenty-seven to thirty-seven dollars, a significant proportion of a
domestic worker’s forty dollar average monthly wage.58
Limited mobility within and between villages, low incomes, and a growing population
produced conditions ripe for exploitation. As African Americans continued to migrate into the
region in the 1930s as foreign-born immigration stagnated, property owners took advantage of
their poverty and dependence on local jobs, turning every possible inhabitable structure into rentproducing property. In Inwood, former Italian homeowners in the swampy ‘Frog Hollow’
neighborhood rented their housing to incoming black tenants, flipping the community from
Italian to black dominated.59 In the Banks Avenue section of Rockville Centre, property owners
converted former barns, morgues, cellars, and storefronts into dwelling spaces. In Oyster Bay
village, twenty families shared the charred remains of a partially burnt down blacksmith’s
shop.60 Vacancies in these sections remained low, and since wages from individuals or even
intermittent dual earners barely covered monthly rents, multiple families holed up in rooms to
make ends meet. Cots converted kitchens into makeshift bedrooms while outhouses became the
restrooms for forty or more people. Tenants and property owners exploited seasonal demands
for housing, taking in ‘roomers’ who had migrated from the south in search of short-term
employment.61 All of this rapidly deteriorated already unsafe housing conditions, generating
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suburban ‘slums’ parallel to their urban counterparts. A 1934 housing survey of the Bennington
Park section in Freeport revealed that of 213 dwellings, only fifty-five were connected to the
village sewer system and only forty-two had gas stoves. Storefronts were converted to makeshift
housing, as Figure 1.1 shows, and residents of these ‘flats’ had to draw water from a hydrant near
the privy, relying on the coal kitchen stove for heat.62 Bennington Park’s conditions were found
across the “Harlem Belts” in the incorporated villages of Nassau and western Suffolk counties, in
the “Battery” section of Oyster Bay village, “the Hill” in Hempstead, “Banks Avenue” in
Rockville Centre, and “Long Branch Road” in Glen Cove. In these districts, families survived
without insulation or water during the winter and sewage overflowed into wells, threatening the
health of those who used it.63

Figure 1.1. “Bennington Park.” Backyard of 132-138 E. Sunrise
Highway, in the Bennington Park section of Freeport circa 1950.
Courtesy of Freeport Historical Society.
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Black housing conditions were the physical markers of Long Island’s ‘negro problem,’ a
growing concern about the region’s poverty that coincided with black southerner’s increased
presence on the Island. Their skin color, higher levels of poverty, and migrant status became
intertwined with the debate over poverty and the housing conditions poverty bred. Prior to the
1930s, local activism treated African Americans and foreign-born immigrants similarly. Long
Island’s wealthy elites funded settlement houses in Long Island villages to assist the destitute and
offer training in the trades and ‘domestic arts.’ Philanthropist Margaret Sage endowed the
Margaret Sage Industrial School in 1907 in the Inwood/Lawrence area of southwestern Nassau
County, which served both the local Italian and black population. In Glen Cove, estate owners
funded two settlement houses, the Orchard House in the heavily Italian ‘orchard’ section of the
city, and the Lincoln House for black Glen Cove residents, both of which offered domestic
training courses, athletic programs, and social activities.64 Continued black migration amidst the
Depression led to an intensifying focus on the African American poor and their status as
‘migrants’ in particular.
Welfare was the most contentious issue. New forms of welfare emerged to soften the
blow of unemployment and poverty during the decade, and as the poorest Long Islanders, blacks
and foreign-born Italian immigrants received home relief in greater proportion than their
population.65 In the hamlet of Inwood, a social work survey determined that Italians and African
Americans were forty percent of all relief cases in 1937. Taxpayers decried the increasing costs
and alleged ‘abuse’ of the system, though their vitriol was targeted toward black recipients rather
64
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than foreign born whites. This occurred for three basic reasons. Firstly, racist assumptions about
black irresponsibility pervaded discussions of welfare, although Italian immigrants were not
immune to such assumptions. Second, unlike foreign-born whites, African Americans became a
larger proportion of recipients over the course of the 1930s. Data from the Family Service
Association of the Five Towns, a private welfare agency in southwestern Nassau County, found
that their minority caseload nearly doubled in proportion over two years. Finally, this increasing
proportion were southern migrants directly from the south. Of eighty-seven applicants to the
Family Service Association, seventy-four were from southern states.66
Migrants on the welfare rolls during the Depression was hardly surprising. Welfare
checks filled the gaps in seasonal employment and was a better alternative to returning south
where prospects were even more desperate. For a small proportion, relief was also an attractive
alternative to declining wages in domestic work.67 Such behavior, even from a small minority of
African Americans, shaped the views of black poverty. Welfare investigators expressed their
anger when receiving applications for relief before the applicant had found adequate housing,
sharing stories of clients who were “completely satisfied once they get on relief, and often refuse
to accept private employment for fear of being taken off relief.”68 Community members adopted
similar views. In Inwood, a local police officer believed that despite the jobs available, a “low
type of black…far under Harlem” were moving to Nassau specifically for relief. Glen Cove’s
Chamber of Commerce president believed his city had the largest welfare cost per capita in the
country, a problem emanating from “the colored group” who relied on “public relief” unlike
‘homeowning’ Polish and Italian immigrants. Others in the city agreed, and a social worker
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report found that the “white community has actually come to resent the presence of the colored
population…the feeling seems to be that when employment relations ceased, responsibility
ceased and it is up to the foreign and colored elements to shift for themselves rather than become
a burden of the community.”69
Welfare, though a rational response to unstable income and a bulwark against destitution
among Long Island’s poor black population, was understood as the motivation for the southern
migration and the cause of deplorable housing conditions. These assumptions, when combined
with the financial implications of an increased relief load, resulted in new policies designed to
curb the ‘abuses.’ Nassau’s Department of Public Welfare, already in the business of monitoring
relief cases as of 1935, added a ‘settlement’ auxiliary branch to their department in 1938 with the
sole purpose of verifying a recipient’s county residency. If a resident did not live in Nassau for
at least a year prior to receiving public assistance, the Department could “return” them to their
original residence. Such a policy was incredibly time-consuming, difficult, and largely
ineffective (from 1938 to 1940, the branch deported sixty-six people), though it exemplified the
belief that the poor were abusing the state’s benevolence and that the county’s problems
originated from outside rather than within the dynamics of the region.70 The consequences of
such a policy were devastating for the few families targeted by the welfare department. In 1936,
an African American widow, referred to as “Mrs. X” in the welfare department report, moved
from South Carolina in search of domestic work, leaving her five children behind with her
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brother in the South. When her brother could no longer afford to care for the children and sent
them north, Mrs. X quit her sleep-in domestic job to care for them. The county paid her rent for
two years until 1938, when the welfare department demanded she return to South Carolina. She
refused, and planned to forgo relief for a year to establish legal residence in the County. Her two
sons worked irregularly over the next year, though the family fell behind on rent, gas, and
electricity bills, seeking relief again in 1939. When the department determined that “neither
Mrs. X. nor her two oldest sons were making a real effort to become independent of public
relief,” they again ordered she return to South Carolina. After a court action, the Deputy Sheriff
took Mrs. X and four of her children to South Carolina, separated from her family and Long
Island’s job opportunities.71
African Americans’ ‘migrant’ status likewise informed the debates over housing
conditions in Long Island’s ‘Harlem belts.’ As overcrowding further deteriorated the low-rent
housing stock in Nassau’s incorporated villages, concern grew over the consequences of such an
environment, especially as potential breeding grounds for disease and crime. As a housing
activist warned fellow middle class residents, “the woman in that house who lives here under
those conditions, engaged by you and by myself or by anyone else as a domestic, could carry
typhoid fever into your own home.”72 Tensions emerged between those who wanted to improve
village housing stock and those who feared such improvements would induce further
immigration. Those in favor of eliminating the worst conditions looked to stronger housing code
regulation. In Rockville Centre, the building department forced landlords to renovate or face
condemnation, though condemnation pushed tenants into the remaining housing or compelled
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them to find housing in other village black districts, exacerbating the conditions elsewhere.73
Improving housing stock, while helpful to existing residents, was viewed as an inducement to
further migration.74 In Glen Cove, residents hoped to “discourage colored families from coming
to Glen Cove by continuing the poor housing conditions.”75 The fear that housing
improvements, which increased public costs for sewage, clean water, or housing itself, would
only worsen conditions by encouraging further settlement stifled any movement toward largescale housing renovation during the 1930s, despite unprecedented efforts in cities across the
country and new streams of federal funding.
The belief that housing or welfare was the primary motivator for Long Island’s black
settlement and the cause of Long Island’s ‘negro problem’ misunderstood their role as the
region’s source of cheap labor and the living conditions their low-incomes produced. When
Perry Gangloff of the New York School of Social Work surveyed the city of Glen Cove in 1937,
he found a community blaming the lack of industry, poor transportation, and the presence of
foreign groups for the city’s high unemployment and income inequality, but as Gangloff
recognized, Glen Cove had “lost sight of their own growth and its relation to the present
situation,” that those very ‘problems’ sprouted from the city’s growth itself, an economy
dependent the “existence of wealthy suburban estates.”76 As a city tied to the Woolworth, Pratt,
and Morgan estates, among others, improving housing conditions and alleviating poverty
required breaking free from the structure of the estate economy, and providing living wage
opportunities.
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“Death in one hand and prosperity in the other”77
Long Island’s dependent service economy languished during the Depression. Tied to the
wealth generated in New York, the fortunes of the wealthy and middle class in the city
determined that of Long Island. The building boom ended after 1929, while elites constructed
only eighty estates in the 1930s. At the Depression’s nadir in early 1933, nearly a fifth of Nassau
County’s population applied for emergency relief.78 New Deal projects, while supporting
thousands of unemployed Long Islanders, supplemented the foundation of residential suburbia,
completing the state parkway network as envisioned by Robert Moses, designing a public golf
course at Bethpage State Park, and improving local public amenities.79 All of the projects
buttressed the stagnant suburban economy, but growth did not return until 1940, and the recovery
was not based upon the fortunes of Gotham but rather from the region’s aircraft industry, a
relatively small segment of the elite recreational economy prior to 1940 that transformed the
nature of the Long Island economy by the end of the war, revolutionizing the region’s labor
market, the spatial layout of the Island, and its relationship to the metropolitan region.
The origins of Long Island’s aircraft industry are closely tied to the origins of aviation
itself. While North Carolina, Ohio, and even Connecticut compete over aviation birth rights,
Long Island can claim most of the seminal flight accomplishments prior to 1930 thanks to the
disposable wealth of the nation’s upper class flowing through the region.80 Early aircraft was a
novelty, dominated by wealthy sportsmen, adventurers, and entrepreneurs. Wealthy interest in
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aviation coalesced with the ample land available in Nassau County, and early aviators carved
seven airfields out of the Hempstead Plains, holding internationally recognized tournaments and
supporting major breakthroughs in flight. From Long Island’s airfields, Earle Ovington made
the first airmail flight, Lieutenants John Macready and Oakley Kelly began the first
transcontinental flight to San Diego, and Charles Lindbergh took off for Paris. The area’s early
dominance made it the center of America’s small military aircraft efforts during World War I,
and the “Lindbergh Boom” in 1927 birthed a commercial market. Sales jumped from twentyone to seventy-one million dollars in two years, and Long Island’s social elite established the
Aviation Country Club in 1929, complete with tennis courts, swimming pool, and a landing
field.81
Long Island’s early aviation industry, while world-renowned, remained on the periphery
of Long Island’s economy through the 1930s, an outgrowth of the region’s proximity to New
York’s wealth rather than a distinct industry. For one, aircraft employed few people. In 1930,
Nassau County had only 4,000 manufacturing workers in any industry. Aviation was a ‘craft
industry’ done in ‘job shops’ with a small number of skilled workers rather than an assembly
line. These men (all men prior to World War II), designed handmade tools and parts drawn from
their own expertise, and often built a ‘lot’ of parts for an order, moving from one component to
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another. New York City supplied the craft workers, including Polish, German, and Italian
immigrants with backgrounds in Old-World metal and woodworking trades.82 The craft-based
nature of early aircraft limited both entry into the job market as well as the need for large
numbers of employees, and given low demand in the 1910s and 1920s, aircraft remained a small
part of Long Island’s economy despite its strong geographic and popular presence.
The industry’s close relationship with the US military transformed its role in the region.
The Depression destroyed the nascent consumer market, and private production remained
stagnant through the 1930s. The manufacturers who survived wedded themselves to military
contracts. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, founded in 1929 by six men in a garage
in Baldwin, worked closely with the Navy, moving to a 120-acre site in Bethpage by 1936.83 In
neighboring Farmingdale on the Nassau/Suffolk border, Russian expatriate Alexander de
Seversky founded the Seversky Aircraft Corporation in 1931, developing record-breaking
military aircraft like the P-35 for the Army Air Corps in his 250,000 square foot factory. While
Seversky was ousted in 1938 and the company was reorganized into the Republic Aircraft
Corporation, his early relationship with the Army was pivotal to the company’s survival.84 Other
firms, including the Sperry Gyroscope Company of Brooklyn and Fairchild’s Ranger Aircraft
Engineering Corporation in Farmingdale, powered through the Depression as instrument and
engine developers for military aircraft.85 Despite such growth, their impact on the area’s labor
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market remained small. Grumman’s employment remained below five hundred workers until
1937, never climbing above 1,000 until 1940. Republic likewise remained below 1,000
employees.86
Global hostilities changed this. Military-related exports to Europe and Latin America
grew in the late 1930s, and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 pushed the War Department to
strengthen the nation’s air defense. In March 1940, FDR requested 50,000 planes a year from
American manufacturers. By the end of that year, legislation was in place to streamline the
contract process, assist in the development of defense facilities, and produce a governmentprivate industry partnership popularly known as the ‘military-industrial complex’ in the postwar
period.87 Long Island’s aircraft manufacturers benefitted from this partnership, and the region
became the nation’s sixth largest recipient of military contracts by 1945.88 Republic’s
relationship with the Army thrived as the company produced the first single-engine single-seat
pursuit aircraft, the P-47 Thunderbolt, building 15,683 P-47’s during the war as the second
largest producer for the Army Air Corps.89 Grumman built thousands of F4F Wildcats, F6F
Hellcats, and TBF-1 Avengers for the Navy, and the company became known as the “Iron
Works” for their planes’ ability to survive battles and return pilots to safety. Around these
airframe producers (firms that built and assembled airplanes) emerged a network of
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subcontractors making instruments, flight equipment, and engines, including Sperry, the Ranger
Engines division, and Liberty Aircraft Corporation.
This high level of production, supported through military spending, revolutionized the
region’s economy and geographic layout. The factories transitioned from the craft-based,
innovation-oriented ‘job shop’ to an assembly line mass production system, necessitating long,
slender single-story buildings covering thousands of acres. They also necessitated thousands of
trained factory workers to design, manufacture, and assemble the more than 100,000 parts
required to make an airplane. These massive needs transformed Long Island into an industrial
suburb, joining what Sarah Jo Peterson calls “the latest eruption in a decades-long process of
suburban diversification” across the nation during World War II, as new industrial nodes
sprouted along the nation’s outlying urban fringe.90 Defense-related industrialization
reconfigured cities, built towns from farmland, and aided the regional growth of the South and
West. 91 In Long Island’s case, defense-related industrialization pivoted the region away from its
subservient position to New York City. Long Island’s residential suburban service economy no
longer dominated the labor market as industry moved to the center of its job growth and source
of income, making the bi-county region a center rivaling the nation’s largest manufacturing
cities. Industry also provided Long Island’s working class with unprecedented opportunities for
jobs, housing, and services, transforming their lives.
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Manpower
When aircraft demand took off in 1940, Republic, Grumman, and their subcontractors all
scrambled for workers. Republic’s staff climbed from a few hundred to 1,500, with an additional
8,000 in training. Grumman’s jumped to over 6,000 by 1941, and the company continued hiring
around 1,000 workers per month. At their peaks, Republic’s employment rolls were over 24,000
and Grumman’s more than 25,000 in 1943. Scientific instruments, the largest parts
manufacturing sector for aircraft production, went from non-existent to employing over 10,000
by 1943. Overall, more than 100,000 people were part of defense-related aviation manufacturing
on Long Island at the war’s peak, about forty percent of the 1940 labor force. They built
everything from stabilizers and bomb sight equipment to the planes themselves, part of the
production front for the most advanced air power in the world.92 In other parts of the nation,
filling suburban factory positions involved massive migration and coordination between housing
agencies, private builders, and local government to meet the needs of these workers in these new
communities.93 On Long Island, the existing population provided a ready workforce, and the
challenge was transforming these service and agricultural laborers into industrial workers.
Despite Long Island’s proximity to the nation’s largest city, defense manufacturers
overwhelmingly relied on local labor. A Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) survey of
Republic Aircraft employees in 1940 determined that almost eighty percent lived in Nassau and
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Suffolk counties, with the remainder commuting from Queens and Brooklyn.94 Local workers
were preferred for several reasons. Transportation from New York City, especially to the
Nassau/Suffolk border, was limited and difficult, unless one had access to a car and the parkway
system along the city’s perimeter. When Grumman and Republic began tapping the city for
workers during labor shortages in 1943, they had to coordinate with the Long Island Railroad to
operate special trains to their plants.95 Both companies also operated multiple shifts over twenty
and twenty-four-hour periods during the war, and waited on irregular shipments of materials to
their plants, all requiring a workforce ready for abrupt schedule changes.96 Lastly, the state
defined the limits of the local labor market. The Navy coordinated with Grumman to limit
employment to “bona fide residents of Nassau and Suffolk counties” in 1941 to counter fears of
subversive groups in defense plants.97 Numerous agencies, eventually centralized under the War
Manpower Commission (WMC) in April 1942, tried to stabilize the intense labor mobility
occurring during the war, regulating the transfer of workers to areas of production. The WMC’s
local committees calculated labor supply and production demands across the nation, restricting
contracts to firms with adequate labor supplies. The WMC collaborated with Long Island’s
aircraft companies and effectively closed off the labor market, given the fact Long Island’s labor
supply could meet production demands. With United States Employment Service (USES)
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offices in Hempstead, Rockville Centre, and Patchogue (among others), firms exhausted local
supplies of men and women, and Long Island remained relatively closed off, a labor market all to
itself.98
With only a small manufacturing employment base available on the Island (less than
3,500 registrants with the NYS department of Labor were classified as “general industrial
workers”), the government and private firms established island-wide training programs to turn
farmers, fishermen, housewives, domestic servants, general laborers and high school students
into riveters, welders, and sheet metal workers. In 1940 and 1941, the government and aircraft
firms utilized ten high schools and four aviation training centers across Nassau and western
Suffolk counties. The government restructured its Works Progress Administration and National
Youth Administration programs to train the unemployed for defense, preparing over 16,000
future employees in 1941 alone. Republic and Grumman augmented public programs with their
own private schools. Republic established the “Faust” School in Jericho with a one million
dollar grant in 1941, while Grumman trained and re-trained its employees in local high schools
through night classes and apprenticeship programs on the job, a system they continued into the
postwar period.99
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Long Island’s service economy all but collapsed as laborers left the estates, farms, and
resorts to fill the job openings and training programs in the defense industry. Estate worker John
Gregory recalled that World War II ended the dependency on estate work, and “when Grumman
and different factories opened up, a lot of these men went. The younger fellows were drawn into
services….and the others went to Grumman and what not.”100 Farm laborers like Joseph
Mancuso of Bethpage no longer depended on intermittent wage work that “paid practically
nothing” and instead got a job at subcontractor Kirkham Engineering, where “work was steady.”
Adeline Fischer, whose family barely eked out a living during the Depression, recalled that war
work pulled her father off welfare and seasonal agricultural labor. It was “the best time of our
life because he had a steady paycheck and we had food on the table.”101 All over Long Island,
former construction workers, butchers, potato farmers, fishermen, and bakers became industrial
blue-collar workers, and the “only thing they had in common was that they were Long
Islanders.”102 The divide inherent to Long Island’s residential suburban economy dissipated as
these industrial workers entered a labor market that offered competitive wages. They were the
beneficiaries of what Robert Margo and Claudia Goldin call the “Great Compression,” the
narrowing of the wage gap between the bottom and top twenty percent, between skilled and
unskilled workers, and the educated and un-educated during World War II, a process especially
apparent in the former ‘Gold Coast.’103

100

Oral history transcript of interview with John Gregory on February 18, 1987, p. 6, Gold Coast Estate Workers
Oral History Collection, PWLHC.
101
Quoted in Michelle Mancuso, “Joseph Mancuso Remembers Life in Bethpage during the Great Depression,” p.
59, and Quoted in Robin Cook Jacobsen, “Life in Cutchogue and Mattituck during the Great Depression,” p. 55, in
Lorraine Lupinskie-Huvane and Alan Singer eds., “The Great Depression and the New Deal on Long Island: A
Local History Curriculum Guide,” Hofstra University Faculty Page: Alan Singer. Accessed May 7, 2012,
http://people.hofstra.edu/alan_j_singer/294%20Course%20Pack/9.%20Depression_ND/124.pdf
102
Thruelson, 142.
103
Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo, “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at MidCentury,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, No. 1 (February, 1992): 1-34.

60
Black workers pinned their hopes on the defense industry’s transformative potential as
well, though their aspirations were dashed as racial barriers barred black workers, along with
white ethnics, from industrial employment at the outset of the defense buildup in 1940. Before
Pearl Harbor, Grumman refused to hire any German or Italian born Americans, while Ranger
Engines required citizenship papers dated before 1932. Proof of American birth proved
problematic for blacks as well, since many had come from areas of the South where births went
unrecorded. Republic, the largest employer in December 1940, required all of its employees to
be “white, full citizens, aged less than fifty.” For white ethnic workers though, the barriers
quickly faded as employers and the government relaxed citizenship requirements during the war,
and defense firms quickly absorbed them during labor shortages in 1941 and 1942.104 Long
Island’s employers did not relax their restrictions on black workers, following general trends
across the country that denied blacks jobs in the defense industry. Black activists challenged
these racial restrictions as early as 1940, forcing state governments and the Executive Branch to
pass the most significant civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.105 New York City’s
NAACP, Urban League, black labor groups raised awareness to the problem within the state,
pushing state congressmen and eventually Governor Herbert Lehman to establish the Committee
on Discrimination in Employment (COD) as part of the New York State Council of Defense in
March 1941.106 Devoted to integrating the defense industry because “discrimination of any kind
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is un-American, indefensible, and…dangerous to our democracy at this time,” the committee
coordinated with the broader defense council to gather statistics, negotiate with employers to
adopt non-discriminatory practices, and concurrently launch an anti-discrimination educational
campaign. Executive Order 8802, Franklin Roosevelt’s response to A. Philip Randolph’s threat
of mass protest in Washington, established a similar bureau at the federal level, the Fair
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). The FEPC accepted individual complaints of
discrimination and could investigate the alleged claims, basically launching a publicity campaign
in order to compel a firm to comply. FDR expanded the FEPC’s powers in 1943 under
Executive Order 9346, requiring all contracts to carry a non-discrimination clause.107
On one hand, these committees, at both the state and Federal level, were as “toothless,”
as historians claim. The FEPC remained chronically underfunded, underpowered, and unwilling
to threaten war production to integrate firms. Of some 8,000 claims nationwide, only a third
were resolved in some form. As Kevin Kruse and Stephen Tuck argue, the FEPC was “thin on
substance,” representing little more than a symbolic origin to any federal civil rights commitment
in the twentieth century. New York’s COD also had little power to enforce anti-discrimination,
and mostly launched publicity campaigns or number-gathering initiatives.108 Regardless of the
apparent limitations, the effectiveness of these committees ultimately rested on local
cooperation, as Joseph Abel argues. The FEPC was most effective in the North and among firms
with sympathetic management or in desperate need of workers. Once the FEPC was integrated
into the Office of Production Management in 1942 and then the War Manpower Commission in
107
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1943, those bureau’s regional offices were responsible for enforcement. Local black workers
discovered that on Long Island, government officials were committed to integrating firms,
especially as firms faced worker shortages, and as a result, aspiring black workers were able to
join the defense industry on Long Island.109
The black struggle to join Long Island’s war economy began during the defense buildup
in 1940. After Republic Aviation announced a fivefold plant expansion on September 9th, New
York Urban League Industrial Secretary Charles Collier Jr. visited the plant to inform the
company of available black aviation mechanics from the Manhattan High School of Aviation
Trades. At the time, there was only one African American chauffeur among the company’s
2,400 workers. Republic’s public relations director, William L. Wilson, dismissed the effort to
employ more black workers, stating that he could do little “because of objections from white
workers in the plant if Negroes were employed” which would “interfere with efficient production
on defense orders.”110 Republic’s attitude galvanized black activists across the metropolitan
area, and members from New York City’s Urban League, the Catholic Interracial Council, the
Committee for Employment Opportunities for Negroes, and the National Conference of
Christians and Jews united in an ad-hoc committee to launch a massive publicity campaign
against the metropolitan area’s intransigent firms.111 By January 1941, the committee contacted
President Roosevelt and Governor Lehman to raise awareness, and by the end of the month,
State Lieutenant Governor Charles Poletti launched a full-scale investigation, condemning
Republic, Brewster, and Grumman for their refusal to hire qualified black employees from the
109

Joseph Abel, “African Americans, Labor Unions and the Struggle for Fair Employment in the Aircraft
Manufacturing Industry in Texas, 1941-1945,” The Journal of Southern History 77, no. 3 (August 2011): 598, 637.
110
Charles A. Collier, “Memorandum: The Employment and Training of Negro Aviation Mechanics by the
Republic Aviation Corp,” January 10, 1941, Box 7, folder 404, War Council Papers
111
Charles A. Collier, “Memorandum: The Employment and Training of Negro Aviation Mechanics by the Brewster
Aeronautical Corporation” January 10, 1941, Box 7, folder 404, War Council Papers; Letter from George K. Hunton
to Mr. W. Wallace Kellet, November 4, 1940, Box 7, folder 404, War Council Papers.

63
Manhattan school.112 In May, Republic agreed to train one black resident of Patchogue, Long
Island, “an experiment…in this one instance” that if successful, would provide avenues for other
minority employees. By August, all three companies committed to “liberal hiring policies” and
promised to “give job and training opportunities to every qualified Negro in Nassau and Suffolk
counties.”113
Long Island’s firms did little to fulfill their promise. When the local division of the
Office of Production Management (OPM) (responsible for coordinating the nation’s economy
and for the FEPC’s implementation early in the war) received a letter from William Hendricks,
an experienced black electrical engineer who was refused a job at Republic, the labor division of
the OPM investigated. OPM field employment assistant Edward Lawson reported that “frankly,
I’m beginning to think that Republic is stalling along” after discovering the company still had
only a single black employee in a laborer position. Lawson wrote to Republic public relations
director William L. Wilson, and the company gave Hendricks a job in the tool and die
department. By November 1, 1941, Hendricks was officially on the payroll as a toolmaker, the
first black employee on the production line at Republic.114 While securely employed by the end
of the year, the environment at Republic remained hostile to blacks, and within a year, Hendricks
faced serious threats to his job. He felt “treated with an aire [sic] of suspicion because it was
unusual for a black to be seen here,” and felt discriminated by “a superior who possibly was
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afraid that I might aspire for his job.” He managed a number of employees but was unable to
keep them from “shooting oil from pressure cans, throwing towels knotted up at one another and
tying cups of water to whirling machines.” Hendricks tried to reprimand them, but those he
spoke to were quickly removed from his charge until he led only a single employee. When he
asked his sectional supervisor about the situation, the supervisor replied that “no matter how
qualified a colored man was, still white men did not want to take the work from him.”115
Hendricks returned to Edward Lawson in 1942, now working for the local office of War
Manpower Commission in charge of FEPC implementation. Hendricks filed another complaint,
and outright hostility ensued at work. Supervisors advised him to leave the company, fellow
workers believed he was a government spy (admittedly, he had been writing letters to
government officials about inefficiency at the workplace, blaming “German” elements at
Republic) and pranksters removed the screws and bolts from his chair so “when I sat down, the
chair fell apart and I found myself on the floor.” Despite his excellent record on the job, the
company transferred him to the methods engineering department (a sector devoted to
experimental manufacturing), and was so eager to remove him altogether that they willingly
wrote a letter of reference for him and claimed he was “unhappy on the job.”116 While admittedly
uneasy at work, Hendricks did not want to leave the company, asking the WMC once again for
assistance. Edward Lawson tried to negotiate with the company, but Republic claimed that a
hate-strike would ensue among white workers and that “the management” would not hire more
blacks unless Hendricks was ousted. Lawson responded that if management could not control
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their employees, “the Army representatives of the War Manpower Commission would see to it
that no serious stoppage of work occurred because of the refusal of individuals to work with a
Negro.” Lawson went further: “any employee who refuses to continue normal work because of
his personal prejudices will be considered disloyal to the Government and not only will be
subject to immediate dismissal, but may be prevented from obtaining employment in other
industrial establishments engaged in war production.”117 Republic conceded, giving Hendricks a
senior operation sheet writer position in the methods engineering department.
It took nearly a year and outright threats to secure a job for a single, well-qualified black
worker. While undoubtedly a major victory for officials assigned to prying open the industry,
this did not guarantee opportunities in defense work for the masses of African Americans in the
metropolitan region. In a region with few trained industrial workers, access to training programs
was the key to entry into the aircraft industry, and this proved the most formidable obstacle to
integrating Long Island’s defense workforce. Aside from the immense unpaid time investment
for the unskilled (three-hour night classes on weekdays took nearly half a year to complete), it
was in training schools where birth certificates were checked, literacy tested, and physical exams
administered. Training schools were the major regulators of the workforce, and firms could stall
integration while still promising to hire on a non-racial basis by simply limiting access to
training programs, a widespread form of “training discrimination” as Joseph Abel argues in his
study of the Texas aircraft industry.118
Defense firms limited access to training programs in two ways. First, to assert control
over the training regimen, they refused to recognize training from unacceptable programs. The
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National Youth Administration (NYA) centers on Long Island, which had converted to defense
training after 1940, were celebrated for training black men and women for war work.119
Nonetheless, this public form of training was deemed inadequate, and NYA graduates like Sarah
Tibbs, a black resident of Amityville, were denied employment at all the major companies.120
Aside from limiting acceptable training programs, firms also used schools to screen potential
employees. Migrant domestic Myrtle Lebby of Inwood was refused a position at an aviation
school in Lynbrook for having recently held a job in Washington DC, and therefore did not meet
local residency requirements. Arthur Lindsay of Freeport was likewise dropped from a school in
Freeport after a “confidential investigation of his residence, associates, and habits” deemed him
unfit to work for the company, despite stellar records at the school and good rapport with his
teacher.121 The Freeport National Defense School’s 425 enrollees in June 1942 had no blacks at
all, rejecting a dozen black applicants the month prior who were below the school’s
requirements.122 African Americans rejected from these schools turned to government agencies
to rectify the situation. New York State’s COD responded to complaints over the Freeport
school’s anti-black stance in 1942, forcing the school to re-enroll two of the twelve rejected
applicants and continuously monitoring the school through July when they accepted nineteen
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black students. In 1943, the COD launched hearings, conferences, and a full-scale investigation
to guarantee equal access to the schools. By June 1943, the COD, in cooperation with the FEPC,
restricted the firms’ ability to select trainees at schools, requiring standardized non-racial
admissions criteria for entrance that were assessed any enrollee alleged discrimination.123
After nearly two years, workers and government officials managed to pry open the
industry to black employment, a struggle that coalesced with the growing labor shortage after
1942. Republic’s minority employment increased from two employees in October 1941 to 105
by September 1942, with over half working in skilled or semi-skilled positions. While still only
one percent of the firm’s entire workforce, black workers were making headway in the company.
Grumman likewise improved their hiring policies, from fifteen non-white employees in October
1941 (with only five laboring on the assembly line) to fifty the next year, with twenty five in
training (though this only represented a quarter of a percent of the total workforce).124 After
1942, those numbers would grow as Long Island’s labor market dried up. In December 1942,
the WMC considered Suffolk County “pretty well drained of applicants,” and by the next year,
firms canvassed over radio, in newspapers, and door-to-door. They accepted part-time
employees, cut the process of hiring aliens down to two weeks, encouraged women to apply, and
even went as far as accepting trainees from New York City, although more often they relaxed
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residency requirements for people moving to Long Island in order to qualify for the local
schools.125 With racial barriers broken and immense manpower needs, the FEPC and the COD
became referral organizations, solving the labor shortage while also getting blacks hired. When
five black women from Amityville did not receive calls for jobs after completing training, the
FEPC alerted Republic of the situation, who found these women jobs as they opened. Likewise,
when Mrs. Laurona Hunter was refused a position at Republic in 1943, the FEPC negotiated a
non-factory position for her since the company was not hiring for the assembly line.126
Upholding anti-discrimination took a back seat to filling jobs. After a year of fighting to keep
William Hendricks employed at Republic Aviation, the FEPC supported his termination in
September 1943, citing the fact that other blacks were now employed in the tool room and 280
were in the plant overall. Hendrick’s previous defender, WMC officer Edward Lawson, believed
Hendricks suffered from a “very pronounced persecution complex.”127
Over the course of the war, the proportion of African Americans workers in Long
Island’s defense industry grew. From 1942 to 1943, the black proportion jumped from just under
one percent (0.9%) to 3.1 percent, or over 1,500 employees within the seven largest aircraft
firms. While relatively small number, when measured against the 1940 black population, the
seven largest aircraft producers employed over ten percent (10.4 percent) of all African
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American adults, close to the twelve percent of all adult whites working in the industry. By
1944, that white-black difference narrowed to 9.3 percent of all adult blacks compared to ten
percent of all whites as total aircraft employment dropped eighteen percent. Given the walls
around Long Island’s labor market, this was a significant achievement. The numbers in
scientific instruments, a field closely tied to aircraft production, followed a similar trajectory. In
November 1942, only 130 non-whites worked in the entire sector, or 1.6 percent of the total
labor force. By November 1944, that number jumped to 4.3 percent of the workforce.128
Racial integration and black mobility within companies varied by firm and sector, as
Table 1.2 illustrates. Fairchild’s Ranger Engine division in Farmingdale, the most intransigent of
aircraft parts firms, severely limited the mobility of its paltry forty-one black employees. When
WMC officials visited the plant, the employment manager informed them that their applications
had removed any references to race or religion, though direct conversations with black
employees revealed that race determined an employee’s occupational status. Employee Sylvia
Morris reported that she was the first black women to work on machines at the plant, and black
men were relegated to the porter department. A male employee confirmed this, stating that
despite his five-month training in preparation for the assembly line, he was told “that the only
job for Negroes in the plant were those of porters or washers.” Another male employee admitted
to operating a burring machine but remained at a washer’s pay-rate. Promotions were not based
on qualifications or training accolades, but made in an ad-hoc manner, overwhelmingly favoring
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Table 1.2: Black Employment Levels in Selected Firms, 1944
Black Employees
Total Employees
Grumman
Liberty Aircraft
Republic Aviation
Ranger Engines

900*
124
375
41

24,000*
2,249
11,417
2,074

Percent of Total
Employees (%)
3.8
5.5
3.3
2.0

* Estimate
Source: “Final Deposition Report” March 9, 1944, Box 25, folder 2-BR-369, Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC;
“Compliance Report,” Oct. 25, 1944, Box 27, folder 2-BR-409, Case Files 1941-1946, FEPC; “Final Deposition
Report,” January 24, 1945, Box 33, folder 2-BC-1131, FEPC; “Final Deposition Report,” March 23, 1944, Box 32,
folder 2-BC-563, FEPC.

whites.129 Ranger was the exception on Long Island, as once workers and corporate heads
generally accepted blacks on the factory floor, they entered into the broad corporate ladder. Of
107 black employees at Republic in September 1943, fifty-seven percent were categorized as
skilled or semi-skilled, compared to a quarter working in the non-manufacturing positions.
Sperry Gyroscope Company, the most progressive of the metropolitan area’s firms, managed to
employ almost two-thirds of its black workforce in its Lake Success plant in the skilled or semiskilled categories, and only four of the 717 black employees worked in non-production
positions.130
Ultimately, prospective black employees compelled government officials to enforce antidiscrimination employment law and require the region’s defense factories to train and hire on a
non-racial basis. African Americans benefitted from this early struggle as labor shortages
became acute. By 1943, blacks were participants in the industry and government-driven
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transformation of Long Island’s workforce that severed both black and white dependence on the
employment patterns of farms, resorts, middle class homes, and wealthy estates. With access to
better paying and more secure jobs, African Americans on Long Island could enjoy the fruits of
the ‘Great Compression,’ as the area’s working class became industrialized, entering into
massive factories with others like themselves, and benefitting from the upward mobility wartime
work provided.

The Future Detroit of the East
Defense industrialization created a brand new world of work and homes for thousands of
black and white Long Islanders, placing the manufacturing production worker, rather than the
middle class commuter or estate owner, at the center. The black and white laborers who left the
farms and estates for defense factories entered a working environment distinct from the
residential and agricultural suburban workplace. While most factories employed less than a
hundred workers, the majority of defense laborers worked for the big three firms: Republic,
Grumman, and Sperry. Here they walked into hundred acre single-story plants, labored above,
below, and alongside hundreds of other workers as they assembled fighter-bombers, aircraft
engines, or on a smaller scale, various scientific instruments. Sperry’s Lake Success Plant
exemplified this new work environment. Elmer Sperry founded the Sperry Gyroscope Company
in 1910 to design and produce navigational technologies, the most prominent being the
gyroscope, a device to measure orientation in ships and planes. By World War II, the company
had expanded into various military technologies requiring new factories and a workforce of over
47,000 employees at peak production in 1943 and 1944. In 1941, Sperry built two factories on
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Long Island along the Queens/Nassau border in Great Neck and Lake Success.131 The plant in
Lake Success was built largely in what was then the “country,” requiring an automobile or access
to the limited private bus transportation available. On a tour of this plant, one FEPC official
commented that “the space covered stretches out beyond the limit of vision and the tour around
the various departments took about two hours and even then I did not see all of them.” The
scientific instruments moved along a belt as the various pieces were assembled, and cellophane
covered the instrument as it travelled through the assembly line to prevent dust particles from
clogging the device. Usually one worker utilized a machine, though most were capable of
working two or three different kinds of machines to prevent boredom and broaden skills.
Women and African Americans worked alongside white men in nearly every sector of the very
hot, noisy, and dirty factory (save the electronics production department, which was air
conditioned and clean), and non-whites were almost sixteen percent of the total workforce in
early 1945.132
The shop floor was merely one place workers of all genders and colors would mingle
together. At Sperry, cafeterias fed employees, a plant hospital provided complete physical care,
and at lunchtime, “negro and white workers were playing games together” including horseshoes
and volleyball. This was common practice throughout Long Island’s defense firms. At Republic
Aviation, dance parties were popular among both black and white laborers, while Grumman was
the most well-known for its paternalistic environment for war workers. The company
maintained an ‘open-door’ management policy so that employees were welcome to air any
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grievance or issue directly to the company’s top managers, and they paid the fourth highest
wages in the nation, not including a bonus system to increase production across the plant (which
other firms in the area emulated). The company also maintained a forty-acre farm, three
nurseries for employee children, and a number of sports programs for both men and women,
including over one hundred softball teams. Grummanites, rather than viewing this as an empty
corporate gesture, openly embraced Grumman’s paternalist policies, and a kind of family culture
developed between workers and the employer that continued into the postwar period.133
The war transformed the lives of thousands outside the defense workforce as well.
Domestics found work in the USO, servicing military personnel at Mitchel Field (and the
surrounding bases, including Santini), a key supply base for US defenses in the North Atlantic
and home to the Air Defense Command. While estate workers like James Baxter jokingly
referred to Mitchel Field as “the white officer’s country club” between the wars because wealthy
military officers kept horses and played polo (requiring black service workers to care for their
horses), the war broadened the activities taking place at the base, and employment opportunities
abounded. Irma Brasier left her domestic service job at the Garden City Country Club in 1943,
working as a USO senior hostess along with her mother for the duration of the organization’s
initial existence to 1947.134 Further east, Mason General Hospital in Brentwood opened to handle
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soldier’s psychological issues, while Camp Upton expanded from its army training origins to
include a hospital, separation center, and a host of new buildings, and both required hundreds of
construction workers, office personnel, mess attendants, and general service workers.135
Demand for food meanwhile afforded agricultural laborers an unprecedented degree of stability.
With a rise in potato planting, black farmworkers had plenty of work, and the WMC opened a
number of agricultural labor supply centers to house and coordinate work schedules for some
652 indigenous, southern, and foreign laborers, supplementing their intermittent agricultural
employment with non-agricultural war-related work. Even with a continued influx of southern
blacks, the Department of Agriculture had to import 450 Jamaican workers to harvest produce
across two-hundred farms on Long Island from 1943-1945.136
Long Islanders also encountered a new spatial layout catering to the needs of
manufacturing production workers. Real estate developer Frederick Leeston-Smith, who bought
up a 300-acre plot of land to build 1,200 homes adjacent to the growing Grumman plant in 1940,
foresaw that the Island was “fast becoming a great center of aircraft and allied industries…the
future Detroit of the east.” He imagined the farmland giving way to homes for industrial
workers, and secured Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages to make the homes
affordable. Bankers, retail store owners, and above all builders anticipated the building boom
and “buying power of our people” unleashed by the high wages of defense work as early as
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1940. In a region that had built much of its prosperity on housing construction prior to the
Depression, a new housing boom directly related to industry would lift the two counties out of
the decade-long construction slump.137
On one hand, workers did have access to new housing opportunities as they flocked to
communities immediately surrounding factories. Farmingdale, a village resting between
Republic Aviation and Grumman, became completely overrun with workers trying to secure
even temporary housing. A survey noted that “most of the houses are rented even before they
have been vacated” and homeowners capitalized on the limited housing stock, charging
exorbitant rents “even for the shabbiest dwellings.” Workers even resorted to renting “defense
trailers” in lieu of actual housing. Only seventeen percent of surveyed Republic employees
owned their own homes, while nearly half rented an apartment, house, or slept in room & board
accommodations. Demand for housing was high, especially because “increased earnings of the
workers have spurred their desire for better housing facilities.”138 The U.S. Housing Authority
appropriated one million dollars for defense housing at the outset of the war, and dozens of real
estate developers capitalized on housing demand as well.139 Aside from Leeston-Smith’s
housing tracts in Bethpage, several housing developments appeared early in the war. In
Farmingdale village, South Park Homes, East Park Homes, Nakomis Park, and Republic Homes
all catered to defense workers with FHA mortgages, and many were “sold faster than they are
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being built.” In the New Hyde Park/Lake Success area, one hundred and thirty homes were
erected after Sperry opened its factory in 1942. Developers even built luxury homes to
accommodate “executives, engineers, architects, and the better paid workers,” including
Alexander Edelman’s 500 shorefront homes in Lindenhurst village along the Great South Bay, “a
mecca for yachting, fishing, and duck shooting.”140
Aside from these projects though, Long Island would not have the kind of boomtown
development like Willow Run outside Detroit or the burgeoning defense areas of the South and
West during the war. While factories blossomed across the region’s landscape, the housing
boom would follow the war, not coincide with it. Housing construction from 1940-1944
declined sixty-four percent from the 1930s and was seventy-one percent lower than the
immediate postwar period (1945-1950), the birth-pangs of the postwar suburban boom.141
Government restrictions played a pivotal role. Aside from widespread rationing of building
materials, construction itself became highly regulated during the war. The National Housing
Agency (NHA) limited government housing loans to properties within war areas with actual
housing shortages, and the NHA found no housing problems on Long Island. Since the majority
of workers lived in Nassau and Suffolk Counties anyway, the government encouraged bus
services, increased use of railroads, and car-pools or temporary tenancies as alternatives to new
housing.142
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Rather than a housing boom occurring near burgeoning factories, a factory boom
happened in the ample but dispersed settlements across the bi-county region, a pattern that would
expand in the postwar period as firms decentralized aspects of production to draw in pockets of
workers from local neighborhoods. Grumman opened five auxiliary plants in 1942, stretching
from Port Washington on the North Shore to Amityville on the South shore, allowing local
employees to walk to work.143 Jake Swirbul saw the advantages not only in bringing in new
workers, but also as a means to expand manufacturing space without limiting production.144
Republic and Sperry likewise opened multiple plants in Oyster Bay, Great Neck, and Lake
Success. Subcontractors remained even more decentralized, operating anywhere from former
airfields in Valley Stream on the Queens/Nassau border to Greenport on the North Fork of
eastern Long Island. So unlike the military bases of the South or the massive industrial Willow
Run Bomber plant twenty-five miles outside of Detroit, housing and factories did not emerge
simultaneously or in the same magnitude on Long Island, though the transformation was no less
significant. In Nassau and western Suffolk counties, industrialization came to the suburbs,
transforming suburbia’s purpose from agricultural, commuter, and estate economies to that of
manufacturing mass-production. Industry pulled workers off farms or out of upper and middle
class homes and into the more stable world of defense manufacturing as well as the multiplier
effects of wartime demand.
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Conclusion
Wartime’s broad-based prosperity was short-lived, a result of unprecedented war needs
rather than any sustained civilian demand that consumer industries could look forward to. As the
material demand declined in 1944, workers were left with uncertainty. The next year, wartime
spending dried up, and in regions transformed during the war, economist Paul Samuelson’s
warnings of a returning depression rang true: the military cancelled over 18,000 contracts, and
fifty of the nation’s sixty-six airframe plants ceased to produce aircraft.145 Republic Aviation
ordered a ten-day shutdown in 1945, and by December, employment dropped to 3,700. Sperry’s
workforce meanwhile shrank from 30,000 to 5,000.146 Grumman took a different approach,
dismissing everyone over a loudspeaker announcement, and only notifying certain employees to
report for work the next week.147 The emergency of war turned these small companies into giant
enterprises, but peacetime could not sustain their size. Each tried converting to leaner civilian
production. Republic attempted to convert its XF-12 Rainbow military transport to commercial
uses, though both American and Pan-American Airlines cancelled purchases, while Republic’s
small-scale commercial amphibian (the RC-3 “Seabee”) proved costly and undercapitalized. The
company managed to sell only twenty Rainbows, and the RC-3 was a $6.5 million dollar loss.148
Republic consequently let 3,200 workers go in 1947 after increasing its workforce to 8,000.
Grumman had some success, producing a number of small-scale commercial aircraft (most
notably the G-73 Mallard), while also branching out into aluminum canoes and truck bodies, but
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Grumman’s diversification never comprised more than five percent of their total sales, which had
dropped from $236.8 million in 1945 to $24.2 million two years later, requiring a new round of
2,000 layoffs.149
Long Island’s airframe manufacturers competed for dwindling military funds, which
continued to comprise nearly eighty percent of all aircraft orders nationwide in the immediate
postwar period.150 For the industry’s employees, the mobility war work provided proved
fleeting. Women were overwhelmingly let go in what Stephen Patnode refers to as a postwar
transition to “neo-traditional” gender roles in the workplace, removing women from the shopfloor and restricting female jobs to low-level white collar work. As former Grummanite
Catherine O’Regan remembered, “after the war was over… they removed all of the females from
the shop… [the] next day they were all replaced by men.”151 For Long Island’s blacks, the
question was not so much about ‘last hired, first fired’ that unionists, civil rights activists, and
industrialists on the national level debated during the transition to peace, but what to do after an
entire industry collapsed, a problem they shared with their white co-workers. James Baxter
returned to estate work after losing his job at Grumman, securing stable employment again in
1956 as a groundskeeper for the public school system in Great Neck. Irma Brasier likewise
returned to the service sector after her stint for the USO, sewing dresses from home, and doing
day work or laundry.152
Within a little over two decades, black Long Islanders had moved from the fringes of the
low-wage suburban service market to participation in industrial suburbia. This was largely the
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result of the exceptional economic boom of war that drove an entire national economy to devote
its manpower and resources to develop thousands of planes, millions of tanks, and billions of
ammunition rounds. These African Americans were part of the broader Great Migration flanked
by the two World Wars, exploiting better-paying and liberating industrial work. Black migrants
to Long Island did not come to the area for industrial jobs however; they were swept up into the
wholesale transformation of the region, and this was thanks to local efforts as much as national
trends. The state played a pivotal role, structuring the local labor market and defending their
work rights. Local activists likewise pushed firms to employ all of Long Island’s manpower,
regardless of background or skin color. Through the combined forces of state intervention and
activist interest in black employment, opportunity emerged. Ultimately, these efforts were all for
temporary work in a wartime emergency, and there was little evidence that either the defense
industry or equal opportunity would be sustained for existing African Americans or new black
migrants after World War II. Like the nation as a whole, Long Islanders feared a return to the
old prewar economy. Blacks, too, feared that the war years were aberrant and wondered about
their futures as the factories closed around them.
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Chapter 2
Progress and Poverty

In 1951, National Geographic magazine published an article of writer-photographer and
explorer Howell Walker’s most recent excursion. It was not to remote Australian territories or
obscure Quebec farms, but instead a drive from the East River to Montauk, to observe an island
where the “only monotonous thing about it is the constant change.” Emerging from the newlyconstructed Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, Walker made his way east, stopping to interview locals
and observe Long Island in flux. The detour included Levittown, and Walker snapped photos of
the new model homes, the lines of anxious homebuyers, and veterans filling out applications for
low-cost loans.1 Walker’s photographs, along with the pictures and stories in Time, The New
York Times, and elsewhere cemented Levittown and Long Island as the quintessential postwar
suburb, emblematic of America’s prosperity and social mobility after 1945.2 And though the
myth that surrounds Levittown attributes its popularity to the baby boom, returning veterans, and
Americans’ proclivities toward homeownership, Walker recognized a major factor in Levittown
and Long Island’s popularity: “along with the popular eastward migration goes industry. Home
seekers want space for their families, business needs space for its plants. The general trend is a
healthy one; transplanted factories find available labor in the grown suburbs, and residents find
jobs close to home.”3
Though Walker neglected the structural factors undergirding postwar suburbanization,
historians have filled in the gap, showing the role of federal housing subsidies and highway
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construction in fostering postwar sprawl. Unlike Walker, historians still overlook the importance
of jobs to postwar suburbanization, and if suburban industry is mentioned, it is in the context of
tax revenues and the urban/suburban divide, not as central to suburbanization itself.4 On Long
Island, jobs and housing grew together, both thanks to federal agencies: the FHA spent $601 per
Nassau County resident from 1934 to 1960, while defense spending per capita in Nassau County
amounted to $596 in 1960 alone.5 Defense dollars buttressed a robust labor market in blue-collar
jobs and services, supporting an estimated 600,000 of 1.3 million Nassau County residents in
1960.6 Defense-related manufacturing also fostered the infrastructure and construction capacity
to attract other industries, while the population boom led to new jobs in finance, retail, and
various services. In all, job growth was a critical factor in Long Island’s 400 percent population
increase from 1945 to 1960, especially for the thousands of upwardly mobile working class
Americans who took advantage of new employment opportunities to purchase homes on the
Island and become members of the postwar ‘middle class.’
Whether one could access these jobs determined their ability to enjoy Long Island’s
postwar consumer bounty; the labor market was critical to social mobility. This was as true for
the region’s burgeoning black population as anyone else. While housing segregation was
endemic across Long Island, residential discrimination did not forbid aspiring black suburbanites
from moving to the bi-county region, nor did it push pre-war black residents off Long Island. On
one hand, a rising black ‘middle class’ procured jobs that financed homeownership, at least one
car, a washer machine, and a TV. They sat in traffic on their daily commutes, fretted over taxes,
4
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spent weekends tending to lawns, and entertained guests in their living rooms, all like the
average white suburbanite.7 Families like the Blackmans, who owned a 50 x 100 lot in the
Nassau County hamlet of New Cassel, typified this black middle class. Carl Blackman was an
engineering supervisor who drove to his defense-related instrument job in Suffolk, while his wife
Lorraine taught pre-kindergarten in nearby Westbury. Together, they earned $20,000 a year,
well above the Nassau County median family income.8 But for every success story like the
Blackmans, there was a family like the Jacksons. Bessie and her husband moved from Harlem to
the very same neighborhood of New Cassel in 1966 after years of saving and job hunting. Her
husband Logan got a trucking job on Long Island, and Bessie hoped to leave the workforce to
care for the kids. Unfortunately, Logan contracted tuberculosis and was admitted to a
sanatorium. Bessie tried to apply for welfare, but was denied because they were homeowners.
She then returned to the workforce as a domestic servant, a job sectors commensurate with her
skills and work experience. Each morning she rode a bus to an employment agency in
downtown Hempstead and then another bus to her job site. The kids helped one another get to
school, and returned home long before her.9
As Newsday, Long Island’s suburban daily newspaper recognized in 1966, “there is the
middle class Negro who has made it and the poor Negro who has not.”10 While the Blackmans’
trajectory was only possible in Long Island’s robust postwar economy, the Jacksons and the
thousands of others who labored in homes, on farms, or waited for work on street corners were
what Peter Bacon Hales insightfully calls “ghostly images” in suburbia, “of a different time and
place, a different land and landscape.” Almost half of Long Island’s black population in the
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postwar period did not obtain the kinds of jobs that enabled upward mobility in the postwar
period, and instead labored in occupations resembling the pre-war world of work: inconsistent,
low-wage, and lacking benefits. Though living within a region of unprecedented opportunity,
they were seemingly untouched by the prosperity around them. “These negroes were not actors
in the Levittown drama,” as Hales put it.11
While a tiny proportion of Long Island’s population, the region’s disproportionately
black poor nonetheless complicate the spatial narrative of postwar urban history, one that places
housing segregation at the center of racial inequality. In the most popular metropolitan histories,
the suburban economy is prosperous, but segregation limited African American access to these
jobs. The postwar suburb, while racially divided, is above all class homogeneous.12 On Long
Island, the black poor lived in the suburbs, though residence within a prosperous region did not
translate into upward mobility, and the central problem was the structure of the economy itself,
in terms of the jobs it produced for the unskilled and the ways racism pervaded the labor market.
Their existence illustrates the limits of Long Island’s postwar growth and the postwar economy,
which unlike World War II, favored the educated and skilled; those lacking either or both
competed at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Living amidst affluence did not assure
inclusion.
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Jobs and Housing
In 1958, social workers at Adelphi University interviewed industrial workers living on
Long Island, the ‘M’ family being among the dozen of blue-collar interviewees. Mr. ‘M’, his
wife and two sons were originally New York City residents with ‘limited assets,’ but when Mr.
‘M’ secured a job at Republic Aviation in 1951 during the Korean War boom, the family
relocated to Long Island. They rented for two years, saving Mr. M’s high wages to purchase a
$9,600 single-family home, completing their transition into the postwar middle class. The story
was typical on Long Island and significant for two reasons. First, it illustrates the importance of
industry to suburbanization, including postwar suburbanization. As geographers Richard Walker
and Robert Lewis argue, “residential areas…have always been joined at the hip by industry
locating to the urban fringe.”13 Long Island’s postwar suburbanization was both an industrial and
residential process occurring simultaneously, as Table 2.1 illustrates. Job growth actually
outpaced the population increase from 1935-1954, and manufacturing led the charge, laying
down the foundation for the postwar residential boom. The ‘M’ family story is also significant
because they were a working class family who took advantage of industrial growth in the
suburbs to become homeowners and members of the postwar ‘middle class,’ using geographic
mobility for upward social mobility. Though not all suburban migrants moved to the urban
fringe for jobs, recent research has indicated that job decentralization influenced residential
suburbanization after World War II, i.e. people followed jobs to the suburbs.14 And needless to
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Table 2.1: Nassau-Suffolk Population vs. Manufacturing, Wholesale, and Retail
Employment, 1935 and 1954
1935
1954
Change (%)
Population
530,000*
1,346,414
154
Manufacturing
6,979
110,737
1,487
Wholesale
2,159
10,978
409
Retail
18,741
71,211
280
Total
24,879
192,926
592
* Estimate
Source: Source: Harold L. Wattel, “Economic Growth and Unemployment,” in Long Island Business 5, no. 1 (Jan.
1958): 7, Box 1, Hofstra College Center for the Study of Business and Community Research Records, Long Island
Studies Institute, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York.

say, working class suburbanites were more likely to relocate for jobs, particularly on Long
Island, where relatively high-wage industries could be used as the stepping-stone to suburban
homeownership. Unlike pre-war working class migrants, working class families moving to Long
Island were no longer relegated to the low-wage job opportunities of the estate and agricultural
economy. Instead, the postwar working class benefitted from a decentralized landscape of
industry and services for a broad population of blue-collar workers, engineers, small
businessmen, and a growing army of retailers, government employees, wholesalers, and other
service workers. The ‘crabgrass frontier’ was indeed a new space, for both jobs and homes.
At the center of Long Island’s postwar industrial growth were the defense-oriented
aircraft producers. World War II laid the foundation for industrial suburbia, but the Cold War
sustained it. The industry’s postwar uncertainty in 1945 dissipated as the Cold War precipitated
a gradual military expansion that lasted into the 1980s. Long Island became part of what Ann
Markusen describes as the ‘gunbelt,’ the defense-induced industrial shift to loosely developed
areas stretching from the suburbs of Boston down the Atlantic coastline to Florida, across the

Decentralization and Residential Location," Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs (2009, no. 1): 17-19; For
critiques of their analysis, see “Comments,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs (2009, no. 1): 21-31.
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Deep South, and up the West Coast in the postwar period.15 Cold War spending favored
airpower, and Republic, Grumman and their subcontractors benefitted in two ways. During
conventional ‘hot wars’ like Korea and Vietnam, airframe firms manufactured jet aircraft. In
the broader arms race, Long Island’s defense-oriented firms sustained their businesses with
experimental weaponry contracts during the guided missiles boom in the wake of the Soviet Abomb detonation, and later the space boom following the launch of Sputnik.16 Electronics firms
became prominent during the guided missiles boom, and Long Island’s electronic manufacturers,
including American Bosch Arma and Sperry Gyroscope, joined Grumman and Republic in
missile production.17 The ‘space’ boom of the 1960s then pumped billions of dollars into what
was now the ‘aerospace’ industry, and Grumman secured the Apollo Lunar Module contract
from NASA in 1962, constructing twelve modules.18
The presence of these large defense contractors influenced the physical layout and the
labor market of Long Island’s postwar economy. The contracts flowing to these large firms
attracted subcontractors engaged in war production to the region, accelerating a process of
industrial ‘decentralization’ in the New York metropolitan area occurring since the turn of the
century.19 While New York’s consumer electronics industry migrated to the Midwest, firms
developing un-standardized electronics (namely military goods) stayed in the tristate area, and

15

Markusen et. al, 3. See Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development,
and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) for an excellent
account of the South’s defense-driven regional growth in the postwar period.
16
Ann Markusen differentiates between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war’ booms, the former (Korea, Vietnam) necessitating
conventional armaments, the latter (Sputnik, SDI) demanding experimental weaponry. Markusen, et. al, 9.
17
“American Bosch Arma Corporation,” Careers in Astronautics, April 1959, folder “Arma – Garden City,” CAM;
“Sperry Golden Anniversary Book,” folder “Sperry Gyroscope Corp. – Brooklyn/Lake Success,” CAM.
18
Onkst, 20-24; Thruelson, 333.
19
The “New York Metropolitan Area” is defined as defined as a 22 county region across New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut; Richard Harris, “Industry and Residence: The Decentralization of New York City, 1900-1940,”
Journal of Historical Geography 19, no. 2 (1993): 171-176.

88
Long Island employed almost a fifth of the nation’s military electronics workers in the 1950s.20
New firms accounted for some of this growth, though a 1956 survey of Long Island industry
found that three quarters of bi-county firms emigrated from New York City.21 Electronics, along
with the large aerospace producers, were the most visible industrial growth sectors in the bicounty region, making up two-thirds of all Long Island’s exports from as well as eighty-eight
percent of all export-oriented manufacturing.22
Defense manufacturing, which required huge flexible factories, encouraged an industrial
real estate market that attracted other industrial firms to the region, part of the broader industrial
decentralization taking place nation-wide. Developers designed ‘industrial parks’ to
accommodate this shift, single story factories built in a zoned area for industry with setback
requirements and parking, usually near major transportation nodes. The ‘industrial park’ offered
firms versatile workspaces. Managers utilized the floor-space to adapt ‘assembly stations’ to
new products and automation techniques, and could use large plots of land for plant expansion if
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necessary.23 Developer Abraham Shames is credited to have built the first industrial park in the
northeast, a “community of commerce” in Westbury, Long Island in 1956. By 1965, more than
sixty-eight industrial parks went up on Long Island, buttressing a twenty-two percent growth in
industrial firms.24 These parks attracted urban factories in search of space, as three separate
surveys revealed spatial needs were the primary factor in a firm’s relocation to Long Island.25
The publishing industry, which had been slowly leaving the city since 1910 when Doubleday
Publishers opened their “Country Life Press” facility in Garden City, grew to include some 290
establishments with over 9,400 employees by 1964.26 Plastics manufacturers, from kitchenware
to Christmas decorations, also established facilities in Nassau and Suffolk. Aurora Plastics
Corporation, makers of Batman, Superman, and Captain America hobby kits, moved from a
4,000 square foot plant in Brooklyn to a flexible facility in West Hempstead in 1954 where they
immediately added 148,000 square feet of floor space.27 Long Island even received some of the
massive decentralization of the city’s apparel industry in the postwar period, taking advantage of
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flexible plants and a cheap female labor pool. Apparel accounted for seven percent of all
manufacturing jobs in 1962.28
The aviation and aerospace industry was as influential to the labor market as it was Long
Island’s physical industrial landscape. First, defense production, which included electronics
manufacturers, metal fabricators, and chemical factories (among others), dominated
manufacturing employment in the region despite industrial diversification, accounting for half of
all industrial jobs in 1963.29 Secondly, the aerospace industry paid high wages. Unions
organized Long Island’s firms after World War II and successfully negotiated wages above
regional and national industrial earnings. The International Association of Machinists (IAM)
won recognition among Republic Aviation’s workforce in 1950, and by the end of the Korean
War in 1953, Republic’s workers earned the nation’s highest hourly industrial wages: $1.45 for
laborers and $2.45 for skilled workers. The International Union of Electronic and Electrical
Workers (IUE) organized a number of electronics manufacturers, including Sperry and American
Bosch Arma. By 1955, around eighty percent of defense workers were unionized on Long Island.
Grumman remained the only non-unionized major plant, though they maintained high wages and
generous benefits as a bulwark against labor organizing.30 75,000 aircraft and aerospace
workers, making on average $103.37 per week in 1956, raised the wages of electrical machinery,
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fabricated metal, and other defense-related manufacturers, not to mention the effects these wages
had on the service sector, which had to compete with the defense industry for workers.31 More
broadly, federal defense spending in the region had multiplier effects on the entire Long Island
economy. Several surveys determined that wages in the defense sector supported between one
and a half to two persons in related retail, service, and construction.32
Thanks to factory expansion and relocation, manufacturing employment in Nassau
County grew three percent from 1950-1960, triple the national average. By the end of the
decade, boosters bragged that more people worked in Long Island industry than “in the industries
of eighteen of our states.”33 And the relatively high-paying industrial jobs accounted for the
region’s rising affluence despite its rapid population growth, as Nassau became the most affluent
American county with 100,000 or more people in 1960, while Suffolk’s median income climbed
from below the New York State average to seventh highest in the state.34 This broad-based
wealth contributed to the massive housing boom after World War II, when over half of the
region’s homes were built, nearly ninety percent of which were single-family housing.35 While
federal housing subsidies were important factors in expanding homeownership, it was wellpaying job opportunities that enabled millions of upwardly mobile Americans to afford monthly
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mortgage payments and insurance. New York City commuters were still forty percent of
Nassau’s and fifteen percent of Suffolk’s workers as of 1960.36 But for Long Island’s working
class, Nassau and Suffolk’s budding high-wage industrial sector sustained homeownership, and
defense manufacturing in particular encouraged suburban migration.37 Sperry conducted a
survey in 1962, and while their largest facility sat on the Nassau/Queens border, only twelve
percent of their employees lived in the boroughs. New Hyde Park, the neighboring suburb of
Sperry’s Lake Success plant, had the highest concentration of families with employees (718
families), and nearly 2,484 employee families had moved east to Suffolk County since 1949.38
Republic likewise determined that of 12,681 employees in 1962, only nine percent commuted
from the boroughs, while over half (6,884) of workers lived in the immediate surrounding towns
of Oyster Bay, Hempstead, and Babylon.39 Finally, eighty percent of Grumman’s workforce
hailed from Long Island during the 1960s.40
Among Long Island’s postwar suburban housing tracts, the proportion of industrial
workers grew over the course of the 1950s, in step with suburban industrialization. Levittown,
America’s quintessential postwar suburb, exemplified this trend. Abraham Levitt and his sons
William and Alfred applied assembly-line construction techniques to construct 17,447 homes on
seven square miles of former potato fields and undeveloped land on the Hempstead/Oyster Bay
town border. 41 When the first homes entered the market in 1947, over two-thirds of the original
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veteran and white-collar homebuyers worked in the five boroughs. Fourteen years later, the
proportion of commuters fell to thirty-six percent, as did the number of white collar workers,
whose dominance dropped from over three-fourths to only half by 1961. As sociologist William
S. Dobriner argued, by 1960 Levittown was “no longer so clearly middle class… [it] has drifted
down from middle to working class.” 42 With over 1,000 aircraft workers in Levittown in 1960,
the quintessential postwar suburb was the realization of the American dream because of its ideal
location in an emerging industrial landscape.
The jobs-housing link worked both ways, as the sheer population growth laid a
foundation for a dynamic service sector, the final pillar to Long Island’s postwar prosperity.
Plant relocation and expansion, along with new housing and improvements (necessary for the
unfinished second floors of Long Island’s cheaply built Cape Cods), buttressed construction,
which remained a relatively stable source of jobs for around nine percent of Long Island’s labor
force from 1952-1965. Burgeoning suburban communities also necessitated a growing army of
sanitation workers, public works employees, police officers, teachers, and other civil servants.
From 1952-1965, government employment more than doubled. The retail sector, restricted to a
few railroad suburb downtowns prior to 1940, exploded after the war. Urban retailers followed
their customers, initiating a process of commercial decentralization similar to that of industry.
Macy’s moved into a 300,000 square foot anchor store in the newly constructed Roosevelt Field
shopping ‘mall’ in 1956, part of a complex that became one of the largest in the nation. Malls
and their step-brother, the strip-mall, proliferated across Long Island, making the region the
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fourth largest retail market in the country by 1964. In that same year, retail employment became
the largest single employment sector on Long Island, exceeding manufacturing by 24,000 jobs.43
Within twenty years, a transformed urban space developed on the outskirts of America’s
largest city. Cold War state spending and strong labor unions, along with state-subsidized
housing, highways, and commercial development supported broad-based upward mobility for
working class Americans. These national developments coalesced with decisions of real estate
developers, manufacturers, and commercial firms, who collectively pulled workers to factories
and homes in the suburbs, as Robert Self argues.44 While commuters still relied on Manhattan
and downtown Brooklyn for work, the region shed its dependence on Gotham, drawn instead
into the orbit of the federal government and its stimulus to housing construction and aerospace
manufacturing. Workers likewise shed their dependence on older, less equitable forms of work,
entering into unionized industrial or rapidly expanding service jobs. Opportunity on Long Island
was now predicated upon access to the region’s mass employment opportunity.

The Old Economy
The estate economy was already stagnant by the 1930s, and Long Island’s farms had
been competing with residential speculation since the turn of the century. But with the explosion
of housing, factories, and malls across Long Island after 1945, the estate era was officially over,
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though both farmers and estate owners maximized Long Island’s transformation from the ‘social
capital of the world’ into a ‘bedroom for the masses.’45 The costs of maintaining estates rose
precipitously, as taxes to support urban infrastructure fell heavily on large property owners. In
addition, the general shift away from Long Island’s elite status lowered the prestige of 100-acre
manses. Some shed their estates for as little as a quarter of the original purchasing cost, while a
few, including the widow of Marshall Fields III, transferred their properties to local and state
government for parkland. Others did well in the subdivision boom. JP Morgan Jr. sold the
family estate to developers who built some 100 homes on the site.46 The hamlet of Great Neck,
once a Gold Coast locale for industrialists, bankers, actors, and writers (including F. Scott
Fitzgerald), blossomed into a thriving suburban community, and ninety-five percent of the
estates were subdivided into one to two acre plots for 40,000 residents.47
Long Island’s farmers also exploited the opportunity to profit from suburbanization.
Budding housing tracts and the concomitant demand for urban services raised tax rates and
assessments, while a golden nematode outbreak temporarily devastated potato yields. Luckily,
these farmers were sitting on rapidly appreciating property, and many (including the fifty-five
farmers who sold their farms to the Levitts) let their land ‘idle’ for speculative purposes. Nassau
County’s 32,000 acres of farmland in 1945 dwindled to 5,565 acres by 1964.48 Remaining farms
in Nassau and western Suffolk now served a suburban population who wanted Halloween

45

Self, 17-18.
Sobin, 54-64, 112-117; “Caumsett,” the Marshall Field’s estate, was sold to Robert Moses of the Long Island
Parks Commission in 1961. See “State park Unit Buys L.I. Estate,” New York Times, Feb 4, 1961, 21; Planting
Fields State Park and Wertheim National Wildlife refuge on Long Island were similarly turned over the government
authorities; “Many view Home on Morgan Place: Seven-Room Model is Part of Development at Glen Cove,” New
York Times, Oct 8, 1950, R6.
47
Judith S. Goldstein, Inventing Great Neck Jewish Identity and the American Dream (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2006), 3-5.
48
U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census of Agriculture: 1945. Volume 1, Part 7: New York Statistics for
Counties (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1947), 24; U.S. Census Bureau, 1964 United States Census of Agriculture.
Volume 1 [State and County Statistics]. Part 7, New York (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1966), 261.
46

96
pumpkins or fresh produce during summer. In contrast, eastern Suffolk County farmers thrived
after World War II, exploiting new disease resistant crop-strains, fertilizers, equipment, and
pesticides. Suffolk County became the nation’s third largest potato producer in 1954 with
43,000 acres devoted to the tuber. Cauliflower was the second most popular crop, and Suffolk
farmers were innovators in its mass production, growing over two million crates per year.49
Suffolk also continued to be the nation’s premier duck producer. Wartime rationing expanded
the demand for ducks in the 1940s, a development that extended after the war as ducks competed
with chickens and turkeys for America’s favorite dinner bird. The Hollis Warner Duck farm, the
largest duck producer in the world, sat on 250 acres along the mouth of the Peconic River in
Riverhead, producing 500,000 ducks per year. The operation employed the latest technological
advancements and organizing techniques available, including electric incubators, devoted wheat
fields, and two miles of cart tracks to feed thousands of ducks. Warner’s farm employed 150
workers alone, not including the freezers and transportation network necessary to reach the
national market. In all, seventy Suffolk duck farms reached peak production of 7.5 million ducks
in the late 1950s, thriving amidst postwar suburbanization. Where Nassau and western Suffolk
County developed into an urban agglomeration of homes, factories, and retail centers, eastern
Suffolk was a sparse cluster of commercial farming and small housing tracts.50
In sum, while industrial suburbia largely engulfed Long Island’s prewar metropolitandependent economy, elements of the old economy endured, some in new ways. As of 1952,
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16,000 Long Islanders still worked in agriculture, along with 5,000 migrants.51 Though
indigenous agricultural laborers rapidly declined, farmers continued to exploit migrants. Estates
only disappeared slowly; the live-in system continued in what remained of the ‘Gold Coast.’52
Across the rest of Long Island, domestic service adapted to postwar suburbia. Rather than large
staffs working on estates, single servants complimented the new postwar household, full of
labor-saving home devices and a housewife-oriented domestic culture. Household workers
might work part-time and take on a multitude of tasks, from childcare to cleaning and cooking.
They were less likely to reside in individual homes, instead piecing together incomes from
multiple employers.53 Thirty-six domestic employment agencies operated in Nassau County
alone after the war, linking domestics to employers through advertising gimmicks, including free
item giveaways with a contract. A network of chauffeurs and laundry services supported
domestics who now had to travel across the hundreds of single-family housing tracts spread
across Long Island.54 Though all these sectors were dwarfed by opportunities in industry and
services after 1945, they remained an option in the postwar labor market, one though with lower
pay, no job security, and few if any benefits. As was true in the pre-war period, these jobs did
not enable upward mobility.
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The New Suburbanites
The new landscape of jobs and homes attracted the massive population that made Long
Island the nation’s suburban exemplar. Prior to World War II, Long Island’s population was just
above 600,000. Twenty years later, the population more than doubled, filling in most of Nassau
County. Suffolk’s boom continued into the 1960s as Nassau’s growth slowed, and by 1970, the
population of Long Island reached more than 2.5 million residents, larger than all but three
American cities, a three-fold increase in thirty years.55 Where these eligible workers fit into the
booming economy determined their ability to enjoy Long Island’s consumer bounties.
Commuters were the wealthiest residents, including professionals, managers, or other high-end
service employees, and disproportionately contributed to Long Island’s overall earnings. But the
majority of Long Island’s workers relied on the structure of a bi-county labor market, a young
and distinct market with no precedent. Unlike the wartime economy, where defense firms
needed unskilled laborers in a supply-restricted market, the premium for educated workers
rebounded in the 1950s, and skill requirements increased throughout industrial sectors. The
college premium rose in the 1950s after dipping during the war, and high school diploma
requirements likewise returned.56 Rising productivity (primarily via automation) occurred in
Long Island’s capital-intensive aerospace industry, where new machine investment and skill
upgrading produced higher returns that were shared with workers.57 Sectors in competition for
defense workers likewise increased skill requirements and pay to attract new employees.
Beyond industry, Long Island’s burgeoning service sectors demanded high school and even
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college degrees, from office and governmental work to accounting, law, and business.
Essentially, Long Island exemplified what economist Charles Killingworth called the labor
market ‘twist’ – the decline in demand for low-skilled workers coinciding with long-term
demand growth for well-educated and skilled employees.58 This was not merely a ‘market’
phenomena; government spending was biased against the unskilled in the 1950s and 1960s.
Federal dollars poured into research and development, and public spending generally funneled
into education. R&D spending grew some 20 percent a year, and the growth of teachers trebled
that of the general labor force.59
Among Long Island new residents, whites were most prepared to exploit the region’s
opportunities. Long Island’s whites were a diverse lot, either immigrants themselves or the
children and grandchildren of Europeans, and most relocated from the five boroughs.60 ItalianAmericans became the single largest ethnic group in the region, representing a quarter of all
Long Islanders after World War II and settling across the middle and south of the Island, from
Elmont on the Nassau/Queens border out to Mastic and Shirley in Suffolk County. They, along
with a substantial Polish and Irish population (about eight and seven percent of the Island’s
population each, respectively), made Roman Catholicism the dominant faith in the region. Pope
Pius XII formed a new diocese in 1957 specifically to serve Nassau and Suffolk Counties, which
immediately became the sixth largest in the nation.61 Over 400,000 Jews also settled on Long
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Island, both as commuters to New York City and as industrial workers. Vibrant Jewish
communities emerged in Great Neck and the Five Towns area, but Jews also scattered across
Nassau and western Suffolk’s suburban housing tracts.62 Over half of these Census-designated
‘white’ Long Islanders completed high school as of 1960, and that number rose to nearly twothirds by 1970. A significant minority, fifteen percent, held bachelor’s and/or graduate
degrees.63
Though black migrants came for the same reasons as whites, they were less able to
benefit from Long Island’s postwar economy. In the 1940s, the black migration trailed the white
exodus to the suburbs and their proportion of the population actually declined. In the 1950s, they
outpaced overall population growth, and during the 1960s, their arrival doubled that of whites.
While a small proportion of Long Island’s overall populace, they reached almost five percent of
the population by 1970, 119,019 residents in total.64 But of these residents, only twenty-eight
percent completed high school in 1960; the new migrants of the 1960s increased the proportion
to forty-two percent. As the region’s economy increasingly demanded educational credentials
and the skills associated with those degrees, the majority of Long Island’s black population
lacked high school diplomas.65 This was most attributable to the southern origin of a
disproportionate number of black Long Islanders, who, as part of the tail-end of the Second
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Great Migration, were three times more likely to migrate from outside the New York area and
four times as likely to have relocated directly from the South, not including southern migrants
with brief sojourns in New York City.66 Arriving with educations from Jim-Crow schools placed
black Long Islanders into the least skilled occupations of the region’s labor market, with few
credentials or skillsets for Long Island’s well-paying jobs.67
The educational gulf was expressed in the labor market divide. As Table 2.2 indicates,
fifty-six percent of white suburbanites held white-collar jobs, while another sixteen percent, or
over 100,000 workers, labored in skilled blue-collar jobs in 1960. In contrast, less than twelve
percent of Long Island’s employed African Americans were white-collar workers, while nearly a
third were domestic servants, the largest employment sector for black residents, along with
another ten percent in the ‘laborer’ category.68 As the education gap closed during the 1960s, so
did the black-white difference in the labor market. The new cohort of African Americans in the
1960s entered into the better-paying jobs on Long Island, benefitting from general trends that
improved African American labor market outcomes, including access to education, the booming
economy of the 1960s, and civil rights legislation.69 They found jobs in white-collar and service
positions, including commuting professionals, along with local black dentists, doctors, lawyers,
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Table 2.2: Occupation and Occupational Distribution of White and Black Employed
Residents, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, 1960-1970
Total
1960
1970
White
Non-white1
White
Black1
2
Employed Civilians
656,527
31,831
877,783
43,168
Professional and technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Clerical and kindred workers
Sales workers
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred
Operatives and kindred workers
Private household workers
Service workers
Laborers and farm foremen
Not reported

Professional and technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Clerical and kindred workers
Sales workers
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred
Operatives and kindred workers
Private household workers
Service workers
Laborers and farm foremen
Not reported

108,429
87,277
106,523
64,695
107,277
77,944
8,665
47,139
20,214
25,887

1,356
173,217
4,034
552
110,297
1,567
1,640
182,682
6,907
379
91,969
1,123
1,929
124,110
3,571
4,580
74,421
7,864
10,181
4,533
4,874
4,575
89,859
9,482
3,039
31,539
3,746
3,518
Distribution (%)
1960
1970
White
Non-white1
White
Black1
16.5
4.3
19.7
9.3
13.3
1.7
12.6
3.6
16.2
5.2
20.8
16.0
9.9
1.2
10.5
2.6
16.3
6.1
14.1
8.3
11.9
14.4
8.5
18.2
1.3
32.0
0.5
11.3
7.2
14.4
10.2
22.0
3.1
9.5
3.6
8.7
3.9
11.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Occupation (White Population), 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11103734 (accessed April 10, 2015); U.S. Census
Bureau, Occupation (Non-White Population), 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11103734 (accessed April 10, 2015); 1970 Census of
Population and Housing, 863, 865.
Note: There are no labor market distributions by race for Northern states in 1950, as economic statistics by race
were compiled for ‘southern states only’, with the exception of employment rates.
1
The calculation for both ‘white’ and ‘black’ changed between the two censuses. In 1960, African Americans
were collapsed into the ‘non-white’ category though they were over 94 percent of all non-white inhabitants on
Long Island. Indian, Japanese, and Chinese-Americans were the remaining five percent, and could skew these
numbers toward higher skill levels, particularly since the defense industry recruited Asian-American technicians
and engineers. In 1970, ‘whites’ were not calculated exclusively, though white and ‘negro’ Long Islanders were
99.6 percent of Long Island’s population.
2
In 1960, the Census calculated all employed residents ages 14 or older, though raised the employed age to 16 in
1970.

and a small cohort of engineers. Craftsmen and operatives, who were over a quarter of Long
Island’s black workforce, labored in metro-area factories, including Long Island’s defense-

103
oriented aerospace factories, machine shops, or in the transportation industry.70 Clerical
positions likewise expanded, a reflection of Long Island’s burgeoning service-sector and the rise
in black educational levels. Bookkeepers, secretaries, typists, bank tellers, file clerks, and
telephone operators, among others, were largely female-dominated occupations that typically
required a high school diploma. Government employment, generally a secure sector for African
Americans, blossomed too. In Suffolk alone, the New York State government employed over
2,800 black workers, a fifth of the entire state workforce within the county.71 This included three
massive state mental hospitals, Kings Park, Central Islip, and Pilgrim State, the largest mental
institution in the world, servicing over 16,000 patients at its peak in the mid-1950s. African
Americans made up around a third of all hospital personnel, working mostly as attendants, the
most prevalent occupation in these facilities.72
Despite improvements, the black/white gap still existed, a reality on Long Island as
nationwide.73 Education alone did not close the gap, because diplomas did not reward blacks as
much as whites with equivalent preparation.74 A Hofstra University study revealed that a black
worker in Nassau County with a high school diploma earned less than a white worker who quit
70
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school after the eighth grade, while a college-educated African American made less on average
than a white worker with no college experience. Discrimination limited the numbers of blacks in
professional and managerial positions, but this should not discount the incredible progress in the
postwar period. More than half of black workers moving to Long Island were indeed securing
what a Newsday article in 1966 called the “visible measures of success: a good job, a
comfortable home, a car.”75 They were no longer the reflection of ‘pre-war’ black Long
Islanders, the “marginal workers engaged in occupations which were the least secure and lowest
paid.”76 They made sixty percent more than African Americans in the rest of the country, and
bought into the postwar middle class, though housing segregation defined them as a ‘black’
suburbanite distinct from that of whites, a consequence of housing policy rather than any broad
cultural differences in their consumption patterns.77
But the very same structure producing black opportunity for the credentialed limited
opportunity for those without. For the unskilled, the job market was bleak; in some ways more
desperate than what existed before and during World War II. Few opportunities existed outside
the traditional ‘black’ sectors. While industry afforded the greatest opportunity for mass social
mobility, African Americans occupied the lowest positions and worked in poorly-paying
industrial sectors. Despite high black employment rates during World War II, the defense
industry’s postwar racial progress proved disappointing. Few African Americans were re-hired
after post-war demobilization, and the state’s commitment to racial equality receded for almost
two decades after the war. The few hired were concentrated in unskilled positions, a problem as
the industry shed its unskilled jobs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the key source of well-
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paying jobs for working class residents in the region, the small black presence and their low
occupational status within the industry limited black mobility. Chapter 4 delves into race and the
defense industry in detail. Outside defense, black workers encountered the same mobility
problem. African Americans found jobs in Long Island’s primary metal, chemical, fabricated
metal, and printing industries, though they were concentrated in the low-skill positions – janitors,
shipping clerks, and other laborer positions – or in jobs most threatened by automation. In
addition, non-defense manufacturers paid four dollars less per week than the state and city
average, mostly because they did not compete for the same workers as the defense industry.
While advantageous to wives or young workers looking to supplement the breadwinner’s
income, such low pay made it difficult to sustain a family in high-cost Long Island.78 And
through the 1960s, automation hit these workers hardest. Herman Smothers, a 42-year-old black
resident of Freeport lost his factory job to a machine in 1964, turning to odd jobs and separating
from his wife and kids so they could qualify for welfare. When interviewed while drinking on a
street corner with friends, he pleaded “I can’t get a job. I want to work, man, and get mine. I
don’t want no charity.”79 A similar occupational divide existed in Long Island’s service sector.
‘Services’ entailed a broad swath of jobs, from nurses and police officers to orderlies and
busboys. While the nationwide rate of service jobs rose 40 percent between 1957 and 1963,
‘personal’ services was the bulk of this growth, including low-paid positions in day care, elderly
care, and cleaning services.80 To reach the region’s median in these fields, two or three of these
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jobs were necessary. One black Nassau County resident, a former Floridian, worked two
hospital jobs to make ends meet, an average of 112 hours per week at $1.65 an hour.81
Well-paying jobs that did not require credentials or pre-existing skills, i.e. those below
the skill premium threshold were in high demand, and African Americans were not the only ones
fighting for these jobs: in 1960, over 20,000 white Long Islanders were still laborers. The
competition often played out along racial lines. Construction was a growth field, though the
building trades unions, which had a powerful influence over Long Island’s residential and
commercial construction, hired through personal networks of family, friends, and community
members, making it difficult for outsiders to find union-protected work.82 Black union
membership was inconsistent, though minority workers tended to concentrate in less-skilled
unions. For example, of 762 painters in Nassau County’s Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators,
and Paperhangers local, only six were black in 1963. Conversely, the International Hood
Carriers’ Building & Common Laborers union local, which organized unskilled construction
laborers, boasted a twenty percent black membership.83 A union card did not guarantee stable
employment anyway. The mason’s union boasted some of the largest enrollments of African
Americans, though card carrying black masons rarely secured more than 400 hours of work per
year, excluding them from various union benefits including health care and paid vacation. White
masons meanwhile managed between 1,200 and 1,400 hours. Black members also found that
they were passed over when new jobs were available. White masons fresh off previous work
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consistently secured jobs as black workers sat idle.84 Civil rights activists addressed these
problems in the late 1960s, particularly during the buildup of New York’s state university
system, though progress in Affirmative Action was slow, bleeding into the 1970s.
The decentralized layout of the suburban economy compounded the effects of the family,
friend, and neighborhood networks of ‘job knowledge.’ Despite the proliferation of single-story
suburban factories, warehouses, and retail establishments across Long Island, economist David
Gayer found that employers continued to rely on the old urban custom of canvassing for
unskilled workers at their job sites, which included posting ‘now hiring’ signs outside their
factories. While thousands of workers might pass signs or factories in concentrated urban areas,
only those with automobiles, driving through industrial parks or retail areas, caught a glimpse of
new employment opportunities in suburbs. As a result, word-of-mouth, rather than hanging
signs, spread news of jobs. As his survey in the late 1960s revealed, most unskilled industrial
workers found jobs through friends. So few black employees only perpetuated the low minority
proportions in Long Island’s factories because finding work beyond one’s network of job
knowledge required expenditures of time, gas, and/or bus fares, a significant sacrifice for lowincome residents.85
This left a disproportionate number of black workers in the traditional industries:
domestic service, farm work, and generalized ‘day labor.’ Domestic service remained the largest
employment sector for African Americans as late as 1960, when the industry hit peak
employment of nearly 19,000. This became an increasingly black sector, as fifty-nine percent of
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all workers were black, and it continued to be a female-dominated occupation.86 Though
domestics could earn up to thirty dollars per week (over $225 in 2012 dollars), prospective
domestics outnumbered job opportunities, lured by the ‘mirage’ of high-paying work rather than
the reality. Farm labor remained another popular occupation for black Long Islanders, a largely
‘male’ sector. The number of farm laborers on Long Island’s east end ranged from an estimated
5,300 in 1957 to 3,600 in 1966, and eighty-eight percent of the workforce was African
American. Migrants made up around three-quarters of all farm laborers, part of the migrant
labor streams running from Florida to Maine.87 Like their pre-war counterparts, migrant workers
were tied to crew chiefs, who recruited individual laborers, brought them north, and as
filmmaker Morton Silverstein put it, “allocated their work, supervised their lives, and paid them
at the end of the week.”88 Like domestic service agencies, the crew leader offered credit to cover
transportation and food costs, and since housing was often provided on site in makeshift camps
at the farm, food, shelter, and other living expenses were removed from wages during the extent
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of the stay.89 Even settled seasonal workers, called ‘ex-migrants’ despite permanent residence,
were tied to the crew chief and migrant labor system, relying on these contractors for yearly
work and having little in common with white Suffolk County residents around them.90 Work
was physically demanding for both migrants and ‘ex-migrants,’ sometimes reaching fifteen hours
or more during a harvest season of back-breaking picking, sorting, and lifting. Pay was low: a
1964 study of seventy-one east-end migrant households with an average of 3.7 residents
determined that nearly a third survived on incomes below the official $3,000 poverty line for a
family of four, while those above that threshold averaged a yearly income of $4,723.91
Farm workers were in direct competition with new arrivals from the South, putting
downward pressure on wages and working conditions. Though the Second Great Migration
greatly improved economic opportunity for Southern migrants, it reduced wages of northern
African Americans who had little opportunity to enter other occupations.92 Migration and the
labor market trend toward skill premiums were not solely to blame for the outcomes; the
conditions of these jobs was a direct consequence of New Deal-era policy decisions that
marginalized these lines of work. These occupations were excluded from labor protections,
including social security benefits, minimum wage protections, and the right to organize.93 The
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fight to protect these workers was slow and contentious; while these largely ‘black’ occupations
were added to Social Security legislation in 1950 and 1954, minimum wage and unemployment
protections came only in the 1970s and were difficult to enforce.
Marginalization only reinforced beliefs that these jobs were ‘menial,’ and the association
with black skin led to widespread discrimination among black Long Islanders, including at the
region’s employment offices where black workers sought new opportunities. Unskilled defense
plant worker Dan Hester put it best when he lamented, “look for a job in Hempstead, and the first
thing they ask is if you want a job as a porter.”94 For domestics in particular, labor market
structures and cultural attitudes locked them into domestic service, even when they reached out
for other work available within the suburban economy. An AFSCME union investigation of a
New York State Employment Service (NYSES) office in Great Neck discovered that the office
kept a separate “active domestic file” with 350 active applicants. While half had high school
diplomas and were deemed fit to work outside private households, they were nonetheless placed
in “day worker” and “yardman” categories. The office claimed that black clients preferred day
jobs over higher skilled work, allegedly forgoing unemployment insurance, social security, and
other provisions for the immediate benefit of casual employment. These files tracked domestic
servants’ character traits like “drinker,” “borrows money,” and “submissive” in their job
applications, not work preferences or skillsets.95 Domestics were treated as a class apart in
person as well, complete with a separate employment office telephone number, a service worker
assigned exclusively to them, and limited hours to call (3-5pm) for jobs with only one-day
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advance notice. An AFSCME member and employee at the office exposed the discrimination
behind these policies when he complained to the union, stating that a supervisor commanded he
“either get those dark clouds jobs, or get them out of here,” and he was repeatedly pressured to
deal with the “Mississippi car of seven, eight boogies in it…looking for day work jobs.”96
Working outside the protections of labor laws situated these workers, despite their
geographic proximity, outside postwar suburbia. Though the majority of Long Islanders enjoyed
basic labor protections, federally-backed mortgages, and state support for jobs through defense
spending, the only form of public security open to these workers was ADC (later AFDC), the
‘second-tier’ of economic security afforded by the New Deal and subsequent legislation.97 A
1966 social work survey determined that African Americans were disproportionately receiving
AFDC, over four times their proportion of the population, and more importantly, black mothers
receiving welfare were three times as likely to be working as white mothers. In addition, these
women were overwhelmingly domestics.98 Welfare was never adequate to support a family, and
black domestics, along with ex-migrants on Long Island’s east end, cobbled a living together
from AFDC and other programs, like Nassau County’s Food Surplus program that provided food
baskets on a monthly basis to registered applicants in the 1960s, to supplement their inconsistent
and low paychecks.99
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Domestics and migrant laborers recognized the degraded status of their work and
organized to improve their working conditions. Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Worker’s
Organizing Committee planned protests in 1969, though failed to start an Island-wide strike. The
National Committee on Household Employees (NCHE) organized a Nassau County branch
started in 1970, fought for health insurance, clear boundaries for work responsibilities, sick
leave, and vacation time, but also recognition of their skills and basic respect from their
employers.100 As one organized domestic, in anonymity argued “People scorn you. ‘She’s a
domestic, she’s nobody.’ You’re somebody. You really are the person who is somebody. Those
houses that are sparkling – ask who cleans the house.”101 Within a year, they had organized an
estimated ten percent of the county’s workforce, planning protests against domestic agencies and
promises of improved employer/employee relations. In 1972, state law extended the minimum
wage to household workers, and domestic organizing only escalated as domestic issues reached a
national platform.102
Organizing coincided with a decline in these sectors, in both absolute and relative terms
for African Americans. By 1970, domestic service employment dropped by half. The number of
farm laborers stagnated, and black workers increasingly competed with Puerto Ricans, machines,
and new housing developments on Long Island’s east end. Some former domestics and
agricultural laborers leveraged their skills into postwar service jobs. Clarence Phillips, the Port
Washington resident who worked between the domestic and agricultural fields during the 1920s
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and 1930s, eventually secured a job as a janitor in the Port Washington school district after
World War II, and later moved into landscape gardening.103 Others moved into the personal
service industries, but a fifth of black workers still remained domestics or laborers, while another
forty percent were employed in the other lower-rungs of service and low-wage ‘operative’ jobs.
For the least skilled, a job remained a daily struggle, one that began on the street corner at
6:30am, waiting for contractors to drive by, and then bidding for daily wages among the offers, if
any appeared. Work in construction and landscaping remained on the margins of the labor
market generally, not even regulated by the needs of particular employers, as in the case of
commercial farms or households.104

Poverty and Progress
Both the gains black Long Islanders made in the postwar labor market and the limitations
of postwar growth were expressed most clearly in Long Island’s income distribution. The black
population boom during the 1960s narrowed the black/white earnings gap in the bi-county
region, a nationwide development that was particularly pronounced on the Island. African
Americans outpaced white income growth by eleven percentage points in Suffolk and nearly
fourteen percentage points in Nassau in real terms during the decade. The black median reached
sixty-four percent that of whites in Nassau and seventy-two percent in Suffolk, compared to
sixty-four percent nationally.105 As Table 2.3 indicates, Long Island’s black middle class became
dominant during the decade. These gains were part in parcel with the trajectory of the labor
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market itself, because while the gains of the 1940s were due to the tight wartime labor market
and the 1950s saw the black/white gap stagnate, civil rights legislation and rising black
educational outcomes combined with favorable market conditions to close the divide in the
1960s.106 Long Island’s burgeoning black middle class was responsible for the narrowing racial
gap, as those black families earning near or above the region’s median family income increased
at a much higher rate than white families at or above the median.
Behind the emergence of a black middle class and the gains relative to whites were black
families stuck at the lower end of the income distribution. While white families generally
experienced upward mobility over the course of the 1960s as incomes below $10,000 declined
across the board, only middle class black families matched them. Those below three-quarters of
the median family income, half the median increased as well, and families in the lowest category
(the federal poverty level) grew nearly thirty percent. Calculating whether these families lived in
‘poverty’ is complex given the inadequacies the official federal threshold and the subjectivity of
‘relative’ poverty measurements, though Long Island’s widespread affluence makes relative
poverty measures useful.107 After all, the region’s high incomes were necessary to even get
around on Long Island; jobs, shopping amenities, educational facilities, and health centers were
spread across the suburban highways and single- story suburban ‘parks,’ though buses were
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privately operated and ran infrequently. In a 1968 survey, unemployment and car ownership was
inversely proportional: in low-income neighborhoods where the average number of cars owned
per household was below 0.75, unemployment reached twenty percent, but where car ownership
exceeded one per household, unemployment dipped under fifteen percent.108 In addition,
consumption levels were increasing broadly; a full belly was not a sign that one escaped material
deprivation. A ‘decent’ standard of living in the postwar period included modern amenities,
health care, and education, on Long Island and elsewhere. Given these factors, the official
‘national’ poverty measurement did not account for geographic differences in living costs,
especially problematic when measuring economic distress in Nassau, the nation’s wealthiest
large county. If we define economic distress as those families making half each counties’
median income, over a third of Long Island’s black families did not meet the minimum income
requirements to live securely in Long Island’s suburban hamlets, compared to thirteen percent of
white families.109
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Table 2.3: Family Income Distribution of Long Island Residents, 1960-1970 (Constant
1969 dollars)
1960
1970
Change (%)
White
Less than $3,000
23,362
23,079
-1.2
$3,000 - $4,999
26,079
22,481
-13.8
$5,000 - $6,999
57,945
32,387
-44.1
$7,000 - $9,999
126,730
83,288
-34.3
$10,000 or more
237,486
438,719
84.7
Black
Less than $3,000
$3,000 - $4,999
$5,000 - $6,999
$7,000 - $9,999
$10,000 or more

2,197
2,564
2,921
2,921
2,624

2,846
2,523
2,987
4,886
10,416

29.5
-1.6
2.3
67.3
297.0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Family Income (White & Non-white Families), 1960. Prepared by Social
Explorer, http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11109521 (accessed August 12, 2014); U.S.
Census Bureau, Family Income for White Families, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11109522 (accessed August 12, 2014); U.S. Census Bureau,
Family Income for Black Families, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11109522 (accessed August 12, 2014).
Note: Nassau-Suffolk Median family income for 1960 was $9,935 in 1969 dollars. In 1970, it reached $13,475
in 1969 dollars. See Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, U.S. Census '70: Volume 6: Income
(Hauppauge, New York: 1972), 7.

African Americans were not alone among Long Island’s low-income families: 80,000
white families fit into this category. Like low-income black workers, skill and education
requirements, tight competition for unskilled jobs, and relatively low wages in these sectors
accounted for their near poverty status. The difficulties of obtaining an automobile to go to
work, or keeping the car filled with gas to get to work, particularly among the poor commuters
who continued to hold jobs in the city, influenced opportunity just the same. Automation and
rising educational premiums also pushed unskilled whites into the lower tier of the income ladder
by 1970, particularly as the defense industry shifted toward highly technical work. The only
difference was their skin color, which permitted them wide choice in housing on Long Island,
spreading ‘white’ poverty broadly, and placed them in distinct networks for job opportunities.110
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Nonetheless, low incomes stalked African American Long Islanders disproportionately, as it did
nationwide, and just as importantly, suburban residence was less likely to induce upward
mobility. If we measure poverty using the federal poverty threshold, sixteen percent of Long
Island’s black families lived under the poverty level in 1970. While favorable when compared to
the New York metropolitan region’s highest poverty rates in Brooklyn (23.2) and the Bronx
(22.4), the black rate was only four percentage points below that of the metropolitan region as a
whole (19.9). This is compared to the huge divide between Long Island’s overall poverty rate
(4.1 percent), and that of Brooklyn (13.9), the Bronx (15.5), or the New York metro area (9.2).111
Long Island’s affluence did not absorb all, a reality for black New Yorkers seeking opportunity
throughout the metropolitan region’s labor market.
This poverty in the postwar period is not in of itself revelatory; by the 1960s, the nation’s
‘poverty amidst plenty’ was the dominant domestic issue that launched a flurry of domestic
programs rivalling the New Deal. But its suburban dimension, though small compared to the
concentrated poor migrating to urban centers or dispersed poverty in the countryside, nonetheless
illustrated the limits of postwar prosperity regardless of where one lived. The paradox of poverty
amidst affluence was not a contradiction of suburb versus city, but of the dynamics of the stateinfluenced labor market that produced both jobs for the skilled and few opportunities for the
unskilled. The questions were how the state distributed spending to boost employment as much
as it was how the state subsidized mortgages, how the state enforced fair employment in its
subsidized industries as much as it enforced fair housing, and how the state approached
employing the unskilled themselves. These questions plagued Long Island’s activists, local
politicians, policymakers and anyone concerned with the black poor living in what President
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Dwight Eisenhower believed was the space “universally and exclusively inhabited by the
workmen:” the postwar suburb.112
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Chapter 3
Class versus Class
While decentralized labor markets made mass suburbanization possible, the suburbs were
a space for homes, in both the popular imagination and the physical layout of the postwar urban
fringe. Long Islanders were attracted to the region’s housing developments laid atop potato
fields, demolished Gold Coast estates, and saltwater marshes. The Cape Cods, ranches, and
split-levels dotting the Island, along with the possibility of a garage, basement, large backyard,
expandable second floors, not to mention neighborhood schools and a plethora of shopping
choices, all represented what was captured in the postwar “American Dream.” State policy
undergirded this explosion in affordable single-family homes and amenities, from federal
mortgage guarantees and highway development, to pro-development tax policies and the
expansion of consumer credit.1 As the previous chapter demonstrates, whites dominated the
purchase of these homes, though African Americans moved to the suburbs as well. FHA policy,
municipal zoning and land-use laws, a web of local governmental boundaries, and the realtors,
developers, and homeowners operating within this public framework determined where they
could buy houses. As a generation of scholars have shown, state-sponsored segregation and ‘de
facto’ racist private actions constrained black housing choices after World War II in both cities
and suburbs. But it did not cut African Americans out of the market entirely.
The labor market divide shaped the process and outcome of postwar African American
suburbanization, because segregated housing barriers produced distinct but overlapping housing
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markets for the African American middle class and the black poor. For the middle class, racist
housing barriers, tied to schools and local government services, served as the most formidable
obstacle to racial equality on postwar Long Island. As historian Andrew Wiese argues, black
suburbanites settled within the cracks of the segregated housing market, near older black
working-class settlements or in undeveloped spaces not yet claimed as ‘white’ suburbia. A few
confronted segregation directly, serving as ‘pioneers’ for others to follow.2 In the process they
established thriving neighborhoods, using their economic power to become home-owning
postwar suburbanites. Here black progress was made within the segregated housing market, and
in a few cases, against it. The middle class looked to end remaining inequities through a
suburban-oriented civil rights movement, influenced by national protests and national
organizations, though addressing local issues: housing, equal educational opportunity, and fair
access to government services.
The black poor faced the same racial constraints, though low-incomes limited their
housing choices further in a residential market designed for affluence. The FHA had minimum
income thresholds, zoning and building codes imposed costly standards on residential units
island-wide, their neighborhoods were marked for slum clearance and homeowners strongly
opposed affordable housing. But these barriers did not cut the black poor out of the market
entirely either. Pre-war communities remained at the fringe of postwar suburbia, and realtors
found ways to turn postwar single-family homes into affordable housing in modestly priced
postwar neighborhoods, black middle class hamlets, and tenuously integrated blocks. In the
shadows of the single-family subdivision lived those lacking the means to participate in the
consumer bounty of suburban prosperity.
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While the arrival of the black middle class and their agitation for racial equality had a
distinct suburban bent, the existence of the black poor, their dire housing conditions, and their
settlement within middle class neighborhoods produced dynamics familiar to American cities.
Black homeowners demanded open housing and integrated schools, challenged downzoning
proposals, and celebrated their upward mobility. The black poor faced slum clearance and urban
renewal, and after relocating to middle class neighborhoods, stiff homeowner opposition and
efforts to push them out. Housing segregation concentrated the poor into Long Island’s black or
integrated suburban hamlets, pitting the middle class against the minority poor over schools,
taxes, illegal tenancies, and welfare, and the black middle class against local government for
their implicit support of poverty concentrations. By the late 1960s, tensions reached a boiling
point, spilling into urban violence. Though Long Island was on the winning side of what Robert
Self calls the “overdevelopment of suburbs and the underdevelopment of cities” after World War
II, the region was not immune to the challenges a growing African American poor posed in a
segregated residential landscape.3 This was a consequence of suburban segregation, but also the
structure of the labor market that left disproportionate number of black families with little
income to support homeownership and financially contribute to local taxes.
The conflicts that cut across both racial and class lines on Long Island reveals the
complex history of postwar suburbia, going beyond the city/suburb dichotomy to the dividing
lines between individual hamlets and within suburban neighborhoods.4 At the heart of these
conflicts were class tensions, because while African American homeowners challenged the racial
homogeneity of postwar suburbia, they reified class homogeneity, seeking their place within the
stratified housing market. In contrast, the black poor challenged middle class exclusivity and the
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public foundations built upon it. Historians ignore these class tensions, especially within African
American suburbs. Andrew Wiese’s national study of twentieth century African American
suburbanization portrays the relationship between working and middle class as harmonious and
successive, because pre-war black enclaves were spaces for postwar suburban developments
catering to black buyers. This was true on Long Island as it was nationwide, though the black
poor did not disappear, and the relationship between the two was contentious, as pre-war housing
‘blighted’ new black suburbs and segregation permitted speculators to introduce the black poor
to middle class neighborhoods. The tensions between middle class and poor played out in school
board elections, civic association meetings, and on the streets.5

The Contours of Housing
Long Island’s postwar housing market was formed through an interconnected web of
national and local housing policy. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans
Administration (VA) mortgage programs were the most important factors in housing
development after World War II. Initiated as a depression-era solution to the high foreclosure
rate and unemployment in housing construction, the FHA revolutionized homeownership in the
twentieth century. The mortgage insurance program lowered the barrier to home-buying by
reducing down payments and extending the repayment period to thirty-years. The government
also shouldered the risk of default, and as a result formed strict, enforceable, and standardized
criteria for publicly-subsidized mortgages. Benchmarks included the structure of individual
homes, minimum lot size, distance from street and other buildings, and width of the house itself.
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Insured homes also had to be in residentially desirable areas, measured subjectively in terms of a
neighborhood’s economic stability and protection from ‘adverse influences.’ Racial prejudice
along with class biases against multi-family housing and diverse neighborhoods became
quantifiable calculations for mortgage insurance risk. Simply put, the FHA favored
homogeneity, in race, income, and land use. Homogeneity did not mean white exclusivity, and
the FHA did insure black mortgages within its ‘homogenous’ framework. Class barriers
however, were rigid.6
With over a third of Nassau County homes guaranteed by FHA mortgages as of 1960, not
to mention the VA loans closely associated with FHA standards across the Island, the region’s
developers were sensitive to government standards.7 Builders planned subdivisions using FHA
criteria for design, construction, and cost. The Levitt brothers constructed ‘Levittown’ with
FHA-sanctioned house-to-lot ratios, Cape-Cod home designs, and curvilinear streets.8
Developers also included restrictive covenants on their properties, an FHA-approved measure to
safeguard property values, which often contained a clause against selling or leasing property to
non-whites. Racial covenants were ubiquitous on Long Island, covering forty-seven percent of
large subdivisions in Nassau County as of 1947.9 Though Shelley v. Kraemer declared covenants
unconstitutional in 1948, the practice was already entrenched on Long Island, part of the spatial
landscape and the strategies of developers, realtors, and homeowners themselves. When
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confronted with the injustice of covenants and racial segregation, Levittown developer William
Levitt famously quipped that “we can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial
problem…but we cannot combine the two,” basically stating racial integration threatened to
undermine homebuilding.10 Since FHA underwriters weighed race among their factors of
judging mortgage risk, Levitt’s statement followed the logic of state officials.
Local government policy was likewise responsive to FHA standards and the developers
reliant on these mortgage guarantees. On Long Island, this often meant relaxing building codes.
Most zoning codes in Nassau and Western Suffolk County were adopted prior to World War II
for the pre-war middle class and elite Gold Coast residents, with standards well above FHA
requirements. In the wake of Long Island’s industrialization, demand for modest homes
skyrocketed, though minimum lot-sizes and high construction standards priced many out of the
market. The housing crisis immediately following the war gave federally-backed developers the
justification to demand zoning law changes.11 Levitt’s basement-less house design required
revised codes, and in 1947, the Town of Hempstead repealed the basement code, permitting
Levitt and others to construct cheaper single-family dwellings. With the proliferation of Levittstyle developments in the 1950s, zoning authorities pulled back, increasing lot sizes to raise
property values. The Town of Oyster Bay erected one acre minimums for future land by the
1960s to prevent new Levittowns.12 Zoning battles reflected the tension between expanding
housing opportunity to the wider swath of Long Island’s new residents and protecting
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municipalities from ‘incompatible’ use of property, i.e. any land-use that threatened property
values and therefore tax revenue.13 On Long Island, FHA-subsidies and the developers
dependent on the mortgage guarantees opened land to working class New Yorkers, while zoning
agencies served to check affordable housing growth, though in effect zoning maintained the
pattern established in the postwar boom since planning measures were largely enforced after the
heaviest waves of migration in the 1950s and 1960s.14 The barrier was lowered, though only for
those climbing into the postwar middle class.
The FHA guidelines also included requirements for urban amenities and public services
in order to qualify for mortgage insurance, and this largely coincided with the demands of
suburbanites themselves.15 Paved roads, garbage removal, police protection, and schools, among
other public needs, were satisfied within the fragmented governmental system inherited from the
pre-war period, largely because the existing structure was adapted to the new environment.16
Long Island’s two counties provided general services like welfare, police (in Nassau and western
Suffolk after 1960), and justice, while Towns (which in the case of the Town of Hempstead had
over 834,000 residents, larger than most US cities) or incorporated villages furnished brick and
mortar services, including road maintenance, sanitation, land-use policy, and sometimes police
protection. Beyond this were ‘special districts’ created to provide water, fire, or sewage
amenities to areas incongruous with town or village borders. School districts, determined by
New York State, expanded to meet the needs of the region’s exploding student population, and
these rarely matched other political boundaries. In all, two counties, two cities, thirteen towns,
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ninety-two villages, 135 school districts, 126 fire districts, and 477 special districts, 870 different
governmental units in total, had taxing authority on Long Island by 1970.17 The average Nassau
County home in an unincorporated area paid taxes to sixteen different districts.18 This system
has more or less remained, and as of 2010, Nassau and Suffolk were the most balkanized
suburban counties in the United States.19
These factors in sum produced Long Island’s particular housing market. It was a racially
and class segmented market, since the FHA and developers considered skin color a calculable
risk when determining the inhabitants of a neighborhood while zoning authorities carefully
excluded unwanted socioeconomic groups to secure property values and ‘community character.’
The FHA’s stance on race changed in the wake of Shelley, though the administration blamed the
‘market’ for segregation and funded separate federally-protected homes for African Americans
in the 1950s. Such housing never met the demand, constituting only two percent of FHA loans
and three percent of VA loans, but Andrew Wiese calculates that this nonetheless accounted for
up to 40 percent of the new African American housing during the 1950s.20 The FHA was both a
boon and detriment to African Americans.21 A number of FHA-approved ‘minority housing’
suburban developments were built on Long Island in the 1950s, and after John F. Kennedy ended
discriminatory federally-insured loans, developers constructed housing tracts for the black
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market across Long Island.22 These developments had to be constructed within the layout of
Long Island’s zoning, school, and public service boundaries, all divided by race.
The market was also simultaneously more expensive and more affordable than its prewar counterpart. Rapid residential development raised land values, and though housing
standards were relaxed, they applied to a much broader swath of properties and were more likely
to be enforced if FHA mortgage guarantees were involved. Meanwhile, Nassau and Suffolk’s
fragmented government resulted in a massive public sector that imposed high taxes, particularly
because property taxes funded sixty percent of county governments and nearly one hundred
percent of local governmental units. Despite postwar industrialization and commercial
development, suburbanites still owned the majority of all property value; residential homeowners
were the primary funders of local government on Long Island, with the exception of the few
taxing districts with substantial commercial and/or industrial property.23 On the other hand,
federal mortgage subsidies greatly lowered the barrier to homeownership, with down payments
between ten percent and zero for veterans. Mass production also reduced construction costs.
Obtaining a job in the metropolitan area’s robust labor market gave borrowers the current income
threshold and the prospect of future earnings capacity that the FHA required when extending
mortgage insurance. At its core, the housing market rested on the foundation of postwar
prosperity, and the FHA’s success was not possible without it.24

22

Adam Gordon, “The Creation of Homeownership,” 217-218.
A Nassau County sales tax, along with fees and fines (also paid by homeowners), made up for the remainder of
revenue for both Counties (state/Federal aid excepted). The Bi-County Temporary State Commission for Tax Relief
on Long Island, Working Paper #2, Suffolk County Operations: Revenues and Expenditures, 1960-1990 (October,
1991), 1; The Bi-County Temporary State Commission for Tax Relief on Long Island, Working Paper #5, Nassau
County Operations: Revenues and Expenditures, 1960-1990 (December 1991), 1, 15; The Bi-County Temporary
State Commission for Tax Relief on Long Island, Working Paper #4, Taxation: Sales, Income, Property – Analysis
and Alternatives (December 1991), V.
24
The FHA measured the ability of a mortgagor to bear the cost of homeownership by their effective income, an
estimate of their earning capacity for the first third of the mortgage duration. See U.S. Housing and Home Finance
Agency, Annual Report 1955 (US GPO: Washington, 1956), 179.
23

128
This was the web of regulation that Long Islanders navigated. White migrants’ near-full
participation in the labor market and FHA-approved skin color gave them wide choice in
housing. The black middle class had the income but not the skin color, limiting them to
segregated options. But above all, Long Island’s housing market was class exclusive, and the
poor confronted an inhospitable housing environment as every available parcel was absorbed
into the FHA approved and highly regulated housing market. But where there was housing
needs, there were those willing to meet demand. The regulatory framework was not
impenetrable, and the needs of all three populations were met both within the zoned and properly
coded communities as well as outside them, in the cracks of Long Island’s housing market.

Another “Young Harlem”
For black suburbanites who benefitted from the postwar labor market, housing
segregation, both in policy and practice, made it difficult, though not impossible, to purchase
suburban housing. The constraints of the late 1940s and early 1950s were the most formidable,
written into law and violently enforced. Restrictive racial covenants, legal until 1947 and
practiced afterwards, explicitly denied blacks housing. Levittown was the most infamous
covenant-protected development on Long Island, and when African American military veteran
and Harlem resident Eugene Burnett toured Levitt models, the agent refused to provide Burnett
an application, stating “the builders have not at this time decided to sell to Negroes.” Burnett
was devastated; “I'll never forget the ride back to East Harlem," he remembered.25
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White homeowners who imbibed the logic of racial segregation meanwhile proved to be
the most visible barrier to black homeownership, even resorting to violence as a means to protect
racial homogeneity of neighborhoods.26 One of the more famous examples occurred in 1953,
when Clarence Wilson, a non-white beauty products manufacturer from Brooklyn, attempted to
purchase a home in Deauville Gardens, a white working class suburban development in
Copiague in western Suffolk County. The house caught fire twice before his move-in date. With
help from the local NAACP, Wilson declared he would rebuild the $16,000 ranch home: “I’m
going to finish this house and live in it” declared Mr. Wilson, “I am not afraid. I regard these
two attempts to burn down my house as enemy attacks…and I’m not running away. The future
for me and my family…and for others like us…depends on what I do now.” Despite assurances
from the press and public authorities that this was an isolated incident perpetrated by a few
extremists, the Deauville Gardens community made it clear that residents like Clarence Wilson
were not welcome in their neighborhood. When the NAACP met with the Deauville Gardens
Civic Association to discuss the incident, most of the questions from the audience asked why
Wilson was causing trouble.27 Wilson hired a detective after receiving dozens of threatening
letters from the Ku Klux Klan, and the detective’s survey determined that about three-quarters of
Wilson’s white neighbors did not want the Wilson family in Deauville Gardens. By January
1954, Wilson decided to sell the $16,000 home at a loss because he feared for his family. The
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transaction was arranged through the Deauville Gardens Civic Association and sold to a white
buyer. 28
Outright violence, though a visceral reminder to black homebuyers of the risks of moving
into suburbia, was the exception. Instead, black homebuyers more often encountered tacit
opposition at the real estate office, the middlemen between segregated policy and antidiscrimination law.29 When engineer Irving Winters went house hunting near his employer in
Suffolk County, realtors repeatedly told him nothing “suitable” was available. The one broker
willing to show him ‘homes’ merely drove to empty lots. Winters then tried another realtor, but
was once again rebuffed. In a fit of anger Irving let out “caustic words” and the realty office
relented, sending them to a builder in nearby St. James. The Winters liked the house, though the
builder led Mr. Winters into the basement, and in tears, confided that selling the home to a black
couple would destroy his small business dependent on local customers and bank loans. Though
angry, Mr. Winters decided not to press the builder, deciding to go it alone and deal with owners
directly. The Winters found a home, and with a lawyer in tow, closed on the mortgage. Despite
the concerns of realtors, the Winters felt welcomed into the community once they moved in.30
While realtors, builders, and banks were operating within the hard rules (or in this case legacy)
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of the FHA’s racial regulations, white homeowners were not tied to such stipulations and could
respond in a variety of ways. In this case at least, white neighbors were not the obstacle.
The dance with realtors was an all-too-common reality for prospective black buyers, and
moving directly into white neighborhoods required uncommon fortitude. Consequently, most
African American housing needs were met within the segregated housing market. As Andrew
Wiese argues, pre-war black enclaves, redlined from mortgage approval for white suburbia,
provided the space for FHA-approved black suburban developments.31 This is how the majority
of black buyers found homes on Long Island in the 1950s, in the spaces demarcated as ‘safe’ for
black housing. North Amityville, in the far southwest of Suffolk County, was an unincorporated
hamlet with a small community of mixed Native American and slave descendants dating back to
the eighteenth century. Migrant laborers also worked North Amityville’s farms in the early
twentieth century, some of whom settled along what was referred to as ‘tobacco road.’32 This
small community enabled the Ronek Construction Company to exploit the “pressing housing
problem of minority groups,” and they built single-family FHA- insured housing competitive in
price with Levittown but available “to all qualified buyers without regard to race, creed or
color,” a direct advertisement to those aware of segregated housing policy.33 When the Ronek
Company unveiled the model units in 1950, over 8,000 potential buyers, almost all black,
inspected the homes, “necessitating a special police detail to direct the flow of automobiles along
the route to the development.”34
The turnout reflected the acute housing demand among African American middle class
homebuyers, and unsurprisingly, the Ronek Company was not alone in using existing black
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enclaves to construct FHA-insured single-family developments catering to black homebuyers.
Just three miles northeast, Taca Home Builders Inc. bought land in an un-suburbanized area in
Wyandanch, home to working-class German, Irish, and African Americans prior to World War
II. They designed ‘Carver Park’ in 1951, and other developers followed, securing FHA funding
to build developments like Powell Estates, which offered ‘spacious’ cape cods for qualified
buyers. As their advertising stated “if you can earn $60 a week, you can afford to buy this
beautiful home.”35 The housing tracts constructed in North Amityville and Wyandanch, part of
the larger Town of Babylon, contributed to the town’s skyrocketing black homeownership that
rose from only nine minority owner-occupied homes in 1950 to 1,885 in 1960.36
To the west of Babylon, builders and realtors carved out black neighborhoods in the
housing boom of Nassau County. In Hempstead, pre-war black enclaves enabled black
homebuyers to purchase single-family housing along its outskirts, which grew to house over a
quarter of Nassau County’s middle-class African Americans by 1960. A similar process
occurred in Freeport, as pre-war domestic settlement encouraged postwar middle class housing
construction.37 Just to the north in the unincorporated hamlet of Roosevelt, prewar black housing
enabled postwar developers and realtors to design black subdivisions, heavily marketed through
metro-area newspapers. By 1960, African Americans grew to nearly a fifth of the hamlet’s
population.38 And north of Roosevelt, a tiny black nineteenth century subdivision served as the
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foundation for postwar black housing in New Cassel.39 Here modest homes were built to house
local factory workers in the hamlet’s machinery and instrument plants.40 Unlike the middle class
in Hempstead or Roosevelt, these prospective homeowners had “less financial means than
“middle class” may imply… [and] strapped themselves to buy their homes, often necessitating
full-time employment of wives and mothers in order to meet expenses.” Nonetheless, they
qualified for FHA approved homes.41 By 1960, 2,693 African Americans lived in the hamlet
along with 4,833 whites.42
While subdivisions in Nassau County operated within the contours of segregation, all
were built near or within majority white hamlets. Though tensions existed, the middle-class
background of these residents tempered white fears. In Roosevelt, social researchers found that
whites accepted black residents largely because “their occupational status was higher than most
other white residents in their block,” and included doctors, teachers, and psychologists.43 The
hamlet of Lakeview, where black housing subdivisions were built as early as 1950 but whose
black population expanded rapidly from 1959 to 1961, managed to integrate largely because “the
blacks moving in were generally considered to be of the “better class” with high income, good
manners and took care of their property, even an improvement over the residents they replaced”
an Adelphi University sociological study noted.44 This is not to say that African American
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incomes alone alleviated white anxieties; black homeowners often had to go above and beyond
to ‘prove’ their class status and alter the association of black skin with poverty. As one black
homeowner admitted, he had to work ‘like hell’ to make improvements on his home “so that way
the people around here will know we don’t keep chickens in the living room.”45 Nonetheless,
housing costs and mortgage criteria ensured that these homeowners were from the same class
makeup as their white counterparts, fitting into the surrounding community in every way save
the prejudices whites held for their skin color.
Of course, these weren’t the only places the African American middle class settled; from
the ‘Nostrand Gardens’ subdivision in Uniondale in Nassau County and the western Suffolk
hamlets like Huntington Station, Deer Park, and Brentwood, out to Coram in eastern Suffolk,
black Long Islanders were purchasing homes across Long Island’s budding subdivisions.46 But
North Amityville, Wyandanch, Hempstead, Roosevelt, New Cassel, Lakeview, and Freeport
contained over a third of Long Island’s total black population in 1960. Most importantly, they
were the centers of postwar black middle class life, nestled within the broad swath of postwar
suburban housing tracts, just as their residents were tied to the bounties of the postwar labor
market (See Figure 3.1). This was distinct from the prewar domestic and agricultural laborer
neighborhoods, save Hempstead and Freeport, tied to what remained of the pre-war economy.
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Figure 3.1. Long Island’s largest black suburbs as of 1960. Data and map generation from Social Explorer.

These hamlets became thriving black communities, the centers of black middle class
culture in the two decades after World War II. North Amityville, the largest postwar black
hamlet in 1960, featured prominent black businesses, like James Calloway’s ‘Delly’ founded in
1954, which proved so popular that Calloway expanded the business into a full-fledged IGA
Foodliner supermarket in 1966.47 With real estate firms, law offices, general stores, barber
shops, and community clubs, North Amityville residents took great pride in their community.
IGA employee Sam Edwards proclaimed it a “new era… [for] Negroes in business,” where
blacks would “overcome and reach immeasurable heights, taking our place in the economic
mainstream of American life.”48 Barber Joe Daniels declared that North Amityville was a
47
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“Harlem young, vibrant and undismayed… a very nice place to live for the average working
man.”49 While North Amityville was the most celebrated, there were several “Harlems”
emerging across Long Island. Lakeview and Roosevelt served as quiet leafy-green sanctuaries.
Hempstead was a bustling downtown with easy commuting to New York City. All were
connected through an expanding black press, primarily the New York Amsterdam News, one of
the nation’s leading black newspapers. The paper, sensing the migration to the suburbs, added
reporters to cover Long Island stories (Chuck Smith’s “Nassau-Suffolk News-Beat”) as well as
local gossip, “high society,” achievements, and real estate in sections like the “Babylon
Bailiwick” and “Out our Way.”50 One could pick up the weekly paper and catch up with the
activities of their neighbors, from summer vacation plans and holiday festivities, to new births,
promotions, and scholarly achievements.51
Long Island’s flourishing black communities developed within the contours of statesponsored segregation, which initially barred those labeled ‘black’ in the late 1940s, but later
provided an exclusive ‘black’ housing market in the 1950s. By the 1960s, the FHA was
prohibited from segregating mortgages and New York State passed anti-discrimination housing
laws, further encouraging black suburban development. Local zoning, real estate practices, and
neighborhood politics still shaped a segregated market, but middle class African Americans had
opportunity to become homeowners. Despite segregation, racial progress was possible.

49

“Amityville Another Harlem?” New York Amsterdam News, December 26, 1964.
Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York:
Random House, 2008), 175; See Chuck Smith, “Nassau-Suffolk News-Beat,” March 13, 1965, “On the Town,” New
York Amsterdam News, February 18, 1961, “Babylon Bailiwick,” New York Amsterdam News, February 13, 1965,
“Around Amityville,” New York Amsterdam News, May 27, 1965, for examples of local activity reports.
51
For three examples, see “Out our Way,” New York Amsterdam News, September 9, 1961, 20; “Out our Way,” New
York Amsterdam News, May 26, 1962, 26; “Out our Way,” New York Amsterdam News, June 8, 1963, 30.
50

137
Postwar Housing and the Poor
Though the black middle class could not live wherever they chose, their income allowed
them to participate in the postwar housing market. In contrast, the entire structure of FHA’s
mortgage-insurance standards and associated zoning codes wrote the poor out of the housing
market altogether. Proliferating residential subdivisions, industrial parks, and strip malls placed a
premium on land, and FHA mortgage-insurance, zoning laws, and developers favored singlefamily home construction, which made up eighty-four percent of all units in Nassau and ninetyfour percent of all housing stock in Suffolk.52 Apartments built after 1945 were primarily in the
‘luxury’ category, attracting the same kinds of residents as single-family homes. In addition, the
cost of housing construction uniformly rose as building code enforcement touched every inch of
Long Island’s landscape west of the two forks. This was a housing landscape built on the
affluence of the postwar labor market, with few options for those untouched by postwar
prosperity. In this environment, pre-war domestic and migrant laborer enclaves served as safe
spaces for postwar poor communities, predating land-use laws and written off by federallybacked developers.
The black poor continued to concentrate in the largest pre-war hamlets with housing
stock below postwar market rates. These districts also remained the most convenient housing to
the domestic and migrant farm economy, including Inwood, Rockville Centre, and Freeport on
Long Island’s South Shore, Manhasset and Glen Cove on the North Shore, and Riverhead out
east. In general, the black poor further concentrated in these enclaves without attendant
increases in housing supply, intensifying dilapidated conditions and high prices present since the
1930s. The degree of severity depended on the immediate surroundings and low-wage labor
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demand. In the North Shore domestic enclaves of Manhasset, Roslyn, and Port Washington, a
proliferation of upper-middle-class subdivisions replaced the estates, concentrating the black
poor into the same pre-war districts. In these three neighborhoods, lived over 1,000 people.
Seventy percent of units did not have central heating, sixty-five percent lacked hot water, and
over half of households were without indoor toilets or baths. Demand nonetheless made tool
sheds, garages, and even chicken coops profitable. 53 In the larger and more urbanized city of
Glen Cove, builders constructed mid-century tenements that slipped under city and state building
codes, with coal stoves, faulty wiring, and bathrooms shared by an entire floor. This was the
newest of what became a four-building slum owned by Morris Idelevitz in 1953, which included
older buildings and a former incinerator. Three fires had broken out in the late 1940s and early
1950s, killing a child.54
In Nassau’s South Shore domestic enclaves, a similar pattern emerged despite Levittstyle mass suburbanization. In the affluent commuter village of Rockville Centre, the Banks
Avenue area remained the sole affordable residential district, housing over two-hundred black
and three dozen white families who worked as cooks and house-cleaners along with a large
contingent of day-laborers.55 In Inwood at the extreme southwest of Nassau County, postwar
economic development led to a more diverse population in the 1,200-unit domestic
neighborhood. Manufacturing, construction, transportation, and utility workers joined the area’s
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domestics, and housing conditions did not deteriorate as rapidly: only a quarter of units lacked a
bathroom, heating facilities, and/or running water. African Americans were concentrated in the
most substandard dwellings though, including rooming houses, where entire tenant families
squeezed into two-room rentals and shared bathrooms with half a dozen other families.56 While
Hempstead and Freeport became middle class havens during the 1960s, they too remained
sources of low-income housing in small corners of each neighborhood.57
Unlike in Nassau, where intensive residential development aggravated dilapidated
conditions, cheaper land and relaxed building standards in Suffolk enabled developers to exploit
acute housing demand among the poor. In western Suffolk, the same forces at work in Nassau
operated, where former domestic enclaves deteriorated as demand became acute.58 On Long
Island’s expansive east end, housing options expanded for the black poor. Migrant farm laborers
were already housed in barrack-style ‘bullpens,’ or in former chicken coops, tool sheds, and pig
sties, sharing bathrooms and eating facilities with an entire camp.59 A growing population of
‘ex-migrants’ and eastward migrating black poor were ripe for new forms of housing
exploitation, and the lack of building codes in Suffolk’s three eastern towns gave landowners
freedom to provide housing in any capacity they saw fit. On the Hollis Warner Duck Farm in
Riverhead, the Warner family constructed a suburban subdivision for the poor. An awardwinning Newsday article depicted the three available models: a three bedroom and two-bedroom
500 square foot model with gas-stove, refrigerator, kerosene gas heater, and hand pump, or an
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eighty-one square-foot single-room model with refrigerator only. None had bathrooms; the
Warners erected a row of outhouses behind the units. While most inhabitants were local migrant
or ex-migrant laborers, tenants included those displaced from other areas of Long Island. A
resident named Mary and her family were forced to move from their Greenport rental after it was
sold, making their way to the Warner Farm. She found work both on local farms and
periodically commuted to Roslyn, sixty miles away. Another resident living in a former duckbrooding house was a long-distance commuter to his landscaping job in the Gold Coast hamlet of
Brookville, over an hour west.60 Unsurprisingly, Riverhead’s minority poor rented out over
ninety-nine percent of the Town’s shoddy housing, much of it comparatively new.61
All low-income housing shared one common problem: high prices. Rents in Nassau
County averaged between $130 and $138 for a four-person family in the early 1960s.62 For
those families with incomes of $5,000 a year, $130 a month represented over a third of their
wages. Families below this threshold could be ‘shelter-poor,’ i.e. unable to meet their nonshelter needs (food, clothing, medical care) due to such high housing costs.63 Though Suffolk’s
rents were cheaper, the average black family in hamlets like Bay Shore spent nearly a third of
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their income on rent, while Riverhead residents paid low prices for vermin-infested housing in
rural isolation.64 The fact that the poor paid high prices for decrepit housing was nothing new;
what differed was the wide swath of Long Island’s population spending a fifth of their rising
incomes to build equity.65 Those obtaining secure jobs built assets through property ownership,
and the lack of affordable housing only exacerbated the precarious job situations of the poor in
postwar Long Island.

Suburban Civil Rights
These two divergent black housing experiences, though a small facet of Long Island’s
postwar suburbanization, were at the center of the region’s housing politics in the 1950s and
early 1960s. For the black middle class, housing and school segregation, along with equal
political representation, were the final frontiers of racial inequality in suburbia.66 Local
homeowners and activists took to the courts, realty offices, school boards, town halls, and streets
to wage their war against racism. Their fights made front-page news, particularly as they
coalesced with the civil rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Activists, including
some of the same groups and individuals involved in middle class issues, were also deeply
concerned with the postwar black poor, whose challenges required public intervention in the
housing market. The two struggles, like the divergent housing experiences, followed different
tracks, appealing to distinct constituencies, organizing disparate communities, and on a
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fundamental level, fighting different problems. Nonetheless, the belief that segregation was at
the core of these problems crossed the lines between the two movements, particularly because
the NAACP, the most powerful civil rights organization on Long Island, assumed that both
challenges stemmed from the same root cause: the inability of African Americans to move
freely through the housing market.67
The middle class postwar suburban struggle for equality was rooted in the concerns and
organizations of black homeowners, who melded their demands as property owners with broader
civil rights activity. Homeowner activists worked through institutions as diverse as the
ubiquitous suburban ‘civic association’ to explicitly civil-rights oriented organizations like
NAACP and CORE. In fact, the line between the two blurred as activists defined civil rights
through the lens of the homeowner, while race-conscious civic associations adopted civil rights
language when pressing for homeowner demands.68 For example, black civic associations, like
the Progressive Civic Association of New Cassel (PCANC) or the Ronek Park Civic Association
in North Amityville, operated as any civic association in white neighborhoods. They fought for
the interests of their home-owning constituents, including the preservation of ‘residential
character,’ quality public services, congestion and noise abatement, or environmental protection.
This meant demanding paved roads, sidewalks, or playgrounds, and fighting down-zoning
proposals, factory development, or illegal apartments.69 Unlike their white counterparts though,
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black civic associations approached these problems as a racial minority. North Amityville’s
civic associations operated as a racial organization, fighting an attempt to re-zone forty-three
acres of the hamlet for industry with chants of “we shall overcome.”70 So did PCANC, who
argued that “it is very hard for us in a minority group to obtain homes” when New Cassel was
threatened with a new industrial park near their residential community.71
Long Island’s NAACP branches likewise interpreted the concerns of their home-owning
constituency as civil rights problems. The NAACP had a small presence on Long Island dating
to the 1930s, but the postwar migration of middle-income African Americans and the national
board’s encouragement of neighborhood organizations transformed the NAACP’s local presence.
By 1965 there were fourteen branches representing all of Long Island’s black neighborhoods,
from Great Neck in the extreme north-east of Nassau County to Riverhead and Greenport on the
east end of Suffolk.72 Collectively, membership totaled over 2,800 Long Islanders.73 Members
in solidly middle class neighborhoods used the branches as both community centers and sources
of homeowner activism. The Central Long Island branch (stationed in North Amityville),
representing the entire Town of Babylon, grew to include over 1,300 members in the 1950s
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under the tutelage of “Mr. NAACP” Dr. Eugene T. Reed, who helped organize banquets, a credit
union, and the 1954 New York State Conference of Branches of the NAACP.74 The branch
bulletin reported on zoning changes to black neighborhoods and occasionally lent official
support to homeowner efforts, from fights against downzoning proposals to promoting large-lot
housing tracts for affluent African American homebuyers.75 The Central Long Island Branch
was far from alone in these efforts. The neighboring Deer Park NAACP branch won an NAACP
Thalheimer local branch award in 1966 for opposing the “’down-zoning’ of a nearby tract for
industry.”76 Overall, the NAACP exemplified its middle-class outlook most explicitly in the
suburbs, where local branches supported black homeowners in their quest to secure equal status
among white middle class suburbs.
These local homeowner’s associations and NAACP branches were embedded within the
broader fight against racial inequality, particularly the national struggle for integration. Highprofile legal tactics, including two NAACP suits against Levittown for using illegal racial
covenants, looked to strike down the structural barriers to housing choice.77 After New York
State passed the Metcalf-Baker Law in 1961 (which barred racial discrimination in housing sales
or rentals), the Long Island Council for Integrated Housing, an interracial volunteer organization
founded to lobby for the law’s passage, tested real estate offices and provided financial support
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to black homebuyers moving to white suburbs. The Council targeted real estate practices
because it was the source of “the myths and misconceptions about real estate value, which are
used to deny equality of housing.”78 Even union locals joined in the crusade for integration,
assuring members that any fears of black neighbors were unfounded. The overwhelmingly white
Engineer’s Association of Arma (EAA), which represented engineers at the defense-oriented
American Bosch Arma manufacturing plant, educated its members on the reasons why “well-todo Negroes” would want “white housing,” including better schools, services, and the fact that “a
Negro doctor, lawyer, or engineer has as little interest in common with a negro-laborer neighbor
as would their white counterparts.”79 The EAA’s efforts most directly reflected the class-specific
vision of open housing for those that could afford it, a key element of the housing integration
struggle in the postwar period.
Homeowners also encouraged integration themselves. In the wake of Lakeview’s rapid
influx of African American professionals from 1959-1961, thirty-five of the 170 white-owned
homes went up for sale, stoking fears of ‘white flight.’ Jamaican born World War II veteran and
airline employee Lincoln Lynch, a new homeowner in the neighborhood, spearheaded a
movement to ‘stabilize’ the racial ratio of the community. Lynch wanted to achieve a ten
percent black population in all of Long Island’s suburbs, based on a rough national percentage of
African Americans, and together with local white residents formed The Emergency Committee
for a Stabilized Democratic Community. Lynch and the Committee first asked Morris Milgrim,
the interracial private housing developer, for advice. Milgrim suggested the Committee steer
sales towards whites. The Committee had difficulty finding white buyers for the neighborhood’s
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high prices.80 When black real estate brokers continued to show homes to black buyers, the
Committee launched the “Freedom Dwellers” campaign in 1961, which actively discouraged
further black home purchases in the hamlet. Lynch and other committee members barricaded
roads and deterred minority buyers with signs like “Negroes! This community could become
another Ghetto,” and “you owe it to your family to buy in another community.”81 Integration in
this case extended beyond ‘open housing,’ pushing black buyers to become ‘pioneers’ in white
neighborhoods themselves and reach an even quota across the metropolitan area. Similar efforts
emerged in other neighborhoods in the early 1960s. In Hempstead, the interracial Hempstead
Neighbors Committee went after supposed ‘blockbusters,’ picketing offending realty offices,
persuading white sellers to remove their homes from the market, and investigating the origins of
rumors they believed fomented white fears.82
In no other fight were the efforts of the NAACP’s national office, activism of local
branches, and interests of black homeowners more aligned than school segregation. Segregation
was legal in New York State until 1938, and in Freeport, Hempstead, and Glen Cove, separate
black elementary schools existed, though each fed into larger integrated high schools. After
World War II however, all-in-one neighborhood school districts proliferated, where students
stayed within a district from the kindergarten through the twelfth-grade. With over a hundred
districts across Long Island, all funded locally through property taxes, one’s choice in housing
was strongly tied to schools. As Jack Dougherty argues, school districts and developers were
aware of the school-housing link. The former designed special programs to attract residents and
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carefully zoned its school boundaries for certain populations, while the latter advertised and
attracted homebuyers to these school districts. In effect, shopping for a suburban home was also
‘shopping for schools.’83
As black homeowners arrived on Long Island, their own search for schools confronted
the reality of both housing and school segregation. Fortunately, activists could harness the
national office’s financial and legal clout.84 The challenge was choosing the best strategy to
integrate schools where both ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ segregation existed. In 1949, young
NAACP lawyer Constance Baker Motley successfully desegregated the Hempstead school
district, distributing black students on the basis of their residence, not their race.85 While a
victory against overt segregation, the divided housing market nonetheless led to white and black
schools, which worsened as more African Americans moved to Hempstead. Challenging the
‘neighborhood’ concept of schools as a source of discrimination proved difficult. In the
Amityville School district, which encompassed children of Amityville village, North Amityville,
and East Massapequa, two new elementary school sites were proposed in 1953, one in the
northeast section of North Amityville, where Ronek Park and other black suburban
developments were built, and another in the majority-white northwest part of the district in East
Massapequa. The two schools, while meeting the need for new school buildings, were
gerrymandered to be racially separate.86 The Central Long Island NAACP sued the district in
1956, though lost because the courts adopted the housing market argument, stating that the
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school board did not have to gerrymander lines to achieve a racial balance “because of the
incidence of location.”87
Activists had more success in the 1960s, thanks to deeper involvement of local
homeowners who adopted direct confrontation strategies, as well as new court rulings and
legislative solutions that overcame housing barriers. The most sensational battle emerged in the
Malverne school district, which included children from the white and affluent village of
Malverne as well as the middle class integrated community of Lakeview (along with a small
sliver of students from Lynbrook). Of the district’s three elementary schools, Lakeview’s
Woodfield Road School was overwhelmingly black – seventy-five percent of students were
African American, compared to the other eighty-eight percent white schools. Residents with
children in the Woodfield School complained that the district failed to distribute financial
resources equally, left the school overcrowded, and therefore denied their children an equal
education. The district’s solution was to build another elementary school next to Woodfield,
though parents voted against it, and then the board planned a sixth grade wing for its junior high
school, though the wing would be separated by geography, maintaining the racial order of the
district. The NAACP challenged all measures, as did activists within the district. Black
psychologist and local resident Dr. Lloyd Delany unsuccessfully ran for school board in spring
1962, and that same year Lincoln Lynch, the architect of Lakeview’s ‘neighborhood stability’
movement, along with other parents picketed school board meetings with signs reading “Equal
Education for All Children” and “Separate Cannot Be Equal.” Lynch then staged what was
considered Long Island’s first sit-in at a school board meeting in August, demanding the district
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rectify ‘de facto’ segregation and distribute students evenly across all schools.88 The already
politicized housing situation in Lakeview now reached the schools, and a tension emerged
between militant school integrationists and the desire to keep a balanced interracial population,
particularly as the non-engaged white community disagreed with the confrontational tactics of
Lynch and his allies.89
The protests forced New York State Education Commissioner James E. Allen Jr. to
intervene. Allen appointed Dr. Kenneth Clark and other prominent academics to study the
Malverne school issue. Ironically, the committee found the school’s education to be on par with
the other elementary schools and excellent in all regards, despite its racial imbalance.90
Nonetheless, Commissioner Allen implemented the ‘Princeton Plan’ in 1963 (splitting
elementary schools by grade rather than neighborhood to achieve integration) because the
segregated school “interferes with the achievement of equality of educational opportunity.”91
The school board and a contingent of white parents refused to comply, and a nasty four-year
battle ensued in the courts, state legislature, and streets. White parents and the school board
sought a restraining order to delay the plans and denied funds for new crosswalks and buses.
The NAACP meanwhile went to court to assure the Princeton Plan’s implementation. Both sides
resorted to sit-ins and protests. Five black parents, including Lincoln Lynch, were arrested after
refusing to leave a school board meeting in 1963, while nine white women were arrested in 1966
after climbing onto vans filled with desks in preparation for integration. The Princeton Plan did
not begin until 1967.
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Malverne was the highest profile school segregation case, though one of many across
Long Island’s districts. From Manhasset in western Nassau County to Bellport on Suffolk
County’s south shore, black parents demanded integrated schools, a national goal of the civil
rights movement refracted through the local politics of schools and housing. And in Long
Island’s black middle class hamlets, including Roosevelt, Amityville, Freeport, and Bellport,
activists successfully desegregated schools in the 1960s after years of litigation, protest, and
debate over the ideals of integration and its implementation.92 These fights, like the struggle for
open housing and integrated communities, or the demand for equal treatment from local
governments, sought parity with white suburbanites. The black middle class was already on “the
stony road toward advancement” as PCANC member William F. Oliver put it, though Long
Island’s segregated landscape still produced inequities, even if there was no “aggravated
injustice” or “sensationalistic situation.” Oliver laid out what remained in the middle-class fight
to his fellow PCANC members in New Cassel in 1961, asking:
“is there no local current situation when housing opportunities fosters segregation,
when mothers fear for the quality of the education in neighborhood schools, when
feelings of “step child” treatment results when area improvements are decided
upon?”93
While Oliver listed these concerns to remind civic association members of remaining
challenges, it spoke as much to the achievements reached by the 1960s. A vigilant movement
had secured thriving communities, confronted housing segregation, and dismantled school
segregation.
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“Destined for Redevelopment”
As the black middle class bought homes, formed neighborhoods, and agitated for racial
equality in suburbia, the black poor faced qualitatively distinct problems: homes unfit for
habitation, few options outside concentrated low-income neighborhoods, overcrowding, and high
prices. Though the activities of black homeowners made occasional headlines, the plight of the
black poor was of central concern to postwar suburbanites and suburban government, viewed
through the lens of ‘blight.’ As Amanda Seligman argues, ‘blight’ “connoted a type of physical
decay with organic qualities,” that overcrowded or dilapidated housing was bad for the people
living in it and could spread to nearby properties, engulfing whole neighborhoods into a spiral of
lower property values, poor health, and moral decay.94 There was widespread panic of ‘blight’ in
the suburbs, as those moving from urban areas wanted to thwart the processes they believed
responsible for urban decay. Robert Moses warned Long Islanders that without proper planning,
“you are going to have suburban slums as sure as God made little apples.”95 Newsday journalists
noted in 1957 that “nothing seems to arouse quite the controversy among Nassau’s residents as
the subject of slums.”96 Since the African American poor disproportionately inhabited decrepit
housing stock on Long Island, and because black skin itself was associated with ‘blight’
generally, suburban officials targeted poor black neighborhoods as the ‘cancer’ to a stable and
slum-free Long Island. They wanted a “complete break from the past,” remaking outdated
neighborhoods and integrating them into the vast expanse of industrial suburbia.97
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Black middle class activists, including the NAACP, their white allies, local civic
associations, and residents themselves were part of this debate. All supported efforts to improve
housing, though they were also concerned about affected residents. The poor wanted better
housing and input. Civic associations wanted to protect property values as low-income housing
was remade. Civil rights activists wanted to address racial segregation, even though these
problems were as much a product of poverty and class inequality as racism in housing. The
overlapping interests evolved into conflict as projects to eradicate blight got underway. Urban
historians interpret the efforts to clean up ‘blight’ as failures and detrimental to the people
affected, as ‘negro removal’ both in purpose and outcome. Andrew Wiese argues that Long
Island’s suburban renewal was a form of suburban ‘racial cleansing,’ as “white Long Islanders
sought… not only to exclude African Americans but to displace many who were already
there.”98 While planners and politicians were surely reforming the ‘racial geography’ of Long
Island, this reductionist interpretation ignores the complex intentions, goals, and outcomes of
such efforts from all actors involved.99 Most, including the poor, were supportive of improved
housing, but the process and the outcomes produced conflict.
Suburban officials had three primary means to improve housing stock in postwar Long
Island: public housing, code enforcement and condemnation, and urban renewal. Public
housing, first possible in 1934 thanks to state legislation that permitted local municipalities to
construct low-income housing, gained momentum during and after World War II.100 The
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NAACP and League of Women Voters were strong advocates of these projects, but faced stiff
opposition, driven by the same fears and anxieties of the pre-war period – attracting additional
poor residents, concentrating poverty within their hamlets, and raising local taxes. In Freeport,
the Nassau County branch of the NAACP lent its hand to the long-standing efforts to replace the
Bennington Park slum with public housing in 1943. In 1946, Village voters struck down the
project in fear of rising taxes and attracting new poor to Freeport.101 The League of Women
Voters in Port Washington and local clergymen had more success, compelling the Town of
North Hempstead to form a town-wide housing authority in 1946. The authority planned a lowrent project along Harbor Road, but local property owners sued the Town for destroying land
values and building housing that “does not belong on tree-lined suburban Port Washington
Boulevard.” But supporters won in State Supreme Court, and the project was completed in
1951.102 Port Washington’s ‘Harbor Homes’ was one of three New York state-sponsored
housing complexes that replaced slum housing on Long Island’s North Shore by 1958, including
the domestic enclaves of Manhasset (Spinney Hill) and Roslyn (Laurel Homes), 236 units in
all.103 This was in addition to the Village of Hempstead’s eighty-one unit ‘Parkside Gardens’
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complex completed in 1951, and Freeport’s Moxey Rigby homes that finally replaced parts of
the Bennington Park area, opened in 1958.104
Though public housing replaced ‘blight’ with sleek apartments, it solidified the lowincome status of the area where it was built, necessitated state approval and intervention,
required local taxpayers to share maintenance costs with the state, was constructed within
wealthy hamlets with declining unskilled job opportunities, and faced nationwide opposition by
the late 1950s.105 As a result, public housing was rare on Long Island; by 1965, only 658 family
units were available in Nassau County, and none existed in Suffolk.106 In contrast, housing code
enforcement was locally implemented and did not require long-term taxes to house the poor. It
was also popular, “taking the profit out of human misery” by attacking ‘slumlords’ considered
responsible for the deplorable conditions.107 In reality though, few local governments had the
power to condemn; only one of Long Island’s thirteen large towns developed ‘housing’ codes,
distinct from zoning and building codes because they could be imposed after construction.108
Villages and cities, particularly in Nassau County, were more likely to both develop and enforce
housing codes.109 In 1955, the village mayors of Freeport and Glen Cove met with the New
York State Rent Commission to plan a joint attack on slum landlords, using the combined
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powers of the state and local government to withhold rent, inspect, and condemn. Similar efforts
were done in the city of Long Beach.110
Housing activists were torn by code enforcement. On one hand, they supported better
housing quality for Long Island’s poor and supported the state’s interest in ending landlord
exploitation. On the other, they felt local government disregarded what would happen to tenants
and ignored housing segregation. In September 1955, Glen Cove’s city government condemned
one of the Cecil Avenue slum buildings along Glen Cove Avenue. Forty-three adults and sixtyeight children, all black, faced eviction. NAACP New York State Housing Chairman Laska
Strachan, along with the Glen Cove NAACP branch and NAACP attorney Jawn Sandifer,
demanded Glen Cove Mayor Joseph Stanco relocate the families, but Mayor Stanco refused,
stating it was not his responsibility. The NAACP then turned to the courts to delay the eviction.
Since the building was only two years old, it had clearly slipped under the city’s building codes,
representing a failure of the city to enforce its laws. But the NAACP went further, blaming the
housing conditions on the people of Glen Cove for endorsing housing segregation, since “the
residents of that building would not be in that condemned house if there was a free housing
market.” The point fell on deaf ears, though the NAACP secured an extra sixty days for tenants
and arranged for the Long Island Home Builders Institute, a building industry trade group, to
purchase and bring the building up to code. Tenants were then allowed to return.111
The danger of code enforcement was eviction, eradicating ‘blight’ without a clear
template for what would happen to the tenants, though activists could intervene to steer
condemnation toward humane ends. This was less true of urban renewal projects, where the
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factions invested in remaking poor neighborhoods greatly overpowered critical voices.112 Born
from the Housing Act of 1949 and the 1954 amendments, ‘urban renewal’ was the most
comprehensive answer to the problem of postwar suburban slums. Federal authorization and
funding gave local governments the ability to take slum clearance and redevelopment into their
own hands. Urban renewal also incorporated private developers, limiting public costs and
attracting private capital to blighted areas. Renewal offered more than better housing; it
promised to turn depressed land into commercially viable property for retail or industrial
purposes, increasing tax revenues and providing property tax relief. This is why urban renewal
attracted such broad support, including planners, labor unions, business and commercial
interests, housing advocates, and even tenants.113 These factors led to a flurry of proposals in the
late 1950s across Long Island, what the New York Times described as a “ferment of suburban
renewal on a scale that was never before possible.”114 As a Newsday article argued in 1957, the
major difference between Long Island’s poor communities and the rest of the island was that
places like “Levittown started life with a clean slate…they had no inheritance from the past.”115
Erasing the outmoded vestiges of the estate and agricultural past and making them conducive to
a single-family oriented, automobile dependent, industrial park and mall-dominated landscape
was the goal. Where the residents fit was only part of the equation.
This is not to say that residents’ needs were ignored; instead, housing and the needs of
the poor were subsumed into the broader purpose of these projects, which included jobs,
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commerce, higher tax receipts, and integration into postwar suburbia broadly. Glen Cove’s
renewal proposal in 1959 looked to erase the ailing infrastructure of the estate economy,
including horse-carriage roads, scattered factories, and rundown domestic enclaves. If residents
supported the construction of industrial parks, a “miracle mile” commercial shopping district,
and new multi-family housing units, “better living and working conditions are ours.”116 In the
Village of Freeport, slum clearance and a new industrial park was not only as a boon to the local
job market, but could expand public services without raising costs thanks to more valuable
property for tax purposes.117 The jobs and services were never directly reserved for local
residents, but the benefits would trickle down to them nonetheless because the space itself would
be integrated into the broader postwar economy. It was this logic that undergirded New York
State Housing Commissioner James W. Gaynor’s convertible public housing/middle-income
coop project in Glen Cove, designed so that tenants could convert their subsidized low-income
apartment to a middle-income cooperative as their wages rose. As he argued, the wealth
distribution in American society was no longer a pyramid, but a diamond, “with the bottom
representing the low-income group and the wide center the middle income level.” Postwar
suburbia offered mass upward mobility, and poor housing districts were unnecessary as lowincome Americans would benefit from the nation’s egalitarian wealth distribution.118 As Andrew
Highsmith argues, politicians simply saw ‘blighted’ neighborhoods as obstacles to economic
growth. 119 These obstacles trapped area residents as well.
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Fifteen projects were planned across Long Island in 1959, from Inwood in the southwest
of Nassau County to Patchogue in Suffolk County.120 Four large-scale projects began in 1960,
affecting an estimated 578 black and 108 white families in the domestic enclaves of Huntington
Station, Long Beach, Glen Cove, and Rockville Centre.121 They drew support from politicians,
planners, and private developers, but also from civil rights groups and tenants themselves who
hoped to benefit from the remodeling of their neighborhoods.122 Their support was contingent
on three factors, particularly in the case of the NAACP. First, that adequate relocation and
affordable housing be made available to affected residents. Second, that housing integration was
included within the urban renewal project. And lastly, that tenants and advocacy organizations
have direct input in the outcomes of the projects themselves.123
The battle over Rockville Centre’s urban renewal project, which at its outset looked to
redevelop an area with over 1,100 black residents, illustrates the conflicts that emerged out of the
process of fixing suburban ‘blight.’ The Village planned to demolish the 36-acre Banks Avenue
domestic enclave and replace it with competitively-priced suburban single-family homes,
commercial space, and a large industrial park covering 24 acres.124 The plan received federal
approval in 1958, and site resident Zeddie Brown contacted the Central Long Island Branch of
the NAACP “for protection and to get the full benefit of the program.” Brown hoped to use the
NAACP’s clout to incorporate affected residents into the renewal process, and in 1959, she was
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appointed to the urban renewal area’s Citizen’s Advisory Committee, though they only met three
times.125 In August 1959, the Mid-Village Civic Association analyzed the demographic statistics
of the village’s renewal application and concluded Rockville Centre government did not provide
adequate housing for the area’s low-income residents. The civic association was “fully in accord
with the Village’s desire” to carry out the renewal project, but wanted the final plan to be “sound
in conception, fair to the people in the area, and one which will receive full support of all citizens
of Rockville Centre.”126
The Central Long Island NAACP also affirmed their support for better housing in a May
1960 report with qualifications. The report asked whether displaced residents would receive
temporary housing, whether owners would get full market value for their property, and whether
affordable housing would be included in the renewal project. In addition, the NAACP added
their own long-standing fight against housing segregation, that without ‘special attention’ to this
issue, the urban renewal program would eliminate the black population, leaving Rockville Centre
virtually ‘all-white.’127 Calls for integration contrasted with the immediate need for affordable
housing, which could not be met in the nearby private housing market. The NAACP surveyed 67
families, and determined that 54 made too little to own an FHA home. Only thirteen could and
wanted to purchase homes in the urban renewal area, while most needed affordable rental
units.128 Though segregation limited housing choice, so too did the low-incomes of these
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residents, who were unable to remain in the area given the high cost of housing elsewhere in the
village and the demolition of cheap units.
The village balked at the NAACP’s demands, promising only sixteen families affordable
housing.129 With federal funding involved, NAACP housing director Jack Wood filed
complaints with the federal Urban Renewal Administration, New York State Division of
Housing, and State Commission against Discrimination (SCAD) to halt all four of Long Island’s
renewal projects in November 1961. In December, the NAACP staged three simultaneous
demonstrations at the Glen Cove, Long Beach, and Rockville Centre renewal sites, condemning
the projects as “racial relocation with federal funds” and for forcing black residents to be “driven
out” to make way for “a shopping center & high-cost housing.”130 The NAACP still supported
urban renewal generally, and Dr. Eugene Reed claimed the demonstrations “showed the concern
of Negro residents for fair urban renewal programs.”131 The protests forced the Village Board to
capitulate, and in January 1962, they agreed to relocate residents within the area “according to
what they are able to pay.” Resident Zeddie Brown, now president of the new Rockville Centre
chapter of the NAACP, re-affirmed the support for the program though lamented the lack of
commitment to village-wide open occupancy.132
Now the problem of relocation came to the fore, as the Village proceeded to condemn
properties and had difficulty finding accommodations for low-income residents and domestic
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‘roomers.’ The NAACP suggested the Village shoulder the responsibility of housing roomers
and directly accept monthly rental payments.133 When the Village followed this route, it
essentially became ‘slumlords,’ placing low-income tenants in temporary housing in and near the
renewal area, collecting rent on homes equipped with wood-burning stoves, kerosene heaters,
and kitchen sinks for bathing. The village refused to improve housing soon to be demolished.134
By 1963, these conditions pushed the NAACP to fully oppose Rockville Centre’s urban renewal
project. In January, NAACP housing secretary Jack Wood condemned the project for promoting
both segregation and a ‘negro exodus’ at a local NAACP meeting in Rockville Centre, and in
February, the organization forced the New York State Division of Housing to withhold funding
until the village met affordable housing needs and furthered integration.135 Rockville Centre
Mayor W. Harry Lister was confused about the charges of promoting segregation, arguing that
“this project doesn’t have anything to do with integration or segregation…the thing is not to
cause it.” In his mind, the goal was simply to rehabilitate a blighted area. The NAACP’s
demands to integrate was an added requirement, difficult to meet given the village’s expensive
housing market. Prioritizing the residents could secure housing, but would end up with another
segregated enclave.136
By March 1964, the Village promised a new 164-unit mixed middle and low-income
complex.137 The accusations of segregation and ‘negro removal’ remained unresolved, and as
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the Village continued to condemn properties and house low-income residents in the remaining
dilapidated dwellings, conflict between the Village and residents escalated. In October, Mayor
Lister listened to criticisms from over 100 opponents at a village board meeting and kicked
Richard Stimpfl, who denounced the whole project for building a ‘ghetto’ for African Americans
looking to escape, out of the meeting.138 When residents complained of primitive temporary
housing accommodations, Urban Renewal director Howard Snell defended these conditions
because the residents were “used to living that way.” Their demands for modern amenities were
uncalled for because these houses “have been rented for many years as cold water flats… [and]
we have apartments that do not include bathroom facilities in the apartments and this is now
being demanded.”139 Anecdotal evidence corroborated accusations of racism. When Mary
Flower Thomas approached Mr. Snell about new housing for her family, she was told to leave
Rockville Centre, and when William Osborne asked Mr. Snell whether urban renewal would
attract new black residents, Snell responded that the village was trying to get them out.140
By 1965, tenants, with support from the NAACP and CORE, began a series of marches,
sit-ins, and other demonstrations to force the Village to improve temporary housing conditions,
immediately begin construction in the renewal project, and fire the renewal authority
members.141 The Village responded with a timetable for construction beginning in February
1966, though did not promise action on the housing conditions, and at a meeting in October,
Zoning Appeals Board chairman Robert Sasseen slapped tenant-activist Alfreda Brown in the
face after an altercation instigated by a racial epithet Sasseen hurled at Brown. Demonstrations
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followed the incident, and when the Village delayed the start of the building project in 1966, the
Rockville Centre Tenants Association staged a ‘dig-in,’ an unofficial groundbreaking
ceremony.142
After seven years, seven revisions, a dozen protests, and countless meetings, Rockville
Centre’s project began. The process was particularly ugly in this instance, and clearly racism
was deeply intertwined in the drawn-out debates over renewal, particularly as the Village
opposed the demands of residents and the NAACP. Numerous organizations condemned the
racism and manipulation of the local residents “to secure the benefits of added wealth to the
Village through a twist of the federal Law” as the Catholic Commission on Interracial Affairs
concluded. A Nassau County investigation reported that the village emphasized “the economic
and legal aspects of urban renewal… [with an] almost complete disregard of the human problems
involved.”143 But for urban renewal supporters, in Rockville Centre and elsewhere, the
‘economic and legal aspects of urban renewal’ were not divorced from the human problems; the
former would improve prospects for the latter. This was true of all anti-blight strategies. Public
housing, code condemnation, and urban renewal all aimed for ‘integration’ of housing to meet
postwar standards and incorporate poor neighborhoods into postwar industrial suburbia. Civil
rights groups, while supportive of the opportunity for better housing, nonetheless wanted
‘integration’ in a different sense; open occupancy to break down the concentration of poor black
Long Islanders into the most decrepit and oldest housing stock in the region. The former
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understood blight as the obstacle to civic progress; the latter viewed blight as the consequence of
racist housing policy.
While the controversies surrounding these projects drew the most attention, it was the
slow process of condemnation, renewal, and affordable housing construction that left residents
uncertain of their current living conditions and future homes. For all the fanfare, the “glacierlike progress of urban renewal” and the focus on spatial redevelopment offered little to displaced
residents except destroyed homes. Alexander Clifford Johnson, a young cook who had left
Freeport’s Bennington Park during its decades-long renewal process, concluded that “urban
renewal is a lot of bull shit…you can’t eat salvation.”144 Affected residents generally agreed
with his sentiments, because only determined residents waited out these public projects; the rest
left, producing the outcome of ‘Negro removal’ regardless of the project’s intent. Rockville
Centre’s black population dropped by a third from 1960-1965, while the urban renewal office in
Glen Cove estimated that the city lost twenty percent of its black population living within the
renewal area’s boundaries. Overall, former domestic enclaves lost black residents from 19601970 as Nassau County’s black population grew by two-thirds. Inwood lost a quarter of its black
population, Rockville Centre’s dropped by a fifth, Manhasset lost seventeen percent, and Glen
Cove’s black population dropped fourteen percent.145 Since developers demolished more than
700 substandard dwellings and only 303 units of housing replaced them by 1969, such loses are
unsurprising.146
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Class vs. Class
The goal of fighting ‘blight’ was to prevent suburban slums on Long Island, but while
substandard housing was demolished, the poor remained. As a study on Suffolk’s code
enforcement and relocation policies concluded, “the problem is being moved, not removed.”147
The poor continued to reside on Long Island, joined by new low-income African American
migrants from the South and the five boroughs. As the older domestic and agricultural laborer
enclaves were bulldozed and remade, the problem of affordable housing only grew more acute in
the 1960s, further limiting housing choice in the affluent suburban market. Low-income housing
demand nonetheless offered opportunities for profit, and racial segregation, along with the class
divide among the region’s suburbs, provided the cracks within the residential market to meet
poor black housing needs.
Long Island’s most affordable postwar suburbs, including its integrated and thriving
black hamlets, were the destinations for most of the new black suburbanites in the 1960s,
including the black poor. Racial concentration intensified during the decade. Among Nassau
County’s ninety-four neighborhoods, over eighty-percent of African Americans resided in just
thirteen communities by 1970, a jump from two-thirds a decade prior. In Suffolk, only a third of
African Americans resided in the five largest black neighborhoods in 1960. A decade later, that
concentration rose to sixty percent.148 Among these migrants were refugees from urban renewal
and condemnation projects. From Rockville Centre alone, a survey of sixty-seven renewal area
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residents found that fifty-four relocated within Nassau County’s five largest black hamlets:
Hempstead, Freeport, Roosevelt, Lakeview, and New Cassel.149 In Suffolk’s wide rural expanse,
the condemnation of dilapidated housing in Riverhead pushed families out to other largely black
enclaves within the Town of Riverhead, Brookhaven, and Southampton, including suburban
North Bellport.150
These postwar communities, constructed within the suburban boom for an FHA-qualified
middle class constituency, were formerly closed off to low-income residents, save the few preexisting affordable units that zoned these neighborhoods safe for black FHA housing. But
amidst racial transition, ‘blockbusters’ not only profited from the wedge between the ‘dual’
black-and-white housing market, but used segregation to make low-income housing enclaves in
middle class suburbs. The actions of real estate ‘blockbusters’ in the postwar period, striking
fear into white homeowners of black neighbors to induce quick sales which were then flipped to
prospective black buyers at inflated prices, is well documented.151 As Amanda Seligman argues,
the controversy surrounding ‘blockbusting’ was as much about the fears associated with rapid
racial change as it was the actual tactics blockbusters used. Some realtors condemned as
‘blockbusters’ were opening opportunities for aspiring black homeowners in a market with
limited supply, and not necessarily acting in an unscrupulous manner. Most importantly,
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blockbusting was impossible without the larger structural context: a racially divided housing
market where homogeneity was critical to an investment’s security.152
A similar dynamic occurred to meet low-income housing demand, though rather than
realtors purchasing homes to flip at inflated costs, it was primarily speculators in search of rental
income who turned FHA single-family homes into low-income living quarters. The process
remains more elusive than racial blockbusting. In Nassau County and western Suffolk, from
New Cassel and Roosevelt to North Amityville and Wyandanch, speculators posed as real estate
brokers, buying up homes from both white and black owners, splitting the rooms between
multiple families, and collecting rental checks. Enterprising homeowners joined the speculators,
putting up walls in their basements, building makeshift dormers, and renting out spare rooms to
low-income tenants, adding multiple families to their single-family homes or acting as absentee
landlords.153 While some homeowners profited from rental housing demand, others were
desperately holding onto properties as local costs rose. As a New Cassel civic leader explained
the process in her hamlet:
Here were, in many cases, hard pressed non-whites, running to get away from slums
and ghettoes…They wanted them to have a place to grow and enjoy living. They
came. Taxes skyrocketed and their income was not commensurate. The children
grew up and moved on their own and the homeowner takes in roomers at $20, $25
a week. Suddenly, the first hint of crabgrass suburbs, absentee landlords and all.154
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Cash-strapped homeowners put their main asset to work so they could sustain a
livelihood in suburbia. In addition, high rents encouraged tenants to sub-lease their
rentals to boarders, contributing to overcrowding in illegally rented housing.155
In eastern Suffolk County, a spate of foreclosures attracted investors who bought up
affordable single family homes for the low-income market. In the tiny hamlet of North Bellport
along Suffolk’s south shore, developers constructed a half-dozen subdivisions catering to white
blue-collar employees of a local Republic Aviation plant. When the plant closed in 1957 during
defense cutbacks, foreclosures and quick sales attracted speculators, who bought homes below
original selling price. By 1964, twelve percent of single-family houses were renter-occupied,
and sixty-seven percent of those occupants were African American, while only ten percent of
homeowners were black.156 To the west in Central Islip, a small cheaply-built subdivision of 320
homes named ‘Carleton Park’ offered some of the most affordable FHA-approved homes in the
county during the 1950s, twenty-five percent cheaper than Levittown.157 Mostly white in the
1950s with a small number of black homeowners, blockbusters exploited a small foreclosure
crisis in the 1960s. By 1965, seventy homes were vacant, and a local civic association report
revealed that four holding companies, the FHA, and VA held title to ninety-one houses, almost a
third of the development. High school principal James Northrup began buying up the mortgages
that same year, renovating the homes for people he described as desperate for “anything with a
roof and four walls.” With 196 homes in his name, Northrup rented the houses to low-income
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families, netting over $1,000,000 by 1969.158 Whether in Nassau or Suffolk, these were simply
new rooming houses, constructed in a Levitt-style Cape Cod or ranch rather than a turn-of-thecentury Victorian or colonial houses.
Race and class blockbusting ultimately met the housing needs of the black poor and
middle class in the same suburbs. As Table 3.1 indicates, Long Island’s postwar black suburbs,
along with some of its former white hamlets and Freeport, one its largest black domestic
neighborhoods, all experienced growth in both their black middle class and low-income
populations. Though only six percent of Long Island’s families lived in Freeport, Roosevelt,
Hempstead, New Cassel, Lakeview, North Amityville, Wyandanch, Central Islip, and North
Bellport, the rate of families in poverty residing in these communities was thirteen percent in
1969. And nearly sixty percent of all black families lived in these communities, including over
half of all black families in poverty that same year.159
For civic associations, NAACP branches, and homeowners, the migration of the poor
complicated the politics of integration, formerly rooted in the class homogeneity of postwar
suburbia. Unlike new black middle class residents who exacerbated segregation but preserved a
hamlet’s class makeup, the poor posed new economic threats. They jeopardized property values,
suburbanites’ largest investment. On a larger scale, the poor signaled to the FHA that the
neighborhood was now an insurance risk, and in the worst cases, like Central Islip’s Carleton
Park, the FHA and VA refused to authorize mortgages in the area. Such an outcome wrote the
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entire community out of the postwar mortgage market.160 More importantly, within Long
Island’s balkanized taxing jurisdictions, the quality of public services rested on the property
taxes of local neighborhoods, costs borne by a small number of homeowners rather than the
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Table 3.1: Income Distribution Changes, Black Population, and Poverty rates in Long Island’s
Black Suburbs, 1960-1970
Nassau County
Freeport
Roosevelt
Hempstead
1960
1970
1960
1970
1960
1970
Black Population
2,407
7,467
2,241
10,135
7,594
14,111
Proportion (%)
7
18.5
17.4
67.5
21.9
35.8
Incomes
Total Families
8,960
10,296
3,262
3,321
9,127
9,867
50% or less CMI1
1,336
1,879
511
902
1,396
2,156
% of total families
15
18
16
27
15
22
70% or more CMI1
6,212
6,735
2,033
1,914
6,058
5,893
% of total families
69
65
62
58
66
60
New Cassel
Lakeview
1960
1970
1960
1970
Black Population
2,693
5,355
2,509
4,495
Proportion (%)
35.6
61.4
52
82.2
Incomes
Total Families
1,865
1,983
1,837
1,235
50% or less CMI1
276
434
248
332
% of total families
15
22
14
27
1
70% or more CMI
1,164
1,264
1,187
701
% of total families
62
64
65
57
Suffolk County
North Amityville
Wyandanch2
1960
1970
1960
1970
Black Population
6,350
7,768
2,193
6,371
Proportion
75.9
65.1
59.2
86.2
Incomes
Total Families
1,854
2,724
847
1,619
50% or less CMI3
354
510
80
316
% of total families
19
19
9
20
3
75% or more CMI
1,072
1,494
549
865
% of total families
58
55
65
53
Source: Cavaioli, 16-17; Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, U.S. Census ’70: Volume 1: Number of
Inhabitants (Hauppauge, NY: Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1971), 7-25; U.S. Census Bureau,
Family Income, 1960. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1960TractDS/R11104505 (accessed May 6, 2015); See U.S. Census
Bureau, Family Income, 1970. Prepared by Social Explorer,
http://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C1970/R11104508 (accessed May 6, 2015).
1
CMI stands for ‘County Median Income.’ Income brackets are inexact in Census records, so ‘50% or less CMI’
are those Nassau families making below 47% of the CMI in 1960 and 47.8% in 1970. ‘70% or more CMI’ are
those families making at least 70.4% of the CMI in 1960 and 68.3% in 1970.
2
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broad swath of the suburban population. No institution felt the pain of locally bounded funding
more acutely than school districts, the most local form of government and costliest element of
suburban homeownership. A school district’s property tax rate varied depending on the
proportion of assorted revenue streams (residential, commercial, industrial, or exempted
property), versus the costs of educating resident students. Families with multiple children,
lower-income students, and students with disabilities used more services than they paid in taxes,
and the rest of the community shouldered the expense. Illegal rentals added families without
contributing taxes. Industrial and commercial property meanwhile provided revenue at no cost
to school districts, though these land-uses were unevenly distributed across suburbia. What
emerged were higher-cost educational systems among lower-income suburbs, and when those
suburbs did not have lucrative industrial or commercial property within their borders, the burden
of sustaining the school system rested on residents living within the school district who were less
able to support the costs of educating their children and neighbors. With multiple families
moving into single-family homes, schools became strained, physically and fiscally.161
Affected homeowners mobilized all the strategies available to fight these changes, most
of which were familiar from earlier civil rights and anti-blight efforts: stabilizing housing
integration, enforcing housing or building codes, and demanding local authorities redress the
problem. Class dynamics complicated these tactics. Stabilizing integration was the least
effective tool, since it was predicated on the belief that the arrival of black residents alone was
responsible for white flight, and that addressing private actions of realtors and homeowners
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could thwart the exodus. This was apparent in Roosevelt, where white and black homeowners
formed the United Organization of Roosevelt, a collection of homeowner groups fighting to
maintain a 60/40 black-white ratio and prevent further ‘inverse segregation’ as its leader Morton
Decker described the process.162 This was a typical response to racial transition, particularly
from whites, who looked to stabilize communities and halt ‘white flight’ by keeping whites in
and blacks out, policing the buying and selling behaviors of their neighbors and the actions of
local real estate agents.163 The problem was that homeowners were selling for reasons beyond
the color of new residents’ skin. At a fiery meeting in 1966, 150 white and black Roosevelt
residents argued for several hours about whether it was simply the arrival of black residents,
school integration, or “the growth of the blighted area on the south end” that scared white
homeowners.164 PCANC, New Cassel’s black civic association, and the Westbury branch of the
NAACP were not as confused about the motivations of white flight: it was the poor driving out
whites and turning the hamlet into an all-black neighborhood.165
Homeowners also demanded local government do something to redress the arrival of the
poor, particularly state placement of welfare recipients in these hamlets. Though a tiny
proportion of the population, indigent residents nonetheless faced strong opposition, partly a
reflection of the national backlash against ADC recipients in the 1960s, but also because they
were the most visceral reminder of downward neighborhood trajectory.166 Both Nassau and
Suffolk counties left recipients to the market for housing. Welfare recipients in search of cheap
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housing navigated Long Island’s middle-class landscape using friends and relatives tied to
landlords who accepted state-subsidized rental checks. With high rental costs, welfare recipients
were a profitable source of passive income for cunning homeowners and speculators, and the
housing market fissures along racial and class lines in North Amityville, Wyandanch, Central
Islip, and North Bellport in Suffolk, along with New Cassel, Freeport, and Roosevelt in Nassau
County enabled publicly-assisted housing to emerge within middle-class suburbia.167
Residents alleged that the counties were colluding with landlords and concentrating the
welfare population within their hamlets, called ‘welfare dumping,’ and they associated the
problems of the community directly with the residents receiving public assistance. In Central
Islip, homeowners complained that there were “too many welfare people who do as they please,”
leaving garbage and leading the area “down the sewer.”168 At a meeting about welfare housing
in Roosevelt, Town of Hempstead Buildings Commissioner Matthew Russo argued that “the
middle-class taxpayer is being destroyed by the thing he supports – welfare recipients who come
in and wreck the most precious thing he has, his neighborhood and his home.” While “these
unfortunate people must have housing,” declared United Organizations of Roosevelt chairman
Morton Decker, “it is unfair to put large numbers of welfare recipients into one community.” In
New Cassel, PCANC blamed the Nassau County welfare department for ‘white flight’ because
they permitted “welfare recipients [to] overrun our once-quiet residential neighborhood and have
it downgraded with lawless acts.”169 The county welfare departments denied any wrongdoing
because they played no role in placing welfare families in any specific community, and in New
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Cassel, Nassau Welfare Commissioner Joseph Barbaro countered PCANC’s accusation of
‘welfare dumping’ with statistics showing that as of 1966, all but 32 of 315 welfare cases in the
hamlet were already residing in New Cassel when they applied for assistance.170 In addition,
home relief was only a fraction of the total welfare cases. In a 1967 survey of welfare recipients
in Roosevelt, less than a fifth of 576 cases were rental subsidies. The majority were Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cases, and further proved the ‘indigenous’ nature of
welfare applications rather than deliberate welfare placements.171 The concentration of welfare
recipients in these communities was a reflection of both segregation and disproportionate black
poverty, not the actions of the welfare departments, though the public subsidies flowing through
these hamlets nonetheless produced a distinct and concentrated housing market, and the welfare
departments did little to curb this process.
Civic associations, taxpayer organizations, and civil rights organizations urged county
and town governments to rectify the concentration of recipients. Eugene T. Reed, state
president of the NAACP in 1966, wanted the county departments to house recipients on an
“open occupancy” basis to avoid racial segregation, though both county welfare department
chiefs argued that the problem was the dearth of affordable housing itself, which limited
housing choice for the poor broadly.172 Local homeowner groups pressured town and county
governments to withhold welfare payments and fine slumlords for illegal multi-family
dwellings and dilapidated conditions. County and town governments had different powers to
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act against welfare concentration, since the county cut the checks while towns and villages were
in charge of zoning and building codes.
Towns targeted dwellings. In New Cassel, the Town of North Hempstead sent 800
letters to houses asking for voluntary compliance of all codes before sending in inspectors. In
Roosevelt, Town of Hempstead building inspector Matthew Russo sent out a small army of ten
inspectors to investigate 118 homes, and wrote 15 summonses to landlords for misdemeanors
and forty-one violation warnings, all in the hopes of thwarting overcrowding (and welfare
concentration). While the United Organizations of Roosevelt and homeowners celebrated the
inspections, an affected landlord felt that he and his tenants had done nothing wrong, that “the
only crime of this family is that they’re poor and prolific.”173 Efforts like these occurred
periodically, but ‘warnings’ and voluntary compliance did little to stem the problem. In reality,
zoning and code enforcement was selective and reactive, not universal and preventative. It
relied on complaints from neighboring residents, and investigations into abuse were timeconsuming for building authorities with over 225,000 housing units within their jurisdiction,
like the Town of Hempstead.174
The county welfare departments used their rental payments to exert influence over the
quality of housing and the destination of recipients. They withheld rents in units violating
housing or health codes, an authority given to them under New York State’s Social Welfare
Law Section 143-b, but understaffed departments only visited recipients a few times a year,
unable to manage the quick turnover and high demand for housing.175 Nonetheless, counties
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increased their attention to recipient concentration in the late 1960s. In 1967, Nassau County
established a Steering Committee in Roosevelt to explicitly bar welfare recipients and restrict
applications to ‘qualified Roosevelt residents only.’ From July 1967 through March 1968, the
committee, working with the welfare department, managed to locate only one recipient in
Roosevelt, an administrative error. Despite the heavy regulation, the committee found that
Roosevelt residents continued to apply for welfare, and the committee had limited control over
recipients in Roosevelt, who were as likely to be local residents as ‘outsiders.’176 With limited
housing options and no county-owned public housing, Nassau and Suffolk resorted to motels to
avoid the outcry of ‘welfare dumping’ and the explosive politics of welfare placement
altogether. Initially an emergency measure, motel accommodations became an increasingly
permanent feature of the two welfare departments, though Nassau’s problems far surpassed that
of Suffolk County, as Nassau’s motel population climbed to over 300 families in the early
1970s. In Nassau County, rent fluctuated between $500 and $1,000 a family per month, over
twice the median rent in 1970, all for rooms with overflowing cesspools and vermin
infestations, but without stoves, refrigerators, laundry machines, or accessible transportation.
Motel owners were the new slumlords in what became small poverty colonies, while tenants
were basically prisoners, lacking access to opportunity until the department located real
housing.177
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Recipients fought the efforts to limit housing choice. By 1967, twenty-two welfare
advocacy organizations were assembled on Long Island, united under into two umbrella
federations: the Nassau Welfare Tenants Coordinating Committee and the People for Adequate
Welfare (PAW) in Suffolk.178 They were part of the nationwide tenant advocacy and welfare
rights movement that reached its peak in the mid to late 1960s, and recipients used these
organizations to demand adequate housing. In 1967, six welfare recipients staged a sit-in at the
Nassau County Department of Social Services (formerly the welfare department) for evicting
them from dilapidated housing and only offering motel accommodations in return. One of the
protestors, an African American mother of seven whose husband remained in North Carolina,
found adequate rental housing, though it was above the department’s threshold. The department
only offered a motel room in exchange.179 Bertha Grissett, an African American mother of five
children from South Carolina housed in a Westbury motel for $22 a day, found an eight room
house in Roosevelt for just $185 a month, but Nassau’s welfare department claimed it was too
expensive.180 That same year, two welfare families sued the Nassau County Social Services
Department over the department’s steering efforts in Roosevelt, denying recipients housing in
order to ‘affect the racial balance’ of Roosevelt, thereby infringing upon the fourteenth
amendment’s equal protection clause and their right to equal housing choice.181
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Despite the clamor surrounding welfare recipients, they were but a small fraction of the
new arrivals, and the fight against them was a limited response to the broader racial and class
transition. Overall, a socioeconomically diverse population came to inhabit these hamlets. In
North Amityville, in the shadow of Ronek Park and other subdivisions, lived unskilled black
workers in shacks along the remaining dirt roads, or in newly-built rooming houses and
subdivided basements. A recently constructed trailer park along the main corridor on Route 110
was majority white, an enclave of white poor in an otherwise black middle class area. While
the middle class drove cars to their jobs and to out-of-town retail centers, black day laborers
gathered every morning near the Associated Shopping Center at the corner of Albany Avenue
and Great Neck Road. They waited in the bid-and-ask market, as pick-up trucks canvassed for
workers. Only a handful negotiated a job each day; the rest returned home, or hung out on the
corner, in the local tavern, or the billiards hall nearby.182
Tensions mounted between these two classes, and the NAACP branches were caught in
between their middle class constituencies and the needs of the African American poor. In New
Cassel, while spokesmen for the NAACP and other homeowner groups disavowed the claims
they were anti-welfare, they nonetheless demanded an end to ‘handouts’ and encouragement of
work and responsibility. As one resident exclaimed, “we love our people and we help our own,
but we have to work – some of us some of us at two jobs. It’s hard but we maintain our
incentive and we’re aware of our civic responsibilities to our neighbors and community.” Grace
Snead, a single mother receiving ADC resented the claim that the poor were irresponsible to the
community: “They made us feel as though we were animals and worthless and enjoyed or didn’t
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care about our hardship, when most of us are doing everything we can to help ourselves.”
Tensions played out in a fight over a strip of taverns that local day laborers and domestics
frequented along New Cassel’s Prospect Avenue. In 1966, PCANC and the Westbury Branch
of the NAACP attacked these ‘lawless’ hangouts and successfully thwarted an attempt to
expand the neighborhood grill to accommodate new customers.183
In Wyandanch, the class battle played out in the local school district. From 1966 to
1970, the district’s ADC population climbed from forty to sixty-eight percent of all students.
Local taxpayers bore the costs of these students, paying the eleventh highest school property tax
rate in Suffolk County (of seventy six total districts) in a hamlet with a poverty rate of ten
percent.184 The national office of the NAACP, in cooperation with middle-class residents of
Wyandanch, tried to dissolve the school district altogether and integrate students into the
surrounding white districts. This was in line with the longer history of school integration,
though now inflected with class and fighting the fragmented ‘fiction’ of school district lines that
imposed real costs on homeowners. Lower-income residents and the school superintendent
James Lewis opposed the measure, arguing that the black majority gave parents control over
their children’s education. When the State Board of Education denied the request to dissolve
the district, middle class residents then organized and won a majority on the Wyandanch’s
Board of Education in 1969. They cut taxes, eliminated special needs programs, and instituted
austerity measures. This drew the ire of Wyandanch’s lower class, who accused the Board and
their supporters of being ‘Uncle Toms.’185
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In a few instances, tensions boiled over into outright violence. As Thomas Sugrue and
Andrew Goodman note, the riots of the mid to late 1960s were not limited to segregated innercity ghettoes, and in 1967 alone, over a quarter of all racial disturbances occurred in towns with
fewer than 50,000 people. While these riots were embedded within the national racial politics of
the period, each had local contexts and local grievances, even if refracted through the Black
Power movement or the high-profile riots in nearby cities.186 On Long Island, two disturbances
took place in 1966 and 1967, all within Suffolk County’s black hamlets among young black men
over unfair police treatment and little opportunity. In early July 1966, an angry crowd of 400
attacked Suffolk County police officers in North Amityville, and during a meeting between local
residents, the Suffolk County Executive, and the County Police Commissioner on July 29th,
youths began chanting “black power” while a garbage can was hurled through a store window.
Bottles, rocks, and Molotov cocktails were thrown at police, and it took more than three hours
and a helmeted force of 300 policemen to restore order. Police cordoned off a one square mile
area of the community, and by the end of the evening, nine were arrested as the shopping center
where the meeting took place, the same center where day laborers awaited work, was locked
down.187 The next summer in Wyandanch, a small group of youths set a store, two cars, a local
VFW, and a school auditorium afire over the course of two nights in August, all while hurling
stones and bottles at police.188
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Post-disturbance meetings revealed a variety of grievances of community members.
They included police-community relations, as a number of North Amityville protestors were
upset at the police’s regular usage of “nigger.” Protestors and aggrieved youth also wanted
greater recreational opportunities in both North Amityville and Wyandanch, including parks and
movie theaters. In Wyandanch specifically, there were complaints that local markets were
overcharging African American buyers. But central to the protests and disturbances was the
interrelated demand for better housing, public transportation, and jobs.189 As a protestor who
seized the microphone during the outdoor meeting in North Amityville in July 1966 exclaimed,
“a Negro has to be a superman to get an ordinary job.” The inability to reach jobs, the limited
access to housing, and the lack of good paying jobs themselves, were the major grievances. And
while these acts were perpetrated by young men in both communities, local resident and North
Amityville anti-poverty activist William Larregui summarized the feelings of residents in black
hamlets generally when, in the wake of the riots, he declared, “we all came out here for one basic
reason…we felt we could better our circumstances, but we had not been here long before we
found out that many of the problems which had plagued us before are with us here.”190

Conclusion
The story above is familiar, told and re-told in urban histories. Segregated housing,
urban renewal, racial transition, blockbusting, class conflict, welfare opposition, and riots roiled
America’s urban centers as millions of African Americans entered segregated housing markets in
cities while urbanization spread beyond municipal borders and the state remade urban cores to
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counter the ‘overdevelopment’ of suburbs.191 Most histories tell this story in American cities,
but as the chapter makes clear, similar processes were at work in suburbs. On Long Island,
public policy constrained black housing choice, urban renewal remade largely black
neighborhoods, blacks and whites defended and retreated from racial boundaries block by block,
middle class and poor clashed over housing needs versus community stability, and frustration
over limited prospects led to rioting, all in what were considered leafy-green suburbs. The fact
that similar dynamics were at work in both cities and suburbs speaks to the metropolitan nature
of segregation, one which crossed municipal boundaries and divided suburbs as much as urban
neighborhoods.192 The state was central to segregation, because without state support and
without federal policy influencing local authorities, realtors, and homeowners, more African
Americans with the economic means to move to the suburbs could have done so. Even if the
FHA standards reflected the mass desires of suburbanites, they could not rely on state power to
compel segregation. But the development of black middle class neighborhoods and some
integration across racial lines illustrates that segregation alone did not thwart racial progress;
disproportionate black poverty and low-incomes did so. Segregation enabled blockbusters and
speculators to exploit black, integrated, and affordable white suburban hamlets for poor housing
opportunity, but this was not possible without the pressure from a disproportionately black poor
in a housing market dependent on the labor market prosperity of postwar Long Island. And it
was the unequal status of African Americans in the regional labor market that compounded the
effects of segregation, making Long Island’s black suburbs poorer than its white ones.
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The housing politics of the 1950s and 1960s, from black middle class integration and
white neighborhood ‘stability’ efforts, to housing condemnation and urban renewal largely
operated within an ideology of ‘affluence,’ uncritical of the structure of Long Island’s prosperity.
Civil rights and black homeowner activism challenged the public policies that racially
discriminated against African Americans, though they upheld the class hierarchy of postwar
suburbia, demanding parity within the FHA-standardized housing market. Groups interested in
the plight of the poor treated the problems of acute housing shortages and eviction differently,
viewing integration as the solution, without considering limited incomes. Local governments
meanwhile employed anti-blight strategies to clean up slums, the living arrangements of the
black poor, housing districts unsuited for industrial and FHA-standardized suburbia. At their
best, they improved housing at the cost of instability for former residents who put pressure on
other affordable (or newly affordable) neighborhoods; at their worst, they forcibly removed
people for the sake of higher property values. In sum, the anti-blight strategies failed to account
for the class segregation in the market.
By the late 1960s, segregation placed the black poor into black middle class enclaves,
tentatively integrated hamlets, or white neighborhoods with modest homes, illustrating the
problems of using housing policy to eradicate slums without addressing the low-incomes that
made exploitation possible. As single-family housing was split up for multiple families in
desperate need of accommodations, the fight for integration increasingly turned to decrying the
concentration of poverty, and while this was in many ways an extension of the fight to break
down racial barriers, integration always assumed class homogeneity and could not be used to
house the poor. Solving black poverty was more difficult than demanding open housing, and
forcing them out was a continuation of the original problem: moving, but not removing the poor.
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Simply put, housing politics had only a limited capacity to improve the plight of the poor. As a
1968 social work survey of Long Island’s black enclaves concluded, “the not always fulfilled
promise of employment” was responsible for the “growing enclaves of poverty [that] have come
to be a common occurrence in suburbia, sometimes as in the case of a few villages on Long
Island engulfing whole communities,” and while “not so unsightly as the huge slums of the
central city, indeed, often all but invisible in the surrounding plenty, these pockets of poverty
mirror in microcosm the problems of their sister communities in the city’s core.”193 Why they
were not part of the greater prosperity around them, and how to better integrate them into
prosperity would have to be fought on fronts beyond housing.
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Chapter 4
Fair and Full Employment
On the night of January 1, 1963, the NAACP hosted a dinner in Nassau County marking
the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation. Attendees included NAACP labor secretary
Herbert Hill, Georgia state senator Leroy R. Johnson, state assembly speaker Joseph Carlino, and
an assortment of local politicians. Lincoln Lynch, Lakeview’s fiery integration activist and
chairman of the Long Island Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was among the half-dozen
speakers and by far the most memorable, using the occasion to note the failures of the local civil
rights struggle. He chastised local government’s “dwarf-like steps” against racism, though he
saved his harshest criticism for the mostly black audience, stating that the “largest” portion of the
blame rested “squarely at the door of the Negro himself, especially so of those who claim to have
achieved middle-class status.” Black suburbanites “engaged in a mad scramble to attain middleclass status and to acquire the trappings and false values dictated by the same society which
holds him contempt.” They had forgotten that African Americans “cannot attain freedom until
all Negroes have freedom.” Lynch wanted the middle class to broaden their struggle and
“finance lawsuits, badger elected officials for legislation, to picket or sit-in or boycott, if
necessary” to achieve full equality for all black Long Islanders.1
Lynch’s words and stance reflected an alternative to the middle-class dominated fight for
equality: militant, confrontational, and focused on the broader inequalities faced by African
American Long Islanders. Employment was at the center of this struggle, because as Lynch
argued, “the gap between Negroes and whites in terms of family income has widened in Nassau
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County…[and] the failure of Negroes to secure better jobs in the entire range of employment
opportunities is part of the source.”2 Alongside the decade-long fight for integrated housing,
schools, and equal public services emerged a jobs-oriented movement in the 1960s, headed by
CORE but including a host of new organizations, including a black labor federation, a black
union, and the national NAACP office. These groups targeted Long Island’s major employment
sectors: retail, banking, and public employment, but no sector offered more opportunity than
Long Island’s defense-oriented manufacturing companies.
Cold War firms accounted for one of every six Long Island jobs, nearly all of which were
well-paying and pivotal to postwar suburbanization.3 While whites enjoyed open access to
defense work after 1945, the industry’s racial policies changed during the Cold War, and few
African Americans were able to use the industry as a source of upward mobility. Though the
federal government’s fair employment agencies proved necessary to expanding opportunity for
black Long Islanders during World War II, the successors to Roosevelt’s Fair Employment
Practices Committee were weak and left activists with few tools to combat discrimination and
improve black prospects in the industry. This changed when John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson empowered their fair employment committees to monitor minority hiring and revoke
contracts. By the 1960s, civil rights groups and African American workers had strong
institutional support to demand fair employment.
But as activists quickly learned, improving minority hiring was not merely a matter of
fair hiring; the number of jobs, the qualifications within the industry, and the fortunes of Long
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Island’s firms were under intense pressure in the postwar period. Defense spending, and
therefore defense-related jobs, fluctuated as Cold War strategy changed, defense budgets were
cut, the procurement process was streamlined, and technological progress altered the workforce.
After the Korean War, military demand shifted from conventional aircraft to missiles and space,
turning ‘aircraft’ into the ‘aerospace’ industry. By the early 1960s, calls for a leaner defense
budget further jeopardized the industry, and Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara
reorganized the entire defense purchasing process. Companies collapsed in the wake of the
changes, including Long Island’s Republic Aviation. Those that survived adjusted to the new
market by augmenting their labor force, hiring white-collar scientists, engineers, and managers
over blue-collar production workers. Ultimately, defense was moving in the same direction as
the private sector – toward higher credential and skill requirements. By 1970, the defense
industry no longer served to buttress employment among blue-collar and unskilled workers in the
northeast. Spending favored southern and western firms, produced fewer aggregate jobs, and
concentrated those jobs in skilled sectors. Public spending no longer produced the same
employment benefits on Long Island.
Activists concerned with black employment had to contend with all of these factors, from
a labyrinth of federal bureaucracies in charge of racial mediation to a job market shedding bluecollar jobs in favor of fewer skilled positions. They altered their goals, adding black mobility
into skilled and white-collar positions to their demands of minority hiring. But their fight
nonetheless occurred at a pivotal moment in the industry’s history, as aerospace evolved out of
its mass-employment role and source for blue-collar jobs on Long Island. What activists
demanded – secure employment that paid a middle-class wage – was exactly what white and
black unskilled workers were losing. They ultimately achieved Affirmative Action compliance,
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though racial quotas were met from national labor pools and benefitted the already credentialed.
It did not challenge the trajectory of the industry itself. Fair employment for the mass of Long
Island’s black population could not be uncoupled from full employment, and the industry’s
transformation closed the door on industrial mass opportunity, affecting working class Long
Islanders both inside and outside the defense industry, and by extension, ending the region’s role
as a haven for mass upward mobility during and after World War II.

The Shift to Jobs
While housing and schools dominated Long Island’s civil rights agenda, jobs moved to
the center of the agenda in the 1960s, largely thanks to the ascendance of Long Island’s Congress
of Racial Equality (CORE) chapter, which transitioned from a minor player in Long Island’s
housing struggles to the leading organization fighting employment discrimination. CORE
originated in Chicago as a non-violent and interracial organization in 1942, and the Long Island
chapter was founded in the 1950s, popular among whites concerned with local housing and the
southern civil rights movement, though lacking support from black Long Islanders. Aside from a
clothing and book drive for the southern movement, a February 1962 report admitted the chapter
had “not received a discrimination complaint in any area, and to our knowledge the public
services in this area are not discriminatory.” CORE tried promoting black employment at a local
bank, but dropped the effort because they could not find willing black applicants. Good projects
were needed, both to motivate existing members and attract black members so the organization
was truly ‘interracial.’4
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By June 1962, Long Island CORE was transformed. Lincoln Lynch was elected
chairman and set CORE on a path toward a “more aggressive, dynamic, active program.” The
chapter favored African American membership (Lynch moved the headquarters from Levittown
to Hempstead) and shifted toward employment. 5 This was the direction of CORE’s northern
chapters in general, who adopted various forms of direct action to force companies into
accepting minority hiring quotas, first employed in Philadelphia’s consumer boycotts in 1960.
The goals differed from earlier civil rights demands that firms hire “regardless of race,” as
CORE pressured companies to enact “compensatory hiring” policies that would allow blacks to
‘catch up’ in the job market.6 This strategy was direct, giving companies an opportunity to avoid
confrontation if they were willing to negotiate. CORE initially submitted a series of numbered
proposals to a company, including demands to advertise jobs openings to minorities, hire a
specific number of minorities by a specific date, and inform CORE of any relevant decisions the
company made in regards to racial hiring and promotions. Then CORE met with the employer,
and if demands were satisfied, CORE publicized the company’s promises. If the company
refused, CORE advertised the failures and protested the inaction, hoping to affect consumers and
force the company into concessions.
The tactic proved effective and raised Long Island CORE’s stature in the region. Part of
the success was due to Lynch’s hard-nosed negotiating skills. When CORE approached Franklin
National Bank, Long Island’s largest mortgage financier, to hire black workers in “visible” teller
and office positions, Lynch openly refuted the bank’s excuses for its paltry black employment
numbers. When the bank argued that few blacks applied for work, Lynch placed the blame on

5

“Report Form,” June 26, 1962, Departments and Related Organizations, 1946-1967, Series 5, reel 41, slide 748,
Papers of CORE.
6
Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 105-106.

191
Franklin National’s poor outreach. After the bank agreed to do better, Lynch demanded ten jobs
for black recipients within thirty days and that seventy-five percent of their high-school hires
should be black. While the bank nearly cut off negotiations because of CORE’s insistence,
Lynch was able to secure a four-point program that would ensure fifty jobs for African
Americans and a long-term commitment to minority recruitment and hiring.7
When negotiations did not work, Lynch and CORE boycotted and picketed employers.
When the Merchant’s Association of the Roosevelt Field Mall dismissed CORE’s demands for
black retail jobs in 1963, Lynch threatened to protest during the holiday season, bringing the
association back to the negotiating table. By late November, two hundred jobs were secured for
minority workers, and a program of minority recruitment was put in place, “a model for other
shopping centers in Nassau and Suffolk Counties” according to Lynch.8 CORE saved its largest
demonstrations for the Long Island State Parks Commission. CORE conceded that “there is no
deliberate practice of racial discrimination” but that summer help recruitment favored whites.
CORE wanted the Commission to take positive and deliberate steps to hire black workers,
including temporary help and permanent employees. When the Parks Commission dismissed
CORE, Lynch coordinated a picket, sit-in, and kneel-in at Jones Beach, blocking automobile
traffic and pedestrians from accessing the beach on July 4th, the busiest day of the year.
Picketers carried signs saying “Laws aren’t Enough, We Need Jobs” and “Jobs Not Promises.”
Two protestors were injured by police. While CORE had to cancel follow-up demonstrations
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after several threatening phone calls directed at members, the protests forced the State Park
Commission to negotiate, and they agreed to CORE’s demands for the following summer.9
By the end of 1963, CORE emerged as the most powerful civil rights group on the Island,
and Lynch its controversial leader. Moderate activists and Long Islanders generally disagreed
with his militancy, and the chapter was embroiled in a fierce election in 1964 to remove him
from the chair position, though Lynch prevailed.10 But for all the publicity and the significance
of CORE’s affirmative action plans, the chapter opened a few hundred jobs in the service sector.
This was only the first shots in a much broader economic war aimed at what Lynch believed to
be Island-wide discriminatory hiring practices, including the construction industry, migrant
farmworkers, and the importation of domestics into Long Island, what Lynch called a “black
slave-running operation.”11 And no target offered more opportunity than Long Island’s defense
industry, and it was against this industry that Lynch was willing to “take any action necessary to
bring about full employment of Negroes.”12 While CORE would utilize the tactics that worked
so well in retail, banking, and public service, the defense industry proved a more difficult sector
to crack, and the changes riling the industry complicated the activists’ goal of getting blacks
hired.
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Fair Employment
Based on the number of jobs, the relatively high wages, the heavy role of the state, and
low black participation in the defense industry, CORE had chosen the perfect employment sector
to improve black opportunity on Long Island. As of 1959, African Americans were only 3.8
percent of the workforce among Long Island’s five largest defense employers, or 1,974
employees out of a labor force totaling over 50,000.13 Among Long Island’s largest
subcontractors, black employment was even lower. Reeves Instrument in Garden City hired
thirty-three blacks out of a workforce of 1,408, and Potter Instruments Company in Plainview
employed five African Americans of 267 total employees.14 While one could defend the
industry’s low black employment numbers by pointing to Long Island’s overall black population
(and therefore housing segregation), the industry’s labor market included New York City. In
1961, two-thirds of Republic Aviation’s black employees commuted from the five boroughs.15
The industry was also pivotal to the suburbanization of New York City’s working class, so when
compared to the combined Long Island and New York City black population proportion of
twelve percent, the industry’s black employment numbers were deficient. This was not unique to
Long Island’s defense firms; nationwide, participation among prime defense contractors was 3.6
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percent, despite the fact that defense firms were located in regions with substantial black
populations, including the south and western metropolitan areas like Los Angeles.16
Low black participation during the Cold War contrasted sharply with the gains made
during World War II, when acute labor demand and government commitment to antidiscrimination opened jobs to unskilled black workers. Firms shed their black and white
workforces in 1945, and while the Cold War revived defense production, military spending never
produced the same labor demand. Within this context, a ‘neo-traditional’ white male-dominated
work culture, divided by gender and ethnicity, set in among the Island’s major firms. As
Stephen Patnode argues, Grumman developed an unwritten rule against women on the shopfloor. Females were recast as ‘assistants’ and relegated to clerical and other non-production
positions, a practice made explicit at Grumman but replicated across Long Island’s major
firms.17 On the production floor, male workers divided the various job areas by ethnicity. At
Republic Aviation, Long Island’s largest employer in the 1950s, a management culture existed
where supervisors “preferred to have members of their own race working under their
supervision,” and “Italians, Germans and Poles…refused to work with members of other races.”
Such practices restricted hiring networks to family and friends within ethnic groups, denying
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opportunity to prospective black employees who had to rely on a tiny network within the
industry.18
The federal government did little to alter these practices or mandate black hiring. After
the FEPC ended in 1946, President Truman and liberal Congressmen envisioned a permanent
version of the Committee with expanded authority to enforce fair employment on public
employers, contractors, and private companies. A conservative Congress thwarted these efforts,
and Truman established a successor to the FEPC, the Government Contract Compliance
Committee during the Korean War. With jurisdiction limited to defense contracts and no
enforcement powers, the Committee merely advised and encouraged contractors to voluntarily
hire more African Americans. Eisenhower abolished this committee in 1953, establishing the
similarly named President’s Committee on Government Contracts (GCC) which differed little
from its predecessor besides collecting contractor data to assess black employment numbers in
the late 1950s.19 But without the federal mandate to actually provide racial employment
statistics, the GCC was powerless to even compile numbers. Contractors simply did not count
black employees, and compliance officers had to enter factories and count heads to determine the
number of “very dark skinned persons who may have some Negroid ancestry.”20
In comparison to the toothless GCC, New York State’s Commission against
Discrimination (SCAD), successor to New York’s Committee on Discrimination, proved more
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effective. While SCAD enforced existing non-discrimination laws through investigations,
subpoenas, and court orders, its commissioners chose to use “conciliation and persuasion” rather
than the penal tools at their disposal.21 If SCAD found any discrimination in a company’s hiring
or promotion policies, confidential negotiations took place to correct the practice, and SCAD
conducted post-case reviews after six months.22 The agency sought above all “improvement,” as
was the case involving a Long Island defense plant in 1953 that allegedly refused to hire blacks.
SCAD investigated and determined that the firm had no black workers in its 900-person
workforce. After negotiations and two follow-up reviews, the firm employed thirty-two African
Americans, who made up about two percent of the firm’s employees.23 These were like CORE’s
negotiations, and they did increase black employment, but this case was an exception, as Long
Island’s defense firms were rarely targeted. From 1945 to 1960, SCAD received fifteen
complaints against Republic Aviation: eleven from African Americans, two from Jewish
workers, and a one from a Protestant employee. All were dismissed “without probable cause.”24
Federal concern changed when John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 on March
6, 1961, which abolished the GCC and transformed the federal role in anti-discrimination policy
with yet another agency, the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
(PCEEO). The PCEEO went beyond anti-discrimination to a loose kind of ‘affirmative action,’
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requiring federal employers, contractors, and unions hire and promote minorities.25 The PCEEO
demanded compliance reports from firms during the contract process, and also accepted
“complex group complaint situations.”26 The compliance reports and group grievances shifted
discrimination investigations from individual cases to statistically based inquiries, a more
effective tool to challenge discriminatory employment practices. The PCEEO also encouraged
business owners to voluntarily adopt non-discriminatory practices and made businessgovernment cooperation a public matter. Dubbed “Plans for Progress,” contractors committed to
hiring, promoting, and training regardless of race, and would actively canvass for jobs in all
forms of media to increase minority employment.27 Business owners designed their own
individual plans signed in ceremonies with heavy press coverage. While the dual role of the
PCEEO, promoting both compulsory and voluntary means to open jobs to minorities, produced
conflict, the Commission was nonetheless capable of mounting major investigations into
potential discrimination cases. Within the first year of operation, it received more complaints
than Eisenhower’s GCC in its entire existence.28
The PCEEO’s aggressive and statistics-driven approach matched Long Island CORE’s
assertive and numbers-oriented tactics. Within one year of JFK’s executive order, all of Long
Island’s major defense contractors had signed a ‘Plans for Progress,’ further tying these firms to
the PCEEO’s minority hiring efforts.29 Just as World War II activists relied on a committed
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federal government to pry open the industry, CORE had a willing government agency linked to
the industry’s only consumer. And since Long Island’s firms pledged to hire African Americans
in the abstract, CORE could apply their protest-negotiation strategy to Long Island’s largest
employers, transforming employment opportunity for the region’s black population.

The End of Full Employment
The contention that defense manufacturers could solve black unemployment on Long
Island rested on firm ground, not only because of the industry’s role in employing black workers
during World War II or the government’s renewed commitment to fair employment, but because
defense spending was the closest the federal government came to full employment policy beyond
aggregate demand management measures after the end of the WPA. Virtually every government
activity has an effect on employment, and while defense spending was not an explicit
employment policy, it was the largest part of the federal budget with direct employment
outcomes, aside from the military itself.30 During the 1950s, defense procurement consumed
between fourteen and twenty-three percent of the federal budget, and remained above ten percent
of total GDP.31 Governmental priorities first shifted toward defense during World War II. These
well-paying, unionized jobs, particularly in the aircraft industry, supported new constituencies,
including defense firms, workers, and politicians, all of which made New Deal-era employment
programs less attractive. And although the Roosevelt administration wanted to include the ‘right
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to work’ as part of the welfare state during the war, defense-related deficit spending did more
than help people survive a Depression like the WPA and other New Deal jobs programs; it
spurred recovery and growth, vindicating the Keynesian proscriptions for the economy.32 The
warfare state accomplished the long-term goals of the New Deal, and the public understood the
cause and effect of defense spending on unemployment.33 The postwar surge that followed the
war further limited the need for direct job creation, and the ‘Great Disarmament’ of 1945 and
1946 did little to phase consumer industries, though the aircraft industry suffered.
Within two years though, global uncertainty made aircraft’s lull a threat to national
security, while the ailing industry also jeopardized technological progress and employment. The
Truman administration responded by forming the Air Policy Commission in 1947, assembled to
maintain publicly-funded aircraft production to meet the nation’s military needs, sustain
America’s economic welfare, and support air innovation. Key to the Commission’s
recommendations was that the industry should not be subject to the ‘normal laws of supply and
demand,’ that even marginal manufacturers should be kept afloat for the sake of national
security. While the Commission only suggested two producers associated with the Navy and Air
Force for each type of aircraft (bombers, fighters, etc.) along with the necessary component
manufacturers, the government, already the near-exclusive customer of aircraft firms’ goods, was
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committing itself to supporting an entire industry.34 Growing tensions in Greece, Turkey, and
the outbreak of the Korean War only cemented the government’s support for aviation.
This spending supported an industry rivaling automobiles in the United States. In 1954,
aircraft led all industries in employment, R&D investment, and sales, a first during peacetime.35
In the years following, aircraft remained the nation’s second largest manufacturing sector
through the 1980s.36 Though the government directly employed over 2 million people as of
1955, its support of the defense-related aircraft industry (along with other defense manufacturing
generally), was a significant component of the state’s employment toolbox. Of course, defense
spending was never explicitly an employment policy; such spending was justified as necessary to
national security, not to keep Americans employed. Nonetheless, it was considered the “the sine
qua non for full employment, and as the basis for the prosperity of several states and certain
sizeable industries."37 Economists in particular understood the employment benefits of defense
spending, and when unemployment reached eight percent in 1949, Council of Economic
Advisors chair Leon Keyserling, an avowed Cold Warrior who molded the economics of NSC68, fully embraced the economic benefits of defense spending. He was then vindicated by the
employment levels during the Korean War. It became a key component of his full employment
plans following the war, the “default source of revenue” to finance his full employment drive and
post-Korea prosperity, as Edmund F. Wehrle argues.38 Truman, the Department of Defense,
labor organizers and economists meanwhile looked to defense spending to aid depressed areas,
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enshrined in Defense Manpower Policy no. 4, passed in 1952 to permit contractors in ‘laborsurplus’ areas to match low bids. There were critics of this approach, like Budget Bureau
director James Webb, who feared what military spending meant for domestic priorities like
education, housing, industrial policy, and agriculture, and the ‘guns versus butter’ debate was
alive and well in the late 1940s.39 But defense spending, unlike the contentious domestic social
welfare policies of the ‘Fair Deal,’ had bi-partisan support, largely because national security
appropriations were first and foremost for defense and had only ancillary employment effects,
though every Congressmen whose district depended on defense dollars was aware of the local
impact of such spending.
Despite the clear employment outcomes of defense procurement and spending, jobs were
weighed against other priorities, including the size of the military budget, overall military
necessity, foreign policy strategies, technological change, and institutional rivalries between
military branches. Congressmen wanted defense dollars to flow into their districts, while the
military branches demanded affordable high-performance products from trusted contractors,
which resulted in concentrated spending in already saturated markets. The three military
services meanwhile defended the enormous defense budget as necessary to national security,
while Truman, Eisenhower, and Congress were wary of deficits and the political implications of
the federal budget’s military dominance. Finally, the executive branch had to consider what
weapons would best meet the nation’s military strategy, which constantly evolved in response to
Soviet maneuvers, newly perceived global threats, and domestic politics.40 Keeping contractors
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afloat, and by extension, hundreds of thousands of industrial workers employed, was submerged
within these broader concerns about how to fight the Cold War, what weapons were necessary,
and what they should cost. While we think of the defense industry as powerful agents in the
‘military-industrial’ complex, in reality contractors were at the whim of these larger bureaucratic
decisions and global contingencies, not to mention the irregularities involved in war production,
a crucial factor during Korea and later Vietnam.41 Remaining profitable and keeping plants open
necessitated that firms be attuned to the ever-changing environment of defense procurement.
While Long Island’s two largest airframe manufacturers, the Air Force-associated Republic
Aviation and Navy-dependent Grumman, were one of the fifteen firms laid out in Truman’s 1947
Air Policy Commission report, their privileged relationship, and the workforce relying on this
relationship, were challenged by two interrelated factors after the Korean War: the technological
shift toward high-tech weaponry and the regional shift of defense contracts toward the South and
West.
The Korean War fully revived Long Island’s airframe producers who limped along with
small contracts during the late 1940s, re-establishing the industry’s dominance in the region.
Grumman and Republic hired thousands and subcontracted work to hundreds of small firms to
build jet aircraft. Republic’s F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bomber, capable of air-to-air refueling and
atomic weapons deployment, proved to be a devastating asset to the U.S. Air Force, destroying
dams across North Korea.42 Republic produced over 7,000 F-84s and became the “workhorse of
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Korea,” the world’s largest private producer of jet aircraft and Long Island’s largest employer in
1952 with 22,000 workers.43 Grumman’s F9F Panther proved useful to the Navy, and they built
over 1,000 during the war, as Grumman’s workforce reached 11,000 by 1953.44 Following the
Korean Armistice and brief disarmament, defense spending consistently rose, though the nature
of spending changed. ‘Cold War’ military strategy turned away from the construction of planes
and tanks toward experimental weaponry as the United States committed itself to the escalating
arms race with the USSR. With the Soviet detonation of the A-bomb, the drive for deterrents
created the first arms-race economic boom: guided missiles.45 Defense expenditures for guided
missile development increased from under one percent in 1951 to almost a quarter of the entire
defense budget by 1959.46 Meanwhile, between 1953 and 1957, the value of conventional
armaments dropped from $11 to $2 billion.47 Missiles jeopardized established aircraft
manufacturers, making former airframe production facilities obsolete and exposing firms to
competition from the electronics industry. In this regard, California companies like North
American, Lockheed, and Martin adapted quickly. Lockheed for example transformed itself from
airframe to missile producer within three years, as missile development jumped from two percent
in 1957 to over seventy-five percent of the company’s production in 1960.48 Long Island’s two
airframe producers, Republic and Grumman, joined the guided missiles race as well, though not
to the extent of their west coast competitors. Republic opened a dedicated missile plant in 1954,
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while Grumman expanded to electronic surveillance aircraft and a variety of smaller military
goods.49 Long Island’s electronics manufacturers procured missile contracts more effectively.
American Bosch Arma in Roosevelt Field developed the inertial guidance systems for the
ATLAS and TITAN Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, while Sperry Gyroscope won a number
of contracts in the late 1950s, constructing guidance systems for the Navy’s Polaris submarines
and tracking systems for air-to-air missiles.50
Missile demand declined in the 1960s, though the ‘space’ boom followed shortly after
Sputnik’s launch in 1957. NASA provided a new source of funding in 1959, and companies
once again jostled for contracts in what was now the ‘aerospace’ industry. On Long Island, the
fortunes of Republic Aviation and Grumman reversed during the space boom. Republic
Aviation had been the largest employer on the Island through the 1950s, and it invested over
$700,000 and two and a half years of work into space research, including the multi-million dollar
Paul Moore Research and Development Center in 1958. Nevertheless, the company lost a key
contract for the Apollo spaceship.51 In contrast, Grumman was awarded the Apollo Lunar
Module (LM) contract in 1962. From here, the company moved to the center of the space race,
becoming NASA’s second largest contractor and building twelve lunar modules. By 1964,
Grumman employed one out of every seven Long Islanders in manufacturing and was the largest
employer on the Island.52
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If Long Island’s firms internally managed the technological transitions of the industry,
they had less power to prevent the defense spending shift toward the South and West,
particularly California. New York’s share of defense procurement fell from 13.5 percent in 1952
to 10.5 percent in 1962, while California’s rose from 11 percent to over 19 percent during the
same period. Annual defense purchases in New York dropped over one million dollars from
1953 to 1956, and though they climbed afterwards, they did not reach the 1954 peak through
1962. In comparison, California’s high of 5.7 million in 1954 dropped by 1956, though just one
year later, the state hit a broke a new record and continued to do so every year through 1962.53
The shift toward the south and west was not a process of firms leaving one region for the other,
but of contract cancellations in the Northeast and Midwest coinciding with new contracts in the
Sunbelt. Republic Aviation felt the pains of cuts, particularly when the Air Force cancelled the
F-105E Thunderchief contract, leading to a loss of 7,000 jobs in 1957.54 Republic was not alone;
Fairchild’s engine division, formerly Ranger Engines during World War II, closed down entirely
in 1959 in response to the Air Force J-83 engine contract cancellation in favor of General
Electric’s J-85 engine, laying off 2,600.55 Concerns over regional parity reached Congress when
New York Senators Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating, along with every House member from
New York, introduced Senate Bill 1875, the Armed Services Competitive Procurement Act of
1959. The bill would ensure fair distribution of defense contracts among small businesses, areas
with ‘labor surpluses,’ and most importantly, to different geographic areas in the country,
especially eligible contractors in defense-starved regions. As the bill argued:
The security of the nation requires that its economy, and the economy of each
section of the country, be maintained at a level which can support its programs for
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defense and sustain the private economic system, and that procurements by
agencies under this chapter have a meaningful effect upon the Nation's economic
health.56
This was a call for jobs couched in the language of national security. But the bill did not pass,
and the Department of Defense countered that New York firms weren’t competitive enough.
Defense Department procurement policy director G.C. Bannerman testified that New York must
“present new ideas if it expects more contracts.” As Bannerman argued, “we’re not buying the
production of a missile but we’re buying the brain power.”57
Long Island’s defense firms invested in brain-power to remain competitive, and this led
to the slow transformation of the industry’s workforce from unskilled and semi-skilled
production workers to engineers, scientists, and other specialized technical staff. Nationwide,
production workers fell to forty percent of the workforce by 1962, while one in nine of the
nation’s engineers and scientists worked in aerospace that same year.58 Long Island firms
followed this trajectory. Republic’s proportion of white collar workers doubled from nine to
eighteen percent from 1954-1959, while engineer hiring outpaced production worker
employment by sixty-one percent from 1957-1961.59 This reflected President Mundy Peale’s
assertion that the company was “part university research lab, part giant machine shop, part space
medicine center, part undersea exploration lab, part military systems analyst, part weapons
manufacturer, part satellite and spacecraft builder, and more…much, much more.”60 Grumman’s
space contracts required physicists, medical researchers, hydro-dynamicists, and all sorts of
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engineers. Nearly 7,000 worked on the Apollo contract, a project where production resembled a
handmade cottage industry. About one-third of Grumman’s entire workforce focused on the
company’s space projects in the 1960s, with 2,400 engineers working on the Lunar Module
project alone.61
The transition from assembly-line production to technical craft and R&D put unskilled
and semi-skilled workers at a disadvantage. While defense jobs did not decline in absolute
numbers, the skills necessary to remain employable increased and production workers had to
compete with well-educated and younger engineers entering the field.62 Bob Schmidt, who
began as a riveter at Grumman in 1941, realized that in the decades after World War II, the
industry
got so high tech that you couldn’t slump along as a high school graduate only, a
tech school graduate, and really hope to get anywhere, because it got to be so that
you’d have to be practically an engineer like the guys that work on the cars today.
The airplanes got so complicated.63
These changes led to layoffs, and while workers were accustomed to periods of unemployment
since the post-World War II and Korean War cutbacks, layoffs in the late 1950s and early 1960s
coincided with R&D investment and engineer hiring. Fairchild, a Maryland-based aviation
manufacturer with a Guided Missile Division on Long Island, cut its production workforce by
nearly seventy percent from 1957 to 1959 as they increased their technical staff eight percent.64
Layoffs were no longer a temporary measure following a contract cancellation or short-term
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disarmament; they were a narrowing of opportunity for production workers due to the divide in
the labor market between production and white-collar workers and the increased technical
requirements favoring the latter.
For production workers who relied on defense jobs to sustain suburban homeownership,
unemployment threatened to end their foothold in middle-class society. In the wake of the mass
1957 layoff at Republic Aviation, social workers found that while production laborers were
“essentially middle class in terms of values, status, and goals…many families are far removed in
terms of income and resources.”65 Workers leveraged their relatively high wages at Republic to
secure loans and credit for the various accoutrements of the postwar middle class. One family in
the social work survey, a married couple with a three-year old son, had monthly payments for
their freezer, car, fence, furniture, storm windows, refrigerator, new tires, auto insurance, VA
mortgage, and an FHA loan to finish the attic. The loss of the husband’s job at Republic after
four years of employment forced the family onto welfare for over a year.66 While such a case
was extreme, most families relied on credit to finance their suburban living on Long Island.67
When laid-off workers re-entered the workforce as cab-drivers, gas station attendants,
construction workers, or retail employees, jobs that paid ten percent less on average per year
with fewer hours of work available, their middle-class suburban lifestyle was increasingly
precarious.68
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Production workers could hold onto defense jobs if they climbed the company ladder
through promotions and training. In an industry that evolved so rapidly and required all sorts of
new and sometimes arcane skills to solve cutting-edge problems, internally coordinated training
programs tied to the promotion process were a necessity. Sperry offered educational
reimbursement for production workers who took industrial technology courses, along with a
comprehensive professional engineering program to upgrade engineers for the space age.69
Unions like the Engineer’s Association of Arma (EAA) provided funds to attend classes at local
colleges, and even sponsored lectures on new equipment.70 Grumman offered the most
comprehensive training programs, outlaying 600,000 dollars a year on average to train over
18,000 employees in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They offered tuition reimbursement for
night classes, and provided an incentive for their employees to excel in coursework (you could
only receive full tuition remission if you managed an ‘A,’ eighty-five percent for a ‘B’ and so
on). Grumman even developed a Corporate Training Development Department responsible for
all employee training across the company’s divisions.71 These training programs, whether union
or corporate subsidized, were central to promoting workers within a firm since seniority did not
prepare them for more technical work.
The changes occurring within aerospace and the path to job security was of particular
significance to the industry’s black workforce. The burden of production job loss fell
disproportionately on African American workers, who occupied the lowest positions in the
corporate ladder. In 1961, Republic Aviation had greatly improved their overall proportion of
black employees, though hired or promoted only ninety-five non-whites to supervisory,
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professional, technical, or clerical positions (see Table 4.1) and only 127 were skilled craftsmen.
Meanwhile, 655 were operatives, mostly assemblers and fabrication workers.72 Grumman’s
distribution was similar. Of 605 black employees, only fifty-nine held clerical, supervisory or
professional/technical positions, though forty percent of Grumman’s overall staff were employed
in operative categories.73 These numbers were even more skewed at electronics firms: Reeves
Instrument had three black workers in white-collar or technical positions, while the remaining
thirty were blue collar, and Fairchild’s Stratos division in Bay Shore had no black workers in any
of its white-collar/technical positions.74 Overall, in a cross-examination of nine major defense
manufacturers in 1959, the distribution between white-collar and technical positions versus bluecollar production was even (they were forty-three percent of the workforce each, service
occupations making up the difference), while the non-white distribution was skewed: eightyeight percent held blue-collar production jobs, while only eleven percent were employed in
white-collar positions.75
Two factors accounted for the disparity between the industry’s white and black
workforce. In the defense industry, the education gap between blacks and whites played a
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Table 4.1: Racial Composition of Republic Aviation, by Job Category, 1961
All Workers
Non-White
Percent NonWhite (%)
Officials and Supervisors
1,816
17
0.94
Professional and Administrative
2,374
47
1.98
Sales
23
0
0
Technicians
505
9
1.78
Office/Clerical
2,278
22
0.97
Craftsmen
2,893
127
4.39
Operatives
5,342
655
12.26
Service Workers
281
41
14.59
Laborers
31
3
9.68
TOTAL
15,543
921
5.93
Source: Republic Aviation Occupational Distribution by Race Report, November 15, 1961, Box 31, folder C-4-1538, Complaint Files, 1961-1965, President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1961-1965, RG
220, NARA II.
Note: See footnote 72 for breakdown of ‘non-white’ category.

critical role in aerospace’s particular racial division. Herbert Northrup’s comprehensive study of
black participation in aerospace revealed that regardless of any discrimination, the low
participation of minorities was “above all a function of the skill requirements of the industry.”76
Nonetheless, with training programs and promotional opportunities available, the issue was not
simply one of educational deficiencies, and black workers pointed to discrimination as a
potential source for the industry’s racial disparity. Republic production employee Norman
Baskin claimed “negroes in production jobs are often passed over for promotion to white collar
jobs in preference to white employees.”77 Such discrimination threatened to decimate the
industry’s paltry black population. For activists interested in improving the minority
representation at defense plants, the uneven distribution of black workers added a layer of
complexity to their struggle, as saving existing jobs was as important as opening new ones.
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Bias and the end of Republic
The end of defense as a mass unskilled employer, federal re-commitment to black
employment, and the racial disparity within the workforce all came together at Republic Aviation
in the early 1960s, illustrating the challenges activists confronted in Long Island’s largest job
sector. Eight months after the PCEEO’s establishment, the national NAACP compelled the
Committee to end discriminatory practices across the nation’s largest industrial sectors. NAACP
Labor Secretary Herbert Hill targeted aerospace in particular for exhibiting “an industry-wide
pattern of racial discrimination,” and in November 1961, the NAACP launched its largest
PCEEO complaint against Republic Aviation. Hill amassed sixty-two promotions complaints
from black employees at the plant, including mechanics, riveters, assemblers, punch-press
operators, and electricians. These ‘lower grade production workers’ were allegedly passed over
for promotions by whites with lesser qualifications. Hill accused the company of
“discriminatory practices against Negroes in employment and upgrading,” stating that “many
Negroes at Republic would be much further along than they are if color were not involved in
many promotions.”78
The sixty-two complaints were filed together, and most grievances were pre-made forms
workers signed stating blacks were denied promotions solely because the “person was a
Negro.”79 A few made additional individual complaints, revealing the complex nature of bias
within the industry. One was Randolph Ford, hired as a press brake operator in 1951. Ford was
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trained as an engine mechanic in the Air Force, and hoped to parlay his experience into an engine
mechanic position at Republic in 1952. Despite this experience, he watched fellow white Air
Force mechanics become Republic mechanics while he was deemed unqualified. In need of
better pay to support his wife and newborn child, Ford took a job as a stock clerk. He remained a
clerk for the entirety of the decade. Though he excelled at the position, and broke few rules at
the plant (aside from the commonly-broken prohibition against posted flyers inside work
stations), white clerks were promoted to supervisory positions over him.80 John Diggs likewise
experienced promotion discrimination that ultimately cost him a job in 1961. Diggs was a
structural assembler since 1958, though he contended that the ‘assembler’ classification was
meaningless since he and other workers did a variety of jobs, including assembling, drilling, and
installing rivets on plane skins. In July 1960, Diggs wanted his classification as an assembler
changed, though the request was denied. A few months later, he and eighteen other workers were
laid off during a company-wide reduction-in-force, though Diggs was the only employee who
was not called back. The company offered jobs to seven laid-off white workers in other
classifications because they were deemed ‘qualified’ for those positions, thus saving them from
unemployment. Diggs filed a grievance, but was not rehired given his ‘poor work performance.’
He denied this, stating that his ‘slow’ productivity was due to over-work with too few tools, part
of the multi-tasking that occurred on the shop floor. Diggs was laid-off, denied a new
classification, and placed in the re-hire queue, as per union rules.81
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In both cases, the PCEEO dismissed the discrimination allegations based on a lack of
documentary evidence, stating that testimony from Republic supervisors and black employees
was inadequate. The PCEEO investigations, while unable to find explicit discrimination,
nonetheless discovered pervasive favoritism, sometimes along racial lines. Lawyer Simpson,
IAM union steward, admitted that “by making a job offer to some favorite employee whom they
did not wish to lay off” the company discriminated “against any other more qualified employee
subject to lay-off.”82 This favoritism, as was the case with John Diggs and Randolph Ford,
promoted white workers to ‘safe’ classifications and helped white workers save their jobs during
layoffs. Black workers, if unable to climb into these more secure positions, faced job loss. And
promotions, or even just reclassification, was pivotal to job security at Republic in the early
1960s because of major contract losses. It could mean the difference between having a job and
collecting unemployment insurance.
As outlined previously, defense spending had been politically contentious in the 1950s,
including where dollars went, the problems of ‘wasteful duplication’ from inter-service rivalries,
and rising costs. John F. Kennedy entered office following the longest peacetime military
buildup in US history, and while committed to expanding the defense budget and closing the
alleged ‘missile gap,’ he was wary of the spiraling costs associated with current procurement
practices. Higher taxes could pay for new missiles, but Kennedy also entered office during a
sluggish recovery from the 1958 recession, and increased taxes threatened to stall the economy.
So JFK opted to streamline the contract process, because “while it is vital for us to maintain a
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military force structure that will insure our security and sustain our foreign policy commitments,
it is also vital to our economic health that we operate this force at the lowest cost possible.”83
Kennedy chose Ford Motors President Robert Strange McNamara to lead the Defense
Department. McNamara enforced the recently passed Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958, which gave the Secretary of Defense control over weapons acquisitions formerly
managed by the military branches. With direct control over all procurement, McNamara brought
his private sector acumen to the Defense Department, hiring systems analysts, introducing the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to the Pentagon, and creating an office
of Systems Analysis, among other changes.84 The goal was to cut costs and improve military
capability through increased efficiencies. Purchasing weapon systems for the entire military
could reduce costs without sacrificing security. Weighing what system to purchase depended on
its function in the overall military strategy, or as McNamara put it, asking whether each weapon
system adds “something significant to our national security."85
The new process shifted procurement from within each military branch to broad
competition among all contractors. This, coupled with a ‘try before you buy’ policy, introduced
new market mechanisms to the contract process, a fundamental transformation in the structure of
the entire industry. McNamara could theoretically cut unnecessary spending without sacrificing
military preparedness, because the health of the industry was no longer the primary concern, but
rather what spending could best meet the military’s overall strategy. Essentially, McNamara did
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not alter the quantity of defense spending, though these reforms altered its quality.86 Aircraft
contracts were ripe for re-shuffling, as the Navy, Army, and Air Force each had their own jet
fighters from distinct contractors. In 1961, McNamara forced the Navy and Air Force to jointly
develop a new multipurpose fighter, known as the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX),
estimated to potentially save $1 billion. The announcement threw all aircraft contractors into
panic, including Republic and Grumman, whose cozy relationship with the Air Force and Navy
respectively kept each firm running. Ten companies competed for the largest contract since
World War II and what would also be the only major aircraft contract of the decade. Since the
Navy and Air Force had different interests in the plane, companies either teamed up with a
competitor associated with a different branch, like the Navy-friendly Chance-Vought with
Republic or General-Dynamics and Grumman, or went it alone, like Boeing. On January 24,
1962, Boeing and General-Dynamics/Grumman were chosen in a final eight week runoff, though
Grumman was a subcontractor in this instance, and the majority of the plane would be built in
Fort Worth, Texas.87
The question was what would happen to the rest of the aircraft manufacturers. Republic
Aviation was in the most trouble because 100 percent of its business depended on defense
contracts. Aside from Grumman, no company had greater than 90 percent dependence on
defense procurement.88 Having lost space contracts, the TFX contract, and the ‘phase-out’ of the
F-105D, Republic made its first post-McNamara ‘reductions-in-force’ on February 23, 1962,
cutting 201 employees from the workforce. Another 8-9,000 were estimated in the next two
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years. This was besides the estimated 8,000 subcontracting jobs on the line.89 In Congress, first
congressional district representative Otis Pike, hailing from Long Island’s east end, asked Air
Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert “how are you going to keep the airframe industry
competitive when one by one the companies are going out of business, and where Bell is gone,
Curtiss-Wright is gone, and Republic is apparently going?" Zuckert replied “What happens to the
industry after that I can't say. There certainly is going to be need for some consolidation.”90
While Pike’s question represented the twenty-year old concern about defense spending’s
regional employment impact, Zuckert’s response reflected the new approach to defense
manufacturers and the defense budget itself. Economists and politicians increasingly turned
away from the idea that defense spending was good for the economy. Charles J. Hitch and
Roland N. McKean’s 1960 book The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age influenced the
drive for efficiency, but books like Disarmament and the Economy by pacifist economist
Kenneth E. Boulding directly challenged the pro-spending theory, arguing defense cuts would
not hurt the economy, and if spending was redirected to ‘more useful’ programs, it would
produce greater economic and social benefits. A growing school of economists dug into the data
to prove this, estimating the real costs of defense spending on a per capita basis for the first time
and advocating a re-orientation of defense spending toward domestic development in the early
1960s. These ideas reached the floor of Congress in 1963 when newly-elected Senator George
McGovern gave an impassioned speech against the defense budget and for the utility of domestic
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social spending.91 Supporting the industry and its jobs was no longer the primary concern,
though economists spoke of how best to transition these factories and workers toward peacetime
activities.
While Kennedy remained a Cold Warrior, these ideas were not far removed from the
plans of his administration, particularly the architect of Kennedy’s domestic economic policy,
Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Walter Heller. Heller had been pushing Kennedy to
support a Keynesian tax cut to boost aggregate demand, and while there would be no large-scale
spending cuts to match the revenue loss, defense cutbacks would at least partly reduce budget
growth. On July 10, 1963, Heller organized an informal disarmament committee to investigate
the economic impact of defense spending cuts on dependent regions and communities. Johnson
made the committee permanent in December, adding that the Committee on the Economic
Impact of Defense and Disarmament would aid governments, private industry, and labor on ways
to “minimize potential disturbances which may arise from changes in the level and pattern of
defense outlays.”92 In the two years following, Heller’s Committee (later an agency), published
reports concluding shifts away from defense would have no major impacts on employment or
growth, even with complete disarmament.93 These findings coincided with the eventual passage
of the 1964 tax cuts. Vigorous economic growth in 1963 and 1964, occurring alongside reduced
proportional defense spending, marked the first time since World War II that unemployment fell
during defense reductions, confirming Heller’s economic approach.94 Aggregate demand
measures replaced targeted industrial policy no longer justifiable for national security.
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This broad transitional plan was hardly transparent to affected firms and their workers.
In response to the loss of contracts at Republic and the 13,000 jobs now in jeopardy, Republic
production workers went on strike in April 1962, stipulating the company no longer use workers
outside their job title (thereby avoiding promotions), but most importantly, demanding better
supplemental unemployment benefits and increased severance packages. After 80 days of no
production, Kennedy invoked Taft-Hartley to force negotiations because the strike, “if permitted
to continue, will imperil national safety.” The union won, but jobs were still on the line.95
Workers, their families, and Long Islanders in general wrote over 50,000 letters to Washington
demanding more contracts. Journalists, union officials, and workers justified their call for more
contracts beyond the terms of national security; for Long Islanders, employment was a
government responsibility. Newsday editors established the basic argument: “even before
World War II, the government has encouraged Republic and similar defense plants to expand to
the point where all of them represent a crucially important source of employment… [the federal
government] has a responsibility to these people that extends beyond emergency help.”96 Justin
Ostro, President of Republic Aviation’s IAM union Lodge 1987 similarly contended that “many
of the men who will be laid off in the next month…came out to work in the defense industry for
the Government and it’s up to the Government to look out for these workers now.”97 Workers
thought in the same terms, as one laid-off Republic employee demanded the government “use the
billions of dollars they are wasting trying to reach the moon” to keep workers like him
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employed.98 Such a statement was on one hand ironic, since federal spending on the space race
supported aerospace manufacturers like Grumman, but this kind of spending did not benefit
production workers like conventional defense appropriations. For workers, union
representatives, and journalists, not to mention politicians like Otis Pike representing them,
federal spending was still necessary to maintain employment. This contention was premised on
the direct benefits Long Island had received from defense dollars since 1940.
The local outcry finally found a national platform in the 1964 elections. By that point,
Republic was laying off the last round of a total 13,600 workers, three-quarters of their entire
workforce. Suffolk County’s unemployment rate hit 7.1 percent, and the county government
considered separating Suffolk from the metropolitan area to qualify for ‘depressed area’
funding.99 On October 25, U.S. Senate candidate Robert F. Kennedy promised defense workers a
visit from Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz and Robert McNamara in January 1965 to see how
the area’s declining economy could be rebuilt, particularly because Long Island’s population was
set to grow by 400,000, and as RFK put it, “where are we going to get the jobs?”100 In the
meantime, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the outgrowth of Heller’s
disarmament committee, sponsored a report to prepare these workers for the private economy
entitled the Transferability of Defense Job Skills to Non-Defense Occupations. The government
committed to “research and placement, retraining, and relocation,” relying on the private labor
market to absorb these manufacturing workers who had depended on federal stimulus dating
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back to World War II.101 In addition, the Department of Labor and Defense sponsored a
relocation project through the Manpower Development and Training Act, encouraging former
Republic employees to work for Douglas Aircraft Company in Long Beach, California.102
Kennedy’s campaign promise was not fulfilled until October 1965, when Secretary
McNamara landed in Lake Success to tour Long Island’s defense plants. By this point, Republic
had all but collapsed, and Maryland-based Fairchild Hiller Corporation bought what remained of
the company. The ‘Republic’ division of Fairchild Hiller received some subcontracting work,
building the tail section for McDonnell Aircraft’s F-4, but its new workforce was lean and R&D
oriented, numbering around 3,700. Approximately a fifth of these workers were engaged in
production compared to Republic’s eighty percent proportion.103 Politicians, desperate for a way
to boost industrial employment, expected McNamara to forecast future defense spending. Union
officials meanwhile pressed McNamara for a pilot project to convert the local defense economy
toward consumer production.104 Instead, McNamara used the opportunity to inform Long Island
the defense boom was over. Though he discussed the prospect of two contracts for FairchildRepublic and Grumman, he reminded workers that new contracts did not mean more
employment, and that Grumman’s success depended on the company’s ability to keep costs
down, labor costs and subcontracts in particular. McNamara generally scolded Long Island’s
government, business, industry, and education leaders for relying on defense spending because
“the defense industry is a highly erratic industry and you should not try to build an economy on
it.” It was time to shift to non-defense industries, and political leaders should not expect new
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defense dollars. When asked whether Long Island’s high wages penalized the area, McNamara
denied it, though added “if you are there isn’t anything I can do about it.”105

Figure 4.1: The Long Island equivalent of “Ford to City: Drop Dead.” From “McNamara Tells LI: Diversify
Industry,” Newsday, October. 14, 1965, 1.

Essentially, McNamara was informing these workers that the government was no longer
committed to employing industrial workers, and what happens to these plants, workers, and the
region in general was not the state’s responsibility. Contracts would continue to flow to Long
Island, though based entirely on how well firms competed in the marketplace. The trajectory
toward more technical weaponry would also continue. McNamara’s demand that defense firms
and politicians shift toward non-defense activities ignored the structure of the industry, one that
could not simply transition into private consumer production. Defense-oriented companies had
low capitalization, little commercial marketing capabilities, and no experience producing lowcost items in high volumes. They were an outgrowth of the warfare state, committed to meeting
their one customer with high quality products made from over 10,000 parts.106 Assisting defense
workers’ transition into the private economy misunderstand the challenges of the region,
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focusing on worker skill deficiencies rather than industrial opportunity. The Disarmament
Agency overstated the skill divide between consumer and defense production because most
production workers were essentially light assembly operators working in gigantic job shops.107
The problem was the lack of industries hiring production workers, as defense firms cut jobs and
moved toward high-skill technical contracts. Relocation meanwhile only poached workers away
from Long Island (and fewer than two hundred relocated anyway), and Congressman James
Wydler demanded McNamara move work to Long Island rather than workers to California, all to
deaf ears.108
The post-layoff experiences of Republic workers illustrate the consequences of these
defense procurement reforms in the early 1960s. Technical contracts kept the booming
electronics industry and Grumman’s space work going, and Republic’s laid off engineers and
professional employees found plenty of opportunity. Professionals were unemployed for an
average of three months, and they overwhelmingly returned to manufacturing, either in the same
job category or in higher positions.109 This represented a minority of Republic’s unemployed;
only five percent of employees held bachelor’s degrees while slightly less than 80 percent were
high school graduates. These production workers were unemployed for an average of five
months, and over a third exhausted unemployment benefits entirely. When they returned to
work, they earned on average less than half what they had been at Republic. Less than one
percent of Republic’s workforce made under $450 a month when employed at the plant (around
$3,200 in 2012), but forty-three percent made less than $450 a month by March 1965, placing
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them below the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s ‘lower budget’ threshold.110 Unsurprisingly, over
half of workers were dissatisfied with their new jobs. Salaries and their new status were the
leading reasons for discontent. One Republic worker feared the “possible loss of my home if I
do not find employment soon.” Another worker claimed that “the local sweat shops take
advantage of the situation and offer you a salary which it is impossible to live on… when most of
them offer two dollars an hour less it is impossible for a family man to survive on such an
insult.”111 These workers were entering Long Island’s increasingly ‘diversified’ industrial
economy, one with an influx of low-wage industries like textile and non-electrical machinery,
making it difficult to live in high-cost Long Island.112
For the NAACP and black workers demanding increased minority representation and fair
promotions, the changes taking place within the industry made such struggles difficult. While
the PCEEO strengthened the government’s obligation to ensure equal opportunity in the defense
industry, there were fewer jobs to enforce fair employment. As the Republic case illustrates, the
government was no longer using defense spending as a means to boost employment; the defense
budget was fully wedded to other priorities by 1961. Simply put, the state’s renewed
commitment to fair employment meant little when the state’s commitment to full employment
was ending. The consequences were felt across the region’s blue-collar workforce, and seriously
compromised the efforts of black activists to incorporate African Americans into the region’s
prosperity.
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CORE vs. Grumman
Despite the collapse of Republic in 1964, defense-oriented manufacturing remained the
largest employment sector outside low-wage retail jobs through the 1960s, and the problems of
fair promotions, production versus technical employment, and the role of federal civil rights
agencies were still relevant. Grumman, Long Island’s largest employer by the 1960s, remained
competitive during McNamara’s reforms and was closely tied to NASA’s non-defense contracts.
Here CORE hoped to improve black prospects, introducing their aggressive tactics to secure
promotional opportunities and black hiring at the last major industrial firm on Long Island.
From 1961 to 1965, Grumman’s workforce more than doubled, mostly thanks to NASA space
contracts. Lincoln Lynch was aware of Grumman’s employment growth, its ‘Plans for Progress’
pledge, the PCEEO’s nascent ‘affirmative action’ framework, and the need to place black
workers across the entire occupational ladder to improve minority representation in the industry.
The fight to open up jobs at Grumman was, in Lynch’s words, “the opening gun in our battle…
[to] open up the entire defense industry.”113 For Lynch, African Americans should be included
within the employment benefits of such spending, especially since the PCEEO could force firms
to employ black workers. And since Grumman had paltry minority employment, CORE could
use Grumman’s non-discrimination pledge and the PCEEO to negotiate an affirmative action
plan.
Despite the company’s claims that it was “unique in its achievement in the field of human
relations,” only 1.1 percent of their workforce were African American as of 1962. Of 187 black
workers, 157 were production workers, and there were only two black managers. In the wake of
Plans for Progress, Grumman made concerted efforts to employ more African Americans, and
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the company boasted that their black workforce had grown to 3.6 percent of total employment by
1965. They had increased their black employment numbers by 256 percent compared to an
overall employment increase of 71 percent, and the greatest gains were in skilled blue collar and
white collar positions. Black skilled craftsman increased over two-hundred percent, while
professional/technical employees quintupled, and black clerical workers increased a whopping
1,320 percent.114 Of course, as a memo attached to Grumman’s own report noted, these
ridiculous percentages illustrated the company’s low black employment prior to 1962 and
undermined their assertion that they consistently maintained a fair hiring policy.115
Lynch and CORE submitted a fifteen-point proposal to Grumman on August 5, 1965,
laying out the company’s faults, including its low black employment numbers and the various
ways the company excluded African Americans from higher positions. These included an
esoteric promotion policy, a transfer system that ‘loaned’ black workers between departments
while limiting skill development, and the “virtual exclusion of blacks from the available Rocket
Training School,” thereby denying them “an opportunity for the development of superior
technical skills and promotional opportunities.” To rectify these failings, CORE proposed
Grumman ‘vigorously’ recruit black workers for jobs, advertise in black media outlets, and target
heavily black areas on Long Island. In addition, Grumman must have ‘meaningful
representation’ in all its departments, from research and development to sales and service, and
on-the-job training should favor blacks. To combat future cases of bias, CORE demanded the
company establish an employee-elected minority grievance panel. Most importantly, CORE
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wanted Grumman’s plan to meet these objectives within thirty days, and CORE asked for
periodic updates on Grumman’s racial progress.116
Grumman balked at the proposal. Though the company benefitted from space contracts,
its long-standing partnership with the Navy, and American involvement in Vietnam, Grumman
was painfully aware of the national race for dwindling military contracts. The company had
transformed over the past decade to remain competitive, and its flagship Lunar Module project
required a massive recruitment drive for engineers and scientists.117 CORE’s social demands
jeopardized Grumman’s ability to get the best engineers and scientists, and by extension,
threatened the contracts that kept Grumman in business.118 Grumman President E. Clinton Towl
even went as far as claiming that discrimination was impossible at the company, given the high
standards for talent and quality to make air and spacecraft.119 Grumman personnel manager P.E.
Viemeister took offense to CORE’s publicity gathering campaign that used Grumman as a
‘symbol’ to prod the entire defense industry on Long Island to “bend over backwards to
compensate for past discrimination.”120 The company was particularly opposed to the demand
that the civil rights group be included in the decisions made within the company, because CORE
was “unqualified to advise us in meeting the responsibilities inherent in the conduct of a highly
complex business.”121
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Grumman took a strong public stance against CORE, though behind the scenes, the
company feared CORE’s protests. Management was particularly concerned that such protests
provided a wedge for unionization. The company favored government intervention to labor
strife, hoping that federal fair employment agencies might settle the case without disruption.122
By the end of August, management agreed to twelve of the fifteen proposals, though three of the
most contentious proposals stalled compromise: the employee-elected grievance panel, written
notification to employees of all new job openings, and detailed implementation plans submitted
to CORE.123 The company offered to train minority Long Islanders in general ‘employability’
skills, like “grooming,” “personal finance,” and “motivation and attitude,” along with basic
industrial skills. Grumman also proposed a Long Island Fair Employment Board, a regional
private FEPC that would settle discrimination grievances in the industry.124 Nonetheless, the
company outright refused to offer any jobs or much meaningful commitment to training.
Grumman agreed to join a ‘Job Opportunity Day’ where Long Island’s major industries would
provide job and training opportunities, though the company clarified that it was only offering
advice for qualification.125 These plans did not satisfy CORE’s primary grievances, and neither
side reached any agreement from September through November 1965. Grumman ceded no
operational control to CORE nor any input in the company’s personnel decisions. On November
1st, Lynch called off further negotiations, citing that he and the organization were “tired of
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agreements in principle which mean nothing in fact.”126 Grumman management for their part
concluded that “CORE wont [sic] be convinced of Grumman sincerety [sic].”127 They bluntly
stated that the company “can fulfill its obligations to all its employees and to the U.S.
Government…or it can follow the dictates of Long Island CORE. It cannot do both.”128
While CORE threatened protest, the pickets never came. Lynch admitted in April 1966
that “the exciting times of the demonstrations, while not over, are diminishing.” Lynch himself
left Long Island CORE that same month to become associate national director under newly
elected national director Floyd McKissick.129 CORE’s approach, while useful in the growing
service sector, proved powerless against the aerospace employer. CORE used tactics that could
threaten local businesses’ customer base, but Grumman’s only customer was the federal
government, and with a vague mandate under the PCEEO, the company could maintain a nondiscriminatory employment policy while improving minority hiring, limiting their racial
employment policy to informing minorities of jobs and providing them the opportunity to
promote themselves.
If Grumman could ignore CORE’s demands, it could not avoid increasing pressure from
the federal government. CORE’s own compensatory quota struggles informed a national debate
on such a policy as early as 1963, and in the flurry of civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965,
President Lyndon Johnson abolished the PCEEO and created yet another compliance agency, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). This agency, part of the Department of Labor,
had direct control over the contract purse, and it required non-discrimination clearance or
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‘affirmative action’ hiring policies prior to contract awards. Construction protests in 1966 and
1967 sharpened the definition of ‘affirmative action.’ The term now meant that companies must
provide numerical goals for minority hiring, when they would hire them, and what positions they
would hold. By 1968, ‘affirmative action’ plans, now clearly defined, were required as part of
the bidding process itself.130 When mixed with McNamara’s intensified contractor nationwide
competition, the new quota system could prod firms into improving their racial numbers.
Indeed, Grumman was sensitive to its own racial deficiencies and the negative publicity
they might draw in the wake of this legislation. The company embraced Johnson’s War on
Poverty, designing a small job training program for the ‘hardcore’ unemployed. They also
visibly increased black participation in training courses, averaging between twenty and thirty
percent of all graduates between October 1967 and August 1968.131 In addition, the company
targeted North Amityville and Wyandanch residents in February 1968. Grumman was inundated
with over two hundred hungry job-seekers who waited up to three hours for interviews. The
recruiters were surprised at the amount of skilled labor they found among the ninety-percent
minority population that applied, though given the layoffs at Republic, a pool of qualified
unemployed or underemployed workers in search defense jobs was not surprising. They hired
thirty-five workers immediately and planned to hire around sixty-percent of those who came in
for interviews.132 In regards to promotion and grievance procedures, Grumman President Lew
Evans formed the Open-Door Advisory Council (ODAC), which held bi-weekly meetings to
handle discrimination charges within the company. ODAC had both black and white employee
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representatives and handled discrimination charges on an individual basis to include African
Americans equally in upgrades and transfers.133
Grumman’s efforts, while unprecedented in the company’s history, were slow and faced
potential setbacks from broader industrial changes. The company increased its minority
representation to four percent by 1968, though black workers were concentrated in
unskilled/semi-skilled production jobs compared to an overwhelmingly white technical staff. As
NASA contracts declined in 1967 and Grumman’s F-111B contract remained in limbo, the
company was in flux. Grumman reached its peak employment in 1967 with over 37,000
employees, but by the end of that same year, the company’s “general re-evaluation of the
workforce for the sake of efficiency” led to a reduction-in-force of 800 workers.134 In January
1968, black Grumman employees Robert Caupain and Bill Paige, along with members of CORE,
the Suffolk County Human Rights Commission, and local Community Action Programs, met
with black Grummanites to discuss ways of improving black positions at the company and secure
better jobs, a concern in the face of possible layoffs.135 From these meetings, Big Brother was
formed, an organization chaired by Bob Caupain to encourage current black employees to join
training programs and to inform prospective employees of necessary skills and credentials to get
jobs at Grumman. It explicitly avoided the function of a grievance committee, and Grumman
never officially recognized the organization.136 Nonetheless, over the course of 1968, Big
Brother became the de facto ‘black’ representative organization for minority Grummanites, and
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Bob Caupain met several times with management to offer suggestions about employee race
issues. The organization negotiated a company promise of 47 supervisory positions for minority
members as well as a black Corporate Director of Personnel by December 1968. With around
500 members, Big Brother formed what was essentially a racial labor union, and when their
demands were unresolved a year later, Big Brother broke off negotiations with the company and
turned to Long Island CORE to address their grievances.137
Unlike CORE’s initial failed attempt, the civil rights group now had a substantial number
of complaints to justify their protest because Big Brother claimed to represent nearly one-third of
Grumman’s minority workforce. More importantly, the OFCC could cancel contracts if the
company did not meet affirmative action requirements, and since Grumman won the new Navy
VFX jet fighter contract in January 1969 (out of which emerged the F-14), compliance would be
a mandatory part of the contract process. 138 Given these factors, CORE, now chaired by
defense-oriented Sperry Gyroscope employee Lamar Cox, was given a second chance to make
Long Island’s defense industry a minority employer. On March 24, 1969, Big Brother and
CORE held a press conference in Hempstead where CORE alleged that Grumman had made “no
real move to place blacks into decision-making jobs, or any positions of real power.” They
contended that black workers were concentrated in food service and janitorial positions (half of
these positions were minority-filled), while there were few black foremen or managers (around
fifty). Promotions, salaries, and raises also differed between blacks and whites. Both

137

“Outline – Complaints against Grumman Aircraft in Regard to Bias in Employment, Placed by Long Island
CORE and Big Brothers,” Box 1, folder 2, Burghardt Turner Collection.
138
“Grumman Accused—Denies Bias on Blacks,” New York News, March 25, 1969 and “Charge Bias at Grumman;
It's Denied," Long Island Press, March 25, 1969 in Alphabetical files, Section A-12, cabinet “Com-Cu,” folder
“CORE,” NGHC; See Onkst, 268; Lamar Cox was an engineer at Sperry and admitted that Grumman was only the
first of CORE’s efforts to require Long Island Companies to maintain fair hiring policies. See “Blacks Seek
Grumman Showdown” New York News, July 18, 1969, Alphabetical files, Section A-12, cabinet “Com-Cu,” folder
“CORE,” NGHC; See also “LI Blacks Urge Strikes Monday,” Newsday, September 25, 1969, Alphabetical files,
Section A-12, cabinet “Com-Cu,” folder “CORE,” NGHC.

233
organizations buttressed their allegations with support from black Grummanites. CORE sent the
OFCC executive director a petition signed by six hundred employees, while Big Brother sent
Grumman over two-hundred written complaints.139 CORE demanded that the government
investigate these allegations, especially in relation to Grumman’s recent VFX contract, and sent
out letters to the Labor and Defense Departments for a review of Grumman’s hiring and
promotional practices. On April 1, 1969, the OFCC agreed to launch a “routine investigation”
into the charges of discriminatory labor practices.140
CORE’s three-pronged approach, including publicity gathering, direct allegations, and
the federal investigation, put Grumman’s VFX in jeopardy, and local officials like Suffolk Labor
Commissioner Lou Tempera warned that CORE’s attack posed “a threat to the corporation’s
position as Long Island’s largest employer” and to Long Island’s economy when over 36,000
jobs depended on the VFX contract.141 Mud-slinging then ensued between CORE’s Lamar Cox
and Labor Commissioner Tempera, as Cox denounced Tempera as an “irresponsible bigot…an
enemy of the black people” for defending the company, while Tempera reiterated the gravity of a
contract cancellation to Long Island’s economy.142 Grumman chose to wait until the federal
investigation unfolded, re-iterating their long-standing anti-discriminatory hiring and promotions
policies. Grumman’s future ultimately rested in the hands of the OFCC, but since the
compliance office had yet to cancel any contracts on the grounds of racial discrimination, the
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company’s contracts were relatively secure.143 On April 14, 1969, the New York Regional
Office of the Defense Supply Agency launched its investigation at Grumman. Finding no ‘overt
bias,’ OFCC officials (through the Defense Supply Agency) concluded there was “room for
improvement,” namely that Grumman had not implemented an Affirmative Action program.144
The company responded with an updated Affirmative Action policy focused on equal promotion
opportunities, and laid the groundwork for an entirely new department devoted specifically to
racial employment policy, the Opportunity Development Department (ODD). The ODD took
over the responsibilities of ODAC and had expanded authority, including running a companywide promotion review board, operating recruitment drives for minority workers, seeking out
qualified minority employees for supervisory positions, and monitoring the company’s overall
Affirmative Action policy. Essentially, the ODD was an internal bureaucracy to take care of the
race problem in-house, as required to ensure contract compliance.145 It addressed the central
problem of promotions, adding a layer of safeguards and inspection across the company to avoid
bad press and contract cancellations.
The OFCC investigation and Grumman’s new commitments did little to satisfy CORE or
Big Brother. CORE immediately responded with a new lawsuit, this time targeting not only
Grumman, but the secretaries of Labor, Defense, and the OFCC because they failed to
adequately address discrimination at the company as outlined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
CORE filed the unprecedented lawsuit (no one had charged the federal government for failing to
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enforce contract compliance) to compel the government to “stop being hypocritical by passing
laws that it has no intention of enforcing,” and the organization hoped the case could affect every
company with federal contracts.146 To CORE, the lack of minority employees was a
consequence of widespread discrimination among defense firms, and the in-house solution that
both Grumman and compliance officers agreed upon would not open the industry, instead only
adjusting the promotion and hiring process to ensure non-discrimination and fair job advertising.
The suit, by charging that all involved parties failed to reform the racial employment landscape
of the industry, was intended to force firms to absorb African Americans from local labor
markets and to include them in every position within the occupational ladder, a solution for two
decades of exclusion from the industry.
While CORE prepared its lawsuit for the courts, Big Brother grappled with a looming
reduction-in-force. The agreement reached between Grumman and compliance officers,
including the new Affirmative Action policy and the Opportunity Development Department, did
not address layoffs disproportionately affecting production workers. When a round of layoffs hit
in 1968, over half of Grumman’s reduction-in-force were blue-collar workers (329) compared to
just seventeen percent of whom were engineers. While Grumman won the F-14 contract in
1969, production would not begin until 1970, and the company announced it would let ten
percent of its workforce go (around 3,500) over the course of 1969 as the Lunar Module program
came to an end and its defense obligations declined. Seniority, necessity, and performance
factored into layoffs, though Grumman President E. Clinton Towl admitted that the pain would
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be felt more heavily among manufacturing employees.147 With black workers concentrated in
production and with little seniority, they faced higher job losses. By August 1969, Big Brother
claimed that two-hundred black workers were laid off, or between seventeen and twenty percent
of the total layoffs, despite the fact that only ten percent of the total workforce was to be let go.
While company officials challenged the data, stating that 164 of those minority members left the
company for reasons other than layoffs, Grumman’s black population was nonetheless shrinking
despite major breakthroughs in the company’s racial employment policy.148
Grumman’s new Affirmative Action policy and the dedicated ODD could check
discrimination in hiring and promotions, but could do little aside from a general commitment to
color-blind layoffs. Big Brother threatened to shut down the company in reaction, and Chairman
Bob Caupain promised to fight “even if it means bloodshed.”149 In July 1969, Big Brother and
CORE laid out seventeen demands to Grumman, including company recognition of Martin
Luther King’s Birthday, a black vice president, and “extensive training to allow Negroes and
“exploited” whites to advance.” If these mandates were not met, Big Brother threatened to
“disrupt, impede and harass Grumman’s production, morale, and image.”150 When the demands
were ignored and the company fired twenty-three black workers and hired thirty skilled workers
at the end of July, Big Brother staged a strike on August 4th. Sixty protested outside the
personnel building, holding signs reading “Blacks work for nothing – no respect, no money, no
advancement,” “how the hell can you get seniority when you are laid off?” and “Sweeper,
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Janitorial, Cafeteria: that’s as far as you go Black Boy.” Caupain wanted seniority waived in
layoffs until more African Americans held skilled positions, and when prodded about how the
company would select the white Grumman employees to be laid off in lieu of black workers with
less seniority, Caupain said “I don’t have time to worry about whites. I’m worrying about black
people.”151 Big Brother’s racial promotions-based approach generated only modest support,
primarily because they challenged only one aspect of a broader layoff affecting black and white
workers. Whites still dominated the reduction-in-force, and the problems of discrimination in
hiring and promotion hurt minority employees at the bottom of the hierarchy, doing little to
skilled workers and not inducing them to join the protests. When Big Brother staged a walkout
and ten mile march from Bethpage to Garden City, it coincided with the nationwide
construction-site ‘Black Monday’ protests on September 29.152 The walkout only attracted five
people at the Bethpage plant in the morning, and by the time the march reached its endpoint in
Garden City ten miles west, around eighty protestors joined the original five, including former
and current Grumman and Republic Aviation employees.153 The race-based strike, in targeting
both the problem of layoffs and discrimination, managed to unite few to its cause.
CORE’s suit failed in the courts. The case, initially deliberated in US district court in
1970 and appealed in 1972, found the defendant innocent of any wrongdoing. Since black
Grummanites and CORE requested a general government inquiry into hiring practices, the
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plaintiffs had not exhausted all avenues to address discrimination claims through Executive
Order 11246 or Title VII. Therefore, they were not allowed to sue administrative bodies that
they had not contacted in the first place.154 After over twenty years of weak fair employment
committees, a labyrinthine network had emerged to formalize negotiations between employers
and minority workers. Long Island CORE and Big Brother continued to use publicity gathering
tactics, including the high-profile lawsuit, but state regulation of fair employment had returned.

Conclusion
The difference between 1943 and 1969, and therefore the victories of earlier activists
versus the failures of CORE and Big Brother, was the health and structure of the industry.
Demands for fair employment corresponded with the end of full employment. From 1969-1971,
defense related jobs declined by 23,000 and the workforce contracted by a fifth.155 The racial
protests were a part of a broader debate over Long Island’s industrial future and what to do about
declining defense dollars. On November 25, 1969, Nassau County officials, defense employers,
and union representatives met to discuss ‘conversion to a peacetime economy,’ a meeting based
on the premise that the defense industry had employed thousands on Long Island since World
War II and therefore the federal government had the responsibility to sustain employment
regardless of current defense priorities. While this harkened back to the discussions during the
Republic closures, five years of anti-war protests and disarmament plans shaped an alternative
strategy to sustaining defense manufacturing firms. The hope was to sustain high levels of
spending, though divert defense dollars toward social needs, including environmental solutions
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to air pollution, waste management, more efficient housing technologies, urban transportation
innovations, educational technologies, and more. The Long Island Federation of Labor, the
region’s AFL-CIO umbrella organization, laid out specific projects for the government to fund,
including a jet port, mass transit, and a bridge spanning the Long Island Sound, all of which
would benefit from the skills Grumman and Republic workers possessed. While some ideas
were R&D focused, others were infrastructure based, and all could tighten the regional labor
market.156 Such ideas also had popular support. At a “Full Employment Day” rally on Labor
Day in Eisenhower Park in 1970, Democratic congressional candidate Karen Burstein argued
that “the investment in the future requires our acceptance of the idea that the government must
play as significant a role in waging peace as it does in waging war.” Just as CORE wanted
compensatory hiring, so too did those laid off from defense jobs and the politicians who
advocated for them.157
Contracts for social development never came. Defense spending slightly rebounded as
Grumman won the F-14 contract, but still favored skilled workers and a leaner workforce.158
Meanwhile, CORE’s five year effort to increase black employment at Grumman was victorious,
though not in the way they intended. From 1965 to 1971, the minority proportion had increased
from 3.6 to five percent of the total workforce. While African Americans had increased in
proportion, their total numbers had declined from an estimated 1,500 during Grumman’s peak
employment in 1967 to 1,142 workers by 1971. In addition, the new hires were concentrated in
skilled positions. By 1971, nearly half of all black Grummanites were categorized as
156
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technicians, professionals, managers, or craftsmen, while only forty percent worked in service,
operative, laborer positions.159 This was partly thanks to Grumman’s vigorous recruitment drive
that began in September 1969 when the Opportunity Development Department was formerly
assigned to find minority group employees for supervisory and technical positions.160 But to
improve their racial distribution of jobs and meet Affirmative Action requirements, Grumman
looked beyond Long Island. The company had difficulty recruiting qualified black employees
from local labor pools, and as David Onkst discovered in oral interviews with former Grumman
recruiters, the company also faced competition for qualified black workers from defense
manufacturers in California. Grumman chose to recruit directly from southern black colleges to
fill its racial quota, including Morgan State, Howard University, and Bennett College, among
others.161 Affirmative Action policy did not account for the specific manpower needs of the
industry or what manpower was available. Through outside recruitment, Grumman could satisfy
federal requirements while also procuring skilled workers to assist in the diversification into
computer data systems and space projects. Once again, CORE’s goal of procuring jobs for black
Long Islander was undermined, as Affirmative Action helped the already skilled, not the
unskilled. Simply put: race was too crude a category for the transformations taking place in the
industry.162
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When Lynch initially targeted the defense industry, he and the rest of CORE believed
they could improve black opportunity on Long Island through the largest employment sector in
the region. Defense spending offered government-subsidized mass employment, and they
wanted that same government-contractor arrangement which supported the suburban blue-collar
middle class to include black workers within its mass employment framework. But their fight
for racial equality was inextricably linked to defense spending, and by the 1960s, the new
technological demands of the Cold War and the restructuring of the contract process no longer
sustained mass unskilled jobs. While the Vietnam War increased demand for military goods (so
much that it contributed to runaway inflation beginning in 1968), spending continued to favor
high-skilled industrial workers or the South and West over Long Island.163 Despite continued
defense spending, opportunity declined for blue-collar workers, leading to ‘suburban divestment’
in Long Island’s blue-collar suburban communities that relied on the consumer spending and tax
revenue from these high-paying jobs. The labor market twist included them. The one
commitment the government made to civil rights, state-mandated compliance, was a narrow
policy framework that failed to address the occupational dynamics of publicly-subsidized private
firms.
While workers and politicians hoped to bring public spending in line with the priorities of
the new decade, their calls fell on deaf ears. Federal job creation in the region declined, and
defense no longer sustained a large middle class (at least until the brief defense surge of the
1980s). CORE and Big Brother managed to prod Grumman to open jobs to a privileged class of
black worker, but given the higher rates of unemployment and the barriers to upward mobility
that black workers faced on Long Island, this victory would not improve the plight of the black
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working class and poor, who needed access to remunerative employment, a problem they
increasingly shared with white citizens. The deeper challenge within Long Island’s racial jobs
movement was addressing the ‘black’ problem within the larger structural changes occurring in
the economy.
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Chapter 5
The Suburban War on Poverty
When Michael Harrington’s The Other America shattered the postwar consensus of
widespread prosperity, he conceived of the ‘other America’ as an aberration, a ‘hidden’ people
living in ‘hidden’ places far from the ‘affluent’ society. For suburbanites removed from
concentrated poverty in Appalachia or central city slums, “it is easy to assume that ours is,
indeed, an affluent society.”1 In the aggregate, Long Island was indeed isolated from poverty.
Politicians in Nassau County claimed that if their county was a city, it would be the nation’s
wealthiest on a per-capita basis and the sixth largest in population, while Suffolk’s rapid growth
in the 1950s placed it in close contention with its western neighbor.2 With high rates of
homeownership, robust job opportunities, and a massive retail market, Long Island was the
exemplar of postwar prosperity. But the average Long Islander did not have to travel far to
discover poverty. In 1960, nearly 55,000 families survived with annual incomes below $4,000,
over a tenth of the bi-county population. As previous chapters have shown, most of these people
were non-white: while only eight percent of whites lived in poverty, over a third of non-white
families in Nassau and forty percent of the minorities in Suffolk were poor. 3 The “paradox of
poverty in the midst of plenty” most resonated on Long Island, where the poor lived in two
counties with some the highest median incomes in the nation.4

1

Michael Harrington, The Other America; Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 3-5.
Sherwood Ross, “Nassau County Factsheet,” Box 66, folder “Economy,” Nickerson Papers.
3
Dieter K. Zschock, “Poverty Amid Affluence in Suburbia,” in Economic Aspects of Suburban Growth: Studies of
the Nassau-Suffolk Planning Region, ed. Dieter K. Zschock (Stony Brook, NY: Economic Research Bureau, State
University at Stony Brook, 1969), 71-78; While the Social Security Administration’s poverty line was close to
$3,000 for urban areas, Long Island experts argued that this poverty threshold was unrealistic in a high-cost area like
Nassau and Suffolk counties. Even $4,000 annual incomes were considered low. See Nassau-Suffolk Regional
Planning Board, U.S. Census '70: Volume 6: Income, 56.
4
“Community Profile, New York, Nassau County,” p. CP-008, box 254, folder 30, “Community Profiles 1967,”
Records of the Information Center, Records of the Office of Operations, Records of the Office of Opportunity,
2

244

The ‘persistence of poverty amidst affluence’ was no paradox if judged by the dominant
conception of poverty in the 1960s. During what historian Robert Collins calls the “superheated
optimism” of the early 1960s, poverty was understood as problem of the poor themselves, unable
to take part in the prosperity surrounding them due to personal deficiencies or spatial isolation.
As Joseph A. Kershaw, Assistant Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity argued, “what
we need in the longer run are ways to increase the productivity of the poor, ways to make them
valuable in jobs and ways of getting them from where they are to where the jobs are.”5 When
Lyndon Johnson launched his War on Poverty in 1964, the war’s commercial Keynesian
architects planned tax cuts alongside the program, believing that injecting capital and consumer
spending into a stagnating affluent economy would spur growth, and through the War on
Poverty’s training and rehabilitation programs, the poor could then be absorbed.6 The suburbs,
the geographic symbol of postwar prosperity, were the perfect laboratories to test the hypothesis.
When LBJ called for “total victory” in his war against material deprivation, suburban politicians
on Long Island believed that their unique fortunes could achieve that goal.7 Nassau County
Executive Eugene Nickerson proclaimed that “Nassau will become the first county in the nation
to abolish slums” and that the entire War on Poverty rested on whether suburbia could in fact

Records of the Community Service Administration, RG 381, National Archives and Record Administration II,
College Park, MD (hereafter cited as RG 381, NARA II); “Community Profile, New York, Suffolk County,” p. CP008, box 256, folder 52, “Community Profiles 1967,” Records of the Information Center, Records of the Office of
Operations, Records of the Office of Opportunity, RG 381, NARA II.
5
Quoted in Collins, 60-61.
6
Margaret Weir, Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 68-73; Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America Race, Economic Policy and
the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 73-76; McKee, The Problem of
Jobs, 93-94; Collins, 52-53.
7
Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty,"
March 16, 1964, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Accessed March 14, 2013.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26109.

245
eradicate poverty because “if it cannot be done here, how can we hope that it can be done in the
cities of America?”8
Long Island’s county governments had their own reasons to join a war on poverty. Both
county budgets became strained under the diverse demands of their surging populations,
especially as costs became shared between the federal, state, and county governments over the
course of the postwar period. Welfare topped the list of unmanageable costs, and both Nassau
and Suffolk’s executives imagined the War on Poverty could turn ‘tax-eaters’ into ‘tax-payers,’
the very same intention LBJ and his advisors had for the program.9 Nassau and Suffolk’s
executives planned to utilize Long Island’s growing and diverse economy to accomplish this
goal. County officials not only shared the same intentions as the Johnson administration, but also
similar assumptions. County Executives, human rights commissions, county labor departments,
and a variety of other state actors operating within federal programs or acting independently with
federal funding, devised imaginative programs to improve the skills of the region’s un- and
under-employed as well as their mobility within the job market. These programs included
replacing migrant farm laborers with local workers, training the poor for suburban jobs,
developing comprehensive job referral centers, and starting transportation services to link poor
neighborhoods with industrial parks.
This confluence of interests and assumptions between local governments and the Federal
War on Poverty agenda contradicts the dominant historiography of Johnson’s anti-poverty
platform. A generation of historians have re-oriented our understanding of Johnson’s project,
emphasizing how local government, community action programs, and grassroots activists shaped
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the direction and the outcome of the War on Poverty. While they have overturned the older
consensus of the program’s failures, Community Action Programs (CAP) remain central to their
narrative. Historians argue that CAPs were a funding source for radical and civil rights oriented
politics, a means to empower the poor and their communities formerly denied political power,
and central to the tensions between the White House, urban Democratic machines, and poverty
activists. But whether CAPs were a source of contention or a wellspring of innovation and
protest during the 1960s, they did not always figure so heavily in local politics.10
If we take a broader view of the War on Poverty, one that understands Johnson’s call for
a ‘war’ on poverty as a movement that included local politicians with mutual interests and a
perspective that looks beyond the Economic Opportunity Act, a different narrative emerges, one
where the suburbs were central to the entire project.11 On Long Island, CAPs did not upset local
political arrangements and local politicians launched their own fronts in the fight against poverty,
unique programs with the same goal as the national War on Poverty in the space where the war
was most likely to succeed: the postwar suburb. But it was in the suburbs where the narrative of
postwar suburbia met the reality of the job market, and where the failure of the War on Poverty
was most apparent. The defense industry, as outlined in the previous chapter, had evolved
beyond the mass unskilled employer it had once been, and suburbia’s service economy either
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required advanced degrees or paid too little to sustain homeownership and the necessities of
suburban life. Anti-poverty training programs were unable to breach the divide, and new
transportation routes merely dropped workers off to non-existent jobs, while referral centers only
offered low-wage employment. By the late 1960s, the county officials realized that the problem
of poverty was not the poor themselves, but of job opportunities and the structure of the labor
market. In 1970, Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson announced a guaranteed
employment program, illustrating that the only way to promise jobs was to create them. Poor
Long Islanders could not rely on the alleged affluence of postwar private enterprise.
This chapter looks at the War on Poverty from a different, but no less important
perspective. Rather than the cities or rural regions where CAP funding mobilized impoverished
communities and drew the ire of local government, the chapter looks at how the War on Poverty
operated in what was the most widely affluent region in the nation. Rather than considering the
War on Poverty within the narrow confines of the Economic Opportunity Act, this chapter
investigates the flurry of local policies and programs that drew inspiration from the Johnson’s
administration’s broader intent for this domestic ‘war.’ These policies looked to end poverty
associated with migrant farm labor, transportation, and skill deficiencies of the poor themselves.
Finally, while there are a variety of perspectives from which to assess the War on Poverty’s
legacy, this chapter looks at the war’s efforts to incorporate the poor into the economic
mainstream. To understand the War on Poverty, we need to understand why it failed in the
suburbs, where it was most likely to succeed.
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Statesmen of a New Society
Nassau and Suffolk’s county government’s welfare state, and therefore relationship with
poverty, evolved in parallel with the federal government. At the turn of the twentieth century,
rural interests dominated both Nassau and Suffolk counties. Both county governments were a
collective of supervisors from each town, each representing local interests. Republican Party
machines monopolized power in both counties, and while machines typically thrived on
decentralized power that enabled patronage and stable electoral victories, the Nassau County
GOP managed to centralize their government. J. Russel Sprague, Hempstead Town Supervisor
and Nassau County GOP chieftain, recognized that county-wide control of police, health,
welfare, and property tax assessment could be more efficient, shape the county’s growth, and
provide new patronage jobs. In 1936, a new county charter created the County Executive
position, a powerful central figure that could veto laws of the Town Supervisors and administer
county services. By 1938, Sprague handily won the County Executive position, a position he
held until 1952.12 As the first county in the United States to have such a position, Sprague
pioneered a new kind of suburban government at the county level, one with municipal functions
like urban systems rather than a limited rural-oriented state.13 Nassau now had its own budget
and departments devoted to tax assessments, health, and overall planning. Welfare, once
delegated to towns, now operated with four divisions for families, child welfare, medical care,
and accounting. All of this accommodated the massive postwar development of Long Island,
from authorizing residential housing tracts to building Salisbury Park, the county’s suburban

12

Teaford, 33-43; Smits, Nassau, Suburbia USA, 64-71; For an in-depth analysis of the deliberations surrounding
Sprague’s county government revisions, see Marjorie Freeman Harrison, “Machine Politics Suburban Style: J.
Russel Sprague and the Nassau County (N.Y.) Republican Party at Midcentury” (PhD diss., Columbia University,
2005), chapter 3.
13
Edwin J. Benton, Counties as Service Delivery Agents Changing Expectations and Roles (Westport, CT: Praeger,
2002), xxv.

249
version of New York’s Central Park (later renamed after Dwight Eisenhower). Sprague
maintained a strong patronage system during this transformation, even incorporating newly
arriving suburbanites into the GOP, earning Nassau “the most Republican county in the United
States” moniker in the postwar period.14
As was true nationwide, the county machine faced increasing pressures during the 1950s.
A. Holly Patterson, Sprague’s Republican successor in 1952, confronted internal disputes as he
suppressed department costs and civil service salaries. The Democratic Party, uncompetitive for
most of the twentieth century, now mobilized newly registered Democrats in the County (about a
third of county voters) and promised to cleanse government of the ‘machine.’15 Eugene H.
Nickerson, a Harvard graduate and Columbia trained lawyer, ran for the County Executive
position in 1961. He campaigned in the shadow of John F. Kennedy’s popularity, promising to
bring the “spirit of the New Frontier” to Nassau County and promised to end the waste and
mismanagement of the Sprague machine, producing efficiency and lower taxes.16 After his
electoral victory in 1961, Nickerson ushered in changes similar to the ‘reform’ liberals shaking
up urban political machines across the country. He hired experts and professionals to manage
county services, and re-structured the civil service system to emphasize merit employment and
advancement. This did more than ‘clean-up’ local politics; Nickerson re-conceptualized the very
purpose of county government. Within his first five years in office, Nickerson and the county
legislature produced what Douglas Rosenthal called the ‘custodial state,’ a local government
committed to the general welfare, leisure, and safety of all county residents. This included
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county departments devoted to the local economy (Commerce and Industry), consumer
protection (Consumer Affairs), the elderly (Office for the Aging), strike mediation (Department
of Labor), traffic regulation (Department of Traffic and Engineering), civil rights (Commission
on Human Relations), and a comprehensive master plan to improve recreational facilities, police
protection, education, and health care. Nickerson contended that all could be provided at lower
cost by ending the patronage that bloated local government.17 Most importantly, Nassau County
government was now a federal government in miniature, a liberal state committed to welfare,
civil rights, mediating labor disputes, and planning.
The expansion of county power was infectious, and Nassau County served as a model for
the nation. Suffolk County, whose government dated back to 1683, had also been controlled by
a Republican Party machine in a decentralized government structure. In 1958, residents voted in
favor of a county charter with a strong County Executive and centralized police, health, and
welfare powers.18 One year later, H. Lee Dennison, a Democrat who never held any political
position, become the County’s first County Executive. A former engineer for the County Public
Works Department, Dennison quit in 1953 after blaming the county’s poor roads on the
Republican machine. He ran on an anti-machine platform, and once in office, overhauled the
civil service and created an office for economic development, a human relations commission, a
labor and social services department, a new community college, and public works projects.19 As
a former engineer, Dennison understood Suffolk’s challenges as a ‘planning’ problem, because
the county faced “unplanned, conglomerate, unrelated, speculative growth” in the 1950s. Only a
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coordinated effort with education, public relations, business, and industry could make Suffolk’s
resources “assets, not liabilities,” producing ordered growth that increased job opportunities,
improved services, and lowered taxes.20
Both Nickerson and Dennison were expanding the welfare state at the suburban county
level in the 1960s, a process that coincided with federal state growth and even pre-dated federal
conservation and environmental reform.21 But county growth in the postwar period was more
than a parallel development because Nassau and Suffolk were increasingly tied to the federal
government itself through federal grants, which permitted counties to expand and experiment
with reforms without raising property taxes or requesting state funds.22 Nickerson actively
pursued federal assistance, paying for his programs with aid rather than taxes. He began
procuring grants in the early 1960s, eventually establishing an Office of Federal and State Aid
devoted entirely to maximizing federal and state subsidies. His methods became a model for
counties nationwide, and by 1967 he was pulling in over $25 million a year from federal sources,
some fifteen percent of the entire county budget, up from less than four percent ten years prior.
This funded everything from elderly aid and welfare to smog prevention and nuclear shelters.
Counties nation-wide adopted these practices, including neighboring Suffolk County.23 Costs
were also increasingly shared between local, state, and federal government, and public welfare
illustrated this relationship. Since the depression, Albany and Washington assisted Nassau and
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Suffolk counties with their increasing welfare outlays. By 1957, Nassau’s federal
reimbursements were between fifty and eighty percent, and Washington covered around twothirds of Suffolk’s expenditures.24 Nonetheless, welfare remained the largest expense for both
counties in the 1950s.
The increasing burden of welfare was a growing concern for Long Island’s new county
executives, especially since both Nickerson and Dennison were elected on ‘efficiency’ platforms.
Reports revealed that the majority of welfare payments went to the aged and disabled, but a
study of Nassau ADC recipients revealed a disproportionate number of recipients were African
American women, and nearly two-thirds of these recipients worked. Both the racial statistic and
their employment status shaped the Nickerson administration’s efforts to improve efficiency and
lower welfare costs for county government.25 In 1962, Nickerson appointed John J. MacManus
to run Nassau’s Public Welfare department. MacManus announced that his sole intention was to
“administer [the] department out of business.” While admitting that abandoned children, the
elderly, and sick would never disappear, he asserted that at least a quarter of recipients were
employable, and he actively wanted to transform the purpose of welfare “from the traditional
custodial attitude toward rehabilitation of welfare cases wherever possible.”26 This attitude,
when mixed with the increased costs of welfare, the faith in bureaucratic reform, a growing local
economy, and the shared governance between Long Island’s counties and the federal
government, made both Nassau and Suffolk eager frontline soldiers when poverty reform
reached the national agenda. Once Congress ratified the Economic Opportunity Act on August
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20, 1964, local government and activist could access the $947 million reserved for education, job
training, local economic development, legal aid, health initiatives, and local political
participation. For Nassau and Suffolk, both rapidly growing county governments with a keen
interest in fighting poverty, the new Act provided unprecedented Federal resources with relative
autonomy.27
Beyond financial resources, institutional capacity, and a desire to alleviate poverty, Long
Island’s county administrations also shared the basic assumption of affluence that undergirded
the War on Poverty itself. County Executive Eugene Nickerson based his poverty agenda on the
belief that Nassau County had unrivaled prosperity, but while Nassau was the “richest county in
the world,” accessibility and qualifications were the “root of the poverty problem.” Unlike
depressed areas where automation or factory relocation eviscerated job opportunities, Long
Island was the destination for these factories and automation went hand-in-hand with increased
wages for those working alongside new technology. High-paying jobs were plentiful but out of
reach to those who needed them most. The welfare system provided survival, not skills to enter
the suburban economy. The goal was to break down the barriers to jobs, be they transportation,
child care, skill/motivation deficiencies, or knowledge of job opportunities, eradicating poverty
through full participation in what postwar suburbia had to offer. This would not only incorporate
them into the mainstream, but lower the largest expenditure in the county. As he stated to
business owners and the public in 1968, “the cost of poverty is high – for everyone [while] the
cost of full employment is relatively low.”28
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In Suffolk, County Executive Dennison was less idealistic. Given Suffolk’s dual poverty
problem, on one hand suburban in its west but also rural on its east end, Dennison did not believe
that “poverty is ever going to be completely or instantly eliminated.” He did however argue that
with proper planning “the anti-poverty program will help build a better foundation for a more
stable and equitable future general economy.” This meant using planning powers to enforce
building codes, eliminate substandard housing, and improve education, health, and employment,
all of which could benefit the poor living in the urbanized west and rural east. To Dennison, the
problem of poverty was one of development, and War on Poverty funding could be used not only
to help the poor directly, but in a broader fashion to develop Suffolk’s rural expanse and
incorporate the region into the suburbanizing process creeping eastward. If Suffolk farmers kept
exploiting migrant laborers, housing conditions would remain poor, and the county would
continue to subsidize those costs. Dennison’s conviction was that planning could transform poor
communities, and the entire farming region, ultimately lowering the burden of welfare.29
Long Island’s War on Poverty and its architects reflected the national aims of the project,
or at least those of its leader, Lyndon Johnson. These leaders constructed a county version of
LBJ’s “Great Society” with devoted agencies for the aged, consumer affairs, and the
environment, among others. They emphasized the costs of material deprivation, not only to
those who faced it, but to the state that supported their subsistence. And like the national War on
Poverty, both Nickerson and Dennison sought to alter the pathways of opportunity around the
market, not to modify the market itself. This meant improving the transportation links between
low-income neighborhoods and jobs, initiating job training programs, coordinating the efforts of
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Community Action Programs to more efficiently provide services, and in Suffolk’s case, stem
the tide of migrant farm laborers and replacing them with indigenous workers. These
unprecedented efforts developed from a conviction that Long Island could eliminate poverty,
because as Nickerson put it, “if the richest county in the world, with the help of the richest state
and nation in the world, can’t effectively eliminate its pockets of poverty in this affluent age,
then the poor are truly justified in their fatalistic desperation.”30 It was on Long Island where
Johnson’s approach to poverty would be put to the test, through both conventional Federal
programs and locally-developed experiments with the same intentions.

“Bailing out the Ocean with a Spoon”
While Long Island’s county executives embraced Johnson’s overarching goals and threw
themselves onto the frontline of the War on Poverty, Community Action (CAP), the Economic
Opportunity Act’s most controversial program, was not a decisive part of Long Island’s poverty
war. Nationally, forty-five percent of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s budget (the agency
in charge of administering the Federal War on Poverty) was devoted to CAPs. CAPs not only
delivered social programs but also mobilized the poor so they could alleviate their own
conditions, and it was these ‘mobilization’ efforts that were nationally controversial, since they
supported competitive political factions that disrupted existing political structures in the nation’s
largest cities.31 This bothered LBJ in particular, who never committed to the community action
idea and came to loathe community ‘mobilization’ as CAPs threatened Democratic mayors
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across the nation.32 But local CAPs proved neither controversial nor empowering on Long
Island. The two county Economic Opportunity Commissions (EOC), in charge of twenty-two
local CAPs, had difficulty mobilizing Long Island’s poor. The CAPs themselves were largely
staffed by social workers and middle class activists, and focused on efficient service provision
rather than empowerment, further diminishing the role they played in transforming Long Island’s
poor into a political force.
CAPs were first organized on Long Island in December 1964. In Nassau, prominent
volunteer organizations and the social welfare establishment managed the Nassau County
Economic Opportunity Commission (Nassau EOC).33 In Suffolk, a conglomerate of social
welfare organizations developed the Economic Opportunity Commission of Suffolk, Inc. (EOC
Suffolk). These two county-wide EOC’s served as umbrella organizations for twenty-two
community action programs across the two counties. The individual CAPs administered federal
programs like Headstart, Legal Aid, and Medicaid enrollment, all while encouraging the poor to
participate in CAP activities so the poor would “have a voice in determining their future.”34
Providing services was straightforward, but encouraging participation from the poor proved
problematic.
From the outset, both the Nassau and Suffolk EOCs had difficulty determining where to
establish community action centers. They defined twenty ‘poverty pockets’ in 1965 (ten in each
County), though only six CAPs were functioning by 1967. It took nearly four years to establish
the twenty-two CAPs, and by then the federal government had curtailed funding and autonomy.
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Nonetheless, if judged by what services these CAPs offered residents, Long Island’s CAPs were
mildly successful. All programs emphasized education and offered courses in a variety of fields.
Some reflected the therapeutic aspects of the War on Poverty. The Westbury Community
Council for Economic and Educational Opportunity (known by its acronym, the WCCEEO)
offered a course on “sewing and charm” to help young women improve their appearance for job
interviews. Just across the hall, the WCCEEO provided small electronics courses. In the Five
Towns area, “Project ABC” tackled child and adult illiteracy, while “Project Reach-out”
procured summer employment for teenagers. CAPs had the greatest impact in health and child
care. Suffolk County’s EOC set up health clinics and food programs within all of their CAPs,
and Port Washington’s CAP in Nassau County provided medical services to some 700 families.
Freeport’s CAP managed a highly regarded day-care center for 32 children and had to turn away
some 150 others. The daycare center was especially important to female workers. Coat factory
employee Dorothy Harris admitted “I don’t know what I’d do without it,” while domestic Mary
Brown could work a full day and move off welfare.35
Long Island CAPs were able to provide adequate service provision largely because they
were managed by professional social workers and middle class activists. This drew criticism
from those looking to “organize the people to force these institutions to respond to their needs”
as North Amityville CAP Chairman Marion Ball put it.36 Members of local CAPs complained of
the “middle-class atmosphere,” of welfare professionals more comfortable with rehabilitating the
poor than political organizing. Social workers operated the EOCs central functions, though with
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federally mandated programs comprising nearly three-quarters of the $28.9 million budget for
Nassau and Suffolk EOC’s from 1965 to 1971, the dominance of professional social workers was
unsurprising.37 Across the nation service provision overshadowed “maximum feasible
participation” of the poor in all but the most radicalized CAPs.38 But even when Long Island
CAPs attempted to organize the poor, they ran into difficulty determining the target
“community.” This was a problem with the formulation of “community action” itself, premised
on an urban conception of a united population living in concentrated poverty. Even in areas with
large poor populations, like Hempstead or Glen Cove, organizers faced stiff opposition from the
middle-class. Activists for TRI-CAP, formerly known as the WCCEEO, but now covering
Westbury, New Cassel, and Carle Place, surveyed the three communities to determine the most
pressing problems, but responses from homeowners illustrated a lack of recognition of any issues
plaguing the communities. Neighborhood aides in Suffolk County’s Patchogue CAP noted a
distinct “middle class fear of rocking the boat and identification with the poor.” And in
Roosevelt, CAP Aides assisting residents with welfare faced a hostile black middle class seeking
to destroy the program outright, because they “do not want the label on their town that reveals
the fact that there is poverty in Roosevelt.”39
These CAPs might have produced local class conflict if they united the poor, but
organizers had just as much difficulty mobilizing low-income residents as they did gaining
middle-class approval. Aides working for CAPs in Suffolk noted that residents “don’t want to
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admit they are poor,” were “satisfied with their surroundings,” or “think it’s a waste of time to
become active in their community.” In Hempstead, Newsday reporters found that low-income
apartment dwellers were not even aware of the CAP center just three blocks from their building.
In Suffolk, only 667 of the 30,000 eligible residents actually voted in local board elections in
1970. An evaluation of Long Island’s programs during that same year determined that few were
aware of CAP’s existence, and even fewer viewed CAPs as their advocate. Apathy was partly to
blame, as was dissonance between the federal conception of ‘community’ and the suburban
reality of poverty. Even in the most concentrated poverty areas, residents were spread across
automobile dependent hamlets and lived amongst those above the poverty threshold. 40
The overall difficulty of mobilizing the poor on Long Island forced Suffolk EOC
Executive Director Dean Harrison to quit after only four months in the position in 1968. Despite
having prior experience in Newark, he was “wearied by the sprawling nature of poverty in this
suburban-rural county,” compared to Newark’s dense urban wards.41 Nassau EOC Director
Adrian Cabral expressed a similar disappointment after seeing how few resources were available
for the challenges they faced, particularly the lack of a united and informed community. It was
like “like bailing out the ocean with a spoon” as Cabral put it.42 Long Island’s CAPs improved
service access, but did not empower, and this is partly why they rarely received much opposition
from the political establishment, in contrast to the tensions between urban CAPs and municipal
government. Improved service provision also did not incorporate them into Long Island’s
economy; that goal would be left to county, local, and volunteer groups who designed their own
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programs to train, transport, and find jobs for Long Island’s poor. In fact, Long Island’s CAPs
were more effective after the 1967 Economic Opportunity Act amendments transferred control of
community action to local government, permitting Nassau and Suffolk counties to include the
twenty-two CAPs into their own locally designed war on poverty. In this way, understanding
Long Island’s war on poverty means going beyond the paltry efforts of the Federal community
action programs, and instead analyzing how local government charted their own course with the
expressed purpose of ending poverty in the suburbs, the micro version of Johnson’s goal to
eradicating poverty in America.

The War on Imported Poverty
Long Island’s local war on poverty began with a local issue: migrant labor in Suffolk’s
east end. Whereas the poor were conceived of as a static population in Appalachia or urban
slums, in Suffolk and across farms on the east coast, the poor chased a low-wage job market
running from Florida to Maine. Suffolk farmers used some 3,600 migrants as of 1966, three
quarters of Suffolk’s entire agricultural workforce.43 Migrants used local resources, like the
county’s rental assistance program and local public hospitals, but contributed nothing in taxes,
subsidizing the farmer and crew chief at public expense.44 Furthermore, this poverty became a
black-eye for the county when Edward R. Murrow’s 1960 CBS special Harvest of Shame
revealed Suffolk’s east end migrant labor situation. Congressional hearings in the following year
exposed the harsh working routines, low pay, and appalling living conditions these laborers
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faced while staying in Suffolk, and New York State Governor Nelson Rockefeller launched
investigations into the legality of these camps. Suffolk County Executive H. Lee Dennison
responded to this press at the outset of his administration, condemning the “questionable
employment agencies…specializing in bringing in any kind of labor into the county at a price”
and established a task force to investigate solutions.45
Dennison’s task force began a war on migrant poverty, a local effort that coincided with a
national concern for poor agricultural laborers. The migrant labor system was a complex
problem, involving labor exploitation, bad housing conditions, rising government costs, and a
transient population with even less unity than the suburban poor. Dennison first chose a strategy
from his planning background, applying ‘slum’ clearance to rural areas. In November 1962,
Dennison and the Suffolk Board of Supervisors bought the 349 acre Hollis Warner Duck Ranch,
the largest in the world and whose residents testified to Congress about their working and living
conditions. The ranch, which sat between the Peconic River and Meeting House Creek in the
town of Riverhead, would be added to a $4 million state-sponsored wetlands program meant to
curb pollution, conserve land, and limit ‘undesirable’ development. The County would assist the
migrants living in the camp with relocation services, and Dennison entertained the idea of
moving those who could not find adequate dwelling west to the suburban part of Suffolk
County.46
After two years, Suffolk County acquired the ranch, and the wetlands project quickly
became as controversial as the migrant camp. Long Island CORE intervened to defend the
migrants against the County action, establishing a headquarters in the Hollis Warner camp and
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forming “Operation Tinderbox,” a summer-long protest against the housing conditions,
relocation plans, and work arrangements migrant laborers endured. CORE demanded the County
provide decent jobs and housing, and that they do not resettle migrants in segregated housing
elsewhere in the county. In June, CORE orchestrated a ‘dump-in’ to protest the lack of garbage
removal since the County takeover and a seventy-person march and sit-in across Main Street in
downtown Riverhead. After two protests, eleven men, including Long Island CORE chairman
Lincoln Lynch, were arrested. Dennison swiftly shut CORE’s efforts down, obtaining an
eviction notice for CORE to leave the County-owned camp, sending bulldozers to the site, and
after a one-day standoff, leveling CORE’s protest headquarters on July 1, 1964.47
To Dennison, CORE was disrupting an effort to eradicate slum conditions, a prerequisite
to alleviating poverty in his mind. He conceded that preventing racial segregation was important,
as were jobs, but would “not be meaningful until and unless the adverse conditions of a slum
environment are removed…the first objective must be the elimination of the slums.”48 Like all
clearance projects, demolishing the duck farm camp scattered the poor to nearby dilapidated
housing. Within two months, 150 of the 250 families fled the camp to housing nearby and nearly
half continued to live in substandard conditions.49 By the end of July 1964, it was becoming
clear that another approach was necessary. On July 29, Dennison met directly with the migrants
of the Warner Duck Farm, promising not only better housing, but greater employment
opportunities. He outlined a plan to place a full-time social worker in the area and get local
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industries to offer employment. He then assured the migrants that he would apply for antipoverty funding from Johnson’s new “war on poverty.”50 Federal funding could provide better
services, job training, and a political voice for migrant workers, but Dennison intended to use the
money to remove this unique poverty problem from the county altogether.
Within a year, Dennison offered what amounted to a war on imported poverty. He
claimed both laborers and the County suffered under the current migrant system, since “the cost
of such importation to the rest of the County – to the overall County general economy – has been
in some ways disastrous.” Welfare, police, fire, and health care expenditures, not to mention the
overall environment, all suffered so farmers could exploit these low-wage laborers. Removing
the migrants would solve these problems, and replacing them with local workers would lower the
county’s unemployment rate. As he stated, “it may be time to start picking up some of our own
potatoes, to initiate what might well be called useful and honest local home rule for a change.”51
With local seasonal workers, the county could invest in ending slums, improve work conditions
and lower welfare costs, all while preventing future slums from emerging out of new migrant
streams. It was a bold plan that had to compete with several alternative approaches. Two CAPs
formed to prepare migrants and seasonal workers for non-agricultural employment. The Suffolk
County Human Relations Commission meanwhile advocated for labor legislation and union
recognition to structure work relations in the field. These three approaches, using local labor,
preparing migrants for non-agricultural employment, and regulating work conditions, offered
radically different solutions to imported labor on Suffolk’s east end, each anticipated divergent
futures for Suffolk’s agricultural economy.
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Dennison’s local labor plan was a compromise between the farmer’s labor needs and the
County’s desire to lower costs. It assumed that manual farm laborers would be necessary in the
foreseeable future but that the county could replace migrants with local sources of labor.
However, it was unclear whether an adequate supply existed on Long Island. The County
Executive claimed that there was enough year-round labor, and that it was the migrants who
added significant costs to the welfare system. His Labor Department could not find local
farmworkers. Suffolk’s unemployed made at least as much on unemployment insurance or
welfare as they would harvesting potatoes. The County could locate only twenty-four welfare
recipients on the East End who could do the work at peak harvest, along with 657 able
unemployed welfare recipients county-wide. These farm jobs existed in a region of affluence,
and “with the present low wages in existence in the agricultural industry, most local residents are
looking towards employment in the areas of Suffolk where the wages are higher, the
employment more stable, and the benefits greater.”52 County officials debated the plan for two
years until a space heater set an eight room barracks ablaze and asphyxiated three of the fourteen
people sleeping in a Bridgehampton camp on January 14, 1968. This high-profile fire coincided
with a local public television documentary aired in February, Morton Silverstein’s What Harvest
for the Reaper, a spiritual sequel to Murrow’s 1960 film that followed one crew chief’s migrant
gang from their homes in Arkansas to their harvest employment in Cutchogue, Long Island.53
Following the fire, the Suffolk County Board of Supervisors established a Seasonal Farm Labor
Commission, a nine-member body of government officials, members of the Long Island
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Agricultural Marketing Association (a representative body of farmers), and church officials on
January 22, 1968. Following the film’s debut, Dennison demanded the Commission solve the
migrant problem because it had become “a matter of national advertising that I don’t really care
for.”54 The administration re-offered local labor once again, though knowing farmers could not
afford to pay higher wages lest they “force them out of business,” County Labor Commissioner
Lou Tempera laid out a ‘wage-subsidy plan’ to maintain the agricultural industry’s national
competitiveness and make wages attractive to local workers. The County would assure packers
received the prevailing two dollar ($13.36 in 2013) area wage and that field workers were paid at
least $1.75 per hour. Tempera estimated a $2,695,810 annual operating cost to subsidize the
wages of 3,890 shed workers and farm hands.55
The Seasonal Farm Labor Commission criticized the plan and Dennison’s intentions.
Even Tempera’s calculations for a one-year operation were meant to show the high costs of such
a program, and he was only willing to implement a test program. Farmers liked the idea of a
local and stable workforce, though they knew in an affluent economy they could not attract local
workers to stoop labor, calling Dennison’s hopes of utilizing Suffolk residents ‘unrealistic.’ But
farmers did not like the ‘wage-subsidy plan’ because it completely altered the labor structure
from piece-work to hourly wages, made farmers wards of the state, and was so costly and
controversial that it could not endure long-term political challenges.56 Farmers also challenged
Dennison’s contention that these migrants were such a grave cost to the County anyway. A 1967
welfare study determined that only nine percent of all of Suffolk’s welfare cases resided in the
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County for less than two years, while over two-thirds lived in the County for five years or longer.
For the 431 short-term (i.e. less than six months) migrants who applied for assistance in 1967,
New York State reimbursed the county for all costs. The Commission also found that migrants
were rarely arrested and private charity or the state absorbed most health care costs.57 The
Commission ended its investigations in May 1968, and the Marketing Association shut down the
local labor idea, blaming Dennison for perpetuating the migrant system with his threats to
‘phase-out’ migrants with public money rather than improve housing, an appropriate function of
government already utilized in urban areas.58
If Dennison’s plan sought to sustain the system with local labor, CAP programs looked to
do the exact opposite: pull migrants away from the farm system and prepare them for Long
Island’s suburban economy, which would in turn force farmers to mechanize and end the migrant
labor system altogether. In no other part of Long Island were CAPs so influential in the local
debate over poverty. Three CAPs formed to provide migrants with alternatives to migrant labor,
the Seasonal Employees in Agriculture (SEA), Community Action Southold Town (CAST) and
the Organization for Community Action (OCA) in East Hampton. While all CAPs provided
conventional War on Poverty services, including psychological counseling, adult education
programs, literacy, day care, and employment assistance, SEA and CAST designed locallyoriented initiatives.59 CAST established a short-lived fish-industry training program, designed to
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at once revive the dying fishing industry in Greenport, Long Island, and to help seasonal workers
supplement their income beyond the planting and harvest season. Twenty men at a time were
trained in marine safety, navigation, wire splicing, and fish preservation.60 The SEA meanwhile
established a self-help housing program. With funding from the Federal Farm Housing
Administration, recipients received a low-interest mortgage to be partly paid off with ‘sweat
equity.’ This would help former migrants develop applicable skills for the suburban economy
while they built their own affordable home. These construction skills were particularly
important because “farms in Suffolk County are giving way to housing developments and those
that remain find mechanization the answer to the greater efficiency and production demanded by
rising real estate values,” both of which would further impoverish migrants. Within a year of its
founding, the program had a woodworking plant, cooperative furniture repair shop, credit union,
grocery store, and day care center. Self-help housing worker James Smith built everything from
the kitchen cabinets and furniture to his roof itself for his $17,000 home in Calverton. He
planned on opening a construction company with the skills he and his eight co-builders
developed.61
Construction skill development was a promising alternative to the migrant system in a
region just beginning to feel the effects of an expanding building boom, especially luxury home
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development in the Hamptons.62 Unfortunately, these programs were expensive to implement
and it was difficult to attract migrants. The Self-Help Housing program included only twenty
families in its initial year of funding at a cost of over $51,000, while CAST trained a similar
number of workers.63 Robert Tormey of the SEA admitted that despite having over 1,600 people
enrolled in training and job programs, the migrant system made retaining the trainees impossible.
Tormey discovered that no matter when they scheduled a program, “no one can show up because
they aren’t finished work yet…they would have more time to learn if they didn’t work. But they
don’t want welfare. They want to work.”64 Migrants and seasonal workers were too dependent
on the migrant system, and these programs either offered uncertain ‘skills’ without jobs, or
stingy projects with too few openings. For those still part of the inter-state migrant system,
permanent residency far from home and family was not an attractive endeavor. Farm laborers
did not take the alternative jobs east end CAPs could offer. Out of 115 migrants placed in jobs
by the SEA in 1966, only ten still held their jobs three years later. The CAPs waged a war to
induce mechanization by removing the migrants from the agricultural workforce, but farmers
would not end the system if a steady supply of laborers remained.65
Between Dennison’s unpopular war on imported poverty and the meager CAP skill
development programs, local anti-poverty measures were inadequate. This was painfully
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obvious to Reverend Arthur C. Bryant, Pastor of St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Greenport and
vice-chairman of the Suffolk County Human Relations Commission. Bryant was one of the first
to demand the creation of the Suffolk County Seasonal Labor Commission in late 1967 to
eliminate the migrant farm labor system. When Dennison offered the wage subsidy, Bryant
condemned it as perpetuating the system and providing the crew chief with ways to suppress
wages, destroying the livable wage the subsidy was intended to provide. Bryant also contended
that the CAPs did not promote worker autonomy, and “only occasionally do we find ways to
help a man escape from the industry.” As Bryant noted, literacy, while a personal and social
good, does not guarantee a job.66 Bryant and the Suffolk Human Relations Commission’s war
on poverty sought to empower migrants. In practice, this meant including migrant laborers in the
1937 New York State Labor Relations Act and extending minimum wage laws to farmworkers.
These legal protections were meaningless without worker activism, and Bryant coordinated with
the UAW to fund an indigenous union, while using Cesar Chavez’s United Farm Worker’s
Organizing Committee to organize an Island-wide strike during the 1969 harvest season. The
union and the strike never came to fruition, and Bryant lamented that migrant workers were “the
most passive group of people I have ever met in my life.”67
Collective action may have been the only means to improve the system, but as Cindy
Hahamovitch argues, labor supply determined everything in the farmworker system, and new
immigrants could undermine any unionization efforts, improved housing, innovative health
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codes, or wage policies.68 Labor organizing or even stabilizing the labor supply would have little
impact if an interstate population could be imported to depress wages and working conditions.
The key to altering this system lay west of Suffolk’s east end, in the rapid suburbanization
process making its way toward the far reaches Long Island’s North and South Forks, which
affected both the landscape and politics of the agricultural region. Suffolk’s population almost
quadrupled from 1950 to 1970, and the construction of the Long Island Expressway, began in
1955, and would reach the two forks by 1972. Planners looked forward to urban development
throughout the East End’s agricultural economy, and Dennison celebrated the end of “those
goddam duck farms occupying priceless waterfront.”69 Speculators gobbled up farms for housing
developments, and Suffolk lost 53,346 farmland acres between 1958 and 1972, cutting potato
production in half. This perpetuated the migrant system because farmers would only invest in
machines if they knew they could farm for years to come. When developers offered $3,000 an
acre for empty land, $10,000 an acre after a nearby land purchase, and nearly $20,000 an acre
after houses went up next door, farmers continued using migrants while awaiting more lucrative
offers. As Bryant himself claimed, “every farmer knows that the time is not too far off when the
most valuable crop he can grow will be houses.”70 This meant housing and working conditions
worsened for a smaller number of migrants as the number of farms dwindled.
Suffolk County preserved the remaining farms in the 1970s as part of a larger open-space
planning initiative designed as a bulwark against ‘sprawl,’ a preservation of Suffolk’s ‘rural’
past, and a means to re-charge the County’s groundwater aquifers. These farms continued to use
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migrant workers, now increasingly imported from Puerto Rico, but jobs disappeared for the
thousands of seasonal workers who relied on the agricultural economy. The old migrant system
that exploited black workers died out, though over time, a new labor stream emerged exploiting
Hispanic workers. Nonetheless, Dennison could claim victory against the war on migrant
poverty as the east end suburbanized. But the migrants who stayed, i.e. ‘ex-migrants,’ while
less likely to be agricultural laborers, nonetheless joined the ranks of the ‘suburban’ poor. The
CAP drive to train the poor for construction jobs looked to the region’s suburban future, though
the programs were too small to have a broad impact.71 Winning the war against poverty in
Suffolk would be fought in its western half, where county government and activists sought to
incorporate the poor into the affluent mainstream rather than regulate a low-wage labor system.

People – Transportation – Jobs
While the shacks that housed migrant workers were the visible markers of poverty in
Suffolk’s east end, if one were to drive around western Suffolk or Nassau County, affluence
abounded. One would pass shimmering office buildings and clean industrial parks along major
roads. A turn onto the endless lanes, drives, and places named after pleasant flowers, fruits, or
trees names revealed Long Island’s multitude of single-family homes. With 471 auto
registrations for every thousand Long Island residents in 1970, the region was indeed a haven for
automobiles. Postwar prosperity and automobile dependence were mutually reinforcing, as new
housing developments catered to a broad middle class who could afford to use the roads tied to
such housing. Beyond this, Long Island’s employment centers were constructed along highways
and large state roads, and over three-fourths of all workers used cars for their commute. Less
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than three percent of commuters relied on the bus system, divided between twenty-one private
companies operating infrequent services and offering no intercompany transfers. The only
significant mass transit option was the Long Island Railroad, though train service went east and
west, used by commuters to reach central business districts in Brooklyn and Manhattan, not for
industrial or office parks in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Long Island’s postwar job market was
essentially tied to the network of mobility predicated on car ownership, a reflection of the high
wages offered in the region.72
Those without a car were part of what Newsday called the “immobile society.” A
resident of the Spinney Hill section of Manhasset would have to ride three buses to get to
Roosevelt Field at a cost of $1.10 and an hour and a half of time. In a car, the trip clocked in at
fifteen minutes. And this was only if one were to ride the bus during rush-hour. Off-hour jobs
were largely out of reach. A Port Washington man had to forgo a night-shift job in Glen Cove
because there was no way to return home on public transportation.73 Carless workers, largely
Long Island’s poor, were limited to local jobs within walking distance or car-pool
accommodations. Carless Long Islanders were also more likely to be jobless. A 1968 poverty
area survey found that car ownership impacted employment prospects. In poverty
neighborhoods where there was less than one car per household, unemployment hovered around
twenty percent. In contrast, poverty neighborhoods with car ownership rates of at least one car
per household had lower unemployment rates, dipping below fifteen percent. In an automobiledependent region, a car opened a whole new world of job opportunity, while living without one
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constrained one’s reliability on the job, the distance you could travel for work, the jobs one could
take, and even one’s knowledge of jobs available.74
This mobility divide between middle class suburbanites and the suburban poor was
central to the ‘poverty amidst plenty’ paradox echoed repeatedly during the 1960s. The physical
divide between ‘ghettoes’ and ‘jobs,’ be it inner city residents and outlying job centers, or
strenuous commutes from one neighborhood or the next, was understood as the key obstacle to
upward mobility. Activists, business owners, and government officials all decried Long Island’s
auto-dependent transportation network for perpetuating poverty and unemployment. Following
Wyandanch’s riots, African American protestors demanded County Executive Dennison build
new bus routes linking their neighborhood to local industrial parks in the hopes of relieving
unemployment.75 Industrial firms also claimed that dependable public transit could fill an
estimated 11,000 unskilled job vacancies across fifty-three industrial parks on Long Island.76
Washington had its own interest in improving transportation options for the poor. Federal aid to
local urban transportation projects began with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,
initially intended for traffic relief. Urban rioting in 1965 transformed public transportation
projects into another front in the war on poverty. The McCone Commission, a response report to
the Watts riots, cited Labor Department research that inadequate transportation deprived innercity residents of decentralized job opportunities. Charles M. Haar, Assistant Secretary of
Metropolitan Development in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
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likewise believed mass transit funding could be a “strategic weapon in the anti-poverty
campaign.” In 1967 HUD granted $2 million to the Tri-State Transportation Commission to test
“the effect of improved public transportation to employment concentrations which are not
located in central business districts” on Long Island.77 HUD money provided the much needed
support to local demands for improved transportation, and HUD could effectively test whether
bus service would ease poverty best in a broadly affluent region. This broader front of the war
on poverty, funded by HUD through a regional transportation commission and administered by
local government, was a war on immobility.
The bus initiative had three phases: a temporary pilot program to a single industrial park,
a research phase to draw links between labor supply and demand, and lastly additional service
development based on the findings. The first three bus routes went from Hempstead,
Massapequa, and Hicksville, all converging on the Plainview Engineer’s Hill Industrial Park, an
employment center straddling the Nassau-Suffolk border along the Long Island Expressway.
The park had 134 businesses employing 9,500 people in 1967, and there were 371 job openings,
including 197 entry-level positions. The Massapequa route served an auto-dependent
community, while the Hicksville route linked a commuter railroad to the industrial park.
Hempstead tied one of Long Island’s target poverty areas to the park, and program coordinators
hoped to decrease the village’s high rate of unemployment. After heavy advertising, the bus
routes attracted consumers, though not the workers Haar and other local officials envisioned.
Only forty-two percent of riders used the bus shuttles for work. Most rode buses to shop
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(35.4%), travel to recreational services (6.1%), or attend personal appointments (6.1%). After
four months, workers began using the buses in greater numbers, though they were not the
formerly unemployed. Out of a total 148 work-related riders, only thirteen from Hempstead,
eight from Massapequa, and nineteen from Hicksville, about a quarter total, found their jobs
thanks to the new bus route.78
As the Commission established new routes, workers increased as a proportion of riders.
In July 1967, two routes connected Bay Shore and Central Islip to three Suffolk County
Industrial Parks (Perez, Cardinal, and Vanderbilt) as well as the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center.
Eleven routes were added from 1968 through June 1969, and the bus system became a fullfledged anti-poverty program, as the Tri-State Transportation Commission allied with the Nassau
and Suffolk EOCs to connect poverty areas in Glen Cove, Rockville Centre, Long Beach,
Wyandanch, North Amityville, Inwood, Central Islip, Oyster Bay, and even Jamaica, Queens to
employment, educational, and health care centers across Long Island. The Suffolk EOC
promoted the program with mobile ad campaigns, blaring music and announcements that buses
“can help you to secure a job or transportation to a job.” After two years of operation, bus use
for work purposes rose to seventy-two percent of all riders, and nearly forty-two percent claimed
they relied on the bus system to get to work, while a third procured their jobs through the bus
system itself.79
Higher employee usage obscured the reality that most of these new bus routes were not
attracting riders. A route between the Grumman plant, Hicksville industrial parks, and the
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poverty areas of Glen Cove had on average six riders per work-day. Newsday reported that
“everybody knows everybody” on the bus, and riders kept one another company, though the
route “isn’t exactly winning the war on poverty” and was ended after a year in operation.80 This
was the reality for most poverty routes. Between 1967 and 1970, the Tri-State Transportation
Commission, working with the two Long Island EOCs, contracted with eleven different carriers
to develop twenty-two routes, though thirteen were terminated due to inadequate patronage and
only seven routes continued after the project ended in 1970.81 The Tri-State Transportation
Commission Executive Director Douglas Carroll Jr. admitted, “I doubt if [the bus program] is
making any improvement in the unemployment problem.” He was right; Long Island’s poor did
not utilize these routes despite heavy promotion. Glen Cove NAACP President James Davis
blamed the low turnout on “basic distrust of government programs and promises,” while affluent
residents of Rockville Centre protested the bus running through their neighborhood as a “waste
of money” since “there just aren’t any jobs to transport people to.”82
Jobs did exist in these industrial parks, and workers did not avoid the programs because
of any general ‘distrust’, the problem was the value of the jobs at the end of the line. From the
outset, anti-poverty activists protested the kinds of jobs offered at Plainview’s Engineer’s Hill.
Nassau EOC manpower utilization coordinator Richard Ford doubted that low-income workers
would make the $1.10 roundtrip bus ride to work for $1.50 an hour. Ford understood that “they
can get that kind of poverty pay in their own neighborhoods.” The Tri-State Transportation
Commission itself concluded that despite claims that transportation ‘handcuffed’ the poor, it was
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low pay, day-care needs, and other factors that withheld workers from procuring employment.
They were not simply “ready and able to work if they could solve only their transportation
problems” as the Commission originally claimed.83 Furthermore, while the program
conceptualized the problem as one of distance between people and employment “centers,”
neither the poor nor the jobs were concentrated enough to benefit from mass transit solutions,
and jobs did not necessarily exist far from these poverty ‘pockets.’ In a 1968 survey of unskilled
job openings Island-wide, the village of Hempstead, with its large poverty ‘pocket,’ had nearly
double the amount of openings in comparison to any other hamlet, meaning long-distance was
not a single deterrent. Only a quarter of Long Island’s poor lived in the poverty pockets (though
a much larger percentage of Long Island’s minority poor resided there), and industrial parks
were dispersed across the Island, making the “traditional, large-vehicle, fixed-route, scheduled
bus transport unfeasible both in terms of service and economy for many areas.” Linking targeted
neighborhoods with limited industrial parks produced few job opportunities. Ultimately, the bus
program on Long Island came to the same conclusions as those involved in the Watts project,
that “bus services are not by themselves creating jobs and that there will be no potential for
movement until there is a demand for the available skills and a willingness to hire.”84
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The bus program attempted the most direct means of improving employment prospects
for Long Island’s poor: literally bridging the gap between poverty neighborhoods and job
centers. The problem at the center of higher unemployment and under-employment was not
access to jobs and mobility, but jobs themselves. Widespread affluence undergirded the
suburban transportation system, and jobs at the parks were either low-paying, or too advanced
for entry-level unskilled workers. Therefore, low-wage jobs, even if they were more accessible,
did not reduce the poverty problem. In fact, linking workers to jobs would take care of itself if
workers could gain permanent, well-paying jobs to support an automobile, as the Tri-State
Transportation Commission learned by 1971. Their report admitted that “if the jobs pay decent
wages, people will invariably find a way to get to work” and “will purchase an automobile as
soon as possible, thus eliminating the need to ride the buses.”85 No anti-poverty measure proved
more idealistic than this bus program, since the initiative, from Washington to the county EOCs,
assumed Long Island’s affluence and its ability to absorb all if only they had the mobility.
Poverty could then be eradicated with shuttles that traversed space and opened the ‘ghetto’ to
middle-class suburbia. But shaping the commutation links between labor supply and demand
proved a losing battle, and the war would be fought in the procurement of living-wage jobs, not
the buses to get there.

Matching Jobs with the Jobless
While only the staunchest idealists considered transportation the silver bullet to solving
poverty, the belief that Long Island’s prosperity could absorb the poor remained central to the
local war on poverty, and no effort reflected the assumption of affluence more than job training
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and placement programs. As Margaret Weir argues, the architects of the War on Poverty at the
federal level directed labor market policy toward “changing the characteristics of workers,” i.e.
improving labor supply so that the poor could take advantage of the growth unleashed from
macroeconomic tax cuts.86 A litany of programs and agencies at the local level, funded through
the Economic Opportunity Act and local government revenues, directed by social workers, civil
rights activists, and government bureaucrats, followed the federal lead. If the economy was
prosperous, then the suburbs, the postwar poster-child of prosperity, had plentiful work. With a
little skill development, a deeper knowledge of the local job market, and a few hiring pledges
from local employers, the problem of poverty could be solved on Long Island, making it an
example for the nation.
Manpower policy on Long Island preceded the poverty war. During the aerospace
industry’s upheaval in the early 1960s, Nassau County Executive Eugene Nickerson utilized the
Manpower and Development Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 to help displaced aerospace workers
with educational and training needs.87 Once the War on Poverty got underway in 1965 and 1966,
the focus of manpower efforts on Long Island switched from the skilled to the most vulnerable
on the Island, and black Long Islanders in particular. A bevy of programs appeared across the
Island, funded locally and through federal anti-poverty programs. Job Corps operated out of
Hempstead, while the two county Economic Opportunity Commissions organized federal
manpower efforts, from remedial training to job placement. The U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare implemented the Work Experience Program, a welfare-to-work

86

Weir, 67-68.
“A Record of Nassau County Government, Jan. 1962 – Sept. 1964,” Box 58, folder “Co Exec –Status Reports” [3
of 3], Nickerson Papers.
87

280
initiative.88 Local organizations complemented these efforts. In 1964, the Patchogue NAACP in
eastern Long Island established Help Educate for Labor Placement (HELP) to counsel and place
low-income and minority group members into jobs. CORE followed suit with similar programs
in Wyandanch, Huntington, and Southold, all in Suffolk County.89
Nevertheless, the Human Relations Commissions criticized the programs for neglecting
the minority poor. Farrell Jones, chairman of the Nassau County Human Rights Commission,
complained that the MDTA and the Economic Opportunity Act programs were “not reaching the
people [they were] designed for because [they were] geared to those who have some basic skill
and thus can utilize training.”90 The Suffolk Human Relations Commission found that locallyorganized programs were not targeting minorities either. They were useful as counseling
centers, but too small to make a serious dent in the employment problem, and the Commission
felt only a county-wide effort could secure enough funding to provide real job opportunities.91 In
response, each Commission established their own minority-focused training and referral
programs. The Nassau Human Rights Commission established the Job Development Center
(henceforth Nassau JDC) in 1964. The Commission dealt in a wide variety of racial issues, from
fair housing to discrimination complaints and equal employment opportunity in county contracts,
but it devoted over half of its county-funded budget to the Nassau JDC alone.92 The Nassau JDC

88

“Guide to Public Manpower Programs Nationwide,” p. 3-22, Box 66, folder “Economic Opportunity
Commission” [2 of 2], Nickerson Papers.
89
“Application for Refunding Community Action Project – Job Counseling and Development Project,” June 1,
1968, p. 3, Box 1, folder 1, Burghardt Turner Collection; Patchogue NAACP Labor….pdf, “Patchogue Branch
NAACP Labor and Industry Committee,” February 5, 1964, Box 2, folder “NAACP,” Edith Gordon Papers;
“Patchogue Branch NAACP Labor and Industry Committee,” February 27, 1964, Box 2, folder “NAACP,” Edith
Gordon Papers.
90
Minutes of Workshop Program on Employment, County Executive Conference on Poverty, October 1, 1964, p. 3,
Box 58, folder “Poverty Program – Conference,” Nickerson Papers.
91
“The People Industry Needs are in Nassau,” Commerce and Industry News 3, no. 1 (October 1968): p. 5, Box 65,
folder “Commerce & Industry,” Nickerson Papers.
92
“Rights Groups: One Aim, Two Systems,” April 28, 1970, Box 1, folder 5, Burghardt Turner Collection.

281
began as a referral and consulting service for other federal and local programs, but by 1967, the
Nassau JDC funded its own job training center to develop work-related skills and directly refer
the unemployed to jobs. The Nassau JDC secured jobs in Long Island’s growth sectors, including
public utilities, clerical work, food service, and auto body repair. In addition, eighty-five percent
of its clients were African American.93 The Suffolk County Human Relations Commission
turned to federal funding for its jobs program, the Job Counseling and Development Program
(hereafter Suffolk JCDP). The Suffolk JCDP inserted itself into the CAPs across Suffolk in 1966
in order to reach out to the county’s poor and “improve their aspirations and self-confidence, and
place them in gainful and satisfying employment.” Like the Nassau program, Sixty-five percent
of all Suffolk JCDP clients were black.94
Between federal, county, and local programs, job and training placement had impressive
results on Long Island. Historians have rightly criticized the War on Poverty’s poor economic
foundation, but when funding was used effectively, as Guian McKee illustrates in Philadelphia,
these programs could procure jobs.95 Unfortunately, an accurate assessment of Long Island’s
programs is difficult since job placement records are inconsistent. Regardless, data from Nassau
JDC records reveal that the commission placed over 7,066 people through 1968.96 The Suffolk
JDCP measured its ratio of applicants to placements, and forty-three percent of all who came
through their doors, 3,517 of 8,114 applicants, were placed into jobs or training programs from
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Table 5.1: Nassau EOC Monthly Manpower Placement Record, December 1967
Employment Sector
Job Placement
Training Placement
Manufacturing – General
21
14
Aerospace Manufacturing
5
Electronics Assembly
4
6
Utilities
8
1
Retail
19
6
Clerical
5
11
Health Care
19
4
Maintenance Services
18
3
Civil Service
3
8
Total
102
53
Source: Includes calculations from six of the ten Nassau Economic Opportunity Councils, including Roosevelt,
the Five Towns, Freeport, Hempstead, Rockville Centre, and Long Beach. See Economic Opportunity
Commission of Nassau County, Manpower Division, “Monthly Manpower Placement Record, December 1967,”
Box 68, folder “Jobs,” Nickerson Papers.

its inception in August 1966 through 1968.97 The Nassau EOC kept the most substantial records,
and in 1967, the various CAPs across the county secured around 1,300 jobs and 600 training
program placements.98 The local programs claimed at least 10,000 jobs by 1968. But we have
little data on the kinds of jobs offered or the length of time workers remained employed at them.
A one month sampling from five Nassau CAPs that did, shows jobs across the occupational
spectrum (see Table 5.1), and nearly seventy-two percent of these jobs were above “poverty
level” wages in December 1967.99 An MDTA job training and placement survey from October
1968 tells a different story, with some success in Long Island’s growth sectors, including nursing
and manufacturing, but high dropout or unemployment rates in both high-skilled jobs (like
electronic technicians and stenographers) and low-wage service work (including waiting and
food service preparation) (Table 5.2). The high dropout/unemployment rates in most categories
(nursing and manufacturing excepted) reflect the challenge of breaching the labor market divide
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in the late 1960s. Low-wage jobs were of little interest to the un- and under-employed, while
significant skill training was necessary to land high-wage jobs. The former required improving
wages or altering the labor market itself, the latter demanded significant investment in education
and training.
Aware of the low-wages offered, program leaders openly protested the futility of their job
placements despite the numerical victories. Long Island’s unemployment rate was relatively
low; Nassau’s rate hovered around 3.3 percent, while Suffolk’s did exhibit some slack at 5.7
percent in 1967. The Island did have an underemployment problem however.100 Two-thirds of
all the people serviced in Nassau’s CAPs found jobs that did not pay enough to raise them out of
poverty. The EOC could offer them plenty of work opportunities, but this only provided
horizontal mobility, not upward vertical mobility.101 Frustrated CAP aide John Gilliard of
Westbury remarked that “when I say to the people I’ve got a job for them for $1.70 an hour, they
look at me like I’m crazy. Some of them figure they can go out on the street and hustle or write
numbers and make a better living.” He minimized the transportation problem, stating that “if a
man can make $100 or more a week, he’ll get to the job if he has to walk.”102 Those who had
minimum wage work chose to stay rather than risk an unfamiliar job, even if it had promotion
opportunities.103 As one job seeker noted:
“Everybody that I hang around with has looked for work at one time or
another…and when they do get jobs they find jobs washing dishes and sweeping
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floors and all like that. And for the salaries they pay you to do that kind of work,
it’s not worth it anyway.”104
For those who utilized the programs, disillusionment set in after the initial consultation. Edwin
Dove, a Westbury resident and former porter, hoped to take advantage of the War on Poverty to
climb out of twenty-five years of low-paying and insecure work. He had worked for the WPA
during the Depression, joined the Army during World War II, and held odd jobs at food shops or
in elderly homes after the war. His family ran into debt, and while his wife managed to pull in
fifty-two dollars per week from a job as a packer and labeler in a nearby factory, the wages
barely covered their $120 monthly rent and other bills. He walked into the Westbury
Community Council office, part of the Nassau EOC in 1967, looking for better opportunities
than the former porter job he left. Despite several leads and interviews, the offers were either
trainee positions, which he thought was “a good way for someone to get cheap labor,” or poorlypaid positions, which led to him question whether he should just “give my labor away.”105
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Table 5.2: Nassau-Suffolk M.D.T.A. Placement Record, October 25, 1968 by
Occupational Grouping
Enrollment
Dropout
Employed Unemployed
rate (%)
(%)
Auto body Repair
323
21
179
30
Auto Mechanic
343
27
147
41
Baker
31
39
14
26
Cashier
11
0
8
27
Clerk Typist
79
11
45
36
Counterman
10
20
2
75
Drafting
93
23
58
19
Electric Meter Repair
22
45
0
100
Electronic Technician
23
48
3
75
Electronics Assembler
44
18
25
31
Food Service Preparation
30
33
0
100
Gas Engine Repair
22
41
4
69
Household Appliance Repair
138
16
87
25
Job Setter
35
26
17
35
Keypunch Operator
24
4
8
65
Licensed Practical Nurse
654
33
378
13
Litho Duplicating Operator
56
30
26
33
Machine Operator General
66
20
39
26
Nurse Aid
434
15
248
33
Office Machine Service
48
31
14
58
Oil Burner Installer
141
5
96
28
Oil Burner Repairman
26
19
11
48
Plumber
43
33
7
76
Plumber, Maintenance
33
21
15
42
Power Sewing
20
20
15
6
Production Machine Operator
74
23
39
32
Refrigeration Mechanic
55
27
19
53
Sales Clerk
13
23
6
40
Sales Person, General
14
0
7
50
Service Station Attendant
21
29
6
60
Service Station Mechanic
36
36
8
65
Sheet Metal Fabricator
69
29
37
24
Short Order Cook
50
16
27
36
Stenographer
104
77
58
44
TV Service and Repairman
44
32
25
17
Typist
204
28
78
47
Waiter/Waitress
35
20
10
64
Source: Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Llewelyn-Davies Weeks, Forestier-Walker & Bor,
Poverty in Spread City: A Study of Constraints on the Poor in Nassau County (August 1969), 23.
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The long-term unemployed who avoided these programs alarmed government officials
committed to reducing welfare rolls. Year after year during the War on Poverty, county budgets
hit record highs, primarily because of rising welfare costs.106 A 1968 study determined that a
woman with three children lived better on welfare unless she earned at least $2.04 per hour on
Long Island. Nassau Executive Nickerson condemned the minimum wage jobs offered to
program recipients since they “can’t get people off welfare or out of poverty…especially if the
job isn’t the beginning of something more.” As Nickerson faced mounting political pressures by
1968, he declared business must do more than “create low-paying, dead-end jobs which again
appears to be all they are now willing to do.”107 It was a reality even his Republican opponents
realized. Hempstead Town Supervisor Francis T. Purcell argued that the $1.60 minimum wage
did not make ends meet in high-cost Long Island, and private employers along with government
must “upgrade these wages” to match the publicly-subsidized trained workforce coming out of
job training programs.108
Higher-paying work existed, and firms complained there was a massive labor shortage
across the Island. In 1967, it was estimated that job openings outnumbered the unemployed by
14,000. The shortage existed in high-skill jobs though, not unskilled work. A 1969 survey
determined that less than four percent of day laborer and eighteen percent of domestic positions
were open for thirty or more days. On the opposite end, over half of machinist, fifty-five percent
of electronic assembly, and nearly eighty percent of metal assembly positions remained unfilled
for more than a month. Electronics, manufacturing, and service dominated the New York State
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Employment Service’s job vacancy listings, and the New York State Labor Department could
not fill nearly two-thirds of their job listings because applicants lacked the requisite skills.109
Howard J. Gresens, personnel manager at Cutler-Hammer’s Airborne Instruments Laboratory in
Deer Park admitted that “most of the job openings on Long Island are for skilled help, some of
them for the highly skilled, and most of the unemployed are unskilled.”110 The War on Poverty
was meant to solve this exact problem, to upgrade skills so that applicants could qualify for these
better-paying positions, but firms did not trust or need the public training programs. Defense
industries had internal skill development programs, and many found the workers graduating from
these training programs inadequate. A canvass of eighty-three Nassau County employers
revealed that over three-quarters had negative experiences with public job development
programs on Long Island, overwhelmingly because the agencies did not supply workers with
appropriate skills. Only fifteen of the Nassau employers made use of public jobs programs.111
The two explanations for intransigent un- and under-employment, low-wages on one side
and lack-of-skills on the other, were in direct conflict. Nassau Human Rights Commission head
Farrell Jones condemned the out-of-touch employment qualifications as “unrealistic,” an excuse
to keep wages low and bar low-income minority workers from the affluent workforce. He cited
World War II, when Long Island industry “took men and women of every type and every
mentality – and they turned them into productive workers. That's the key word – productive.
These people can produce, but industry has to give something to get something; it must train and
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offer opportunities.” The problem as he saw it was that “blacks will no longer accept positions
from which there is no escape” and that “no matter what the job is, it must pay a wage a man can
live on.” The rest of the County administration agreed. Thomas F. Greene, Commerce &
Industry chairman, called the cries of businessmen “nonsense…the people are there, and they
want to work-but they also want to be treated like human beings.”112 Nickerson meanwhile
appealed to business to improve wages and opportunity in Nassau’s official business newsletter,
Commerce & Industry News, in October 1968. In a direct letter, Nickerson declared that “we
must invoke a new spirit of cooperation between private enterprise and public programs,” and
that while government must play a key role, so too must business, because
in far too many instances, industry allots jobs and often fails to fill them. And a
minimum wage is not sufficient for a family to subsist in the New York
metropolitan area. So when we talk about creating jobs, or of assisting the
disadvantaged, let’s act realistically-and responsibly…those few extra cents an
hour, and the opportunity for advancement, foster self-respect, improve abilities,
and make it possible for an employee to absorb the expenses of working.
He concluded by declaring it was in business’ own self-interest “that welfare rolls be reduced,
the tax share be spread more evenly, and the economy be strengthened.”113
Both government and private firms doubled down on efforts to employ the poor after
1968. Grumman initiated a National Association of Businessmen (NAB) affiliated training
program in August 1968, a national program to provide on-the-job training which would develop
skills relevant to aerospace work.114 Limited to unemployed minorities, teens, older workers, the
handicapped, and welfare recipients, the NAB program recruited from the existing job programs
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and welfare services in Nassau and Suffolk counties. Recruits were then put through a gauntlet
of training, including psychological counseling, habit and motivation courses, money
management, and high-school equivalency programs. After passing these requirements, workers
gained experience in on-the-job training sessions lasting up to four months. Federal funding
subsidized support services from medical and child care to transportation. By February 1969,
they had 165 positions ready for OJT recruits.115
Local government likewise pursued a more comprehensive approach to their job
programs. The Nassau JDC and Nassau County government combined all of the county’s
existing anti-poverty resources in an effort to move the “the disadvantaged upward and away
from dependence on government agencies for financial support.”116 Dubbed by Nickerson the
‘Cooperative Center’ in 1968, they were a County-run social service program providing every
possible means of assistance to tackle the structural unemployment problem, including day-care,
a car service, mental and physical health aid, skills training, and income support. Residents
would no longer navigate the multitude of employment and welfare services across Nassau
County. A client met with a counselor who coordinated all the support services necessary as the
client searched for employment. The idea was to “to remedy the conditions which prevent men
and women from enjoying the dignity and material benefits of employment,” and while it
resembled previous attempts to combat poverty, Nickerson claimed this to be the first of its kind
in the nation.117 The innovative rhetoric was at least partly a response to Republican attacks on
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the duplication of services between federal, state, and county programs, but it was unique in that
it recognized both the material obstacles to skill acquisition and the limits of the existing War on
Poverty apparatus.118 For Nickerson, the singular purpose was to remove all “barriers to a better
life,” be they family obligations, poverty, health problems, or emotional issues.119
The Suffolk JDCP established a similar program, where a coordinator helped an applicant
with supportive services, from Medicaid, family planning, and Head Start, to training and
transportation assistance. The coordinator then referred the applicant to an employer, and after
acquiring a job, remained in contact with both the applicant and the employer to assure the
transition remained smooth. Unlike the Nassau program, the Suffolk JCDP focused on living
wages and actively pursued employers who could either offer $2.00 per hour and/or upward
mobility within the firm.120 They established their own US Labor Department-funded On-theJob Training program in 1967 so their applicants could develop skills and advance into highskilled positions. The median wage began at $1.98 per hour, rising to an average $2.10 (though
high wage jobs included $4.50) within six months, and within its first year and a half of
operation, the Suffolk JDCP placed 267 people into the program.121 The JCDP also took
accurate measurements of the wages offered. From January to April 1969, 493 placements
averaged a $2.31 hourly wage, ranging from $1.60 to $3.12, illustrating Suffolk’s commitment to
a living wage.122

118

“Purcell Blasts Poverty ‘Boondoggle,” Newsday, March 16, 1967, 11.
“Pilot Centers to Coordinate Unemployment Efforts” Commerce and Industry News 3, no. 1 (October 1968): 1,
Box 65, folder “Commerce & Industry,” Nickerson Papers.
120
“Job Counseling and Development Program, Summary: Job Program,” Box 11, folder “Suffolk County Human
Rights Commission,” SCC; “CAP 81 “E” Year,” p. 4, Box 1, folder 2, Burghardt Turner Collection.
121
Application for Refunding Community Action Project – Job Counseling and Development Project,” June 1,
1968, p. 10-11, Box 1, folder 1, Burghardt Turner Collection.
122
Job Counseling and Development Program Office Reports, January-April 1969, Box 1, folder 3, Burghardt
Turner Collection.
119

291
Despite these renewed efforts, both the private and public programs did not unravel the
“paradox of unemployment” alongside “unfilled jobs” as a 1969 business report put it.123 The
Suffolk JDCP’s search for voluntary hiring commitments from Long Island firms failed as
companies refused to recruit from public programs. Companies like Linear Electronics
Laboratory, developer of communications equipment for the Apollo Missions, remarked that
“our requirements always lie in a somewhat technical area and you have had very little success in
matching candidates to our job openings.”124 An electrical manufacturer claimed that the JDCP
offered no clients “with the experience requirements needed for our medium-size
organization.”125 Even companies who utilized the program’s prospective employees, like
Fairchild Republic, could not place these workers into skilled or semi-skilled positions, leaving
them in low-wage service positions.126 Private efforts to employ the poor, like Grumman’s NAB
program, likewise ended in disappointment.

Grumman retained one hundred of its 270 trainees

by February 1970, and program administrators realized that the program did not serve the needs
of the company, since they were cutting jobs and
skill needs vary constantly; today we need riveters or clerk-typists, tomorrow spray
painters or industrial truck operators, and the following day welders or machine
operators; so you recruit for a specific open job, not for a job that might be open in
the indefinite future.127
The problems encountered through these efforts revealed that there was no ‘paradox,’ that the
inability to employ all Long Islanders was intrinsic to the structure of the region’s “affluent”
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labor market in the late 1960s. Defense contracts still flowing to Nassau and Suffolk counties
subsidized technical employment and had multiplier effects on the services they used. Whitecollar employment was expanding, though these jobs had a divide as well, either benefitting
workers with advanced education or paying too little to provide primary earners with living
wages. The growth of white collar and technical employment gave the appearance of affluence
and influenced the direction of Long Island’s job programs and the entire War on Poverty. But
any boot camp that reshaped the unemployed and relied on the private market to hire them
required more than behavior modification and a few weeks or months of training. The failure of
these programs was written into their design, since all were based on the assumption that the
unemployed could be absorbed into Long Island’s labor market. In reality, workers were
precluded from the job market because of the structure of the economy, where manufacturing
was no longer the mass employer and no clear alternative existed to sustain wages for workingclass suburban living.

Guaranteed Employment
After five years, Long Island’s War on Poverty did not produce the kind of results the bicounty region’s affluence envisaged. Families living in poverty declined from more than 36,000
in 1966 to just over 25,000 by 1970, but improved social services accounted for the drop in
poverty, undermining both administrations’ goal of putting their respective welfare departments
out of business.128 ‘Tax-eaters’ consumed $63 million of Nassau’s revenue in 1968 as the
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welfare population grew over 133 percent from 1962-1967, a greater increase than any other
jurisdiction in the metropolitan area, New York City included. In 1968, Nassau ran its first
deficit in history thanks to a thirteen million-dollar hole in the Department of Social Services.
Suffolk posted a similar 130 percent increase in the welfare population, and by the early 1970s,
welfare accounted for nearly half of the county budget. Long Island’s welfare recipient
population was only a small fraction of New York City’s, and an aging population was partly
responsible for this increase, as was Suffolk’s population growth. But a 1969 county analysis of
Nassau welfare recipients determined that illness, loss of employment or reduction in other
means of support accounted for three-quarters of cases, and these cases could be resolved with
stable, well-paying jobs. The under-employed still required income maintenance to survive, and
the responsibility fell on the counties to carry that burden.129
Nassau and Suffolk’s jobs problem (and the related welfare problem) was a microcosm of
the broader failures of the federal War on Poverty. With unemployment among disadvantaged
groups holding steady, academics and politicians questioned whether the private economy could
absorb the unemployed. The Labor Department had been advocating for a public jobs program
since the outset of the poverty war, and Congressional Democrats attempted two employment
acts in 1967, including the Guaranteed Employment Act, though Johnson killed both in favor of
‘voluntary’ employment programs.130 Public service employment nonetheless gained traction in
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the late 1960s and early 1970s as a means to bridge the gap in what economists Michael Piore
and Peter Doeringer dubbed the ‘dual labor market,’ the divide between low-wage dead-end jobs
and well-compensated work that straightforward training could not breach.131 Welfare policy
likewise went in new directions as guaranteed income schemes became popular among
conservatives, leftists, and libertarians, each with different stakes in redistributing income to
provide basic subsistence without a work requirement.132 By the late 1960s, the general
conversation (among reformers at least) shifted toward a realization that the private labor market
was not a source for economic security, and that the state would have to do more than train,
modify behavior, create jobs, or provide support services. But policy to reflect this realization
remained mired in debate on the national stage from the late 1960s and into the early 1970s.
Guaranteed income never came to fruition, and limited job programs, first as part of the
Emergency Employment Act of 1971, and later as part of the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act of 1973 failed to meet the hopes of public employment advocates.
Luckily, Long Island policymakers did not have to wait for Congress. Nixon reorganized
the Office of Economic Opportunity to “serve as a laboratory for experimental programs” as
Nixon’s appointed OEO head Donald Rumsfeld put it. While Rumsfeld deprived radical groups
of OEO money, he simultaneously provided an opening for innovative projects.133 Nickerson
had drawn up plans for a large-scale county-wide jobs program in 1968, and a year later he allied
with the New York University affiliated New Careers Development Center to develop a service-
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oriented public jobs program.134 The program was based on an employment opportunity concept
known as “New Careers,” first devised by sociologist Frank Riessman and educator Arthur Pearl
in 1965. ‘New Careers’ claimed that millions of entry-level positions could be created in the
automation-proof human services field, requiring no prior training while offering long-term
career advancement if private enterprise and public institutions implemented a Fordist-scheme of
de-skilling professional positions. Doctors, teachers, social workers, and other professionals had
a multitude of daily tasks that could be done more efficiently by aides, inspectors, or general
assistants – from feeding children at schools to clerical work or recording patient vital statistics.
These jobs, requiring little to no formal preparation, nonetheless provided on-the-job experience,
and with built-in credentialing, they could lead to advancements and pay raises, so that the
teacher’s aide could become a tutor, then a teacher, or a home health aide could become a nurse
or social worker. For the state, this eliminated both the costly “secondary educational system” of
federal training programs and welfare payments. For workers, this ended the dead-end nature of
low-wage jobs. Professionals also benefitted, since they could handle the more complex aspects
of their job and meet the rapidly expanding needs in health care, education, and social
services.135
New Careers was a flexible concept, and found support in Congress from Senator Robert
F. Kennedy, who secured $70 million for New Careers in the 1966 Economic Opportunity Act
changes. It was also similar to the broader push for public service employment at the federal
level in 1969 and 1970, a concept that sought to expand the quality of local public services while
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providing jobs to the unemployed.136 Beyond federal legislation, Riessman’s New Careers
Development Center pushed municipal governments, hospitals, and unions to implement career
ladders, explicit credentialing, and outreach to the unemployed.137 For Riessman, associated
with Richard Cloward, Frances Fox Piven, and the anti-poverty movement in New York
generally, the program had radical implications. In the post-industrial economy, the service
worker was the new working class, and ‘New Careers’ would empower this class without
redistributing power or wealth from one class to another, instead expanding power to both those
at the top (professionals), and the sub- or para-professional. As the poor found jobs and power,
Riessman contended that society would no longer need to maintain a ‘permanent poor,’ and these
workers could now organize into hybrid union/professional associations linked to the New
Careers concept.138 Debates emerged among radicals over the consequences of such a program
as well as its potential to transform the nation. Other America author Michael Harrington lent
his strong support in the hopes that this would lead to a new union movement, but others like
Frances Fox Piven believed the existing political system would not pass such a program, and she
continued to push to overload the existing welfare system.139
Nassau County executive Eugene Nickerson was more interested in the practicality of
New Careers rather than its radical potential. Such a program could win the war on poverty by
breaching the Long Island’s labor market divide and shifting the poor from welfare to
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participants in the region’s economy. If federally funded, Nickerson could also expand public
service provision without tax increases. In June 1969, Nickerson established the county Office
of Manpower Development, headed by labor economist and former textile union organizer
Elwood Taub, who in cooperation with the New Careers Development Corporation filed for an
OEO grant to design what was considered “the nation’s first guaranteed employment
program.”140 The program proposal was an evolution of the County’s Cooperative Centers.
Welfare applicants were treated as job seekers first, and would have the option of receiving
immediate supportive services (day care, income assistance, Medicaid, etc.) while the office
coordinated a job with advancement opportunities. The manpower office had to find cooperative
private employers who would design career ladders, but if they could not find a job within the
private sector, the government served as the “employer of last resort.” The job guarantee was
the major innovation, so that “any individual who is willing to work ought to be able to work.”
In a suburban county with high cost human services, public tasks could be subdivided, training
could be built in, and jobs could be created.141
The Nickerson administration contended that the job guarantee would solve many of
Nassau’s poverty problems, above all the soaring welfare costs strangling local government.
Aside from a three percent sales tax, property taxes were the only form of county revenue and
had reached “confiscatory” limits, according to the administration. The program would reduce
the welfare rolls by a fifth and turn the rehabilitated into ‘taxpayers’ with career prospects and
higher incomes in the future. It would allow the County to meet service demands, particularly
for the growing elderly population without burdening taxpayers. Nickerson also understood the
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political value of replacing the welfare system with guaranteed jobs, reassuring taxpayers their
“hard-earned dollars are not perpetuating someone’s laziness,” and instead going toward a
valued public service. Furthermore, public service employment fit squarely within Nickerson’s
‘custodial’ state, both as an efficient means to provide services as well as guarantee the welfare
of county residents. The Nickerson administration’s support for guaranteed employment also
reflected a broader realization: that the suburban economy, understood as the affluent model of
the postwar 1960s, did not have unbridled opportunity for everyone, if only they had the skills,
motivation, or proper knowledge of the labor market. Suburbia, like the nation itself, had its
share of low-wage jobs that mired people in poverty and placed them on the welfare rolls. A war
on poverty, whether suburban or otherwise, required interventions in both the supply and
demand side of the labor market. The guaranteed employment proposal recognized that “there
are persons who are unemployed or underemployed who cannot be placed in the private
economy,” that Long Island’s labor market had a deep divide, and that despite relative full
employment, there were those who “do not show up in the very low insured unemployment
statistic published and revised monthly,” and instead in other data, from welfare loads to poverty
surveys.142 Direct job creation was necessary to reach full employment and raise the minimum
wage private employers offered.
The guaranteed employment proposal found a receptive audience in Nassau County. At a
public hearing on October 14, 1969, anti-poverty activists and residents expressed overwhelming
support for the idea in a five-hour session. Emma Morning, Nassau Welfare-Tenants
Coordinating Committee chairperson, endorsed the program because “it’s about time that people
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realize that everybody on welfare isn’t there because they are lazy and shiftless.” Newsday
journalist Martin L. Gross praised the plan as a step toward removing citizens from the
“generation-to-generation dole,” and likened it to New Deal work relief programs.143 Nickerson
intended the program for all county residents, publicly employing the recently laid off and
returning Vietnam veterans if private employment could not be found, keeping them out of the
unemployment offices and off the welfare rolls. Nickerson believed that the program was so
popular that he could use it as a political weapon against his Republican opponents, who had to
publicly support the program, and if they didn’t, could be linked to Nixon’s “failed anti-inflation
measures.”144
For all the promise the proposal held, securing funding proved problematic. After an
initial $37,000 OEO research grant, Nickerson finally submitted a full plan in late 1969, though
Manpower director Elwood Taub warned that it would be “an expensive program” and that while
it would ultimately pay for itself, “society must first make the investment.”145 It turned out
society, or at least the bureaucratic representation of society known as the OEO, was unwilling to
invest. The OEO demanded a narrower demonstration project, and Nassau responded with a
pared down proposal covering only 450 volunteers. In April 1970, the OEO rejected the
demonstration project, claiming it could not generate data for “expanded implementation,”
because from a national perspective, Nassau County’s poverty problems were less severe than
most areas, and “a program that is successful in reducing poverty in Nassau would not be
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necessarily successful elsewhere.”146 The OEO, while open to experimentation, wanted largerscale results that could be emulated nation-wide. Nassau’s ‘affluence’ disqualified the county as
a laboratory for experimentation. Later that spring, the County received a much smaller
$400,000 grant to restructure their civil service system and employ 120 unemployed or
underemployed residents into para-professional and blue-collar career ladders.147

Conclusion
The loss of OEO funding spelled the end of the local war on poverty, at least in the way it
was conceived in the 1960s. As the federal purse-strings tightened, the experimentation ceased.
County Executive Eugene Nickerson, who at the War on Poverty’s outset claimed Nassau
County as the litmus test for the national project itself, limped through his final year in office in
1970, failing to mount his third run for state governor, facing allegations that his party received
campaign contributions from architects and engineers in exchange for contracts, and continuing
to run up the county debt.148 The Democrats then lost the county executive seat in November,
the only major county position they held, and Nickerson’s successor, Republican Ralph Caso, reshuffled county government. He appointed a university dean to the Social Service Department,
and wanted something done about the illegitimate children born to women on welfare.149 In
Suffolk, Dennison turned on the Suffolk County Human Relations Commission, firing its
chairman George Pettengill in 1969 for favoring “low income ghetto groups” and therefore
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failing to improve total human relations in Suffolk County, a goal which required working with
both minorities and the “great “silent majority.” The termination became mired in court, and not
until June 1970 did the two sides settle on Pettengill’s resignation.150 With the SCHRC
sidelined, Dennison finished out his third term emphasizing his usual brick-and-mortar solutions
to poverty, namely better housing and a welfare department overhaul. In June 1971, he stepped
down, paving the way for a Republican capture of the County Executive office in 1972.151
After six years and over fifty million dollars, what did Long Island’s poverty war
accomplish? Former Nassau EOC director Donald Middleton lamented that his commission only
“sponsored the kinds of programs which could…merely create a new form of welfare
colonialism….that is, through simple services, these programs could turn served people into kept
people.”152 His diagnosis mirrored that of the war on poverty in general. If judged by the
poverty programs’ ability to mitigate deprivation, the war was won, cutting poverty in half across
the nation and keeping Long Islanders fed, cared for, and with a modicum of material goods,
regardless of income. In terms of political mobilization, Long Island’s CAPs did not produce a
new politically active poor, and the local war on poverty operated mostly through bureaucratic
offices rather than in the streets and poor neighborhoods of Nassau and Suffolk counties. But if
judged by the war’s broader purpose, that of increasing the earning capacities of the poor and
including them into the prosperous mainstream, then it was a failure, and that failure was most
apparent on Long Island.153 The War on Poverty was predicated on the idea that the United

150

For information on the conflict between Suffolk County Human Rights Commission chair George Pettengill and
County Executive Dennison, see Box 1, folders 4-5, Burghardt Turner Collection.
151
“Dennison Switches Emphasis to Social Problems in Suffolk,” Newsday, January 5, 1971, 2; “Dennison to Step
Down; Dems Searching for Candidate,” Newsday, June 3, 1971, 1
152
“Community Action: For the People but not by Them,” Newsday, August 4, 1971, 3A.
153
For a discussion of the legacies of the War on Poverty in economic terms, see Bruce D. Meyer and James X.
Sullivan, “Winning the War: Poverty from the Great Society to the Great Recession,” NBER Working Paper 18718
(January 2013).

302
States had mastered the tools to promote capitalist economic growth, and the suburbs like Long
Island were the geographic manifestation of that mastery. But Long Island’s affluence and its
economic growth, especially by the late 1960s, did not absorb all of its inhabitants.
Manufacturing, which had once been a mass employer, no longer played that role. New
economic sectors, mainly in white-collar service, had a deep divide between well-compensated
skilled jobs and low-wage unskilled work. Nonetheless, a structure designed with affluence in
mind had been laid down. Roads had been designed for automobile use and job centers
depended on them. Schools were sustained with property taxes and zoning encouraged
homeownership. Poverty was not concentrated but spread across a mixed urban and rural
landscape. Poverty activists focused on these barriers as the target of their programs. Buses
carried the poor to job centers to break down the spatial barrier, migrant workers were to be
replaced with local residents, and skills were taught to prepare the under- and un-employed for
the prosperous economy. But all these efforts to employ the poor and provide adequate income
attempted to alter the labor supply, and the only efforts to alter demand were voluntary
commitments to hire.
Skills, residency, and transportation, while problematic, were not the barrier. The
structure of the labor market that failed to provide adequate incomes stood at the center of the
region’s problems. By the end of the poverty war, Nassau County Eugene Nickerson had
concluded that Long Island’s prosperity would not absorb the poor in of itself, and that jobs had
to be created to permit the poor to become participants in Long Island’s affluent society through
a right to work. While perhaps radical compared to the heavy reliance on the ‘free market’ for
jobs under the War on Poverty, Long Island had long relied on public employment for its robust
job market in the form of defense spending. Now that military procurement subsidized technical
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employees and white collar workers, Nickerson merely sought a new source of state funding to
buttress employment in the region as military Keynesianism had been doing since the 1930s.
But, when the Office of Economic Opportunity closed that door, the bi-county region’s war on
poverty was seriously compromised. By 1971, Newsday claimed that Long Island’s poverty war
was in a ‘phased withdrawal,’ and former Nassau EOC director Adrian Cabral stated that
regardless of the war’s failures on the economic front, the anti-poverty efforts “succeeded in
making many Long Islanders aware that poverty was there, and guilty that it was there, and
uncomfortable with it.”154 Awareness did little for the poor.
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Chapter 6
Fair Share

If the suburbs were the symbol of postwar American affluence, the implications of
suburban prosperity dramatically changed in the late 1960s. After two decades of celebrating the
suburbs as the embodiment of prosperity, the urban riots turned policy against the suburbs. The
1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Report) condemned America’s
“two societies, one black, and one white – separate and unequal…one, largely Negro and poor,
located in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs
and in outlying areas.”1 The suburbs were part of the problem, beneficiaries of segregation and
zoning policy to the detriment of cities. Restrictive suburban land practices not only denied
African Americans and the poor free housing choice, but restricted access to jobs leaving for the
suburbs and tax revenue concentrating in suburban hamlets, depriving the urban poor of
necessary public funds. While the Report was not the first civil rights commission to condemn
the ‘white noose’ for urban black problems, it publicized over a decade of activism and policy
research that linked the city/suburb divide to the ‘urban crisis.’2 In this telling, suburban
prosperity was “deeply implicated in the ghetto” because the suburbs concentrated jobs and
public revenue within its borders.3 The problem of poverty and joblessness were spatially
conceived, concentrated in some places and not others.
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The Kerner Report gave long-standing struggles to end housing segregation a new moral
imperative, because urban/suburban integration would solve joblessness, inferior schools, and
poverty. It also encouraged federal administrations and state legislatures to expand housing
agency powers so they could construct suburban public housing, because widely dispersed lowincome housing projects would alleviate urban problems. In all, the Kerner Report and related
research galvanized civil rights groups, federal bureaucracies, state housing agencies, and local
governments to address integration in the wider metropolitan context. The NAACP looked to
break down zoning laws and literally disperse the urban poor into the suburbs and link them to
suburban jobs. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), state agencies like
Nelson Rockefeller’s Urban Development Corporation (UDC), and even county and local
initiatives likewise hoped to enhance employment opportunity with targeted housing
integration.4 Even modest proposals to improve housing opportunity for the suburban poor
adopted the belief that the suburbs were generally affluent and owed their ‘fair share’ of public
services to the poor. All proposed high-density housing projects to redress injustices in housing,
land-use policy, and by extension, employment and public service inequalities.
This view approached the nation’s problems with a binary city versus suburb, poor versus
affluent, and decline versus growth framework, and it obscured the reality that the ‘urban crisis’
was part of a much larger shared economic transformation affecting the entire metropolitan area.
Long Island’s long-term labor market divide already undermined the belief that spatial mobility
translated into upward mobility, and the gap between well-paying and low-wage employment
only widened after 1968. Blue-collar jobs left New York City, but suburban Long Island did not
gain them in proportion. From 1969 to 1974, manufacturing jobs left all but the five least
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populated and most remote suburban counties in New York’s seventeen county metropolitan
area.5 In contrast, white-collar employment expanded in both city and suburbs during the 1970s,
though these gains did not offset the blue-collar losses, and metropolitan area employment fell
seven percent from 1969 to 1976 as the New York area’s population dropped by nearly half a
million.6 The post-industrial turn in New York, Long Island, and the metropolitan area as a
whole benefitted those who could transition to white-collar work, while those who relied on
industry for their livelihoods suffered. The ‘suburb’ was not a promised land for jobs.
Long Island’s suburban hamlets were not necessarily overflowing with tax revenue to
share either, and the dualism obscured the diversity of suburbs too. If suburbs were to offer their
‘fair share,’ the question was who was ‘responsible’ to redistribute their resources. While some
suburbanites opposed low-income housing projects on racist or class grounds, the hamlets
targeted for new housing included working class, low-income, and black or integrated
neighborhoods. Placing the minority poor into black or integrated suburbs would only
exacerbate segregation, and working class or low-income suburbs were hardest hit by job loss.
In Long Island’s balkanized tax system, the fiscal costs of public services were limited to local
populations. Any alteration to a community’s tax base, from declining job opportunities to
proposed public housing had serious consequences on yearly tax bills, neighborhood stability,
and school quality. And since property taxes were based on assets owned rather than ability to
pay, it became increasingly regressive as incomes stagnated and unemployment rose. In sum,
Long Island’s suburbs were deeply divided along race and class lines and property taxes only
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exacerbated the divide. ‘Fair share’ was a question between suburbs as much as it was between
city and suburb.
The following chapter describes the dissonance between the binary city/suburb
formulation employed to solve urban problems and the complex reality of suburban inequality on
Long Island. Historians have documented the brief moment in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when housing integration reached the national stage but was fiercely (and successfully) resisted
by suburban homeowners and their political allies. At the center of most accounts is white
racism and the political coalitions built around segregated property and neighborhoods.7 But by
focusing on homeowner resistance, particularly ‘white’ homeowners, historians simply
reproduce the arguments of the Kerner Report, that city and suburb was the great dividing line
between the haves and the have-nots in postwar America. By ignoring the massive changes
occurring in the suburban labor market, both activists at the time and historians since ignore the
emerging inequality among suburbanites and the links between the urban and suburban poor.

Post-Industrial Long Island
On October 23, 1972, The White House Office of Management and Budget christened
Long Island a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), marking its official
transformation from a bedroom of Gotham to a city comparable with Los Angeles, Chicago,

7

The literature on integrated housing and why it failed is voluminous. For an influential contemporary discussion,
see Michael Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Detailed historical
accounts along this line of thought include Matthew Lassiter’s Silent Majority, who argues that suburbanites
successfully defeated the integrationist liberal agenda by adopting a ‘color-blind’ ideology that claimed their
suburban residence was a marker of market-based meritocratic success, and that integrationist policies threatened
‘freedom of choice.’ See Lassiter, Silent Majority; Lily Geismer makes a similar argument for postwar liberals, who
supported key liberal stances on the environment, war, and civil rights nationally, but believed in the same marketbased individualism with regards to suburban housing and successfully defeated housing proposals on those
grounds. See Geismer, “Don’t Blame Us.” For studies of how Richard Nixon solidified support among
suburbanites by prohibiting federal agencies from pressuring suburbs to accept integration, see Lamb, Housing
Segregation since 1960 and Bonastia, Knocking on the Door.

308
Detroit, and its neighbor, New York. As the first metropolitan area without an urban core, the
region exemplified the 1970 census revelation that more Americans lived in suburbs than in
cities or rural areas combined.8 Long Island was at the center of a debate over what Louis
Masotti and Jeffrey Hadden called the “urbanization of the suburbs,” that suburbs were not only
a distinct place to live, but home to factories and offices as well, making the ‘sub’ prefix
meaningless.9 While recognizing the culmination of a century long process that accelerated over
the last three decades, Masotti and Hadden claimed that a rapid transition had taken place,
turning the suburbs into a source of economic growth independent from the urban core the
suburbs once relied on, what historians Jon Teaford called ‘Post-Suburbia;’ Joel Garreau titled
the ‘Edge City,’ and what Robert Fishman christened the ‘technoburb.’10
At best this was a belated recognition of suburbia’s growth and newly relevant political
influence, which complicated the urban/rural divide that historically drove politics in the
twentieth century. But discussion of suburban independence obfuscated the massive economic
transformations affecting city and suburb alike in the 1960s and 1970s, part of the broader
national transition from industry to services. New York City, while historically the global
financial capital, became the national hub for corporate headquarters in the postwar period,
largely because corporations could utilize New York’s concentration of banking institutions,
professional services, and the region’s highly skilled labor force. Between 1947 and 1980,
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developers added 145 million square feet to Manhattan’s office space supply. Managerial and
professional occupations increased as a proportion of total employment in Manhattan, part of
some nine million jobs south of 60th Street that employed half of New York City’s workers and
300,000 suburban commuters as of 1980.11 New York’s suburbs, Long Island included, were
drawn into the orbit of this growing white-collar economy. While few large corporations located
to Nassau and Suffolk Counties, satellite offices for insurance and credit card companies, as well
as law, advertising, accounting, and real estate firms sparked an office building boom across the
Island.12 White collar employment had been growing since World War II, but accelerated
rapidly in the 1970s. In 1960, there were only thirty office buildings Island-wide, occupying
800,000 square feet. During the 1960s, developers constructed five million square feet of new
office space. Builders added another nearly eight million from 1970-1973 alone. By 1980, some
twenty million square feet existed throughout Long Island, forming new concentrations of
service sector employment that dotted central Long Island from Lake Success to Hauppauge.13
Office development ushered in a new age of job growth. In Nassau County for example,
finance, insurance, real estate, and more generalized ‘services’ accounted for about eighty
percent of all job growth from 1970-1975 (see Figure 6.1). Service-sector jobs did not mean
Long Island developed an “independent labor market identity, separate and distinct from that of
the remainder of the New York Metropolitan region” because the wealth generated in Manhattan
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Figure 6.1. Share of Nassau County Employment Growth,
1970-1975. Source: Nassau County Planning Commission,
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County Planning Commission, 1985), 241-243.

drove this expansion.14 While there were fewer commuters in 1970 than 1960, those commuters
contributed a disproportionate share of local spending, supporting a broad array of service
workers, ranging from teachers and civil servants to health care aides and fast-food attendants.
The median income of commuters was twice that of local employees, and a fifth of all locallyemployed residents toiled in low-level clerical work.15
Just as Long Island’s white-collar growth mirrored the structural changes occurring in
New York City, Nassau and Suffolk also shared in the tristate (New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut) metropolitan area’s manufacturing losses. The defense industry, already discussed
in chapter 3, faced the combined threat of recessionary shocks and long-term structural change,

14

Pearl M. Kamer, “Inflation and Economic Activity: The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island Economic Trends
Quarterly Technical Supplement (June 1974): 6.
15
In 1960, 31.8 percent commuted to NYC. Ten years later, that number dropped to 24.6 percent. Kamer, “Inflation
and Economic Activity,” 7; Professionals made up the second largest contingent of workers on Long Island. See
Kamer et al., A Profile of the Nassau-Suffolk Labor Force, 18-20; Nassau commuters accounted for forty-three
percent of the aggregate earnings for the county. The median income for Nassau-Suffolk commuters was around
$12,000, compared to $6,200 median income for local employees. See Pearl M. Kamer, “An Economic Profile of
Commuter Relationships: The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island Economic Trends Quarterly Technical
Supplement – Third Quarter 1974 (September 1974): 2-4; See also “Island is Found Still Dependent on City,” New
York Times, October 6, 1974, 103.

311
shedding some 11,450 jobs in just two years from 1969-1970. 16 As Table 6.2 indicates, the
entire New York metropolitan area lost industrial jobs in the early 1970s, an abrupt change from
general growth during the 1960s. Manhattan and Brooklyn’s losses were acute, but these jobs
left for the South and West, not the suburbs, which despite small gains along the outer ring,
collectively lost over 29,000 jobs. Academics and journalists focused on the economic decline in
central cities versus the new economic role of suburbs, largely because the central cities in the
metropolitan region – New York, Newark, Jersey City, or Yonkers – visibly displayed the scars
of manufacturing job loss. But manufacturing was “no longer a flourishing industry even in the
suburban portions of some of the nation’s metropolitan areas” as Nassau-Suffolk Suffolk
Regional Planning Board economist Pearl Kamer concluded in 1977.17 By 1976, over ten
million square feet of industrial space was vacant on Long Island, sixty-two percent due to either
contractions or plant closings, and the remainder because of out-migration to other states or
foreign countries.18 Industrial job loss was a regional shift rather than local migration within the
metropolitan area.19
Long Island’s vacant industrial space was less visible because of the nature of suburban
industry, where highly flexible and decentralized industrial parks seamlessly made the transition
from industry to services. No employment center better exemplified this physical transformation
than Roosevelt Field in Nassau County. The former airfield and home to the Island’s largest
mall was a major industrial hub from World War II through the 1960s. Over three-quarters of its
land was zoned for industry, home to defense contractors Reeves Instrument and American
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Table 6.1. Net Change in Manufacturing Employment, 1964-1974, New York/New Jersey
Metropolitan Area.
1964-69 1969-74
Core
Manhattan
6,427 -119,558
Kings
-5,147
-55,786
Bronx
1,832
-13,995
Queens
11,571
-22,079
Hudson
3,009
-24,091
Essex
974
-22,575
Inner Ring
Richmond
-1,388
-1,789
Nassau
17,198
-19,685
Westchester
8,651
-7,880
Bergen
19,220
6,524
Passaic
7,435
-14,052
Union
15,546
-15,190
Outer Ring
Middlesex
12,232
3,703
Somerset
4,339
5,952
Morris
11,426
3,771
Rockland
1,682
-195
Suffolk
9,843
7,747
Putnam
133
-120
Net Change
124,983 -289,298
Source: Pearl M. Kamer, Nassau-Suffolk's
Changing Manufacturing Base, 19.

Bosch Arma. By the 1970s, industry accounted for less than half of Roosevelt Field’s land use
and only forty-seven of the 542 establishments in the area. Vacant factories became furniture
stores and office complexes sprouted from industrially zoned land. Finance, insurance, and
service firms employed five thousand workers in the area. Another quarter of Roosevelt Field’s
twenty thousand jobs were in retail, the new source of “job opportunities for unskilled and semiskilled people” as a local land use study noted. Manufacturing still remained, though
increasingly in low-wage and footloose textiles and plastics. Roosevelt Field, a planned
industrial center that once housed makers of missile guidance systems and spacecraft computer
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components was now a regional center for furniture, clothing stores, and life insurance branch
offices.20
Roosevelt Field’s transformation from industrial to service hub highlighted the cosmetic
differences between city and suburbs, but while idle smokestacks and weed-infested warehouses
did not scar Long Island’s landscape, the effects of the transition were no less traumatic for Long
Island’s industrial workers. Suburban manufacturing employees already faced financial hardship
in the 1960s. Increasing property, income, and social security taxes along with inflation ate up
all but 94 cents of increased purchasing power in Nassau and Suffolk Counties from 1965 to
1968.21 Long Island’s average weekly manufacturing wage was $125 in 1967, just nine dollars
over the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ lowest budgetary threshold above poverty for a New
York family of four.22 Cutbacks in the aerospace industry pushed Long Island’s rising
unemployment rates ahead of the national average in the late 1960s, and when national recession
hit in the early 1970s, manufacturing employees along with construction, retail, and low-level
service workers made up the bulk of the region’s unemployed. The jobless rate climbed to five
percent in Nassau and nine percent in Suffolk in 1971, and after a slight drop, returned to over
seven percent in Nassau and nine percent in Suffolk in 1975.23
Long Island’s working class, who Newsday journalist Bill Moyers called the “not-so-poor
who earn too much to go on welfare and too little to live securely,” took lower paying jobs,
second jobs, or sent another family member to work, forgoing movies and vacations to adjust to
20

Nassau County Planning Commission, Roosevelt Field Area Development Guide, vi-17, 99.
Nicholas Kisburg, Suburban Affluence: For Whom? (New York, NY: International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Joint Council No. 16, 1969), 69-4.1.
22
Ibid, 69-4C.
23
“Labor Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Nassau,” February 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP Records,
LoC; “Labor Demand and Supply Fact Sheet: Suffolk,” February 1971, Part V, Box 1526, folder 3, NAACP
Records, LoC; Pearl M. Kamer, “Income Levels and Purchasing Power: The Nassau-Suffolk SMSA,” Long Island
Economic Trends Quarterly Technical Supplement – First Quarter, 1975 (March 1975): 14.
21

314
their lower standards of living. The Newsday editorial staff viewed Long Island’s workers
through the ‘silent majority’ lens, interviewing the ‘white working class’ and their feelings
toward minorities, student activists, and elite liberals, though these workers had much in
common with Long Island’s black working class, who likewise fit Newsday’s description of the
‘not-so-poor.’24 Black workers were half as likely to hold white-collar jobs, nine percent more
likely to work in the blue-collar sector, and were unemployed at rates exceeding their proportion
of the population.25 The increasing hardship of both black and white blue-collar workers
illustrated a growing inequality emerging during the decade in America’s cities and its suburbs,
an inequality based on the loss of productive jobs for millions of Americans. The focus on
suburbia’s new dominance obscured what suburbs and cities shared, even if the transition in
cities dwarfed that of suburbs. Those suburbanites who possessed higher education and skills,
like their urban counterparts, thrived in the post-industrial economy. Those who could not easily
transition into white-collar work faced an uncertain future, regardless of their urban or suburban
residency.26
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The Lily-White Suburb
While manufacturing jobs left city and suburbs, the nation’s urban problems were
viewed, thanks to the Kerner Report, as a uniquely ‘urban crisis,’ the consequence of a divided
and racist society. The Commission set the terms of the debate in its sixteenth chapter,
presenting statistics that proved segregation of low-income African Americans had accelerated,
while jobs and the middle class had moved outward to the suburbs, a process that excluded
minorities. The Commission offered two possible solutions: ‘enriching’ the ghetto through
public expenditure, or ‘integrating’ ghetto residents into suburbs, and in its conclusion advocated
that both were necessary.27 ‘The Enrichment Choice’ or what policymakers and activists called
the ‘place-based’ approach to urban problems, was an extension of slum clearance, urban
renewal, and anti-poverty policy, though sensitive to local community needs. ‘Place-based’
advocates conceived of the inner city as an underdeveloped region, similar to that of former
colonies in the Third World. These advocates, which included Black Power radicals, aspiring
black capitalists, and the AFL-CIO, supported public or private investment to stimulate the local
economy, train the poor for new jobs, and improve the local quality of life from within the ghetto
itself. This call for a domestic urban ‘Marshall Plan’ eventually became the Model Cities
program in 1966, a massive endeavor to revitalize cities headed by the newly minted Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and its head, Robert C. Weaver.28 The Kerner
Commission and those promoting enrichment after 1968 called for an expansion of Model Cities
and similar initiatives to encourage inner-city institution building.
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The Kerner Commission also urged the ‘Integration Choice,’ which aimed to integrate
the poor into the suburbs and ‘disperse the ghetto’ (known as the ‘people-based’ approach to the
urban crisis). It was the product of the same economic and racial statistics as the ‘place-based’
approach to inner-city development, but was based on different assumptions about the cause of
urban decay and supported by distinct interest groups from those proposing inner-city
‘enrichment.’ The ‘people-based’ approach implicated the suburbs in the plight of the inner city,
arguing that the urban crisis was a product of the broader metropolitan redistribution of resources
away from the city and toward the suburbs. Exclusionary policies, including zoning and real
estate practices, deprived the minority poor of vital tax revenue and job opportunities available in
the suburbs, not to mention housing choice. It was a zero-sum game, and the suburbs won as
cities and their residents lost out. These conclusions were drawn from researchers studying the
link between race, the spatial layout of metropolitan areas, and employment, and few academics
were as influential as Harvard economist John F. Kain, who produced studies that linked housing
segregation and black unemployment. Kain’s theory, a contribution to urban policy literature
known as the ‘spatial mismatch hypothesis,’ were cited in the McCone Commission Report, a
response to the 1965 LA riots, and the Kerner report.29 Kain was a vociferous critic of ‘placebased’ policies, arguing such policies ‘gilded the ghetto,’ hardening the problems associated with
inner-city poverty and encouraging further migration of poor blacks to northern ghettoes. He
wanted to break down housing segregation to open the expanding suburban job market to inner
city African Americans, i.e. ‘dispersing the ghetto.30 For Kain and the people-based approach
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generally, the city was not to achieve parity with the suburbs; the suburbs had to be opened up to
make their plenty available to urban dwellers.
The link between jobs and housing segregation was appealing because it tied the most
profound problems of the urban north together: housing segregation, minority unemployment,
and the fiscal challenges of cities. The ‘spatial mismatch hypothesis’ provided activists and
academics a powerful argument for the plight of the minority poor and a renewed impetus to end
housing segregation. Civil rights groups, particularly the NAACP, who had previously
challenged racist housing policy at the federal and local levels, applied these conclusions to their
existing struggles against segregation. The logic also fit well with the emerging consensus of the
‘urbanization of the suburbs’ and the alleged suburban dominance in the economy, politics, and
social life of the nation. Popular academic books, including Richard Babcock and Fred
Bosselman’s Exclusionary Zoning, Michael Danielson’s The Politics of Exclusion, and Anthony
Downs’ Opening up the Suburbs attacked zoning for constructing the divide between declining
minority dominated cities and white suburbs.31 Policy organizations like the Regional Plan
Association (RPA) and the National Committee against Discrimination (NCDH) incorporated
Kain’s ideas into their own efforts to integrate housing and ease the urban crisis. The NCDH
conducted research into the “relationship between access to housing and job opportunities” and
warned that housing segregation forced black workers into an employment situation “previously
experienced by no other group in the history of this nation: denial of the opportunity to live in
areas reasonably proximate to available jobs.”32 The Regional Plan Association published their
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own findings in 1969, illustrating the “widening “geographic gap” between the location of
unskilled jobs and the location of housing for people who hold (or could hold) these jobs.”33
The NCDH, RPA, and other reports formulated their conclusions from three basic
statistical categories: the racial demographics of cities and suburbs, the disparity between high
black and low white unemployment, and finally, the long-term movement of jobs (namely
manufacturing) to the suburbs. The existence of suburban housing segregation was widely
accepted by the late 1960s, but the suburbs were only recently recognized as the new dynamic
job growth centers compared to jobless inner-cities.34 Expanding commutation links between
city and suburb would help around the margins; building affordable housing, which required rezoning single-family suburban districts for high-density housing complexes, was necessary to
give the inner-city minority poor the ability to relocate to the suburbs and take suburban jobs.
Anthony Downs, economist and member of Johnson’s National Commission on Urban Problems
in 1967 (and contributor to the Kerner Commission), best exemplified this view in his 1973
book, Opening the Suburbs. Job growth was understood spatially, and the suburbs were
currently producing the most employment opportunities and were expected to for the future as
well. Fostering ‘ghetto industries’ would never provide enough jobs for all those in need, and
suburban employment centers were too dispersed for new commuting links to be beneficial. As
a result, “the only way to establish the required linkages is to provide suburban housing
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opportunities near new job openings.”35 Publicly-funded or privately-financed high-density
housing would be affordable, and would shorten the distance between people and jobs. For these
policymakers, researchers, and activists, labor market barriers were rooted in the housing market.
By making housing available in the suburbs, the poor could escape ‘poor places’ for the ‘right
places.’
This framework developed into a ‘dispersal consensus,’ a common belief that dispersing
the poor into the suburbs could improve their job prospects, educational outcomes, and quality of
life. This consensus was convincing enough to inform the strategies of housing agencies from
local governments to Washington.36 In 1969, Housing and Urban Development Secretary George
Romney launched a nationwide attack on housing segregation, fearing that the nation itself could
not survive with “a run-down, festering black core, surrounded by a well-to-do, indifferent white
ring.” Romney’s HUD designed the Open Communities Program to “provide an opportunity for
individuals to live within a reasonable distance of their job and daily activities by increasing
housing options for low-income and minority families” in the suburbs. “To solve problems of
the ‘real city’” Romney contended, “only metropolitan-wide solutions will do.”37 In New York
State, Governor Nelson Rockefeller empowered his new Urban Development Corporation in
1969 with the legal ability to override local zoning ordinances state-wide. The UDC, under the
command of planner Edward Logue, had unprecedented powers to construct low and middleincome units in the suburbs, and Logue set out to build suburban housing for the poor because he
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believed that New York’s urban problems could only be solved “within the wider metropolitan
context.” 38 Agencies did not limit dispersal advocacy to the city/suburb divide; even dispersal
within suburbs was understood as critical to breaking down barriers to employment and
education. On Long Island, the Civil Rights Coordinating Council of Suffolk County formed the
Suffolk County Development Corporation (SCDC) in 1969 to build public or publicly-assisted
housing across the county. The goal was to free “black and other minorities from the
deteriorating ghetto housing in which they had been locked by a combination of discrimination,
poverty and powerlessness.” The Corporation associated inadequate housing in the suburbs with
“unemployment, inferior education, inadequate transportation for access to jobs and the
debilitating effects of successive generations of welfare dependency.”39
Public agencies embraced the ‘dispersal consensus,’ but civil rights groups were the first
to act on this theory, largely because it added urgency to long-standing fights against housing
segregation, and no organization had been as committed over the long-term to ending housing
segregation as the NAACP. Since its inception, the organization addressed residential racial
segregation, invalidating racial residential ordinances in Buchanan v. Warley in 1917 and
restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948. It was during local housing campaigns and
the Shelley case that the NAACP first incorporated economic data and sociological research into
lawsuits, a tactic they adapted to other suits, most prominently Brown v. Board of Education.40
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Despite these victories, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and hundreds of state and local laws
banning discrimination in housing, segregation remained. Selective enforcement was partly to
blame, but so too was the other key component of spatial segregation: zoning. A land-use
power widely used across America’s suburbs since the 1920s, zoning barred unwanted land-use
and ‘undesirable’ development in order to balance the need for revenue-generating property with
the protection of property values. While not explicitly racial, suburban zoning was overtly classexclusive, favoring single-family large-lot homes and banning high-density housing. This, when
combined with a racially segmented mortgage market, produced racially segregated and classexclusive suburbs, as David M.P. Freund argues.41 But the color-blind intent of zoning,
obscured in the language of professional planners, made it difficult to challenge on racially
discriminatory grounds. The ‘spatial mismatch’ of jobs and housing offered a new framework to
challenge zoning policy, since denying housing opportunity to low-income people in effect
nullified equal employment opportunity, and by extension, the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
For the NAACP, the claims of the ‘dispersal consensus’ linked all of the major inequities
facing non-whites, from unequal housing opportunity to unemployment and concentrated innercity poverty. In 1969, the NAACP challenged zoning on these grounds. A trove of economic
data was required to prove such a complex claim, and the NAACP coordinated with the
Suburban Action Institute (SAI), a Westchester based planning think-tank founded by planner
Paul Davidoff. Considered a father of ‘advocacy’ planning, a subfield devoted to addressing
racial and class inequality, Davidoff wanted SAI to be the research and litigation foundation for
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the ‘clientless.’42 SAI represented the millions of poor and non-white urban residents, and they
promised to secure ‘locational choice’ for all, a privilege reserved for industry and white
Americans in the postwar period. Spatial mobility, and therefore increased employment
opportunity, required breaking down those “exclusionary practices of the suburbs themselves
that help create the poverty and ugliness of the slums,” and forcing suburbanites to assume their
social responsibility “by opening up their land, job markets, and tax resources to [the poor and
working class].”43 The NAACP received SAI’s expertise in this relationship, while SAI gained a
prestigious activist organization with unparalleled legal clout, what one planner called
“organized pressure from the people who are being done in.”44 All they needed was a case, and
in 1969, SAI and the NAACP found their first opportunity in the nearly all-white town of Oyster
Bay, Long Island.
Fair Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Burke, the case challenging zoning in Oyster
Bay, had its origins in a local housing fight. The Glen Cove NAACP branch wanted to secure
adequate housing for a small black population in the Town of Oyster Bay in the mid-1960s.
Glen Cove branch President James Davis established a non-profit housing corporation in 1969,
the Fair Housing Development Fund Corporation, and applied for federal housing loans to build
moderate and low-income apartments.45 High-density housing required a zoning variance from
the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning authority, the most local government unit in charge of land-
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use. The authority excluded almost everything except single-family large-lot housing, and
variances provided zoning boards flexibility and gave local residents discretion over what to
permit or deny. 46 The Town did not approve the variance, which attracted the attention of the
NAACP national office. From the NAACP’s perspective, the Town of Oyster Bay was a perfect
example of the spatial mismatch hypothesis and how housing barriers denied employment
opportunity. Oyster Bay was located on Long Island, the national suburban exemplar just twelve
miles from the New York City border. The Town enforced strict zoning laws that favored higher
standards for building construction and minimum lot acreage in the two decades after 1950. The
majority of vacant land was already zoned for two-acre plots, and in the 1950s, smallest
residential zoning category, similar to Levittown’s plots, was erased altogether. Apartments
were likewise removed from zoning categories, and variances were required for any multi-unit
developments.47 Increasing minimum lot size rose property values and tax revenues, as did
attracting industrial property. Already home to Grumman, Oyster Bay vigorously lured firms to
its borders in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1963 and 1969, over half of all Nassau County job
growth occurred within the Town’s borders, largely in industrial fields including electronic
components, machinery, aircraft parts, and plastics.48 In addition, office building construction
attracted insurance companies, brokerage houses, and various business firms to the area,
boosting white-collar employment.49 Lastly, Oyster Bay did nothing to racially integrate
housing, typical of most suburban jurisdictions. In 1970, the Town’s 333,000 residents were
99.2 percent white, and among the thirty-six villages and hamlets over which the Town of Oyster
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Bay had zoning powers, half of the 2,700 African American residents lived in three segregated
areas: East Massapequa, Oyster Bay village, and Locust Valley.50 The Town’s white
dominance, in combination with its economic boom, made it a good illustration of the poor
city/affluent suburb formulation. Oyster Bay was a white fortress, using zoning to block nonwhites from both housing and job opportunity.
As the zoning variance languished at Town Hall in December 1969, NAACP national
housing director William Morris ordered the Town to downzone a fifth of its vacant residential
land for multi-family dwellings and affordable single-family homes, or face legal action.51 The
goal was to open Oyster Bay to New York’s poor, and according to SAI estimates, the re-zoning
proposal would add about 18,000 people to the Town’s population (an increase of five percent)
and would raise property taxes by 2.3 percent.52 The Town and its residents refused to comply.
Newly elected Oyster Bay Town Supervisor John Burke promised to defend ‘home rule’ against
the NAACP, claiming that “Oyster Bay doesn’t have any fences around it.”53 Residents
interpreted the demand within the context of the racial and class inequality inscribed into
property and neighborhoods. At NAACP/SAI sponsored meetings across Oyster Bay, residents
expressed concern that taxes would rise while public service quality would diminish. In addition,
residents associated the decay occurring in city centers with race, and public housing in Oyster
Bay would introduce those problems to the suburbs.54 As one resident proclaimed, “nobody
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wants a Negro project to spring up on the land they’ve cherished. We moved to this area
because of the way it is.”55 Just as the NAACP understood the problem as one of housing, Burke
and the majority of residents resisted the plan in terms of housing, that it threatened their own
neighborhoods and the sanctity of local zoning powers.
A few residents and politicians went beyond the housing framework and questioned the
NAACP’s broader claim that dispersing the poor would transform employment opportunity. The
outgoing Town Supervisor Michael Petito argued that the NAACP was “making a serious
mistake playing with 50,000 human beings, moving them from a ghetto in New York to another
ghetto in Oyster Bay.”56 While an exaggeration of numbers, Petito doubted whether a spatial
move would improve their quality of life. The Town of Oyster Bay Conservative Party likewise
condemned the NAACP’s proposal as a project of activists, who “have apparently despaired of
eliminating city slums, and who now propose to transplant them to Oyster Bay…without
providing anything of value for the slum dwellers themselves.”57 Local resident and city
planning student Jerry Katz elaborated on these criticisms. For the residents to benefit from the
move, jobs would be necessary, but Katz doubted the local job market could employ thousands
of new low-skilled residents. Without employment, poor residents would be worse off in
suburbia, far from public transportation and social services. As Katz argued, the project
increased costs to local and future residents without much benefit to the relocated.58
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After over a year of deliberation, the NAACP took legal action, submitting their suit on
March 24, 1971 to the U.S. District Court.59 It was an ambitious class-action lawsuit, accusing
the Town of Oyster Bay Town Supervisor (John W. Burke), the Town Board, and the Town
Housing Authority of supporting a land-use policy that discriminated in three ways. First,
zoning policy segregated existing non-white residents. Second, zoning excluded non-whites and
other disadvantaged low-income citizens from living in Oyster Bay. And finally, those same
zoning laws excluded non-white and low-income workers from jobs they could otherwise attain.
Therefore, zoning effectively nullified equal housing and employment laws, and since the courts
permitted local zoning powers only if land-use policy promoted the ‘general welfare,’ Oyster
Bay’s zoning codes were unconstitutional.60 The NAACP went further, demanding affirmative
action to end segregation, that the Town set aside land for new dwelling units that “meet the
needs of the Plaintiffs and the members of the classes they represent,” disadvantaged minority
residents from outside Oyster Bay.61 The NAACP assembled a diverse group of plaintiffs to
represent New York’s disadvantaged non-white population. Six plaintiffs were black Town
residents occupying ‘substandard’ dwellings, including a temporary county-subsidized motel
room, a shack on a golf course, and a variety of dilapidated apartments. Another plaintiff
worked for Grumman but could not find suitable housing within the Town. Finally, the suit also
included an unemployed Bronx man who did not take a job in the Town of Oyster Bay because
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he was denied housing.62 Since the NAACP sought a broad Court decree rather than redressing
narrow plaintiff grievances, they had to amass census data, housing statistics, employment
figures, and expert testimony to convince the court that land-use policy, while not explicitly
biased, was in effect discriminatory because it had disparate impacts on housing choice and job
opportunity.63
The NAACP faced formidable obstacles to their claims. The defense refuted the first
claim that poor housing conditions and limited housing choice for Oyster Bay’s non-white
residents was contrary to zoning’s ‘general welfare’ purpose by arguing that income, rather than
race, accounted for such outcomes.64 This line of defense, that economic segregation was the
outcome of pure market forces and lawful efforts to stabilize communities, had been woven into
the logic of ‘property rights’ and land-use policy since the early twentieth century. By the 1970s,
homeowners, Supreme Court justices, and President Richard Nixon himself followed this logic.
One year prior, the Supreme Court upheld color-blind bans on low-income housing in James v.
Valtierra (1971), and by 1975, the Supreme Court fully defended the constitutionality of
economic exclusion. This required a narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment’s equal
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protection clause, but was nonetheless emerging as a defensive strategy against open-housing
cases.65
The same logic could be applied to out-of-town black residents. The NAACP alleged
that the Town’s zoning prohibited black employees of Grumman Aerospace Corporation (located
in Bethpage) from living in its hamlets. To prove this, the NAACP illustrated that only thirtyone of a total 1,100 black employees lived within Oyster Bay’s borders in 1971. Nearly a fifth
commuted from New York City, compared to just four percent of white workers. This was not a
factor of occupational differences between white and black workers either. Operatives, who
were paid the same rate regardless of race (seniority, however, affected wages), were five times
more likely to be city residents if they were African American. Black workers, even in the same
positions, did not share communities with their white co-workers.66 Housing segregation, as
both general population statistics and Grumman employee residence proved, was clear. Whether
Town zoning played a role in this segregation was less apparent, and whether workers or
employers suffered as a result was unclear. The NAACP contended that the racial residential
divide existed because of exclusionary zoning. Edward Underwood, the plaintiff’s
representative Grumman employee, resided in Westbury, a village two miles west of Oyster
Bay’s town border. He desired to live within the Town of Oyster Bay, but did not waste time
looking because he knew of friends who “claimed that [prices] were so high that they couldn’t
buy one over there.”67 The defense questioned whether Underwood faced undue hardship
because he could not live within the Town. From Westbury, he made an eight-mile trek to and
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from work each day, which took on average twenty-five minutes. His commute, while
originating outside the Town’s borders, was substantially less than trips from nearly half of
Oyster Bay’s neighborhoods.68 As Underwood’s case revealed, the Town’s borders were porous,
and out-of-town workers were not necessarily burdened because they lived outside Oyster Bay.
This was the reality for African American Grummanites living in North Amityville, Wyandanch,
and New Cassel, all less than ten miles from the Grumman plant in Bethpage, and for over half
of Grumman’s white workforce in Suffolk County. The defense meanwhile challenged the claim
that zoning played a pivotal role in the Town’s housing segregation, and Edward Underwood
admitted that “because I’m black and if I go to the bank, they’re not going to loan me the money
to buy a house.”69 Aside from loan discrimination, depositions revealed a myriad of widespread
private discriminatory practices, from racial steering to outright realtor refusal to sell to nonwhites.70 This did not implicate zoning directly, which was color-blind but legally classexclusive.
The NAACP had the most difficulty proving that exclusionary zoning increased black
unemployment. They amassed hundreds of pages of data from the 1950s and 1960s,
substantiating the fact that industry had shifted from cities to suburbs, and that between 1963 and
1969, the Town of Oyster Bay enjoyed factory growth. They then projected this data forward to
prove that job opportunities (especially in blue-collar sectors) would increase in the Town, using
Regional Plan Association estimates for metropolitan job growth to 1985 and their own appraisal
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of future plant growth based on vacant industrial land in Oyster Bay.71 As the NAACP claimed
in January 1972,
Regional trends indicate that in the coming decades, increasing numbers of bluecollar workers will be migrating to the New York Metropolitan region to work and
live. Many will look to the suburbs for jobs and housing, as the city’s ability to
provide blue-collar employment continues to decrease. Trends indicate that the
Nassau-Suffolk County area will contain…about 20 percent of the Region’s total
employment growth and more than 50 percent of the manufacturing growth
between 1959 and 1985….the Town of Oyster Bay in particular contains the bulk
of the bi-county area’s major employment centers, a relationship which is expected
to continue in the future.72
The plaintiffs warned that this growth was dependent on “future changes in the Town’s Building
Zone Ordinance” to accommodate the workforce for these plants. Without affordable housing,
black job-seekers would not find work, leading to higher levels of unemployment and labor
shortages. According to the NAACP, zoning undermined the Town’s economic future, because
industrial growth required a ‘diversified’ workforce.73 This was contrary to the ‘general welfare’
purpose of zoning for the broader metropolitan population, Town employers and the Town’s
economy.
These claims were based on past data from the 1960s projected forward, not considering
present conditions. The NAACP did recognize the short-term cutbacks in the defense industry,
though were confident that over the long-term, blue-collar employment would continue to
grow.74 The defense was unconvinced. The NAACP provided no concrete data that blue-collar
demand existed within Oyster Bay, and according to the Town attorneys, the NAACP “merely
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state the conclusion that there are job opportunities in Oyster Bay.”75 Employment data
contradicted the NAACP’s claims (see Table 6.1), as did a 1971 HUD report, which found “no
reason to believe that employment will expand…salaries are on the decline and unemployment is
on the increase.”76 The defense repeatedly asked for numbers proving there were jobs for the
urban unemployed, and in the depositions, they questioned each plaintiff about whether the local
economy was actually expanding.77 Grummanite Edward Underwood agreed that his employer
shed jobs in the early 1970s, and that industry in general had been contracting in the area.78
When Fair Housing Development Corporation chairman and Glen Cove NAACP member
William Joseph Johnson was asked where they amassed their job data, he admitted it was from a
1965 Nassau County Planning Commission report. Defense Attorney Albert Bader then inquired
about employment growth after 1969, to which Johnson replied, “we are in unusual times right
now. We are in a recession. And I think that has affected the whole structure, the whole
picture.”79
The NAACP and the Suburban Action Institute believed spatial mobility, i.e. opening up
the suburbs for the urban poor, would translate into jobs and upward mobility. The plaintiffs
based their case on the alleged city/suburb divide, where suburbs were an affluent space with
plentiful jobs, and city was a poor space with declining employment. Housing segregation
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denied the urban poor access to suburban plenty. But the ‘two societies’ trope assumed the
economy was prosperous, that job opportunities were widely available and what mattered was
the location of economic growth. This was the basic premise behind the dispersal consensus
generally, as outlined in the Kerner Report and promoted by policy-makers, academics, and
activist groups. All operated within a liberal framework that wanted to use the state to enhance
economic opportunity for individuals within the private ‘free market’ of jobs. Like the dominant
strain of the War on Poverty, the problem for the poor and unemployed was supply – in this case
housing supply in the right places, limited by racism.80
Meanwhile, the Town and Long Island generally were shedding blue-collar work, both
due to a short-term recession and the broader transformation occurring in the region. Suburban
plenty was available to those with the skillset and credentials to participate. In response to the
dispersal consensus and this case, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board Chief Economist
Pearl Kamer contended neither “Nassau or even Suffolk can provide substantial numbers of blue
collar jobs for central city residents whose blue-collar jobs have moved elsewhere.”81 Without
jobs, the urban poor would compete with the suburban poor for low-wage work in a high-cost
area. MIT Economist Bennett Harrison warned in 1974 that “there may be jobs in the [suburban]
ring, but they are not necessarily jobs that will raise the ghetto dweller’s standard of living.”82
The two tiers of the labor market, which long-existed on Long Island, were diverging further as
high-paying unskilled industrial work contracted and white-collar jobs flourished.
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Suburbanizing the urban poor would not improve the skills of the current generation nor break
down the discriminatory barriers to higher-paying employment.83
On the brink of losing the case, the plaintiffs changed their argument in March 1973,
demanding Affirmative Action based on the ‘fair share’ concept. They argued that the Town of
Oyster Bay should house some 34,000 new residents, composed of people whose racial
demographics were the same as those of New York City.84 This was necessary because
The Town of Oyster Bay has a duty to provide housing for some of the black
economically disadvantaged persons who currently live in the ghettoes of New
York. Considering the fact that the New York City Housing Authority operates
approximately 154,000 units of public housing, it seems reasonable to suggest that
Oyster Bay build 10,000 units by 1985 as its fair share of public housing needs of
the New York Metropolitan Region.85
The NAACP was now in effect demanding a spatial redistribution of poverty across the
metropolitan landscape, for suburbs to share in the burden of urban poverty and unemployment.
Suburban opportunity would not lift the poor out of poverty, but the suburbs had a responsibility
to house them. The weakened case limped on for another two years before the NAACP
withdrew the suit in October 1975. A recently settled case in Rochester, New York destroyed
their class action strategy when the court limited petitioners to those who were
“personally…injured.”86 And since the Town of Oyster Bay was in the process of building lowincome housing, both parties admitted land-use controls were ‘color-blind,’ and the Town Board
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never outright rejected the zoning variance, the plaintiffs had little chance of winning.87 But the
case also failed on the logic of linking fair housing and employment opportunity, assuming
suburban affluence without considering the particular economic processes occurring in specific
places. When the logic no longer held up, the NAACP turned to a redistributive strategy, that
suburbanites should have their ‘fair share’ of the metropolitan area’s poor.

“More than the Average Homeowner Can Sustain”88
The NAACP case illustrated the flaws of the dispersal thesis, and while the NAACP
ultimately failed to resettle New York’s poor into the Town of Oyster Bay, they were but one
organization attempting to solve urban problems through space. HUD, under the leadership of
George Romney, New York’s Urban Development Corporation, led by planner Edward Logue,
and county agencies initiated their own high-density housing integration plans on Long Island.
They were not as ambitious as the NAACP’s dispersal plans, instead draped in the discourse of
‘fair share,’ that the suburbs held of surplus of tax revenue that could be redistributed to the poor.
The benefits for the poor were improved housing and better access to suburban services, but jobs
were not paramount. Instead, ‘fair share’ focused on the costs, namely the costs suburbs could
afford to bear. It also implied responsibility, that suburbanites owed the poor access to their
resources.
Advocates of these housing projects, including HUD, the UDC, and local agencies, faced
virulent resistance. Suburban opposition partly stemmed from the racial and class views formed
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through segregationist policy and ideas coalescing around crime, urban protest, and public
housing in the 1960s. For many white suburbanites, decades of exclusionary housing policy had
obscured the structures of segregation, and whites believed that suburban homogeneity was a
consequence of market forces. Intrusion into the natural workings of the housing market was a
threat to property rights and freedom of choice, and asking that they ‘take responsibility’ for their
achievement in the marketplace was a threat to basic freedom. This was the basis for resisting
integration since the 1940s.89 These long-held ideas mixed with more recent developments,
including ‘culture of poverty’ theory, the rise in crime, urban protest, and public housing. As
African Americans increasingly inhabited public housing projects in the nation’s cities, public
housing itself became associated with black Americans.90 The riots, originating as protest
against police brutality, were interpreted as the actions of criminals and civil rights protest was
successfully linked to the steadily rising crime rates, as Vesla Weaver argues.91 Finally, ‘culture
of poverty’ academic theory, which drew links between the poor’s behaviors, attitudes, and
values and their poverty, gained academic and public legitimacy.92 These racialized ideas about
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the source of urban poverty were a conservative counter-narrative to the Kerner Report’s
conclusions. Rather than segregation causing urban deprivation, it was the behavior of the poor
and government appeasement through generous welfare, lax arrests, and a search for ‘root
causes’ that enabled such conditions. Responsibility, in the minds of any suburbanite who
subscribed to these ideas, began with the poor themselves and with a government that should
enforce ‘law and order’ rather than abetting the violence. Relocating the poor into the suburbs
would only disperse these problems into their neighborhoods, and segregating the poor was the
only recourse suburbanites had to keep suburbs ‘free’ of the perceived threat of the poor. This
form of resistance was politically potent and had powerful allies, including President Richard
Nixon, who played a key role in diluting housing integration efforts at the national level in the
early 1970s.93
Though powerful, this conservative counter-narrative was expected; these ideas, and the
policies that fostered such ideas, were exactly what dispersal advocates were challenging. But
this was not the only criticism of suburban housing projects. Contrary to the assumptions of the
dispersal consensus, suburbs were diverse, and suburbanites from working class and low-income
hamlets challenged the rationale behind ‘fair share’ itself, namely the idea that the suburban
labor and housing markets benefitted all suburbanites equally and consistently, and that the
‘suburbs’ were a space of generalized affluence, unlike the city. For one, ‘white’ did not
accurately describe Long Island’s suburbs, and black residents felt especially wronged when
their neighborhoods were targeted for public housing because they already shared space with
poor people and adding more non-whites would exacerbate segregation. Just as importantly, the
consequences of low-income housing projects were not borne by the ‘suburbs’ as a whole; the
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affected local community would disproportionately accept the costs of such housing. As
described previously, Long Island’s suburban hamlets were highly fragmented, placing the costs
of key public services on local neighbors. For working class suburbs, the problem of property
taxes and the quality of public services became more acute in the 1970s in the face of stagnating
incomes, inflation, and rising unemployment. This was a ‘suburban crisis,’ fiscal challenges that
hit particular hamlets in a divided suburban landscape, unlike the deeper ‘urban crisis’ shared
broadly by cities with unified taxing districts.
As stated in chapter 3, property taxes were one of the most contentious issues in suburban
politics, linked to residents’ pocketbooks, quality of local services, and the stability of a
community itself. On Long Island, the property tax was not levied evenly across suburbia. A
homeowner’s tax bill was ideally based on the market ‘value’ of the property, though houses
were rarely assessed at market prices. In Suffolk, each of the ten towns had different assessment
practices and did not reassess properties on a yearly basis. Islip calculated assessments on fiveyear old market values, while the Town of Babylon assessed levies according to 1954
construction costs. Nassau County likewise assessed based on 1938 construction costs minus
depreciation. In Nassau and the Suffolk’s Town of Babylon, property taxes were determined by
the quality of construction, not the market value of one’s home. Even if two cape cods in
completely separate hamlets had vastly different market values, their assessed value would be
the same if construction standards were similar. This became a problem as the value of homes
and the incomes of residents between suburbs diverged over time, particularly in the 1970s. By
1984, residents of majority-black Roosevelt, the most over-assessed hamlet in Nassau County
(based on the market value of their home compared to what they paid in taxes), paid over four
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percent of their property’s value in taxes, while New Hyde Park, the most under-assessed, paid
only 1.5 percent.94
Since Long Island’s government structure was divided into tiny taxing districts, a small
group of homeowners had to fund public infrastructure, which further added a burden on
property-poor and lower-income districts that had to raise tax rates to maintain schools and other
public services. Basically, uneven assessments forced lower-income homeowners to pay higher
taxes compared to their home’s market value, while balkanized tax districts placed the costs of
public services on these homeowners alone (save state funding), all while incomes stagnated,
unemployment rose, public expenses grew, and poverty concentrated in these communities.
These combined factors unleashed the property tax’s regressivity. As Table 6.2 indicates, the tax
rate for each one thousand dollars of assessed valuation in 1971 was highest in neighborhoods
with family incomes below the County median. By 1984, tax inequities were skewed further.
Newsday conducted an award-winning study illustrating how Long Island’s assessment practices
disproportionately affected lower-income homeowners. Property owners in the affluent suburbs
of Manhasset and Garden City paid between 0.9 and 1.2 percent of their homes’ value in
property taxes, while residents of the two lowest valued communities, Roosevelt and
Wyandanch, paid over four percent of their homes’ value in taxes each year. In some instances,
residents in poorer neighborhoods actually paid more in taxes than affluent homeowners. In
Nassau, a $41,000 home in Roosevelt owed $2,144 in taxes in 1984, while a $175,000 home in
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Manhasset owed only $2,091. In Suffolk, a two-story Wyandanch home worth one-third of a
West Babylon ranch received tax bills only two dollars apart.95
Discussions of over-assessment and property wealth may seem abstract, but homeowners
felt such inequities directly. As the Newsday report contended, “over-assessment affects the way
a family lives – the way people eat and dress and furnish their homes…whether they can plant
grass, or paint the kitchen or pay the phone bill.”96 Individual stories illustrate this point.
Elizabeth Milton had purchased a $36,500 home in Wyandanch across from a vacant lot, which
came with a $2,233.64 yearly tax bill, about $960 more than she should be paying based on the
value of her home. This tax burden contributed to her $616 combined monthly mortgage and tax
payments, a bill she failed to pay when she fell ill and missed workdays at her $5.45-an-hour
packer job at a local plumbing supply company. To catch up, Milton had to end Friday pizza
nights with her daughters and avoid purchasing needed clothing. Such sacrifices were small
compared to that of the Holman family of Amityville. Glenda and William Holman fell behind
on their monthly mortgage and tax payments, a combined $724 (including a $223 monthly tax
bill, double the county’s median tax burden). To catch up, William worked double maintenance
shifts at a hospital while his wife asked relatives for money and braided hair for extra income.
Nonetheless, the mortgage company had begun the foreclosure process, and Glenda admitted
“we’re just buying time.”97 Such outcomes affected not only individual families, but entire
communities. Foreclosed and boarded-up homes depressed property values, encouraging a cycle
of further inequality between thriving and declining suburbs.
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Table 6.2: Total Tax Burden of Selected Nassau County Communities, 1970-1971
Median Income (1969)
Total Tax Burden, 1970-1971
(per $1,000 of assessed valuation)
Lawrence
27,413
159.12
East Williston
22,671
174.99
Garden City
21,221
154.12
Manhasset
19,864
130.69
Jericho
19,311
149.43
Great Neck
18,167
178.20
Merrick
17,518
167.10
Plainview
16,198
181.56
Nassau County Median
14,632
Uniondale
13,356
149.70
Levittown
13,083
181.64
East Massapequa
12,728
151.04
Farmingdale
12,585
195.07
New Cassel
12,013
196.16
Hempstead
11,504
179.72
Roosevelt
11,122
183.50
Inwood
9,444
152.30
Source: Income Data from Nassau County Data Book, 1974, 152-154; Tax data from New York State
Department of Audit And Control, Division Of Municipal Affairs, Bureau Of Municipal Research And
Statistics, Overall Real Property Tax Rates: Local Government In New York State: Fiscal Years Ended In 1971
(Albany: Bureau Of Research And Statistics), 22, 63-64.
Note: Total Tax Burden Included County, Town, City/Village (Where Applicable), And School District Taxes.

This was the context to public housing opposition in working class and low-income
suburban neighborhoods in the 1970s. Since the costs of such projects would be borne at the
most local level in a regressive tax structure, public housing had material consequences for those
living within its taxing districts. Nevertheless, policymakers continued to embrace the notion of
suburban affluence and sited their integration projects in these struggling suburbs. These
neighborhoods fit their conception of suburbs that should take their ‘fair share’ of the
metropolitan region’s poor. Just as ‘inner city’ and ‘urban’ became euphemisms for ‘black’ and
‘poor’, ‘fair share’ advocates viewed ‘suburb’ as a surrogate for middle class and white. This
obfuscation meant that the integrationist solution, low-income housing schemes, were not social
justice projects but an unfair burden weary governments placed on a small segment of the
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suburban population in an attempt to alleviate poverty through relocation. The fights that
ensued, including the three examples below that originated from the county, state, and federal
levels, illustrate the spatial battles over the poor that spatial solutions to poverty created.
HUD’s Open Communities program, intended to incentivize suburbs to build affordable
housing for the minority poor with grants and urban renewal funds when it was initially
conceived in 1969, targeted the Town of Oyster Bay on Long Island because it fit the ‘spatial
mismatch hypothesis,’ the same reason the NAACP chose Oyster Bay. Long Island, along with
twenty-five other SMSAs with similar conditions, had employment facilities under construction,
a projected labor shortage, and a lack of nearby housing for new workers. Though Nixon
curtailed the ambitious Open Communities program in 1970, the ideals of Open Communities
remained, and HUD continued to favor suburban applicants to further housing integration and
employment opportunity.98 The Town of Oyster Bay applied for HUD funding in the early
1970s to house its small but growing poverty population, most likely to counter the claims of the
NAACP. In 1973, the Town unveiled a 172-unit public housing project (30 units were for lowincome families) to be built in the small hamlet of East Massapequa, tucked into the very
southeast of the town. The location met all of HUD’s suburban objectives as initially outlined in
Open Communities. East Massapequa was majority white (sixteen percent of its residents were
black), had open space, lacked environmental hazards, and was situated in a Town with
“employment positions available to all types of applicants.”99 From the broad formulation of
suburban affluence, East Massapequa fit.
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But environmental data, the suburban location of the project, general census numbers and
Town-wide labor market statistics belied the more complex socioeconomic dynamics of East
Massapequa. The hamlet was the most diverse in the entire Town, and children attended the
half-black Amityville school district in neighboring Suffolk County. Nearly a fifth of the
district’s students were enrolled in Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), while thirteen percent of
school district families survived on incomes below $5,000, around the 1970 Federal poverty line
for a family of five. Lastly, the claim of employment opportunities did not ring true at the local
level. The Sunrise Mall, currently cutting retail jobs, was the only local employment center, and
project residents would otherwise have to travel over a mile for the nearest public bus or expend
between ten and fifteen percent of their yearly income to drive to any nearby large employment
hub.100
East Massapequa residents and Amityville school officials opposed the project from its
outset in 1974. Some residents expressed fear of crime and their rhetoric was steeped in
assumed behaviors of the poor. One resident warned that “someone is going to get mugged,” if
the project were built, engulfing the entire community in criminal activity. The West Amityville
Civic Association took out a full page ad in the Massapequa Post, sarcastically remarking that
“free trouble” came complimentary with low-income housing. Another resident countered the
Town’s claim that eighty-eight children would enter the school district since “sterilization is not
a requirement,” invoking the belief of the poor’s promiscuity.101 But residents also had concrete
reasons beyond their fears of the poor. As the official opposition report noted, the project
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contradicted HUD’s goals of integrating suburbs and increasing opportunity, and would instead
exacerbate segregation and isolation. By re-housing a proportion of Oyster Bay’s low-income
population (estimated to be sixty-five percent black) in this project, HUD would be lowering the
racial balance of other hamlets while tipping the black school population over fifty percent,
requiring an already burdened school district to now educate Oyster Bay’s low-income
population. The potential for neighborhood change already motivated blockbusters to scare
homeowners into moving, tipping the racial balance further. As both the school district and
residents made clear, the project contradicted the ideals of the Civil Rights Acts rather than
upholding them. The project would also isolate the poor from public amenities and job sites,
accomplishing little aside from offering improved and stable housing.102
If the project did little to integrate or improve opportunity, it nonetheless imposed costs
upon existing residents that would not be shared Town-wide. East Massapequa (parts of which
were also called ‘West Amityville’ prior to 1974), had the lowest median income in the entire
Town of Oyster Bay, but residents paid a yearly school tax around the median for school districts
in the area.103 HUD estimated that the project would add fifty children to the district at an
additional cost of $75,000, a conservative estimate given their low-income status. The Town
promised $10,000 from rents paid by residents, and project opponents calculated HUD would
only cover $8,700. The rest would be covered by existing residents, all while the Town removed
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taxable property that could provide $165,000 a year if privately developed.104 In light of the
fiscal costs imposed on the hamlet and school district, the projected increase in segregation, and
the isolation from jobs, residents basically wanted to know why East Massapequa was targeted.
If the Town and HUD were both committed to providing affordable housing to increase
integration and opportunity, as a Town-sponsored planning report claimed, why not place the
project in the “restrictive and exclusionary zoning of the north shore of the Town of Oyster
Bay”? Why not nearer to the larger employment centers in the center of Oyster Bay, in
Plainview, Hicksville, Bethpage, or Farmingdale, where public transportation could provide
mobility and schools were overwhelmingly segregated?105 Placing public housing in the suburbs
was no panacea to limited opportunity and segregation, as the housing debate in East
Massapequa made clear, but it would nonetheless add a fiscal burden to local residents.
A similar conflict occurred when Nassau County tried to build a public housing project in
Uniondale to house the county’s homeless population. The County had long avoided public
housing, but as the costs of welfare motels and private rentals strained the budget, and as
recipients caused friction within affected neighborhoods, Nassau County opted for public
housing. In 1968, the County unveiled a massive hotel, sports arena, and office/retail complex
for the former Mitchel Field air force base in Uniondale, once part of Long Island’s cradle of
aviation. The proposal included an eight building, 1,200-unit low and middle income housing
project. Norman Blankman, real estate developer from Sands Point on Long Island’s north
shore, was the chief advocate of the housing proposal. He argued that such housing was
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necessary to stem both the motel crisis and subsidized rentals “starting to decay whole
neighborhoods into eventual slums.”106 Blankman believed that the same process that created
inner city ghettoes was at work in the suburbs, namely that racism and the dynamics of the
housing market were producing concentrated poverty. In a 1972 meeting with the Nassau
County Board of Supervisors, he presented each board member a copy of the foundational study
of ‘ghetto formation,’ Gilbert Osofsky’s Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto. If housing was left to
the market, concentrated slums of poor people in decrepit conditions would ensue. Only planned
housing that met needs on a county-wide basis could reverse this ghetto-formation.107
This ‘County-wide’ solution actually concentrated the welfare population into Uniondale,
a lower-middle class hamlet with a nine percent black population. Blankman argued that the
housing would prevent a ghetto; a black Uniondale resident responded that “slums are made;
they don’t just occur, and the politicians are trying to make another Roosevelt in Uniondale.”108
To Uniondale residents, the County was forcing them to sacrifice their neighborhood so that
other hamlets would not become slums. Residents opposed the project for similar reasons as
East Massapequans, including race and class-based assumptions about property values, the
perceived behavioral deficiencies of welfare recipients, but also the fiscal concerns of the
Uniondale school district. Residents voted down the school budget three years in a row in the
late 1960s, and the school system operated with temporary classrooms to accommodate
increasing enrollment. The project would add over one hundred children to the district, and
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residents were unconvinced that Mitchel Field’s commercial space would increase tax revenues
by fifty percent as project advocates claimed.109
Deliberations over the housing proposal continued into 1970, and the fight reached a
fevered pitched when welfare activists staged a “move in,” inhabiting vacant military housing on
former air force base property. Sixteen families with twenty-seven children, all former residents
of a welfare motel, squatted in the homes, growing vegetables, cooking, and organizing into a
small-scale protest movement intent on securing adequate housing.110 The County did not
remove the squatters, but Uniondale homeowners and the school district blocked the twentyseven students from enrolling during the 1970-1971 school year. Uniondale was heavily
condemned for their actions, and a state judge ordered the school district to enroll the students
shortly after the start of the school year.111 Newsday columnist Martin Buskin called
Uniondale’s decision “one of the more sickening examples of the rotting civic conscience of
suburbia… [a] selfish, narrow demonstration of local control.”112 Residents did not feel this was
merely an issue of ‘local control,’ but a response to the costs the County was imposing upon
them, so that other hamlets, especially wealthier communities, did not have to bear any of the
costs associated with low-income residents. They framed their fight in spatial terms, rallying
around State Assemblyman and Uniondale resident Joseph Margiotta, who demanded that the
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welfare families be placed “on the North Shore,” the former Gold Coast and still home to Long
Island’s more affluent residents. Hempstead Town Supervisor Francis Purcell put it in blunter
terms: “why doesn’t Blankman go over to Sands Point, where he lives, and the density is about
1.1 persons per acre, and do this in his backyard?”113 The sentiment that the County was only
creating a ‘welfare ghetto’ to the detriment of the poor and the Uniondale community was
echoed repeatedly by residents, who believed scattering the poor across Long Island was a fairer
solution to both Uniondale and the recipients.114
The uproar (and political connections of Uniondale politician Joe Margiotta) pushed
incoming Republican County Executive Ralph Caso to remove any housing plans from Mitchel
Field’s future in 1970.115 Blankman, along with the Suburban Action Institute and Long Island
NAACP sued the County for denying racial minorities and low-income residents affordable
housing in 1972. Blankman demanded that “countywide interests…take precedence over those
of communities.”116 District Court Judge Mark Constantino disagreed and sided with Uniondale
residents. He admitted racial sentiments were a factor in the opposition, but so too was the “the
loss of revenue [public housing] causes and the increased burdens it places on the community's
resources.”117 Constantino judged this burden unfair “considering the availability of land
throughout Nassau County that could be used to construct multifamily housing.”118 In addition,
Judge Constantino recognized that low-income housing in Uniondale would exacerbate
segregation and not alleviate it. Mitchel Field was zoned within integrated Uniondale school
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district, and bordered the Village of Hempstead, the largest black village in Nassau County.119
As both Uniondale residents and Judge Constantino made clear, ‘integration’ was more complex
than a suburban location and county funds. Balkanized and sensitive tax structures made such
housing projects costly for school districts, and if the goal was to redistribute resources to the
poor, Uniondale residents wondered why they were the ones sacrificing their tax bases when
Long Island’s affluent, some of the wealthiest homeowners in the nation, were not sharing their
school and local service resources.
The question of who should give their ‘fair share’ was especially acute in Long Island’s
most impoverished suburbs like Wyandanch. The community already faced illegal tenancies, the
highest concentration of welfare recipients in the county, deteriorating housing stock, and a
majority of its student population were dependent on ADC. 120 Nonetheless, local taxpayers bore
the costs of such change, paying the eleventh highest school property tax rate in Suffolk County
(of seventy six total districts) in a hamlet with a poverty rate of ten percent.121 While black and
white homeowners organized into civic associations and were active on the school board, these
were ineffective tools, as chapter three illustrates. In contrast, low-income residents had new
avenues to shape Wyandanch in their interests. In 1970, over 100 residents and local clergy
established the Wyandanch Task Force in 1970, who wanted to ease the hamlet’s housing and
jobs crisis by “increasing industry, constructing low and moderate income housing, and
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strengthening Negro owned businesses in Wyandanch.”122 The Task Force, “firmly committed
to the concept of a separate black controlled community,” tied itself to the New York State
Urban Development Corporation (UDC).123 Formed in 1968 and empowered with the legal
ability to override local zoning ordinances across the state, the UDC, under the command of
planner Edward Logue, had unprecedented powers to construct low and middle-income housing
in the suburbs. Logue believed the UDC capable of taking a ‘metropolitan’ approach to urban
problems, executing “broad-gauged programs to deal with the urban crisis.”124 The UDC was to
take a ‘fair share’ approach, where no single community or school district bore a
disproportionate burden. Wyandanch’s suburban location and grassroots support fit within these
guidelines.125
The UDC proposed a 182-unit garden apartment complex for a vacant lot near
Wyandanch’s main thoroughfare, and while Reverend David Rooks, a central figure in the
campaign for the project, celebrated the effort as Wyandanch’s poor “trying to pull ourselves up
by our own bootstraps,” project opponents gathered 4,931 signatures against the apartments.126
Reverend Rooks blamed “outside whites” who “come into Wyandanch to stymie the efforts
Blacks were making,” but in reality black homeowners were central to the opposition.127 With
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no guarantees from the Town or County that the existing dilapidated housing would be
refurbished, homeowners feared the project would only attract more low-income residents, and
as African American civic association member Bernice Bostic put it, “we’ve already have
enough [welfare] recipients already.”128 Like residents in Uniondale and East Massapequa,
homeowners in Wyandanch and the surrounding communities wondered why Wyandanch was
targeted. Black homeowner Ella Williams exclaimed that “we are being asked to support
something when we are not able to. We are not elite. We have to work hard for what we have
now.”129 White homeowner Ann San Pedro of neighboring Deer Park likewise didn’t understand
“why they took Wyandanch in the first place. It’s a poor, low-income community.”130 Resident
opposition linked them to a broader state-wide protest centered in Westchester County against
the UDC zoning override powers, also concerned over property taxes, community stability, and
the overreaching power of state government.131
In response to the protests on Long Island and Westchester County, the New York State
Legislature stripped the UDC of its zoning override powers in 1973, and the Town of Babylon,
the most local land-use governing body, rejected the Wyandanch project by a 3-2 vote in August
of that same year.132 Reverend Rooks interpreted the decision along racial lines, citing ‘racial
attitudes’ for its defeat, and UDC President Edward J. Logue remarked, “I know of no other
instance where there has been such clearly demonstrated support for a development in a
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community…it is sad that the will of that community was disregarded.”133 A reporter for the
New York Amsterdam News decried the “death a miniature civil rights movement in
Wyandanch,” further proof that white suburbanites “do not intend to allow Blacks, and other
minorities to break out of the ghetto walls which the whites have built around them and spill over
into neatly manicured lawns and tree-lined avenues which such whites have designated as
belonging to them alone.”134 This binary black versus white narrative did not exist. Black
resident Bernice Bostic celebrated the Board’s decision, proclaiming “finally the taxpayers of
Wyandanch have been heard.”135 Black homeowners like Bostic were either ignored or written
off as white accomplices. In another smaller battle over a HUD-sponsored project in New
Cassel, black opponents of the project were accused of “thinking like whites” and being
“Oreos…Black on the outside but white inside,” all to stop “black people from getting their share
of housing.”136 But as Fred Meeks, one of those opponents remarked, it was unfair to be
“expected that [we] accept what can be considered as the accommodating, or compromise type
of measures with the pretense that these are in [our] best interest.”137
That African Americans should enable other African Americans of lower income to
reside in their communities to the detriment of school quality and taxes was a demand linked to
the logic of white suburban affluence, that ‘fair share’ should be imposed on the ‘suburbs’
without taking into account the complex reality of racial segregation in the suburbs or the fiscal
costs of such projects on communities whose collective incomes varied. In Wyandanch and
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Uniondale, homeowners were able to resist these housing demands, but East Massapequa’s
project was eventually built, largely because as one local resident argued, “the town fathers do
not fear the power of the East Massapequa vote” versus the electoral power of wealthier hamlets
in Oyster Bay.138 Thus, the logic of “fair share” led to an unanticipated result: racially mixed and
working class suburbs demanding that wealthy suburbs accept their own ‘fair share.’ HUD, the
UDC, and County housing efforts tried to solve a real housing need by demanding suburbia
redistribute their resources to the poor. But with only a superficial understanding of the
communities they targeted, advocates only offered added costs and little benefit to the
communities affected. Essentially, they were asking suburbanites to share their public resources
without offering proposals to grow the local economy or increase the incomes of the new
inhabitants so they could contribute to the hamlet’s tax base. And since all of this was imposed
upon suburbs within a balkanized tax structure and upon suburbanites already paying high taxes
for services in a period of rising unemployment and inflation, residents opposed these attacks on
their communities, incomes, property values, and public resources, namely schools. Opponents
deployed “fair share” logic, arguing that other affluent suburban hamlets could easily share their
resources. This was as much an outcome of the framing of ‘fair share’ itself as it was the
‘backlash’ against housing policy, framed in binary and spatial terms. Of course, though
Wyandanch and Uniondale homeowners defeated the projects, the challenge of lowering taxes
and poverty remained. Just as housing advocates looked for new ways to promote spatial equity,
project opponents would still “have to take upon themselves the unwelcome burden of coming
up with something better.”139
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Conclusion
In 1975, the UDC went bankrupt, and its mission re-oriented towards economic
development projects. That same year, the NAACP dropped its suit against the Town of Oyster
Bay and prioritized a ‘fair share’ lawsuit in New Jersey.140 Two years later, HUD’s focus on
suburban integration was sidelined in favor of urban revitalization.141 Interpreted on its own
terms, dispersing the poor and integrating the suburbs was a noble effort to break down an
injustice inscribed into the very fabric of America’s urban and suburban neighborhoods. And
suburban determination to thwart integration, along with the politicians who chose to secure the
suburban vote, defeated these efforts in the 1970s. But the dispersal approach was flawed
because it gave primacy to race and operated within the dualisms of suburb and city, white and
black, affluent and poor. None of these fit the realities of suburban Long Island. The dispersal
advocates assumed the suburbs offered jobs that could lift the poor out of unemployment and
poverty. They ignored job loss occurring in the suburbs, and more importantly the metropolitan
shift from industry to services. Though Long Island successfully transitioned to a service
economy, the change benefitted skilled workers. Unskilled workers, and by the 1970s, industrial
laborers more broadly, faced a labor market of low wage jobs or joblessness. Even the modest
integration projects that sought to alleviate local suburban housing problems ignored the fiscal
crisis tied to this rising inequality between suburbanites and between suburbs, as the property
tax-based structure was overwhelmed by stagnating incomes, rising poverty, and growing service
demands in fragmented local jurisdictions. As Manuel Pastor argues, “suburbs were never
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constructed to deal with such overwhelming poverty and economic challenges – they were meant
to be symbols of success, not markers of distress.”142 The dualist approach ignored the labor
market and thus undermined the moral demand that suburbs take their ‘fair share’ of poverty.
Like the War on Poverty, the Kerner Commission’s diagnosis of America’s social ills, a
reflection of academic research and the impetus for activism, was predicated on an assumption of
suburban affluence. The urban/suburban dualism framed the nation’s problems in spatial terms.
It was about where jobs and prosperity went, not what undergirded postwar growth. And racist
housing practices were the obstacle to overcome, not joblessness and low-wages. The challenges
that Long Island’s working class population faced were disregarded in this formulation. But
cities and suburbs shared in regional economic trends, if unequally, and all experienced the
national transformation from industrial to post-industrial services with its concomitant growth of
inequality. Both the urban and suburban poor needed remunerative employment, regardless of
their metropolitan residence.
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Conclusion

Though christened an ‘affluent’ suburb, Long Island’s economy resembled the rest of the
nation in the 1970s, a decade plagued with three recessions where the average American ended
up poorer than they began.1 Productivity outpaced wages by two-thirds, real wages declined for
the poorest third of families, and the proportion of Long Islanders living near poverty grew by a
fifth despite falling national and elderly poverty rates during the decade.2 Though Nassau was
the fastest growing county in the 1950s, and Suffolk the fastest in the 1960s, from 1970-1980,
Long Island recorded the smallest population increase in census history (one percent), and for the
first time, Nassau County’s population actually dropped (eight percent).3 It was the end of an
era. A local union official admitted in 1978, “I was a lot like other people who felt because of
our growth through the ‘50s that Long Island would always prosper and grow, but our economic
expansion has come to a halt. Considering our present unemployment figures and high costs, I
have very little optimism for the immediate future of Long Island.”4
The bleak figures illustrate the unravelling of the ‘Great Compression’ that Long Island
embodied in the two decades after World War II. Before the war, Long Island was dependent on
the service needs of New York City’s middle class and industrial elite. The region offered
mainly low-wage and precarious employment to its working class population, who were housed
in sub-standard dwellings. The war introduced military contracts that transformed the region’s
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small aviation manufacturers into massive employers and turned Long Island into a haven for the
working class. Military spending continued during the Cold War, and along with federal housing
subsidies, made mass suburbanization possible. Defense contracts not only provided jobs, but
raised wages in competing sectors, not to mention the multiplier effects that reverberated through
the private economy. Federal defense outlays nevertheless served military ends, not unskilled
workers. Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, contracts favored skilled technicians and
engineers, and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s budget changes in the 1960s further
limited the employment benefits of defense spending on Long Island. As a result, highly trained
and educated residents enjoyed robust job opportunities while the unskilled faced declining
prospects. By the 1970s, Long Island’s working class relied on low-wage jobs in services or
footloose factories. The consequences were felt among families and the communities where they
lived.
Predictably, African Americans’ fortunes on Long Island were tied to the same
developments. Southern migrants of the Great Migration struggled in the precarious labor
market of the Roaring Twenties and Depression. Wartime contracts, which included fair
employment provisions, and tight employment conditions benefitted black workers, who briefly
entered the industrial working class. But in the fifteen years following the war, minority hiring
commitments and federal enforcement were weak, and the Long Island’s aircraft manufacturers
did not hire black workers in large numbers. Few unskilled black Long Islanders could use the
region’s defense manufacturers for upward mobility. Left to the region’s private economy,
African Americans were the first to be exposed to the labor market twist occurring on Long
Island and nation-wide. While activists dismantled the racial barriers in defense by the 1960s,
‘aerospace’ manufacturers were hiring engineers, not operatives. Black suburbanites with
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degrees and impressive resumes used defense or the region’s budding service sector to climb into
the middle class, and they narrowed Long Island’s racial income disparity.5 But an equally large
cohort of African Americans had insufficient educational credentials and less skilled
backgrounds, and they were disproportionately on the losing side of the employment divide. In
the postwar period, race declined in significance, while skills became more important. This was
a consequence of policy, including federal policy affecting manufacturing. And out of this, the
median black/white wage gap closed while intra-race inequality increased between the black
haves and the black have-nots.
If the significance of race declined in the labor market, it still mattered in housing.
Discriminatory policy and prejudicial practice produced racially disparate suburbs, with fewer
choices for black than white homebuyers. This did not mean racially unequal suburbs were
inevitable however, particularly in the short-term. When a rising black middle class inhabited
black suburbia, neighborhoods thrived in spite of segregation. Limited supply inflated housing
prices and the discriminatory mortgage market pushed black homebuyers to accept inferior
loans, but progress was possible. As poor enclaves were demolished and low-income housing
opportunity narrowed, segregation provided a wedge to house the poor in middle class hamlets,
making ‘black’ suburbia distinct from ‘white’ beyond the skin color of residents, including
socioeconomic makeup, school quality, and community tensions. And as intra-race inequality
rose in the 1970s, segregation’s negative consequences intensified. While Long Island
experienced little overall population growth, its black population expanded by a third. New
middle-class migrants closed the racial income gap further, while segregation forced them into
the same communities established three decades prior. With them arrived a new cohort of the
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poor, and they concentrated in the same neighborhoods, in Roosevelt, New Cassel, Freeport and
Hempstead in Nassau County, or Central Islip, Mastic-Shirley, and Bay Shore in Suffolk.6 And
both middle-class and poor moved next to downwardly mobile black families in the 1970s,
“those losing their jobs and those not being able to find ones.” These were the neighbors who
“replaced the once stable homeowners” as North Amityville resident Lenny Canton recalled.7
These conditions, in the context of Long Island’s fragmented local jurisdictions,
produced a ‘suburban crisis’ in Long Island’s largest black suburbs by the 1980s. Though black
hamlets never lost their ‘middle-class’ buffer, ‘role model’ neighbors couldn’t prevent fiscallystarved school districts or desperate individuals from entering the underground economy.8 Local
property taxes no longer adequately funded school districts, limiting educational quality across
black suburbia. While Roosevelt’s district was desegregated in 1964, housing segregation and
the county’s second highest poverty rate turned Roosevelt’s schools 99.7 percent minority with
the highest proportion of costs devoted to non-operational and special education needs by the
1990s. Only four of 130 graduates obtained a New York State Regent’s diploma in 1990. The
state put the district under close supervision, and in 2002, the legislature passed a law permitting
state takeover of the district, the first and so far only instance where Albany took direct control
over a local school.9 Drugs and crime likewise stalked these hamlets. The heroin trade reached
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Long Island in the early 1970s, and by the 1980s local police and homeowners were fighting
open-air drug markets.10 Roosevelt had Nassau Road, Wyandanch’s dealers peddled their wares
on the corner of Straight Path and Booker Avenue, New Cassel’s market operated along Prospect
Avenue, and a strip mall at the corner of Albany Avenue and Great Neck Road in North
Amityville was regionally known as “the corner.” These enclaves, abutting single-family homes
and neighborhood shopping centers, became the distribution centers for the drug needs of two
million suburbanites.11
By the 1980s, these communities experienced the cumulative effects of housing
segregation’s long-term costs: decreased property values, inferior schools, and concentrated
poverty. The hardship originated in the simple reality that despite suburban residence, the black
poor and working class did not find greater job prospects or opportunity for upward mobility.
The suburbs were not the land of opportunity scholars, activists, and the public purported them to
be. The dominant view of metropolitan problems and that of the black poor, the urban/suburban
divide and the assumption of affluence, could not solve the problems of black suburbanites.
Anti-poverty warriors and housing integrationists of the 1960s and early 1970s both believed
suburbia’s prosperity would absorb the poor and viewed housing segregation as the great
obstacle to racial equality. As this dissertation contends, the benefits of the suburban job market
and housing integration were dubious without confronting the labor market that crossed
municipal boundaries or the federal abandonment of full employment policy. Housing
integration would surely expand spatial mobility to those already able to live in suburbia; solving
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black poverty and unemployment, whose effect reverberated through communities, was a
question of jobs.
Historians continue to present the postwar suburb as an exclusive affluent ‘space’ and the
urban/suburban divide, the metropolitan and spatial redistribution of jobs, people, and tax
dollars, as the critical factor in urban decay and broader inequality after World War II.12
Segregation was the major barrier, a ‘New American Dilemma,’ distinct from explicit Jim Crow
laws because segregation was supported by “structures…imbedded in the built environment”
according to Matthew Lassiter.13 And therefore the failure to integrate housing and open the
suburbs to the poor during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pivotal years when integration
reached the national agenda, was a ‘lost goal’ to combat inequality in the twentieth century.
Charles Lamb contends that “no point in American history was as vital” as the years following
the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.14 The failure of integration, from the White House
down to local activists, closed the door on racial equality for the century, with dire consequences.
This interpretation falls into the same narrow understanding of metropolitan problems as activists
of the time, which obscures the North Amityvilles, Wyandanches, Roosevelts, and New Cassels,
whose challenges had more in common with urban neighborhoods than their suburban location
might suggest. There is limited analytical utility to viewing postwar problems in terms of
housing segregation, which favors the economy’s spatial transformations over its broader
temporal and structural changes, and uses racial disparities as the “the default frame for
characterizing inequality.”15 This is especially true for the black suburban poor, because even if
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suburbia was thriving or weathering recessions, they did not necessarily benefit despite their
physical proximity.
This points to a different ‘lost goal’ from the 1960s and early 1970s, apparent in Long
Island’s history when defense workers demanded peacetime spending, when War on Poverty
activists called for jobs with living wages, when civil rights organizations urged fair hiring, or
when a county executive proposed a right to a job. All of this was inflected through Long
Island’s particular job landscape, with over a hundred-thousand state-subsidized positions in
aerospace. But they were nonetheless microcosms of national debates, including those over
deindustrialization, automation, the widening chasm between highly paid service jobs versus
low-wage fleeting jobs, racial disparities in employment, and anti-poverty policy. Most
importantly, these were suburbanites who viewed these as suburban issues. Urban historians
would benefit from incorporating these suburban concerns and the suburban economy into their
studies, integrating the suburbs into the broader transition from the ‘Age of Compression’ to the
‘Age of Inequality’ in a unified way the urban/suburban framework cannot.16
Now that most of the nation’s poor live in the suburbs as of the 2010 census, this history
is more relevant than ever.17 Contemporary policy proscriptions, including renewed calls for
urban-suburban regional governments, dispersed public housing, reformed welfare policies that
consider specifically ‘suburban’ problems, and inner-city development programs to implement in
suburbs, while laudable, are still premised in spatial terms.18 As David Imbroscio argues, with
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fewer ‘good’ suburbs available, the benefits of greater spatial mobility are less clear than they
were fifty years ago.19 State support for jobs, including public jobs, is an alternative that does
not require moving people to the current ‘right place’ in an ever-changing economy. It creates a
stronger job market, as it did decades ago on Long Island. The suburb’s postwar history
illustrates that broad upward mobility was built on mass job opportunity, including publiclysubsidized employment. Of course, this was war spending, a controversial budget necessitated
by the unique circumstances of the Cold War. Nevertheless, defense spending was also infused
by the nation’s commitment to full employment. It is not so much a question of finding a
substitute for defense jobs as rediscovering this responsibility, one that infused the nation’s ‘Age
of Compression’ and of its physical embodiment, Long Island.
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